

DISCUSSION PAPER 16

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**The New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
– African Perspectives**

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Preface

From 24 to 26 February 2002, the Hanns Seidel Foundation, based in Germany, came together in Dar es Salaam with African counterparts for its annual workshop. The theme of the workshop was “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (NEPAD). Participants came from nine African countries and were involved in various projects related to developmental activities on different levels.

Some of the contributions to the workshop are presented in this Discussion Paper in slightly revised form so as to make them accessible to a wider audience. They document various efforts to come to terms with a new programme that was introduced and propagated by the political leaders of the continent as part of their objective to overcome its further marginalisation. Their publication continues the Institute’s coverage of NEPAD-related issues.

Henning Melber

Uppsala, April 2002

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) – Scope and Perspectives

*Henning Melber**

This chapter presents a preliminary assessment of recent efforts to strengthen Africa's profile and role in the international community. It focuses on a programmatic policy document aiming to define a far-reaching common denominator for African states in their collective developmental aspirations within the context of globalisation.

FROM THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE TO NEPAD

Current efforts to identify common aims and objectives among African countries by means of a policy document must be directly tied to the proactive role played by the South African president, Thabo Mbeki. With the democratic transition in South Africa, the country emerged during the second half of the 1990s as a relevant new political factor on the continent, either actively assuming or sometimes passively receiving a leadership role far beyond its borders.

It was Thabo Mbeki who, through the exercise of considerable personal initiative, coined the catchphrase "African Renaissance" during the late 1990s. This concept is to some extent rooted in different elements of earlier philosophical discourses on Pan Africanism, Negritude, Ubuntu and Black Consciousness. While the concept failed to materialise as a fully fledged and concise new paradigm, it managed to rally policy-makers, bureaucrats and intellectuals alike behind the not so new but still highly emotional and culturally, psychologically and politically relevant notion of African self-respect, dignity and pride based on previous achievements.

The African Renaissance project contributed in this important way to the revitalisation of values considered and appreciated as both genuinely African and human (in the sense of "civilised" as opposed to the derogatory views of "primitive"). It failed (or maybe was never intended) to establish a political concept and instrumental strategy in applied policy matters, but it managed to consolidate a philosophical foundation.

The translation of the African Renaissance into policy concepts and programmes to some extent led to the gradual phasing out of the term itself within the predominantly political public discourse. Its systematic introduction into the international arena may be dated to the briefing on the "Millennium Africa Renaissance Programme" (MAP) provided by President Mbeki to the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos on 28 January 2001. In his presentation, he qualified MAP as "a declaration of a firm commitment by African leaders to take ownership and

* This text is a considerably updated version of an earlier paper published as "The New African Initiative and the African Union. A Preliminary Assessment and Documentation." Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute 2001 (Current African Issues, No. 25). For detailed and comprehensive references see also by the same author further analyses on NEPAD in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 47, 4, April 2002 and *Forum for Development Studies* 29, 2, 2002.

responsibility for the sustainable economic development of the continent.” President Mbeki was supported by his colleagues Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Ben Mkapa of Tanzania and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal.

At the Conference of Ministers of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Algiers (8–10 May 2001) the South African government presented the “Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme” (Pretoria, March 2001). On that occasion, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade presented the “Omega Plan for Africa” and UNECA presented a “Compact for African Recovery.” It was decided that the documents should be tabled in a merged version to the OAU Summit in Lusaka. The final draft was adopted by the Heads of State at their Summit meeting on 11 July 2001 as “A New African Initiative” (NAI). Subsequently, on 23 October 2001 after a meeting in Abuja of an Implementation Committee of Heads of State, the modified document was renamed as “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (NEPAD).

This label has stuck to an initiative that seeks acknowledgement beyond the continent. NEPAD has had an office at the Development Bank of Southern Africa in Midrand since October 2001. President Thabo Mbeki’s economic advisor Wiseman Nkhulu has acted as the initial chief operating officer. Its steering committee consists of South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal and Egypt, these being the five states that have been involved in the initiative since its early stages. They have been joined by another ten African states on an Implementation Committee.

ESSENTIALS OF NEPAD

In its Introduction, NEPAD emphasises the “common vision and a firm and shared conviction” of African leaders to anchor the programme in “the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world” (paragraph 1). NEPAD goes on to claim that, “African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and political leadership” (paragraph 7). With reference to the continent’s painful historical experience of impoverishment it postulates as a lesson that “Africans must not be wards of benevolent guardians; rather they must be the architects of their own sustained upliftment” (paragraph 27). This latter emphasises the ownership claim previously articulated by Thabo Mbeki, and defines “a new framework of interaction with the rest of the world ... based on the agenda set by African peoples through their own initiatives and of their own volition, to shape their own destiny” (paragraph 48).

For the achievement of these objectives, the African leaders declare joint responsibility for the following catalogue of identified goals and tasks (paragraph 49):

- Strengthen mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution and ensure that they are used to restore and maintain peace;
- Promote and protect democracy and human rights by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and participative governance;

- Restore and maintain macroeconomic stability by developing standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies and appropriate institutional frameworks;
- Institute transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and auditing of private companies and the public sector;
- Revitalise and extend the provision of education, technical training and health services (with priority to HIV/Aids, malaria and other communicable diseases);
- Promote the role of women in social and economic development;
- Build the capacity of the states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework and maintain law and order; and
- Promote the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification.

Preconditions for sustainable development are identified in three areas: 1) peace, security, democracy and good governance (paragraphs 71–85); 2) economic and corporate governance, with a focus on public finance management (paragraphs 86–92); and 3) sub-regional and regional approaches (paragraphs 93–8). The long-term objectives single out poverty eradication and the promotion of the role of women (paragraph 67). The goals include an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate above 7 per cent for the next 15 years and fulfilment of the agreed International Development Goals (IDGs) (paragraph 68). This sounds like an unrealistic shopping basket, based on “wishful thinking.” NEPAD itself stresses, “that unless something new and radical is done, Africa will not achieve the IDGs and the 7 per cent annual GDP growth rate” (paragraph 70). While this sounds more down to earth, the document fails to spell out clearly enough what it considers as the new and radical essentials in its approach.

Considerable space is devoted to the further specification of objectives and measures to be taken to realise the targets within the priority sectors (“Mobilising Resources”). A rather sobering but realistic assessment begins this discussion. To achieve the target 7 per cent annual growth rate, “Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of 12 per cent of its GDP, or US \$64 billion” (paragraph 147). The elements needed to achieve this are identified as increased domestic savings, improved public revenue collection, and, most importantly, funds from outside the continent. Thus, NEPAD “focuses on debt reduction and ODA as complementary external resources required in the short to medium term, and addresses private capital flows as a longer-term concern” (*ibid.*). Notwithstanding these declarations, the challenges remain to achieving results that will contribute meaningfully to sustainable development.

As Thabo Mbeki himself put it when opening the NEPAD Work-in-Progress Review Workshop in January 2002:

We now have an urgent responsibility to develop implementable plans, to ensure that the excellent programmes and policies that exist on paper succeed in practice, that African technical expertise from within Africa and the diaspora is harnessed to convert those programmes and policies into practical and implementable programmes and projects, that the African people come to own these programmes as belonging to them.

SCOPE OF NEPAD

The question remains, however, to what extent current African efforts can convince the outside world, in particular the OECD states, that support for this initiative is a necessary acknowledgement of the continent's problems and a contribution to their solution. Initial reactions from industrialised countries suggested appreciation of the initiative and the "selling strategy" pursued by Thabo Mbeki and his MAP/NAI team during the G8 meeting in August 2001 in Genoa. One of the concrete results of that meeting was the agreement by the heads of government to appoint special advisors in each of their countries. These have been tasked with drafting proposals to support the initiative, and the proposals will be discussed at the next G8 Summit, in June 2002 in Canada.

