| Abstract |
Command agriculture has to be contextualised against a background of the collapse of agriculture since 2000, and of epidemic corruption and inefficiency not only in this sector, but throughout the government policies in Zimbabwe. The country has faced a food deficit for several consecutive years, and the need to regain credibility for the land invasions, as well as fears of food riots, and the desire to be less dependent on international aid for reasons of national pride and sovereignty, all provide partial motives for Command Agriculture. Zimbabwe is becoming increasingly militarised as a State, and the disastrous "Operation Murambatsvina" and "Operation Garikai" were both undertaken with the collaboration of the army. The army has been in control of food distribution for several years now, via control of Grain Marketing Board sales, the only source of affordable maize in rural areas. Placing the army increasingly in control of food production via "Operation Taguta/Sisuthi" is the next logical step for government in the militarization of the State, and is a furtherance of the patronage of the army. Giving the army effective control over large aspects of agriculture is keeping soldiers who might otherwise get bored and angry at their poor conditions, active and fed. |
