KEYNOTE ADDRESS --

FROM THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION TO THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND FROM THE FINAL ACT OF LAGOS TO THE CONSTITUTIVE ACT: WITHER AFRICA?

BY PROFESSOR ADEBAYO ADEDEJI, CFR, FAAS, FNIM, FNES

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Introduction

The Economist, in one of its leader articles entitled **Emerging Africa**, in its issue of June 14, 1997 urged the continent to forge its own future. Indeed, this view is in a way an echo of a similar view expressed at the Denver Summit of the Seven (now turned Eight) most industrialised democracies of the world. Needless to add that this has been a constant refrain: to graciously ‘grant’ Africa what is its fundamental right and responsibility of occupying the drivers’ seat of the automobile of its destiny.

But in reality this has always turned out to be no more than a gratuitous rhetoric because every attempt that has been made by the Africans to forge their future and to craft their own indigenous development strategies and policies has been pooh-poohed by the international financial institutions (IFIs) with the support, or at least the connivance, of the donor community. While African leaders can be faulted in many ways, they have made a series of heroic effort since the early 1970s to craft their own indigenous development paradigms in the light of their own perceptions. Five landmark strategies which together provide the continent’s preferred development agenda emerged in the 1980s and early in the 1990s. These are

i. The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000 and the Final Act of Lagos (1980)
ii. Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER) which was later converted into the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development (UN–PAAERD) (1986)

iii. The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989)

iv. The African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990)

v. The United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF. 1991)

Unfortunately, all of these were opposed, undermined and jettisoned by the Bretton Woods institutions and Africans were thus impeded from exercising the basic and fundamental right to make decisions about their future. This denial would have been ameliorated if the African leaders had shown the commitment to carry out their own development agenda. But given their excessive external dependence, their narrow political base and their perennial failure to put their money where their mouth is, the implementation of these plans has suffered from benign neglect. Lacking the resources and the will to soldier on self-reliantly, they abandoned their own strategies, including the two– UN–PAAERD and UN–NADAF– which were crafted jointly with the international community under the aegis of the United Nations.

Instead, the implementation of exogenous agenda has, perforce, been pursued because of the operation of the development merchant system (DMS) under which foreign-crafted economic reform policies have been turned into a new kind of special goods which are largely and quickly financed by the operators of the DMS, regardless of the negative impact of such policies on the African economies and polities. Assistance is readily available from the DMS to operationalising the paradigms emanating from its operators and favouring the development route that it has mapped out for Africa, including the mode of its integration in the global economy. African governments are obliged to conform to the norms, whims and caprices of the DMS. Needless to add that the overarching objective of the DMS is for the African canoe to be firmly tied to the North's neo-liberal ship on the waters of globalisation (Kankwenda, 2000).

In such circumstances, even as indigenous effort is intensified to come out with paradigms, strategies and policies that the Africans are convinced are capable of forging their future in the right direction, even as the opposition of their governments to the neoliberal model of the structural adjustment programme becomes strident and even as the process of globalisation has continued to breed violence and conflict because it exacerbates poverty, inequality, environmental destruction and unprecedented concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a few while the majority are marginalized, impoverished and excluded, Africa is firmly in the grip of the orthodoxy of the DMS. Without doubt, sustainable development in Africa will not begin until this struggle over development paradigms, strategies and agendas is resolved in favour of its people. (Ake, 1996).

What is the significance of the welcome accorded NEPAD by the North?

Then, why has the new NEPAD initiative, unlike the five African initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s, been so well received by the donor community and the Bretton Woods institutions since its publication in 2001? Is it because it is in the line with the DMS or has there been a dramatic change of heart and attitude on the part of the merchants of the DMS? Are they going through a paradigm shift? These questions are easier posed than answered.

The LPA was the culmination of a four-year long effort, initiated and led by the ECA, to undertake an agonising review of the development paradigms and strategies that Africa had pursued since independence in 1960. The review was prompted by the United Nations General Assembly which called upon the ECA, together with the other regional economic commissions (ECE, ESCAP, ECLAC and ECWA), to undertake an assessment of long-term development trends covering the period 1960 to 1975.

