Previous initiatives to bring peace to Angola, 'lessons learnt' and recommendations for the future

Rev. Daniel Ntoni Nzinga

I worked for the World Council of Churches from 1993 until 1994 as the international co-ordinator of the Ecumenical Monitoring Programme in South Africa (EMPSA) and from 1995 until 1997 as a consultant for International Affairs and co-ordinator in a special programme on Africa called "the reconstruction of Africa". The programme dealt with the problem of violence, especially political violence, in South Africa and other southern African countries such as Mozambique, Angola, and also Liberia and Sierra Leone. I left the World Council of Churches when the programme finished and the work was handed over to the countries where we were working.

I was asked to talk about the lessons provided by previous peace processes and to make some recommendations that could be useful in the future. First, I would like to share with you a definition of peace held by Angolans, and especially by the group I am representing here (the Angolan Group for Reflection on Peace, GARP). We don't define it simply as being prepared to live side by side; we don't define peace as the absence of armed conflict; and we don't define peace as simply silencing the weapons. Unfortunately, these three ideas have always been the foundations of the many agreements reached in Angola, these three ideas have, in one way or another, set the tone for the peace processes that have occurred.

In colonial times, there was peace on the basis of one of the definitions I mentioned just now. In colonial times, one of the rules of the game was that everybody had to live side by side. Angola, as a colonial state, was founded on this basis. People had to carry on living without looking at what was happening, without their consent, around them. As the previous speaker said, the country's identity was created on these terms. The peoples who formed the emerging Angolan nation did not choose to be Angolans but were forced to be Angolans at gunpoint. The lands that today are called Angola were not integrated into the Angolan state with the consent of the people, the people that lived there, this was done at gunpoint. People were forced to live together. And that's the way it has continued. We have an old saying in Kikongo, my language, and I'll share it with you: "Ye ntakudi a mbizi, ye ntubi a matadi mutu kavondi salu kiankweno". Two children went to the river. One went to fish and the other wanted to spend his time throwing stones into the water. They were children, and that's when you learn about living in society. Each did what they wanted; one of them continued to throw stones into the river without interfering with the fishing of his friend. Generally, our elders told us that it was impossible to avoid conflicts. Usually, whoever goes fishing is not only fishing for themselves, because for us in Africa, in my time, fishing was not a sport. We went fishing to get something to eat. All this about everybody living side by side presents this danger. As I already said, the agreements themselves created problems and, at this point, I will get back to commenting on the lessons to be learned and also on the causes of the problems.

In Angola, there is a national conflict. This is our position in GARP. This national conflict is a series of conflicts that were created throughout our history. The previous speaker mentioned the question of identity as one of those problems. Here, I just want to take the example of Cabinda. We have a problem with Cabinda that was not the doing of the post-independence State. As I already said, certain things have occurred that have made Angolans into what we are today. Often, when people talk about the war in Angola, either at a national level or at an international level, they don't include the armed confrontations in Cabinda as part of the problem. UNITA is not the only armed group fighting the Angolan government and if we're not careful, it won't be the last.

In addition to the problems created by colonialism, we have to recognise that we ourselves created our own problems after 11 November 1975, the date held to be the date of Angolan independence. We went to Alvor after the overthrow of the Fascist government in Portugal, after the Portuguese people accepted that the peoples of Africa deserved their independence, deserved to decide their own destinies. We went to Alvor divided, we Angolans, and we left Alvor even more divided. For me and for the Angolan Group for Reflection on Peace, this was a very important lesson. When we raise the issue of peace and development, we need unity, the unity of Angolans.

Then, in 1991, came the signature of what I would call the second peace agreement, at Bicesse. It is interesting because during the weekend which followed the signing of that agreement, I was here in the Netherlands, in Amsterdam, at a conference which I think was organised by the Eduardo Mondlane Foundation, to discuss what should happen in Angola after Bicesse. I am very sorry that I didn't have the ideas then that I have now; Bicesse only affirmed the rights of the most powerful, which was the same as what happened at the time of Angolan independence. Bicesse was an agreement negotiated and signed by those considered to be the most powerful. This is a lesson that we should take into account when thinking what direction we want to go in. Because, if you are going to accept such a principle, it makes the exclusion of others legitimate, it is the politics of exclusion. This did not help us achieve the peace that the country needed.

Later, there were elections, but these elections were decided by the number of bullets fired rather than the number of votes cast. I am talking about the 1992 elections, the first elections in the lives of all Angolans. Because in the 500 years that we lived with the Portuguese, there were never any elections. The people were never asked to give their consent to anything. The first time was in 1992. But as these elections were not well-prepared, the people themselves were not well-prepared for change. The haste to organise the elections made it easy for the political leaders to resort to bullets. It was a repeat performance of what took place in 1975, when independence was declared. Our independence did not come, as in other African countries, with a public declaration by the people, but in a hail of bullets.