But more recent events on and since 11 September 2001 have attracted the attention of the powerful stakeholders in world politics and the global economy, and have not improved the overall climate for publicising and addressing the challenges facing the already marginalised African continent. The World Economic Forum, which moved from Davos to New York for its annual meeting at the end of January/early February this year, was supposed to be a platform for the African leaders' new offensive to promote their initiative. Instead, the financial collapse of Argentina emerged as the dominating issue in North-South relations.

But in addition to attracting the necessary international attention and support, NEPAD has to take account of another relevant factor. The original drafting process came to an end with the adoption of the official policy document by the African Heads of States at their OAU Summit in Lusaka from 9–11 July 2001. The parallel final transformation of the OAU into an AU simultaneously created an additional dimension that will have a future impact on NEPAD.

IMPACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION

The ambitious plans of the AU try to realise ideas already advocated in the early 1960s by Pan Africanists such as the late Kwame Nkrumah. They include the establishment of an African Parliament, a Court of Justice and an Economic, Social and Cultural Council – all institutions that, if taken seriously, would contribute to a stronger continental authority at the expense of the principle of unabated national sovereignty. It is premature to conclude if and to what extent a shift of paradigm will materialise. Given the track record of postcolonial policies on the continent, however, and the primacy afforded by national governments to the exercise their autonomous rule, doubts remain concerning a general political consensus and will to implement such far-reaching possibilities for intervention in the internal affairs of member states. But intervention is also a relevant ingredient in the approach advocated in NEPAD, in which collective responsibility is emphasised as a necessary aspect of meeting development challenges.

Indications of the degree of commitment to the sort of new approach suggested by NEPAD can be gleaned by comparing the Preliminary Draft Treaty Establishing

the African Union with the ultimately adopted Constitutive Act of the African Union. This is a rather revealing and sobering exercise. The Objectives stated in Article 3 still make reference to the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent, but the obligation “to put an end to the scourge of conflicts and their devastating consequences” has been deleted. The Principles under Article 4 lack explicit references to “the respect of individual and collective freedoms, and the holding of free and fair elections,” “tolerance, mutual understanding and respect for the rights of persons belonging to minority groups,” as well as to “accountability and transparency in governance and combating of corruption.”

There is the feeling that the political representatives of OAU member states find it difficult to pay even lip service to certain issues. Instead of closing loopholes, some of them seem to have been intentionally retained. The omission of explicit reference to corruption from the final AU Constitution collides with the intentions expressed in NEPAD. In article 4(g), the AU on the one hand confirms the adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. On the other hand, article 4(h) concedes “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly – in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” This is a far cry from the possibility of enhancing commitment to “good governance” as postulated by NEPAD, and can hardly be seen as a suitable enforcement strategy. The shift of emphasis in the AU from mainly individual national responsibility towards increased collective continental responsibility seems to support the approach advocated by NEPAD, but doubts must remain about the degree of genuine commitment when African leaders at times still apply somewhat undemocratic ways and means to maintaining power and control.

CRITICAL ISSUES FOR NEPAD

It would be premature to draw final conclusions at this early stage in the revision of paradigms and parameters of African policy and development strategy. There seem to be as many sceptical as supportive commentators on the issues at stake. Critical assessments of NEPAD have pointed out that it blends nicely into the neo-liberal globalisation mainstream and is fully in line with the present South African government’s economic strategy of seeking closer integration into the dominant structures of the world economy. This is the main concern expressed by Patrick Bond of the University of the Western Cape. He maintains that, “like all top-down policy formulation, Nepad reeks of technicism, a scent which could dissipate partially if exposed to the fires of popular debate, protest and participation. But that would risk the transformation of Nepad into a partnership with Africans themselves.” Similar critical suspicions of the global policy orientation have been expressed about the AU, which, according to an editorial in a recent issue of the *Review of African Political Economy* “does not signal isolationism and withdrawal from the forces of globalisation, but rather a form of engagement on its own terms, seen as a means of strengthening bargaining power.”

International policy makers and aid bureaucrats tend not to dismiss upfront the opportunity to seek new forms of cooperation through NEPAD. Uschi Eid, the German Junior Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development and Chancellor Schröder's appointed advisor on NEPAD, declared in a speech as early as May 2001 that it was "groundbreaking for African leaders to propose that undemocratic governments and despots be isolated by means of the OAU and joint programmes." It appeared to her that the initiative "could develop into a benchmark for Germany's policy on Africa." But she also pointed out that "this depends very much on the response to this ambitious and optimistic programme in Africa itself" and warns that "the programme also must not be watered down ... in the sense that self-responsibility for good governance gets diluted and countries see the solution for their problems mainly in external assistance."

In the meantime, there is growing scepticism among members of the donor community that this is exactly what will all too soon happen. A NEPAD donor conference to be held in Dakar during April 2002 has been announced. This early stage of rallying external financial pledges to NEPAD from outside sources might prove counterproductive. Such efforts are definitely not suited to increasing the confidence of the outside world in the genuine determination of Africans to primarily tackle the continent's appalling socioeconomic problems through their own initiatives. Such determination, however, would be a crucial initial step in achieving the ultimate goals.

Following a meeting of African heads of state with the European Union in Brussels on 10 October 2001, a press release confirmed the EU expectations. The release stressed that the European players are impressed by the political will of African heads of state in support of more peace, stability, democracy and development.

The new dimension of NEPAD as a blueprint for Africa's future lies in the unprecedented claim by the political leaders to collective responsibility over policy issues. The notion of "good governance" is considered and explicitly recognised as a substantial ingredient in socio-economic development. The NEPAD document welcomes the fact that "across the continent, democracy is spreading, backed by the African Union, which has shown a new resolve to deal with conflicts and censure deviation from the norm" (paragraph 45). It states further: "The New Partnership for Africa's Development has, as one of its foundations, the expansion of democratic frontiers and the deepening of the culture of human rights. A democratic Africa will become one of the pillars of world democracy, human rights and tolerance" (paragraph 183).

NEPAD's strong emphasis on democracy and governance does indeed mark a genuine difference from earlier initiatives to promote, propagate, and seek external support for African development within a continental perspective. As its main initiator Thabo Mbeki confirmed in his speech in January 2002: "The New Partnership is unique in African history in that African leaders have pledged to co-operate and be accountable to one another and to their people in terms of the development strategy, plans and delivery of programmes." Conflict prevention, democracy and governance are considered of primary importance. This perception underpins NEPAD's claim

to speak for the people of Africa through democratically legitimised representatives. Legitimacy and credibility are among the keywords and are essential contributing factors in current efforts to turn NEPAD into a success story. One should not lose sight of these substantial issues amid the variety of pressing demands for socio-economic progress through material delivery. Prof. Ravi Kanbur of Cornell University recently warned that “there is a danger that in satisfying too many demands NEPAD will squander its most precious resource — its position as a regional institution that draws its regional and global legitimacy from its democratic roots and aspirations.”

The NEPAD blueprint currently requires confidence-building measures, especially in terms of its political credibility, and the current crisis in Zimbabwe might be viewed as the real litmus test. If NEPAD’s reference to the principles of “good governance” is more than mere lip service, both SADC and the AU will have to demonstrate the necessary degree of commitment towards implementing such a paradigm. Otherwise, credibility will be lost even before it is gained. In contrast to this understanding, the same SADC Extraordinary Summit of January 2002 missed a golden opportunity and rendered a disservice to SADC’s credibility by putting forth a tepid position in its statement that it “welcomed the assurances by President Mugabe that the forthcoming Presidential Elections scheduled for 9-10 March 2002 will be free and fair.”