The findings were quite sobering. Africa's performance was substantially below all the targets set by the UN Second Development Decade. Its GDP annual growth rate was 4.5 percent instead of the target of 6.0 percent; its export was 2.8 percent instead of 7.00 percent; its agricultural growth rate was 1.6 percent instead of the target rate of 4.00 percent while manufacturing grew at 6.0 percent instead of the target of 8.00 percent. The only macroeconomic aggregate whose performance exceeded target was import with actual growth rate per annum being 10.0 percent instead of the target of 7.0 percent.

The assessment showed unmistakably that Africa was faced with a development crisis of great portent. Indeed of all the five United Nations regions, performance in the Africa region was the worst. I had therefore no other choice but to raise the alarm at the Kinshasha meeting of the ECA Conference of Ministers responsible Economic Planning and Development and Finance in February 1977.

Even the overall regional picture concealed the growing differentiations among the different sub-regions and countries. Only eight countries managed to achieve the targets. The rest of the continent were well below those targets. However, the tragic irony of this evolving saga is that performance during the remaining one quarter of the twentieth century (1975-2000) was more abysmal than that achieved during the first decade and a half of independent Africa (1960-1975). The average annual rate of growth in per capita GDP of Sub-Sahara Africa has been negative for thirty five years – 1965 to 2000. North Africa's negative GDP per capita growth was limited to the 1980s only. Sub Sahara Africa's GDP growth rate averaged only 2.6 percent during this period whereas its population growth rate was 2.7 to 2.8 percent per annum. In retrospect, the period 1960 to 1975 has, tragically, turned out to be Africa's golden era!

Thus, in spite of Africa's ample natural resources, of a favourable population to natural resources ratio, in spite of the generous and even indiscriminate incentives for foreign private enterprise and in spite of adherence to orthodox theories and prescriptions, neither high rates of growth nor of diversification nor an increasing measure of self-reliance and socio-economic dynamism has been within the reach of African countries. It had become crystal clear that Africa's persistent failure to decolonise its political economy by confronting the past and making necessary changes has continued to impede its much needed socio-economic and political transformation. By trying to march towards its future hand-in-hand with its colonial, monocultural, low-productivity and excessively dependent and open economy, Africa has ensured no dignified future for itself.

This is the more so as the tropical commodities produced in the continent for export is characterised by highly income-inelastic demand while supply is price-elastic with the consequent boom-and-bust economic cycles that are frequently the plight of African countries. Commodity booms resulting in high export earnings invariably lead to increased public expenditure. Given the perennial price instability of these commodities–including petroleum—a bust sooner or later follows resulting in severe damage to the economy and reduction in essential public services that are grossly inadequate even in the best of circumstance.

Accordingly, it became imperative to embark in earnest on a search for an African development paradigm that was not imitative of the dominant growth economics of the industrialised market economies with its principal concern on increasing the growth of the nation rather than the development of the people. There was no doubt that the received neoclassical paradigm peddled by the operators of the DMS was inappropriate for Africa. The two-gap model which gave foreign capital and foreign aid a central place in the development process was inspired by the outstanding success of the Marshall Plan in bringing about the economic reconstruction of Western Europe after World War II. Unfortunately, this model is appropriate only to developed industrialised market economies, not to under-developed, backward and traditional economies.

It must also be remembered that it was during the 1970s that the demand for a New International Economic Order was intense. Given the poor performance of the African economy between 1960 and 1975 and the realisation that the continent was faced with a development crisis of great portent, it was important that it should first put its house in order – otherwise, it would remain marginalised and peripheralised even in the reconstructed international economy that would be the consequence of such a New International Economic Order.

Accordingly, the ECA came out in 1976, with its first landmark document entitled the ***Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Order in Africa*** which was the intellectual and theoretical foundation upon which the ***Monrovia Strategy*** (1979) and ***The Lagos Plan Action*** and the ***Final Act of Lagos*** (1980) were subsequently built.

It was the ***Revised Framework*** which postulated that a credible and appropriate development strategy for Africa must satisfy four fundamental principles– self-reliance, self-sustainment, the democratisation of the development process and a fair and just distribution of the fruit of development through the progressive eradication of unemployment and mass poverty.