Then there was Lusaka. Unfortunately, Lusaka did not learn the lessons of either Alvor or Bicesse. It ratified another important feature of the situation: the new elitism and the principle of "might is right". Only those bearing arms were represented at Lusaka. They were the only ones who were invited to sit around the table. As far as we were concerned, this could not result in change, because there had been no preparations for change. It could not change anything because the process itself, and here I am talking about the process as well as the results of Lusaka, condoned the principles of exclusion and "might is right". As the process was not inclusive, as the process did not take into account the lessons of the past, Lusaka was also a failure.

I would like to comment on the role played by the international community. The international community went along with this way of thinking and, in fact, it was the international community that directed the negotiations. If we are honest, we would have to say that it was the representative of the international community that drafted the agreement which we know as the Lusaka protocol. I would go so far as to say that the Lusaka protocol did not express the aspirations of the Angolans because they did not participate. The result was that the people did not feel any ownership of the peace process or results.

Another problem was that the people, as well as not participating in the negotiations, were not associated with the implementation of the agreement itself, and so there were violations of the agreement. For example, you have an area called Cazombo, a long way from Luanda. The Joint Commission that was implementing and monitoring the agreement was based in Luanda. It took a long time for information to get from Cazombo to Luanda. It took a long time for the joint commission to send investigators to the area and to verify the information it was receiving. By the time that particular investigation was completed, more violations had already occurred, because the population in that area was not party to the agreement

The final lesson that I wanted to mention has to do with what I call the war economy. The previous speaker talked about the wealth factor – Angola is a rich country in economic and even social terms. But in human terms, Angolans are very poor. The agreements that have been signed have made some people rich. You have all read reports about the Congo (DRC): money badly used even by the international community representatives in the country. Well, many Angolans are becoming rich. When I use the word many, I don't mean to say that most Angolans are becoming rich, it is a small elite that is getting rich.

In relation to this I should also mention the companies, especially the foreign companies, that are taking advantage of the organised disorder of the country today to get as much as they can from the country. Because the Angolan government and its institutions are incapable of properly monitoring or managing the activities of these companies. At the same time, because of the war, the Angolan government is constantly being forced to pass laws and adopt policies that favour these foreign companies, in a way they would not even expect in their countries of origin.

What does it all mean, what can we do? In the first place, I want to ask you all to work together in an international campaign for an immediate cease-fire in Angola. We can't do anything until the weapons have been silenced. I don't mean to say that silencing the weapons will necessarily mean peace, but I am saying that we must have an immediate cease-fire throughout the country. If you have read the peace manifesto that we published in July, you will know that this was the first point of that manifesto and it still is. We demand an immediate cease-fire and we call on the whole international community to join us in this demand. I said this two weeks ago in South Africa: during the struggle against apartheid, the whole world joined together to demand the end of racist oppression. We are calling on you to do this because we know that you can do this. We ask you to stand up and be counted along with us Angolans in demanding an immediate cease-fire.

Second, we want to see the initiation of conversations aimed at launching an inclusive peace process. An inclusive process in terms of what it covers, because the war in Angola is not the problem, the war is a symptom of the problem. We have got to talk about all these problems, some of which my colleague has already referred to.

Third, the war has created a tragedy in Angola. The very culture that is the main cause of war has resulted in a tragedy in Angola. We have millions of human beings who need immediate help. So in addition to the demand for an immediate cease-fire, we want assistance for the most needy victims. We know that the international community has the capacity to act when it wants to. We have seen what it did in Bosnia, Kosovo and other parts of Europe when crises and humanitarian disasters have occurred. There is a disaster taking place today in Angola. With tears in my eyes, I have to say I am sorry we have not received the same attention.

The fourth point is that for Angola to be able to transform itself from a war to a lasting peace, we need an organised civil society. Because of everything that has happened in our history, we have not found it easy to organise civil society. Now non-governmental organisations have begun to emerge, such as ADRA as represented by my colleague, and many others. The working groups that are being established in one way or another represent this expression of the will of the people to solve this crisis. Our society needs the support of the international community. We call upon the countries of Europe, the Netherlands where we are today, to not hide behind diplomatic rules and principles when we need you to support us, and to support Angolan civil society. It has to be strengthened, it has to be helped to organise itself, to work in a concerted fashion, because it is only then that we will be able to solve the crisis.

Finally, if we are going to build a peace process in Angola, we need to create peace. The English have a better way of putting it: "to have a peace process we need to create the process itself". What should be the role of the international community? The international community should help us first to create peace and only later send people to monitor the peace. There's no point having peace monitors where there is no peace. We do not need a group to come here and count the number of dead people, but we do need you to prevent the unnecessary deaths of Angolans.

My final recommendation: help us develop an authentic and credible peace agenda. These are the tasks that we decided to carry out and with your support we hope we will manage to bring peace to the country, especially as we approach the new millennium.

Thank you.

Rev. Daniel Ntoni Nzinga is co-ordinator of the Angolan Group for Reflection on Peace (GARP).