The challenge to reconcile conflicting postulates (national sovereignty versus collective responsibility) is not confined to Africa. It is also tested and contested in the arena of changing international norms elsewhere. Former Yugoslavia, the conflicts in Kosovo and, more recently, the actions following 11 September 2001 come to mind as prominent examples. The European Union faced a serious but much less critical test in the election results in Austria during late 1999. Subsequent EU internal reactions were evidence of the thin ice on which regional bodies operate when a generally assumed political consensus is questioned, even through the outcome of undoubtedly free and fair general and democratic elections. This also illustrates the point that while NEPAD is a regional document, it touches upon general matters of principle concerning collective responsibility within the framework of commonly defined values and norms.

To turn NEPAD into the success story it deserves to become, one should remember that the challenge is not only to the African main actors, who rightly claim ownership of their own development. It is also the duty of other states outside the continent who support of NEPAD to reduce and ultimately eliminate undue external interference, such as the unabashed exploitation of natural resources without adequate compensation (not only to parasitic elites but to the majority of the people – which again, of course, relates to the issue of “good governance” and involves Africans themselves). Along similar lines, arms deals and especially exports of weapons into conflict zones should be strictly prohibited and punished by both national and international law. The same should apply to any corrupt practices. The challenge to be met is to contribute from the outside towards sustainable development by offering African partners a globally conducive environment to secure their fair share of the world economy and international policy-making processes.

NEPAD seems to offer at least a partly new approach in its thinking. In that sense, it is clearly more than old wine in new bottles. However, given the continued existence of less innovative political structures, which will ultimately shape the political will and impact, NEPAD might well turn out to be new wine in old bottles. The effect might, unfortunately, be almost the same. But as Thabo Mbeki warned in his January 2002 speech, “if we cannot unite through an initiative that can permanently reshape this continent and bring about sustained improvement in the lives of our people, then we would have lost an opportunity that will not arise for some time.”

Kenya and NEPAD

Jephtah Gathaka / Smokin Wanjala

In this paper, we review Kenya's development experience within the context of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) launched by Africa's leaders in October 2001. A brief statement on perspectives of development is given, based on Kenya's political history. Kenya's development record is then analysed within this perspective. Finally, we assess NEPAD's suitability to and viability in Kenya in the twenty-first century.

Kenya is one of the African countries in the East African Region that attained independence from Britain in the early 1960s. Thirty-eight years after independence, the country is still grappling with the basics of a modern state/society. It is still experimenting with democracy while being plagued with myriad problems in the social, economic and political spheres. These problems range from poverty, disease, corruption, food insecurity, environmental degradation and poor infrastructure, to lack of accountability and transparency in government. In other words, in the context of the development discourse, Kenya is either facing a crisis of development or a challenge of underdevelopment.

PERSPECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT

In seeking to demonstrate the reality of the foregoing conclusion, it is important that fundamentals of development be revisited. In this regard, the process of development simply stated entails the planned mobilisation and harnessing of a society's natural and human resources for the advancement of the social, economic, and political well being of a people. The goals set for the attainment of this overall objective are usually short term, mid-term and long term. The process of development therefore depends on an all-inclusive vision based on an accurate account of a country's natural, financial and human potentialities vis-à-vis that country's needs. The strategies, structures, institutions and principles that are evolved for the operationalisation of the development process are as dependent on this internal self-assessment as they are on prevailing regional and international geopolitical dynamics.

Development, to the people of Kenya has meant a number of things since the attainment of self-rule.

On the political front: Development meant the destruction of the colonial legacy of undemocratic and oppressive governance. This entailed the dismantling of the political, legal and administrative order that ensured the marginalisation and exclusion of the people from any decision-making process affecting their destiny. The nationalist government, having destroyed the colonial state, was under a duty to reconstruct a modern state based on the rule of law and protection of the rights

and freedoms of the citizens. Such a state was supposed to be reflected in institutions of government modelled upon the realities of an African postcolonial society. Such a state was supposed to be fully emancipated from both the colonial and traditional structures of authority.¹

The broader frontiers of such a state were to be found in an extensive, though not pervasive, administrative machinery for the delivery of services to the people in an efficient and accountable manner. In other words, the people expected that independence would bring with it a complete break with the colonial past and enable them to recapture their political destiny.

On the economic front: Development meant the deliberate reversal of the trend of exploitation of natural resources for the benefit not of the locals but of the industrial revolution taking place in Europe and the Americas. It meant the building of a modern economy based on sound and efficient management of public resources and finances. Such an economy would be characterised by the deliberate policy of wealth-creation and the redirection of such wealth towards the provision of services, such as education, health, infrastructure, food, shelter, and the eradication of poverty, disease and ignorance. Such an economy would have in-built systems of accountability to the people through representative and other watchdog institutions of governance. The realisation of such goals by the economy would enable the people to lead a life of dignity and self-realisation.

On the social front: Development meant the evolution of a Kenyan nation; a nation united in its diversity of culture, language and history; a nation proud of its ancestral origins and one that would be socially cohesive. Development meant a state-guided cultural revolution based on innovation and creativity, a revolution that would ensure that socio-cultural practices with enduring values for present and future generations would become part of the nation's ethos. On the other hand, practices without any redeeming social feature would be rejected and jettisoned from the public psyche. Kenya would be a country of diversity, but one united in sense of purpose with every citizen proudly committed to the defence of her sovereignty. The guiding philosophy would draw both from the African value system and the realities of a modern society.

On the regional and international front: Development meant that the Kenyan nation would forge mutually beneficial links with the countries in the region, the continent and the wider international community in matters related to governance, protection of the environment, trade, science and technology and the maintenance of international peace and security. In other words, Kenya would claim her place in the community of nations as an equal partner. This, in summary, is what development meant and has continued to mean to the people of Kenya.²

¹ See the incisive explication of the Weberian doctrine of the state by Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.P., *Africa Works*. Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1999, pp. 4 ff.

² This overall development strategy is best captured by the first compressive Sessional Paper developed by the Nationalist Government and published in 1965 entitled "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya." Republic of Kenya, Government Printer 1965. With the failure of this strategy having become more than apparent, the government then adopted the structural adjustment prescriptions by publishing Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1994 entitled "Recovery and Sustainable Development to the Year 2010." Republic of Kenya, Government Printer Nairobi 1994.

KENYAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

Kenya's experience since independence is one of minimal progress on almost all of these fronts:

On the political front: The expected reconstruction of a modern state free from the colonial legacy never materialised. Instead, the state that emerged out of the struggle for independence was largely neo-colonial in character. The fundamental structures of the colonial state were retained. The colonial legal system was inherited largely intact. The main legal and administrative machinery that the colonial government had used to subjugate the people could now be used to entrench the emergent political elites. The independence constitution that had been negotiated at Lancaster House was largely concerned with the transfer of political power from the colonial government to the nationalist political elite. Indeed what followed the proclamation of independence was the struggle for power between two ideological factions of the nationalist movement.³ The victorious faction then embarked on the subversion of the constitution with the sole aim of consolidating its hold on power. This was achieved through amendments to the constitutional provisions that had created checks and balances between the three arms of government. The result was the over-concentration of power in the executive arm (the presidency, to be precise) at the expense of the legislative and judicial arms. In addition, a large body of oppressive laws that infringed on the fundamental freedoms of the people, such as expression, movement, assembly, and association were retained to operate alongside the constitution. A net result of this scenario was:

- (1) The emergence of an all-powerful executive presidency wielding unlimited constitutional powers.
- (2) The emergence of a de facto and later de jure monolithic one-party system controlled by the presidency.
- (3) The emergence of weak watchdog institutions such as parliament, judiciary, trade unions and non-governmental institutions.
- (4) The emergence of a fearful and compliant citizenry.
- (5) The emergence and entrenchment of a loyalist and sycophantic public service based on a reward rather than a meritocratic system.

These in turn led to an oppressive system of government characterised by violations of human rights, the subversion of the electoral process and a largely unaccountable government. This failed experiment in democracy has characterised Kenya's political landscape with varying degrees of intensity right through the 1990s when, with the end of the cold war, the multiparty *experiment set in*.