An increasing measure of self-reliant and self-sustaining development is the only way of achieving economic decolonisation through transformation and diversification by promoting sustainable human development. In other words, the process of self-reliance involves

- the internalisation of the forces of demand which determine the direction of development and economic growth process and patterns of output;
- increasing substitution of domestic factor inputs for external factor inputs;
- increasing participation of the mass of the people in the production and consumption of the social product; and,
- increasing self-sustainment through the promotion of the patterns and process of a holistic human development in which the different sectors and sub-sectors, and programmes and activities mutually support and reinforce each other, so that when related to the internalisation of the forces determining demand and supply, the whole economic, social and political system develops its own internal dynamics.

Therefore, in seeking a new and effective partnership with the international community which could lead to a Marshall Plan for Africa's recovery, NEPAD must not compromise these cardinal principles, which were at the heart of the LPA, AAF-SAP and the Charter — self-reliance, self-sustainment, socio-economic transformation, holistic human development and the democratisation of the development process. In other words, NEPAD, in seeking to draw more resources from the donor community and more direct supervision from the various international institutions, particularly the World Bank and the IMF that have directed the development path of virtually all African countries since independence and more so since the 1980s, must ensure that the African people and their governments occupy the drivers' seats of their development train. Indeed, in the Omega Plan which together with the Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP) constitutes NEPAD, it had been suggested that the management and administration of the African initiative should be entrusted to a board of directors comprising debtor and creditor representatives, IMF, World Bank, European Union, Japan, USA and Canada. This is worrisome. It will exacerbate neo-colonialism rather than advance the cause of economic decolonisation. In other words, NEPAD should aim to let Africa loose from the noose of both multilateral and bilateral financial institutions rather than tighten it. It should not be predicated on the assumption that its goals will be unattainable without tightening further the colonial umbilical cord.

Quite understandably the NEPAD song is at present more soothing to the ears of the West than that of the LPA. The DMS and its marabous appear to have been re-energised and the two-gap model of economic growth which drew African countries into the debt trap has been reactivated and rejuvenated. The protagonists of NEPAD should never forget that it was this model that exacerbated the dependency syndrome of the African economies and at the same time led to mass pauperisation and deprivation of the African people. This means that we must have another look at the clamour for a Marshall Plan for Africa.

NEPAD and the Marshall Plan – What resemblance?

From time to time in the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries have made requests for another Marshall Plan whose primary objective will be to accelerate their development not only through the provisions of massive financial resources but also through large scale transfer of technology available in the advanced countries. It is interesting and remarkable that NEPAD should revive this call, even after more than four decades of aid and technical assistance. In some of the references to and comments on it, the impression is given that NEPAD is either perceived as the African version of the Marshall Plan or as a prelude to it. For example, the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chreten who visited a number of African countries –Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa Mozambique, Ethiopia and Senegal– in April 2002 is convinced that NEPAD has been modelled on the Marshall Plan. However, in some African circles, the view is that the new African initiative could lead to a Marshall Plan for Africa's recovery. But there are fundamental differences between the original Marshall Plan and the African resurrected Marshall Plan, NEPAD.

Unlike NEPAD, which has been initiated and prepared by the African countries, the Marshall Plan was a joint endeavour of the war-devastated European countries (the recipients) and the United States (the donor) for a period of four to five years. In addition, the US sponsored the creation of the organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) to aid in the administration of the Plan. And based on this model, the US supported the creation, in the 1960s, of the Alliance for Progress among the governments in the western hemisphere to coordinate and monitor the use of American aid. Similarly, the British Government established the Colombo Plan — an economic development Plan directed at the former British colonies in Asia.

The Marshal Plan no doubt contributed largely to pulling Western Europe out of the ruins of World War II. It assisted the participating European countries to rebuild their capital base and their public buildings and infrastructure and to reorganise their completely devastated national economies. It is because of the tremendous impact of the Plan in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economy of war-torn Europe that developing countries have felt that what is needed to get them out of their economic quagmire was another Marshall Plan, not only through the provision of massive financial resources but also through the large-scale transfer of technology.

