The future role of a new UN mission in Angola

Dame Margaret Anstee, referring to the impossible mission she was given when heading the UNAVEM II mission to Angola in 1991 and 1992 was once quoted as saying: "The UN has given me a 747 to pilot, with only enough fuel for a DC3." So how can the UN get it right next time? The objective of this workshop was to have a discussion over concrete suggestions for the future role of the UN in Angola (if there is to be a future role).

Although the participants were asked not to dwell too much on the past, a few remarks were made regarding the UN's track record in Angola. After all, the UN has spent a lot of money in Angola. It cannot be said that the UN accomplished nothing. Some of the military actions such as the clearing of land mines in some areas were effective. The importance of this particular action was that it created freedom of movement, which is a pre-condition to national reconciliation and therefor peace. But it is equally clear that the UN should have done more. It must be considered where and why its first efforts failed. The UN was unable to prevent Angola from returning to war, which may have been partly due to an inability to find the appropriate people and put them in the right positions. But there were more underlying causes involved. A significant, felt problem with the UN in Angola was its lack of transparency. This was particularly the case with regard to the de-mobilisation campaign. In addition, over the last few years, the UN has failed to recognise and prioritise human rights. While warring parties were fighting and killing people, the UN simply collected data. Many people asked for data, but no one was allowed access. This was a key problem, which officials at the UN have also (privately) expressed.

So the UN needs to fulfil a number of vital requirements if it is to play a useful role in any future Angolan operation. Unsurprisingly, transparency should be top of the agenda. If UN officials are alleged to be involved in corruption, mismanagement, etc., then it must inform the public of its position. Transparency (of the UN and governments) was more evident in, for example, Cambodia than in countries like Angola. And in Rwanda and Haiti for example, data were collected and published effectively. Clearly, there is also a case for a mandate which actively promotes human rights and does not put them on the backburner for the sake of having peace and reconciliation. The workshop came up with a wish-list of issues to be put in a possible future UN mandate for operations in Angola. These included Human Rights monitoring, information and media support, strengthening of civil society, in particular:

– protecting civil space

– enlarging civil space

– supporting conciliatory initiatives

– And, finally, the UN must find the right person for the right place. Otherwise, its presence in Angola will be deeply compromised. On the other hand, the situation in Angola is complex, and the UN must not be a 'scapegoat' for its failures.

Quite a lot was said about who the UN should be working with. It was felt that the practice of reducing it to a small circle of officials and leaders was insufficient. After all, even Angolan leaders themselves feel it is important to understand the Angolan situation by reference to its people and culture. Furthermore, it is very important to deal with "grass-roots" people. Civil society must be involved. The UN in particular need to have this understanding. It is also important to deal with UNITA, however difficult.

The question really is: how can the UN involve all stakeholders in developing a short, medium and long-term vision? The first requirement for answering that question is to talk to those stakeholders. Consequently, it was suggested that the UN could help support the civil society organisations through direct support. There have been some comparable experiences with the UN and civil society organisations in Cambodia. One ought to learn from these early UN experiences and act upon them. Other peace-keeping operations have indeed shown that it is possible for the UN to help by directly involving civil society organisations, which are otherwise seen as a threat. Since the UN recognises the government as legitimate, it can ask for greater access for civil societies in Angola. Not all civil society organisations are welcome and individuals are sometimes detained. Journalists, teachers are being put on trial. Any action by civil society, however just, can be seen by the government as an act of rebellion. But one can be thankful that these people and organisations continue.

It is a delicate situation that the UN should learn to handle. How should the UN contribute to the creation of a democratic culture from the 'bottom-up'? The UN must allow greater access to negotiations by other parties. Civil society becomes weak if it is not involved in the negotiation process. Strengthening civil society could bring success. There is, for example, a small group of people working on human rights. Before the Lusaka accords there were many more. The UN Division of Human Rights should be reinforced and its support to local human rights groups and information activities expanded. The UN should keep a space open for human rights organisations to work, and give them an opportunity to present their views. What people really miss is a political discussion, picking up ideas from civil society and supporting them. Also, the churches in Angola have made much effort to be involved (food, lodging, etc.), but the UN was unable to understand this role.

The UN could thus contribute to what was termed by one participant 'the politics of inclusion', so woefully absent in Angola today. That also means working in practical terms. For instance, given that human rights violations, conducted with impunity, lead to 'vicious circles' of impunity, what do you do after human rights violations are first detected? The UN record in Angola is notoriously poor here.

Finally, it is important to bear in mind how Angolan people are suffering. Those people who have decision-making power over policy, military and economy also need to understand this. It is equally important to have a medium and long-term framework, even if people are involved in short-term actions. Angola needs more than just short-term solutions. Most of all, Angola needs an inclusive way of working, including the presence of the UN.