On the economic front: Failed democracy in Kenya has meant failed economic development. At independence, the strategies and policies of economic development were informed by the theory of developmentalism. The state was identified as the main engine for development. Capital flows for investment were sourced from foreign

³ On the one hand, there was the capitalist-leaning faction led by the then prime minister and later president, Jomo Kenyatta, while on the other, there was the socialist-leaning faction led by Oginga Odinga.

loans and grants and supplemented by domestic revenue from taxes. Without a strong capital base of its own and weak, if not nonexistent corporate investment, the government relied mainly on foreign loans. The macroeconomic goal was economic growth and modernisation. The provision of basic social services such as food, clean water, hospitals, infrastructure was also state-centred. Thus, an all-powerful state operating within an environment of non-accountability was recognised as the ultimate provider of development.

From the word go, therefore, there was an overemphasis in Kenya's development strategy on macroeconomic growth and a de-emphasis on socio-economic empowerment and poverty eradication. Lack of accountability and fragile democratic institutions meant that little progress was achieved on the economic front.

With increasing levels of poverty and no economic growth recorded in most African countries, in came the Structural Adjustments Programmes of the 1980s. These programmes that advocated the free market as an alternative to the state as the agent for economic development were an acknowledgement of the failure of the African state in this regard. This failure by the Kenyan state in particular was characterised by the decline in per capita incomes, the deterioration of social services, poor and nonexistent infrastructure, intensifying levels of poverty, environmental degradation, and rampant corruption in the public sector.

But the strategies advocated by the multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to redress the situation did not take into account the full picture of the failed African state. They were either unaware or chose to overlook the phenomenon of the "instrumentalisation of political disorder" in most African countries, Kenya being an example.⁴ Thus, they assumed that economic restructuring could succeed outside the framework of political restructuring.

The regrettable consequence was the imposition of economic responsibilities on an already disempowered people and an underdeveloped market system riddled with economic distortions. This strategy worsened an already bad situation and intensified the agony of the Kenyan people. Not even the experiment with multiparty democracy, a post-cold war phenomenon, has helped to arrest this economic malaise.

On the social scene: The social fallout of the political and economic failure has been no less immense. For example, one may be over-optimistic to conclude there exists today a unified and cohesive nation called Kenya. There is a state called Kenya held together by a government that controls both the instruments of coercion and political propaganda. The public campaigns for national unity conducted by political officialdom are informed not so much by the need for a united nation as they are by a perceived danger to political elites that a fragmented state would pose. Three failures are discernible in this regard: failure to de-ethnicise the country's political ethos, failure to revitalise the cultural dynamism of society – along the lines suggested in the introductory remarks – and failure to build a national ethic based on a national philosophy. And, therefore, Kenya is facing a crisis of development.

⁴ Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, pp 13-14.

THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT
AND WHAT IT MEANS TO KENYA

The preamble to NEPAD states that it is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth and development, and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The programme is anchored in the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and their continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world.

Before discussing the relevance of NEPAD to Kenya's development, it is important to make a few general but salient comments about this programme. The first question that must be asked is: How different is NEPAD from previous Plans and Initiatives in support of Africa's development?⁵ Article 59 of the Programme of Action states: "The New Partnership for Africa's Development differs in the approach and strategy from all previous Plans and Initiatives in support of Africa's development, *although the problems to be addressed remain largely the same.*"

The articles that follow do not, in our opinion, offer adequate justification for this assertion. As the above article acknowledges, the problems that NEPAD seeks to address are the same. The main long-term objective of NEPAD is to eradicate poverty in Africa and place the continent on a path of sustainable growth and development. Technically, the strategy has been originated by Africa's heads of state whose Implementation Committee is charged with the duty of revising the same from time to time.

The success of NEPAD is dependent upon massive and heavy investment. The source of funding is the same traditional multilateral institutions and bilateral development partners in the developed world. With cynical optimism, Article 66 recognises that "the challenge ahead for Africa is to be able to raise the required funding under the best conditions possible." The drafters therefore call upon "our development partners to assist in this endeavour."

From the foregoing it is not in dispute that NEPAD is an acknowledgment of the failure of past initiatives aimed at hauling Africa out of the crisis of development. Strictly speaking, it is a restatement of past declarations and recommendations that have been made by critics, commentators and statesmen in various forums in which the "African problem" has been the subject of discussion. The content of such declarations, plans and programmes is usually prepared by technocrats and embraced by African heads of state at a time of systemic crisis.

The only way in which NEPAD can be said to be different from other initiatives is that, for the first time, it acknowledges the fact that poor political leadership characterised by human rights violations, economic mismanagement, and corruption is the cause of the African problem. In a way NEPAD recognises the hitherto neglected

⁵ Such other initiatives and plans include The Lagos Plan of Action, The African Caribbean and Pacific Trade arrangements with the then European Economic Community under the Lome Conventions, and the now famous World Bank/IMF-sponsored Poverty Reduction Strategies.

fact that development is as much an economic process as it is a political process. This fundamental truism has been overlooked or wished away by African leaders and their development partners for a long time, with far-reaching consequences for the peoples of Africa.

By the same token, NEPAD appears to recognise that development is a process whose main pillar is the people. The old and now discredited assumption that the state could originate, nurture and sustain economic growth and development, while the people for whom such development was meant played a passive role, appears to have lost favour with NEPAD.

But even these two factors that distinguish NEPAD from other initiatives are stated in altruistic and exhortatory terms. The new initiative does not come up with wording that goes beyond an expression of commitment to these ideals. Thus, on the need for democratic governance, Article 79 acknowledges the fact that “development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance.” That being so, Africa undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy, whose core components include political pluralism, the existence of several political parties and workers’ unions, and fair, open, free and democratic elections.

But what is the basis of such an undertaking? How would these critical matters be operationalised in individual countries? The Heads of State Forum on NEPAD is to serve as a mechanism through which the leadership will periodically monitor and assess the progress made by African countries in meeting their commitment to achieving good governance and social reform. But is that the most suitable forum for the realisation of NEPAD’s ideals?

Through Article 55, the political leaders of the continent appeal to all the peoples of Africa, in all their diversity, to become aware of the seriousness of the situation and the need to mobilise themselves in order to put an end to the further marginalisation of the continent and ensure its development by bridging the gap with developed countries. The people are supposed to take up the challenge of mobilising in support of the implementation NEPAD by setting up at all levels the structures for organisation, mobilisation and action.

The contents of Article 55 give the impression that the people of Africa are somewhat oblivious to the causes and gravity of their plight. Yet the main impediment for the social mobilisation and empowerment of African people has been an over-intrusive state using its coercive machinery. The call to social mobilisation without a commitment to restructure the state so as to facilitate social mobilisation does not hold much meaning.

All in all, therefore, NEPAD is just an initiative, a declaration of principles, aims, objectives, goals and strategies. It has no normative attributes that would bind the participating states to the ideals they have set themselves. It is an initiative of the African political leadership that is largely responsible for the malaise that afflicts the continent, a leadership which is still plagued by internal divisions and a lack of common approach and commitment towards finding solutions to the problems of Africa. These two factors in fact pose the most serious threat to NEPAD’s success.

Having made these remarks about NEPAD as a strategy, it is important to state that in terms of the fundamentals of development, the content of NEPAD critically captures those fundamentals. It is a thorough and rigorous statement of what constitutes development in the current interdependent world. Especially for Africa, a continent engulfed by armed conflict in many regions, there can be no doubt that the Peace and Security Initiative consisting of the three elements stated in Article 72 is the panacea for development. The four key areas identified by the initiative for the management of all aspects of conflict are crucial for any development process.