This desire completely ignores the fundamental difference between the conditions which had prevailed in post-world War II Europe and those of contemporary developing countries. Europe was before the war a developed industrialised market economy. What the plan did was simply to facilitate, within a time frame of four to five years, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of what had existed before the war. A favourable human factor was still in place in spite of the war. So did appropriate institutional framework and an enabling environment exist. In such circumstances the two-gap model was appropriate. But this is not the case so far as the conditions in developing countries, particularly Africa, are concerned. What they need is not rehabilitation and reconstruction but building anew, transforming their polity and its economy and putting in place all the essential infrastructure required for development to take off and become sustained. In other words, the four imperatives advocated in the African development paradigms – self-reliance, self-sustainment encompassing socio-economic transformation accompanied by the politics and policy of restitution, holistic human development and the democratisation of the development process are imperative. Indeed, as I stated in one of my valedictory statements to the OAU in May/June 1991 as ECA's Chief Executive, what we need is a

New African transformation ethic based on a human-centred development paradigm which puts the people at the centre of the development process, on the driving seat as it were and is predicated, above all, on the rational proposition that development has to be engineered and sustained by the people themselves through their full and active participation. In other words, the new African transformation ethic rests on the firm belief that development should not be undertaken on behalf of a people; rather, that it should be the organic outcome of a society's value system, its perceptions, its concerns and its endeavours.[1]

Of course, African leaders in charge of the preparation and implementation of NEPAD have been arguing that its fundamentals are not different from those of the LPA, that NEPAD provides the framework for pursuing Africa's indigenous development agenda as against the prescription usually foisted by the DMS. However such a stance will seem spurious in view of the fact that NEPAD's underlying assumption is that more aid and freer trade will flow to Africa. It has been postulated in NEPAD that if Africa is to begin to exit from poverty, it needs to achieve consistently a GDP growth rate of 7.0 percent per annum and that given its present low saving and investment ratio, the continent would need some $64.0 billion of resource inflows every year. This is about 12.75 per cent of Africa's gross national income per annum. Of course, it far exceeds all ODA flows to all countries (parts I and II countries), which stood at US$ 62.57 billion in 1999[2].

This expectation contradicts the new development cooperation paradigm, which has emerged since globalisation replaced superpower geopolitics as both the driving force and organising principle. First, the stronger motivating force of national self-interest has changed to the speeding-up of global economic integration and using aid resources to address cross-border problems which are of direct concern to the donor countries as much as they are to the recipient nations. These cross-border challenges include the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, degradation of the national environment and organised international crime. These problems are now perceived to demand new global or regional actions and new uses of foreign aid to provide an array of international public goods.

This shift from geopolitics to globalisation is being complemented by a move away from special treatment for individual countries in mitigating their systematic market failures and structural weakness to accelerated integration of these countries into the world economy and into the management of shared problems which stem from rapid global integration — in other

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[1] *Adebayo Adedeji, Preparing Africa for the Twenty-first Century: (Agenda for the 1990s ECA, 1991 Addis Ababa): p. 49*
[2] *World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001 (Washington D.C 2001); p. 344*

words, strengthening the hold of the DMS by tying the African canoe firmly to the West's neo-liberal ship on the waters of globalisation.

The third shift is from an entitlement to an effectiveness approach in the provision of development assistance, which is reflected in the move by donors to greater selectivity in allocating aid among recipients. Such selections are biased in favour of performance in areas of macro-economic policy, poverty reduction and the exercise of good governance. The assessment of performance is of course usually that of the donor rather than of the recipient. Inevitably, it is their standards that will be imposed on Africa and whenever they conclude that such standards are not met they will withhold aid. Herein lies the unwisdom of making aid a major factor in NEPAD. Every time the behaviour or performance of one African country or a group of countries is adjudged not satisfactory a cloud would hang over the project and the whole of Africa, not just the erring country. The whole continent will be lumped together and collectively vilified. An African Review Mechanism (APRM) provided for in the project will only work if its judgment always falls in line with that of the donors. Whenever it does not, the aid may stop flowing and the trade may become less free. Unfortunately, whenever any African country falls short of donors' expectations, it is not only that country that is condemned, there is also a collective criticism and stigmatisation of the entire region or sub-region.