Likewise, and unnecessary to overemphasise, the evolution of sustainable democratic institutions through which democratic governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law can thrive is the basis of any economic development in modern society. The institutional reforms identified in Article 83, i.e., administrative and civil services, strengthening parliamentary oversight, promoting participatory decision-making, adopting effective measures to combat corruption and embezzlement; and undertaking judicial reforms are crucial in any effort at sustainable good governance.

KENYA: THE WAY FORWARD

In this section, we seek to answer the question: How should Kenya be organised politically and economically in the future? In other words, what should the country do to pull out of its development crisis? The answer to this question lies not in new analytical paradigms but in lessons from our past. It lies in our failures during the independence and post-independence era. We must seriously and comprehensively address the weaknesses that have plagued our political and economic systems over the years. We must then seek to correct those weaknesses in a systematic, systemic and structural manner. The institutions we create must be based on scientifically sustainable conventions. In other words, we need a thoroughgoing reform of our governance, administrative and management systems.

On the political landscape: We must fundamentally restructure our institutions of state so as to set in motion a new political dispensation. In this regard, we have to evolve a completely new constitutional order, one that emancipates the state from social blackmail and extensively de-links the operations of government from personal, community, ethnic and other traditional imperatives. It is only the political elite that emerges from such an order that can seriously embrace the ideals stated in the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative of NEPAD. Otherwise, the Kenyan government as currently constituted will continue, as in the past, to pay lip service to the ideals of democracy.

Secondly, we must re-orient and reorder the relationship between government and the people, so as to make the survivability of the former depend on the sensitivity of the latter. Institutions that empower the people to question and challenge the government and institutions that enhance the government's duty to account to the public must be normatively and structurally enduring. Such institutions' existence

and the manner of their operation should not be dependent on the political will of those in power, as it is in our current situation.

One critical area in this regard is reform of the electoral law and electoral system so as to make elections free and fair. Unless elections are truly transparent, free and fair, they cannot and will not serve as a measure for judging government. Successive governments in Kenya cannot be said to have been the product of free and fair elections. Indeed the imperfections and distortions in Kenya's nascent democracy are most apparent and pervasive in the country's electoral system. Again, this development should help the realisation of the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative of NEPAD.

Concomitant with the restructuring of the political system must be the evolution of a strong civil society in the broadest possible sense. A strong civil society will contribute to the much-needed social mobilisation of the people around specific issues of national interest.

On the economic front: Kenya is already going through some economic reform conditionalities imposed by multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. These conditionalities were imposed as a result of the failure of the state to effectively play its role in promoting growth and development. But this much-acknowledged failure of the state did follow a natural pattern. Economic failure in Kenya, as in many African countries, was accentuated by poor governance, mismanagement of public resources and rampant corruption. It is imperative that these problems be seriously addressed for any economic reforms to take root. Otherwise, the Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative of NEPAD will not be successfully implemented.

But economic reform should not mean the abdication of the state's responsibilities in the provision of basic social services to the poor, who are the majority in the country. A restructured state will still have to make critical interventions in society on behalf of the poor, especially in the provision of education, health, agricultural and infrastructure services. Market-oriented reforms cannot be the panacea for the economic ills that afflict Africa.

To be able to economically empower the people, it is important that the cooperative movement, especially in the agricultural and marketing sector, be revived. This will entail sector-specific research, investment and provision of credit. It is only through the cooperative movement that the economy will again be home-grown. The government must then create an enabling environment in which internal and regional trade can flourish. Above all, the macro- and microeconomic policies must be steered towards making the Kenyan economy less dependent on foreign financing and more on domestic revenue resulting from trade.

On the social front: A deliberate and sustained effort must be made to evolve a national culture that can steer the country towards becoming a more cohesive society based on shared values. Such an evolving culture will draw from the rich diversity of the country, which should be a source of strength rather than a weakness. In this regard, policies should be formulated and laws enacted aimed at inculcating a national ethic in the public psyche. Most importantly, socio-economic and political discourse

must be deliberately de-ethnicised and made more issue-oriented. Education, cultural and language policies must embrace this need.

For the NEPAD plan to succeed, it must be socialised among the peoples of Africa. It should not be simply a statement of intent on the part of the continent's political leadership. Its statist trappings should be enriched with the infusion of critical civil society commentary. In other words, NEPAD should be presented as a standard of commitment for which African leaders will be held accountable.

Another critical factor for the success of NEPAD is the role of the international community – the so-called donor community. The Group of 8, for example, should adopt more ethical and social justice guidelines in its dealings with Africa. The double standards that currently characterise the relationships of the donor community with African states are a sure recipe for NEPAD's failure. More often than not, the good governance and accountability prescriptions upon which development loans and grants are predicated fall victim to the “national interests” of the donor countries. These national interests usually have very little to do with democratic governance.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is important to restate that the New Partnership for Africa's Development is sound and rigorous in content. However, the extent to which its implementation is dependent on the commitment and goodwill of the African Heads of State Forum casts serious doubt on its likely success.

Without a thorough and sustained effort to democratise Africa from within, well-meaning initiatives such as NEPAD are bound to fail. As for Kenya, like many African countries, it cannot benefit from continent-wide economic plans such as NEPAD unless it undergoes a surgical, domestically inspired reform programme along the lines suggested earlier in our discussion.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development: Last Chance for Africa?

Richard Cornwell

The document outlining the nature of the New Partnership for Africa's Development is a long and exhaustive one, and it would be as well to examine the premises upon which it appears to be based.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic ... (NEPAD 2001:para 1).

Turning to paragraph 71 of the same document, we read:

African leaders have learned from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development. They are making a pledge to work, both individually and collectively, to promote these principles in their countries and subregions and on the continent. (NEPAD 2001:para 71).

To what extent will these statements reflect a likely future for Africa? One must, of course, issue a caveat about prediction. The difficulty of prediction is that much of human history consists of the unintended consequences of decisions based on imperfect knowledge and no small measure of wishful thinking and self-deception. If there was any need to test the truth of this commonplace, then the evidence has been available in abundance in Central-Southern Africa over the past three or four years.

The best starting point for our current exercise is to establish as clearly as we can where we find ourselves at present. I am far from certain that most of us have done this accurately. Certainly, the dominant discourse in the public realm seems well wide of the mark. In my view, this state of affairs is the result of our unconscious or conscious acceptance of a set of assumptions so banal as to be taken as virtually self-evident, not the least of which is the putative causal link between security, stability and development (Duffield 2001:1-43).

First among these assumptions is the issue and role of globalisation and, by extension, what it implies or could imply for Africa. As important, and connected to this, are other perceptions about the role of the state in providing security to African societies, and the relationship of the state to its security apparatus. Finally, there is the acceptance at face value of the primary commitment of the leaders of Africa's political class to the development of their countries and citizens (Clapham 1996:4-5).

Let us start with the first assumption, about the role, actual or putative, of globalisation. This is a phenomenon that probably looks substantially different when viewed from the South African as opposed to the African continental perspective.

Of course the states of the Mediterranean littoral and that other African giant, Nigeria, will share some of South Africa's perceptions, because of the relative size and sophistication of their economies, which make it more likely, though far from certain, that they will benefit on balance from this latest transformation in global capitalism.

Much of the thinking behind the new programme for African development seems to be predicated upon this assumption. Here we are, a major player in African terms, aspiring to assist the continent out of its globally marginalised position, in the process ourselves emerging as a modest middle level power. To achieve this, our leaders are willing to embrace the inevitability of the historical triumph of a process commonly known as globalisation, satisfied with the claims of its high priesthood that allowing the unimpeded operation of market forces and the flow of goods and capital (if not labour) will deliver massive and irreversible material benefits to our country and the bulk of its people. This, in turn, will allow our government to care more effectively for the welfare and security needs of the masses, creating an exemplar and agent for change in the revitalisation of the African continent as a whole. As an adjunct to the broad human security benefits we expect to ensue from our insertion as a fully fledged partner in the globalised economy, we also hope to create a new governance and security order based on commonly accepted rules and underwritten by the international community of states at regional, continental and global level.