There is always a childlike naivety among African leaders and policy makers that rhetoric and reality are the same and that claiming ownership tantamounts to having ownership. It is the Africans who are claiming that they are forging a partnership. The other side will no doubt continue to see it as a donor-recipient relationship. With perhaps a greater of degree of humanitarian benevolence but nevertheless with a determination to behave in accordance and consistent with the dictates of the new development cooperation paradigm discussed above.

If there is any doubt about this the outcome of the recently held and much heralded Monterrey UN Conference on Financing for Development has made it abundantly clear that there are no radical changes in policy and attitude in the offing. Rather the Monterrey Consensus represents a surrender by the UN to the economic neo-liberalism of the Bretton Woods institutions and by giving their policies such a UN imprimatur, the Bretton Woods institutions have been encouraged to continue to do more of the same. Even the US$ 50 billion per year, which has been estimated, as the additional resources required for achieving the 2015 Millennium goals world-wide is a non-binding and best endeavour commitment. The US bluntly refused to accept this or any other target. In fact the environment of falling official development assistance (ODA) is projected to persist and even fall further in the foreseeable future. Yet Africa alone is hoping under NEPAD to attract US$ 64.0 billion every year–for an unlimited period!

The damaging surrender by the UN to the Washington Consensus manifests itself most glaringly where the Monterrey Consensus endorses the discredited HIPC (Heavily Indebted for Countries) initiative. No new and innovative proposals achieved a consensus. Consequently in spite of Monterrey the creditor nations retained their right to continue to keep the debtor countries on a short leash with the powers of the Paris and London Clubs of creditor countries remaining in tact.

Partnership between Donors and Recipients: Lessons of experience

In the realm of international cooperation, the vogue-word is ***partnership***. The word ***cooperation*** is no longer deemed adequate while ***compact*** is considered too strong because it implies making binding commitments. The concept of partnership conveys a relationship stronger than cooperation but weaker than a compact. It involves joint effort, joint responsibility but this does not always result or bring about binding commitments. However, more often than not, the three concepts are used interchangeably as if they are synonymous. And sometimes they are even lumped together. Thus in his preface to the **United Nations New agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s** (UN-NADAF), Ambassador Martin Huslid of Norway who was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the General Assembly on the Review and Appraisal of UNPAAERD wrote about "shared responsibility and full partnership" between Africa and the international community.[3]

The concept of interdependence no doubt captures the essence of partnership and international cooperation. However, as long as the objective of the developed countries is to maintain their economic progress along the present lines, the relations between the North and the South in general and Africa in particular will continue to be characterized by a domination of the strong over the weak, a drain of resources from the poor nations to the rich, and appropriation of an increasing share of the world's resources by those who are already prosperous. This is a travesty of cooperation, partnership and interdependence. This is more aptly described as feudo-imperial partnership and interdependence.

[3] UN-NADAF, Preface, p.9

It has been argued by scholars that this has been the essence of the Europe–Africa cooperation which was crafted immediately after independence in 1960 in response to the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC). Barely three years after independence, there was the so-called Yaounde I (1963-69) which signalled the cooperation between the EEC and francophone Africa. It was followed by Yaounde II (1969-75) agreement.

By 1973, the African partners in the Yaounde Convention had become disillusioned. The membership of the EEC by the United Kingdom also necessitated the need to widen the scope of African participation and to include the Caribbean and Pacific anglophone countries. Consequently, the 46–nation African Caribbean Pacific Association (ACP) was established which entered into an agreement in 1975 with the EEC of 9 countries (Lome I). Lome I effectively replaced the Yaounde convention. Between 1975 and 2000 there have been four Lome conventions with each succeeding one altering significantly the nature of the partnership between the parties concerned to the detriment of the ACP countries.