– Well, what is wrong with that? Quite a lot really.

A common popular perception is that South Africa has the potential to become a rich, industrialised, developed country, comparable to the affluent economies of the Northern hemisphere. Brief acquaintance with the major cities, their striking skylines and the suburban shopping malls and mansions cherished by a small class of conspicuous consumers lend spurious credibility to this picture.

By African standards certainly, the country has reached a high level of economic development. Its GNP is more than three times that of the other eleven members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) put together, is three times larger than that of Nigeria, and twenty times larger than that of Zimbabwe.

In the global context, however, it is a middle-ranking, semi-industrialised economy. In addition, and most importantly, it has one of the most skewed patterns of income distribution in the world. Some 51 per cent of annual income goes to the richest 10 per cent of households; less than 4 per cent of annual income goes to the poorest 40 per cent of households.

The gap between rich and poor in South Africa is a wide one. More significantly, it has tended historically to correlate closely with the racial classifications until recently imposed by white-dominated governments on the national population. This has provided much of the dynamic of South African politics in the past, and attempts to redress these imbalances and create a more equitable society will continue to provide the leitmotif of the political economy for the foreseeable future.

According to many well-informed foreign observers, South Africa has the potential for striking economic success over the next two decades and beyond, though the

realisation of this potential is by no means guaranteed. As the World Bank noted recently, South Africa must cope with a number of obstacles in its quest for faster growth in output and employment. Its production structure is highly capital-intensive and inward looking; it has a largely untrained and under-educated labour force; and its urban structure inhibits the productivity of unskilled labour and is not conducive to the growth of the informal sector. In addition we have in the HIV/AIDS pandemic a threat to human security unparalleled in recorded human history, with its epicentre in Southern Africa.

A further inhibiting factor is the general lack of investor confidence arising, in part, from uncertainty about future government policy. This hesitancy partly reflects the generally disappointing, if not disastrous, experience of outside investors in Africa following the optimism engendered by the end of colonial rule in the 1960s. With ample investment opportunities available in the Far East, Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world, South Africa will come under close scrutiny before it receives substantial inflows of private capital. Of course, inflows of capital, though they may be a necessary condition, are not of themselves a sufficient condition of economic growth as conventionally measured, let alone of development.

Recent occurrences have also served as a reminder that what flows in may flow out just as suddenly. The volatility of the money markets that has propelled the government into issuing its macroeconomic blueprint demonstrates the unprecedented mobility of capital, not to mention the overriding importance of sentiment, rumour and anticipated short-term profit or loss that drive the market (Millman 1995: *passim*).

Perhaps a more fundamental question ought to be raised, and this applies to virtually every part of the “developing” world: whether the economic development path being implied by the free-market strategists is actually available to the mass of underdeveloped countries. A glance at the evidence would suggest that it is not, and that the promise of material progress implicit in the bargain being struck is every bit as historically absurd as that offered by the proponents of scientific socialism (Castells 2000; Rist 1997:93–122).

A recent report by the UNDP indicates that for all the unprecedented growth of the global economy over the past few decades, the number of people living in appalling poverty has increased. It also points to the ever-widening gap between the very rich and the mass of people, even in developmentally advanced nations. Of “catching up” or “trickle-down” there is little evidence. During the last thirty years the world’s GDP has expanded from \$4 trillion to \$23 trillion. Over the same period the share of world income for the poorest 20 per cent of countries has declined from 2.3 per cent to 1.4 per cent. Simultaneously the share of the richest 20 per cent grew from 70 per cent to 85 per cent. A similar progression is noted within countries. Based on this view, one might go further to ask whether the development trajectory of the wealthy nations will prove viable for them either, even in the medium run. The triumphalism of the free-marketeers following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite economies seems somewhat premature if one considers the social blight afflicting many post-industrial nations, the erosion of the welfare state accompanied

by radical demographic change, and the steady growth of a disaffected and often criminalised underclass in those societies (Castells 2000:73–82; Faux & Mishel 2000:93–111).

In short then, we have yet to see that globalisation will deliver to Africa what its advocates claim. Africa, as a very small player in the context of the formal global economy, reacts more violently to the squalls and gales worked up by market sentiment than do the larger states upon whose experience most generalisations on political economy and security are based. For Africa to gain equitable access to the global market certainly requires that the dominant players forego some of the extremely unfair advantages they currently enjoy. For all that we have heard from Mr. Blair and from President Chirac, do we really imagine that they are about to tackle the Common Agricultural Policy that keeps Europe's farming sector solvent? And is President Bush made of the sort of stuff that will convince American workers in the textile, garment or farming industries that they have to forfeit their jobs in the interests of global equity? Remember, all this is to be broached at the June meeting of the G8 this year. Remember, too, that the global economy is in deep recession. I find it far more compelling to believe that by June the leaders of the G8 will be giving more serious attention to Japan's banking crisis and the possibility or reality of an American war on Iraq, with all its ramifications for the stability of the Middle East as a whole (Sandbrook 2000:131–47).

I know that since 11 September a great deal has been said about the dangers of the rich ignoring the claims of the marginalised, and about the viability of an inequitable world system. These are certainly moral considerations. Historically speaking, however, they are naïve, and when US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill talks of the possibility of all the world's people being able to aspire to and achieve living standards comparable to those of twenty-first century America, he merely demonstrates the shallowness of much thinking about the nature of the global economy. Africa, with the exception of the Horn and the Mediterranean states, is not going to feature on the radar screens of the anti-terrorism units of the First World. Its declining state systems may well provide opportunities for drug-dealers, gun-runners and money-launderers, but these can be policed by international conventions and the co-operation of pliable, though not necessarily democratic regimes. In certain circumstances any form of state will serve the purposes of wealthy non-Africans (Duffield 2001).

The idea that the choice for Africa lies between a United States of Africa and an African Union based on the European model is also essentially absurd, in that neither of these prototypes is historically or functionally applicable. Both emerged at a particular juncture and subsequently evolved largely as the consequence of peculiar historical circumstances. Neither has achieved what might be regarded as "final success" or an end state: the arguments about federal versus states' rights continues in the USA, as do the debates about the relative powers of sovereign European governments and the authorities in Brussels. And these are models based on the existence of strong, capable and effective nation states, occupying a dominant position in the global economy.

Contrast the situation with that of Africa. We are a continent of more than fifty states, many of which lay claim to a juridical existence only because they are represented in international forums. In some respects, we may find that the reasons for joining a “stronger” continental body would be to reinforce the mythic omnipotence of the state and, of course, the elites that own it. This is a point touched upon by several African commentators, many of whom are at the same time optimistic that the African Union project can be made to work for the African peoples at large. Yet it is difficult to believe that adequate space will be made for what is widely referred to as African civil society, especially if that civil society seeks to make use of the apparatus of the African Union to raise criticisms of their rulers that are impossible or illegal to voice at national level. What Basil Davidson has called “the brutal divorce between rulers and ruled” continues to apply across virtually all of the continent, and one cannot imagine that a Union designed by the beneficiaries of state power, however attenuated, would be allowed to work to any other advantage than that of the dominant political class. And this raises an absolutely fundamental point: that in the global scheme of things we assume that the state apparatus exists largely to protect the security of its citizens. Across much of Africa, and other parts of the world, this is simply not so, and much of the world’s population views the formal security forces as one of the most potent threats to its security, and therefore seeks to disengage and find refuge from the grasp of the state and its uniformed officials. This surely has to loom large in any considerations of continental security and defence debates (Clapham 2001:59–69).