The first Lome Convention was very much a child of the geopolitical power of ACP countries in the context of the Cold War, the oil crisis and the demand for a new international economic order. Not surprisingly, therefore, equal partnership between both parties was its cornerstone. Not only did the convention concede to the ACP countries responsibility for their own development, it also gave them a lead role in managing the resources made available by the EEC with the latter playing a supportive role only. Secondly, predictable aid flows over the five-year period of the convention as well as non-reciprocal trade benefits were guaranteed. Two major innovations were introduced on commodities – the stabex scheme which was intended to help stabilise export receipts on a wide range of agricultural products (cocoa, coffee, groundnuts, tea etc) was introduced under Lome I while the Sysmin mechanism was introduced to stabilise export earnings from mineral resources in Lome II.

While continuity has been a key feature of successive Lome Conventions, each succeeding agreement changed the nature of the cooperation to the disadvantage of the ACP countries. In fact, after 1990 the Lome agreement came under growing pressure due to

- dwindling common interests and the disappearance of the perceived mutual interdependence between Europe and the ACP countries
- the insistence on human rights and structural adjustment in Lome IV
- the downgrading of ACP countries on the EEC (now EU) priority list in terms of geopolitical, economic and security concerns
- the erosion of the principle of equal partnership and its replacement by conditionality
- despite preferential access to EU markets the persistent decline of ACP countries share in EU market – from 6.7 percent in 1976 to 3.0 percent in 1998

- the lack of a breakthrough in diversification away from traditional exports continues to concentrate exports in only ten products
- Falling share of ACP in EU aid. Whereas in 1986, ACP received 69 percent of total EU ODA, in 1990, 1994 and 1998 ACP's shares were 58, 44 and 29 percent respectively. Overall, ACP's share of ODA from the EU between 1986 and 1998 was 44 percent.

Ironically, the successor agreement to Lome IV which was signed in Cotonou in June 2000 has been christened ACP–EU Partnership Agreement! It reflects contemporary geopolitical situation which contrasts sharply with that of the 1970s and the worsening vulnerability of the countries of the South in general and of Africa in particular. Thus, the Cotonou Agreement provides for

- The new conditionality of good governance
- Direct dealing with non-state actors and local authorities
- The cessation by 31 December 2007 of the current all–ACP non reciprocal tariff preferences and the replacement thereof by a set of reciprocal Ecnomic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
- The programming of aid resources as a strategic management tool, aimed at ensuring that the EU support to any ACP country or region is deployed in much more effective and coherent manner.

In all, there are now 78 ACP countries; 48 of these are African countries. Among the EU countries are four of the members of G8 – Germany, UK, France and Italy. Will these four countries treat Africa more generously under NEPAD than they have treated it under the Younde, and Lome and will treat it under the Cotonou accords since 1963?

Will the G8 Summit in Canada in June 2002 result in a compact which will

- be biding on both Africa and the international community?
- state specific obligations and specific goals and measures to be undertaken by both sides?
- be operational and quantifiable with specific targets and timeframe and be monitorable?
- put in place an appropriate monitoring mechanism as an integral part of the compact?

If this is not the case, then the whole process will tantamount to much-ado-about-nothing.

NEPAD and the Constitutive Act

The NEPAD Initiative came a year after the adoption of the Constitutive Act which establishes the African Union in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the OAU Charter and the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. Just as the NEPAD initiative has been slated by its sponsors to supersede all other partnership initiatives so has the African Union been perceived as the most pre-eminent initiative, which has emanated from Africa since independence. If it is successful, the AU will accelerate the process of implementing the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and the Final Act of Lagos of 1980.

Pan Africanism has for long been the idealistic aspiration of the peoples of Africa and of Africans in diaspora. This was one of the consequences of the long period of slavery to which Africa and its people were subjected from the 15th to the 19th centuries. The Pan-African movement stretches back to the 18th century although the first Pan-African Congress was not held until 1990. But it was not until the 1945 Pan African Congress – the fifth in the series – that the Africans played a prominent role and African issues received priority attention. Indeed, at the beginning of the struggle for independence in Africa, supra-national pan-Africanism was the rallying point for independence and economic declonisation.

Although separatism and irredentism set in as the colonial era was drawing to a close and independence was approaching, fortunately independent Africa emerged during the age of regional integration. After World War II, the promotion of regional integration became a global phenomenon. This movement was led by the Europeans whose post-World War II effort, which began with the Marshall Plan of 1945 culminated in the establishment of the six-nation EEC in 1957. The Latin American countries followed this lead by establishing their Free Trade Association in 1960 and this was followed by the Central American Common Market in 1961 and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.