At the same time as Africa is swept along in the economic torrent, the international political environment has also become less favourable in terms of systemic stability. Contrary to most popular expectations, the end of bipolar rivalry has not made the world an altogether more peaceful place. Ironically, the end of the Cold War has contributed to the threat of Africa’s marginalisation in world affairs, just as it helped pave the way for the revolutionary political transformation now under way in South Africa. The end of bipolar superpower rivalry has robbed Africa of whatever strategic significance it had. Suddenly, the continent and its supporters have an extraordinary task ahead of them: to convince increasingly hard-headed policy-makers in the rich North of the need to assist a region whose problematic economies and poor future prospects seem less and less relevant to the growth of richer countries (Martin & Schumann 1997:1–11).

The end of the Cold War also restricted the policy choices for the majority of African states. Caught in a massive and deepening economic crisis characterised by the debt trap, their choice was limited essentially to policies approved by the technocrats of the IMF and World Bank, regardless of their problematic socio-economic and political consequences, and aid sponsors have been restricted to those espousing the Washington consensus. If this was the period of Africa’s second democratisation, what emerged were “choiceless democracies” (Mkandawire 1999:119–36)

There were adverse consequences for human security in Africa too. Some of these related to the incompatibility of the economic and political courses being advocated for these very weak states. In the case of Africa, it is clear that the argument

about the interconnectedness of political and economic liberalisation is based upon dubious premises. Structural adjustment programmes have played no small part in destabilising the political framework. The outcomes of policy application frequently are perverse. In an attempt to restrict the damage done to client-patron networks, privatisation often takes on the form of crony capitalism, in which state assets are sold off to political allies. With the emergence of a "New World Disorder," domestic support has to be sought and nurtured, and the fragile political systems of the continent are finding it difficult to survive now the familiar scaffolding of the Cold War has been dismantled.

Let us take another assumption: that the international security system has to be based on the arrangement of interstate relations. The state has been the most prominent feature of the international political system for so long that it is easy to take for granted the permanence of its role in the organisation of society. Lately, however, there is growing attention to the erosion of the power of the sovereign state. Usually this centres on the impact of what is generally referred to as globalisation, and the emergence of major trans-national economic and financial actors able to shift their operations almost at will and answerable to no one nation's political masters. This has signified the removal from the control of the state of several instruments of economic sovereignty. Indeed, there are some who would argue that we are beginning to see the privatisation of sovereignty itself (Clapham 1996:244-74; Cilliers & Cornwell 1999:227-45).

The reduction in global ideological conflict has reduced the political and military incentives for outside powers to intervene on the continent; and, as we have indicated, an Africa omitted from the calculations of external rivals has not become a more peaceful place. That local disputes are now less globalised means that outside powers have less influence on the conduct, termination and outcome of these conflicts. Local rivalries and antagonisms are given freer rein, being more remote from world centres of power and insignificant in terms of the global system. African states can no longer rely on outside assistance to end local wars that are no threat to vital foreign interests (Dewitt 1993:2-3).

External non-state actors have stepped into the void left by the international community, sometimes as proxies, sometimes as independent agents, able by virtue of their wealth and command of expertise to influence events to their local and often short-term advantage. It is for all the world as if Africa has returned to the 1880s, and the age of the chartered companies, marking out their enclaves in an otherwise disorderly environment. Indeed, some of the colonial states of Africa owe their origins to such companies.

This is the reverse side of globalisation. Trans-national companies, having demanded a new set of global rules which have effectively undermined the state in certain of the world's margins, are now able to provide just as much of the apparatus usually reserved to the state to carry out their businesses in relative safety and at great profit, their bargaining advantage being apparent. Their worries now focus on their competition with others of their ilk, and their relative abilities to co-opt such parts of the state's political apparatus as still has some status in law.

If, indeed, we are witnessing the end of the postcolonial state system in Central Africa at least, how are we to reconfigure our understanding of what is to replace it? Some authors have suggested that rather than seeing the boundaries of postcolonial states as the framework for understanding the continent, we should instead see how Africa is essentially divided in the consideration of external players into

Afrique utile – usable or useful Africa, linked in various ways to the global economy, and *Afrique inutile* – useless, unprofitable or disposable Africa. Those parts that are regarded as useful, or as containing exploitable resources, are provided with a modicum of protection, and are linked to the global economy. Those that are devoid of such attractions are consigned to the margins and left to their own devices, so that, in effect, we have a new “apartheid” of administration and security. In effect, Africa is again divided, between those under protection and those without. The implications for the political and economic future of Africa are profound. For most of Africa’s peoples, the state has long since ceased to be the provider of security, physical or social. Only the “useful bits” will be recolonised by the forces of the outsiders. The historical difference between citizens and subjects will be reconfigured (Lock 1999:11–36).

Other considerations about the nature of state security in Africa also have to be borne in mind. Christopher Clapham’s work on the African state has identified the difficulties of applying Western assumptions about the nature of state security in much of Africa. He points out that in many cases concerns for state survival are subordinate to those connected with the personal security and well-being of the incumbent leadership. The apparatus of juridical statehood is then appropriated to serve the requirements of this fixation. To put it rather more bluntly: a head of state is recognised in international law as able to conclude contracts on behalf of that state, which can be incredibly useful if you intend to profit personally from your tenure of office (Clapham 1996).

A method employed by rulers in circumstances in which little more remains of the state than the abstract and juridical is to create a parallel political authority, where personal ties and controls replace failing institutions. William Reno has termed this “the shadow state,” in his path finding work on Sierra Leone, which examines the role of informal markets in the construction of alternative extra-state power networks, underpinning political and economic privilege. So potent and pervasive are these networks that, by manipulating the vestiges of state power, they are able to frustrate and bend to their own purposes interventions by the international financial and donor community designed to undermine the informal sector and strengthen the structures of the state. It is against this background and in this context that the military activities and interventions of state, regional and private security forces have to be analysed (Reno 1998).

The effective criminalisation of the state contributes to the unrestrained privatisation not only of the productive sectors of the economy, but also of sovereignty itself and the sovereign functions of the state — the maintenance of customs barriers, the concession of territories or harbour enclaves to foreign entrepreneurs, the preservation of internal security and national defence, and of peacekeeping. Globalisation

has facilitated the expansion of international crime at least as much as it has opened the way for legitimate enterprise. The threat to human security implied by this development will also have to be borne in mind (Castells 2000).

In short then: Africa has so far managed to resist conditionality, or pervert the intentions of its authors, and democratisation and good governance will not be the best lens through which to observe the continent, as shadow networks of power emerge in reaction to the privatisation of the state and the economy. Informal and illicit trade, financial fraud, systematic evasion of rules and international agreements will be some of the means used by certain Africans to survive the tempest of globalisation (Reno 1998; Martin & Schumann 1997:196–226).

What Chabal and Daloz have called the political economy of disorder offers opportunities for those who know how to play the system. Informalisation affects politics as well as economics. In many respects what we are seeing in the conflict zones of Africa is the playing out of rivalries for the control of scarce resources and the manipulation of business links, licit and illicit, to the benefit of the entrepreneurs of violence. On the back of these resource wars vast profits are to be made on the transportation of other things, from guns to food. To most of us it seems a commonplace that war and conflict must impede economic growth and development, and so they do. But they may also create opportunities for enrichment of the few. The economic agendas of civil wars are only now beginning to receive the analytical attention they warrant (Chabal & Daloz 1999).

If this analysis of the African state is applied to the current wars raging in and around Central Africa, then we must adjust our thinking and assume that what we are dealing with is a set of pseudo-states in which the interest of the community and the rule of law count for nothing. The problem is that the current international diplomatic and security architecture is unable to cope with this type of crisis. It is partly a matter of scale, of course, the equivalent of a body being overwhelmed by massive infection. But it is also more than that. Current diplomatic and security arrangements are state-centred and predicated upon regarding states as the primary actors in international affairs. In Africa this is simply no longer so. There are regional alliances forming between private actors, or leaders who appropriate the framework of the state to their own ends and in their own private interest. In this environment the UN finds itself ill at ease, having to deal with individuals both as the source of power and wealth and as the origin of ambiguous signals in a rapidly changing environment (Clapham 1996:244–66).

NEPAD represents a noble attempt to alter this picture of an African future. Its authors claim “we will determine our own destiny.” I hope they are right, though I fear that Africa’s future path will be more messy and interesting than that. Men may well write their own history, but not entirely as they wish.

But to conclude on a more positive note: what can Africa, and in particular Southern Africa, do to fulfil its part of the proffered bargain? Let us remember that the outside world, if it is indeed serious about the NEPAD *quid pro quo*, is likely to want evidence of the *quo* before it releases the *quid*. Put bluntly, Africa is not going to receive massive debt relief, nor attract investment of a significant volume if it

does not, collectively, put its governance house in order. Investors of a permanent rather than an ephemeral variety look for a number of things: respect for property rights and the predictability and transparency of administrative and legal systems being among the most important. Nor do they draw fine distinctions between the performance of individual states from the same region. The Zimbabwean crisis is a case in point, though there may be any number of reasons for quiet diplomacy on Pretoria's part, regional solidarity with a thoroughly repellent regime should not be seen as one of them. The result is that, for this and a number of other reasons, outside investors and diplomatic representatives are baffled by what they can interpret only as a non-policy of expedient drift.

To succeed, even moderately, NEPAD is going to demand the commitment of political leaders here and elsewhere to policies that may cause them considerable discomfort in the short to medium term. It is, in a way, a self-denying ordinance. Whether the politicians meet the challenge will determine how history and their citizens judge them. For my part, I have a suspicion that Africa will achieve its rebirth despite rather than because of their actions.

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What's new in "The New Partnership for Africa's Development"?

Henning Melber

Lying on the table in my hotel room in Dar es Salaam was a glossy magazine entitled *Traders*. It bears the rather unsensible subtitle "Journal for the Southern African Region, incorporating the rest of Africa." Given existing reservations about the hegemonic role played by the relative economic colossus at and around the Cape, you would not have to be in the public relations or marketing business to come up with good advice about how to improve (or for that matter spoil) an already fragile image.

Be that as it may, in this *Traders* the Nigerian high commissioner to South Africa introduces the "New African Initiative" (as NEPAD was obviously still labelled at the time of writing) as "the new African reality." While one should not attach too much relevance to a single diplomat's utterances, it is still revealing to take note of some of his statements. According to the high commissioner: "The plan signified a coming together to hasten African Development *with a minimum of effort* and limited resources" (Olagunju 2001/2002: 6; my emphasis). I do not think that this will encourage potential external donors to offer additional support. Again, you do not need to be in the PR-business to realise that this might, at best, be a rather unfortunate "selling strategy."

The ambassador adds another questionable dimension by stating, after the summary of the essentials in the new blueprint, "The next step in the process is to let the people of Africa know what the NAI aims to accomplish" (ibid.). This, in my view, seems to put -- as so often before -- the cart before the horse. It confirms that NEPAD has been developed without the people. At the same time, it supports the statement made yesterday by the Namibian opposition politician Ben Ulenga in his paper: "From the early launch of the OAU in the 1960s to the latest proclamation of NEPAD, the continent must depend on the 'good offices' of presidents and heads of state. African recovery programmes therefore have so far been public relations exercises of the heads of states." (Ulenga 2002: 2) I hope and trust that in the highly unlikely (at least in the medium-term) case of Ben Ulenga becoming head of state, he would contribute to political culture that differs markedly from this top-down approach.

After all, if development without people is in fact possible, what and for whom would this development be likely to be? One speaker has just made reference to the impact the European Renaissance in terms of the social transformation of medieval societies, based on aristocratic feudal rule, into emergent bourgeois societies. But it is important to note that the emerging bourgeoisie required people -- if only as a cheap workforce to produce surplus initially and only later as citizens as well, to make democracy and good governance work within the context of vibrant civil societies. The times, however, have changed. Current globalisation is at one and the

same time as much a process of exclusion as one of integration. Worldwide globalisation trends have resulted in people and regions being marginalised, even in OECD states. The number of unemployed increases everywhere, and income discrepancies do so too in almost every country in the world. The rich get richer and the poor get poorer. The continent of Africa is the most neglected and marginalised link in this chain. If NEPAD remains only a document intended to “buy in” the political and economic elite, then there is hardly anything new in the “new partnership.” It would merely be a modified continuation of the existing relations at the expense of the majority of people.

Instead, the task remains (by re-phrasing a prominent slogan shaped in the early 1990s on the role of the state) to “bringing the people back in.” After all, social progress (including the original Renaissance in Europe) emerged from and was based upon popular struggles. Social achievements since then did not fall from heaven but were the result of organised movements by people for the people. Welfare states were not the product of bourgeois generosity but of popular demands and organised labour movements. Political and human rights, as well as civil and civic participation, were achieved through of grassroots activities and by collective movements from below.

If NEPAD is to present a true alternative to previous futile efforts of African advocacy, it cannot afford to ignore the people. Ownership ought to be ownership by the people. Hence, a conference such as this one is vitally important. It provides an opportunity by the people of Africa to (re-)claim development in Africa. This would then be the new dimension in the partnership both in an intra-African as well as an international sense.

One does not need to reinvent the wheel. Demands of this type are as old as the challenges of genuine African development. One of those who expressed this situation succinctly more than four decades ago was Frantz Fanon. In his remarkable manifesto,

The Wretched of the Earth, written months before his early death in 1961, he spends considerable energy and time on the necessary task of enhancing popular participation in national developmental processes. In the chapter entitled “The Pitfalls of National Consciousness,” he offers a sharp and painful critique of postcolonial African elites, who in the name of progress and social emancipation abuse their mandates.

In conclusion, I quote from this chapter. These words summarise the challenge, which NEPAD and its current owners, the policy-makers from the African continent, are facing:

In an under-developed country, experience proves that the important thing is not that three hundred people form a plan and decide upon carrying it out, but that the whole people plan and decide even if it takes them twice or three times as long. The fact is that the time taken up by explaining the time ‘lost’ in treating the worker as a human being, will be caught up in the execution of the plan. People must know where they are going, and why. (Fanon 2001: 155–6)

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At the end of the Conference African participants from Benin, Burkina Faso, DR Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Togo formulated the following statement:

The NEPAD document is already a reality. It has the potential not just to redefine Africa's relations with the rest of the world but also to reconstitute the shattered social contract between Africa's people and their leaders.

We call upon the international community at large to underwrite this contract in deeds as well as words by applying higher ethical standards in its treatment of, and dealings with, African states.

We propose the following way forward:

- That Africa's leaders individually and jointly explain what they understand by the contents of NEPAD and express their commitments to it politically in word and deed.
- That NEPAD's orientation is currently too state-centred. We appeal to the Hanns-Seidel Foundation to organise meetings in each of Africa's regions to disseminate the results of this workshop and engage civil society in the broadest sense in a critical debate about NEPAD. This will help to ensure that Africa's peoples and their organisations take ownership of the initiative and drive it forward.
- That following a thorough discussion of NEPAD and its endorsement by civil society, it be incorporated in the founding instruments of the African Union.
- That African security has to be understood not as state security but as human security, which consist of freedom from fear and freedom from want.
- That African leaders join the international community in committing themselves in word and deed to the eradication of corruption, which is one of the gravest impediments to development.
- That NEPAD requires that the international community deals consistently with Africa in an equitable and ethical manner.
- That clarity should be obtained about the relationship of NEPAD to previous agreements between Africa and the international community with the aim of maximising mutual advantage.
- That priority be given to identifying pilot projects related to functional literacy, especially among women in disadvantaged communities; and collaboration in the campaign against HIV/AIDS.