To counter the irredentist movements by ethnic minorities within the newly emerging states and to begin to undo the cumulative disastrous impact of five centuries of four millstones of dispossession, colonization, dependence and marginalisation that have hung around Africa's neck, regionalism was considered an imperative. Pan Africanists believed that it would pave the way to the resuscitation of pan-Africanism. This explains the relentless search for regional and sub-regional integration even in the face of many disappointing failures. It was Africa's Hobson's choice in the light of its legacy of balkanisation, fragmentation and economic monoculturalism.

It was therefore to be expected that at the heart of the LPA was regional development, integration and transformation. These can only be achieved through such interdependent processes as

1. the integration of the physical, institutional and social infrastructure
2. the integration of the production structures
3. market integration
4. resolution of inter country conflicts and prevention of acts of political destabilization
5. ensuring stability and security both at nation-state and inter-country levels
6. the creation of an enabling environment for initiative and enterprise as well as facilitating cross-border factor movements.

Consequently, seven of the LPA's thirteen chapters focus on Africa's regional strategic sectors—food and agriculture, industry, human resources, transport and communications environmental protection, science and technology, gender etc. Both NEPAD and the Constitutive Act have similarly identified these sectors as of primary interest to regional transformation and development. NEPAD sees them as constituting the nexus for the provision of essential regional public goods. And the Constitutive Act assigns them to the second most important organ of the AU – the Executive Council. But nowhere in the Act has NEPAD been mentioned. And hardly are there references to the Constitutive Act in NEPAD.

Are both intended to work along parallel lines? The impression is given, perhaps inadvertently, that although the AU is the supreme body – having replaced the OAU – NEPAD is special and is not to be integrated into the AU. It has its own organs which are quite different from those of the AU. In this transitional period this is permissible but once the AU takes root and its various organs begin to function, rationalistation between them and those of NEPAD becomes crucial. How will the NEPAD Implementation Committee of Heads of States and Government relate to the AU Executive Council? Will the NEPAD Secretariat now being set up not in Addis Ababa but in Pictoria remain a separate and independent entity? Will it be absorbed by the Commission of the Union – which is the Secretariat of the Union – once it becomes operational? These are indeed many substantive issues where reconciliation and clarity is needed in the relationship between AU and NEPAD.

But one great deficiency which they both share and which has to be put right is that they are top-down rather than bottom-up initiatives. While it is the responsibility of political leaders to take policy and political initiatives, their effort will be in vain if they are unable to carry their people with them. Both were prepared without consultation with the stakeholders of

Africa’s development. No public discourse or debate has been held on both in majority of African countries. It is even doubtful if national parliaments have been fully engaged in both processes. Yet both claim that the promotion of democratic principles and instituting popular participation and good governance as one of their main objectives. The African ownership which is claimed for them is no more than the ownership of the heads of government and their immediate advisers. This must be corrected without further delay.

Concluding Remarks

The renewed determination of African leaders to press forward with pan-Africanism and to reactivate and rejuvenate inter and intra African partnership and partnership between Africa and the international community at the dawn of the 21^{st} century is of tremendous historic significance. This renewed effort to take the front seat in forging the future of the continent is commendable and must be pursued relentlessly. However this must not be done at the expense of principles enshrined in the LPA i.e. at the expense of principles and paradigms without which structural transformation and socio-economic diversification will continue to elude Africa.

As for the international community, they must move from mere expression of solidarity and enter into a compact with Africa which will be in support of development goals mapped out by Africa with the resources and policies of the international partners being devoted to achieving those Africa-determined goals. But first and foremost, the debt problem must be resolved and conditionalities and cross-conditionaliteis must become a matter of the past.

Africa must take all measurements to put the AU on a firm, solid and sustainable foundation. It is principally by so doing that it will not merely leapfrog but actually race into the twenty-first century. This requires fundamental reshaping of the political economies, the democratisatioan of the development process and the ushering of a new national and regional economic order. The African states and leadership must become, once again, developmental.