

War and peace in Sierra Leone

In March 1991 the war in Sierra Leone began when a few hundred men crossed over the Liberian border and attacked towns in eastern and southern Sierra Leone. A coup in Freetown in May 1992 allowed the rebel incursions to continue, and in late 1992 the RUF captured Kono, the diamond mining capital of Sierra Leone. The country's new ruling body, the National Provincial Ruling Council (NPRC) launched Operation Genesis to defeat the rebels but had little success.

In early 1996 elections were held in Sierra Leone and the RUF were invited to participate. They refused and launched a terrifying and brutal campaign of intimidation against voters and children, using amputation of hands and feet. The eventual victor in the elections was President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who accelerated efforts to reach a peace agreement with the RUF. In November 1996 a peace agreement was signed in Abidjan. However, a few months later the RUF collaborated with rogue elements in the Sierra Leonean army and overthrew Kabbah. The Armed Forces Ruling

Council (AFRC) was formed to rule the country. The Nigerian led forces of the Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) finally drove the AFRC from Freetown in February 1998 and reinstated Kabbah.

The RUF and renegade soldiers withdrew into the bush and, by late 1998, they had re-taken the Kono diamond district. In January 1999, they launched a brutal onslaught on Freetown, killing an estimated 6,000 civilians and mutilating many more. The government were forced to sign a second peace agreement in July 1999 in Lomé, Togo, which legitimised the RUF and brought it into the government with several cabinet positions. The RUF leader, Corporal Foday Saybanah Sankoh was appointed a Vice-President and Chairman of a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development.

In March 2003, the UN Special Court in Sierra Leone indicted several of those involved in the civil war in Sierra Leone for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of international humanitarian law. The crimes alleged in the indictments include murder, rape, extermination, acts of terror, enslavement, looting and burning, sexual slavery, conscription of children into an armed force, and attacks on UNAMSIL peacekeepers and humanitarian assistance workers.



©UNICEF/HORB-0566/GIACOMO PROZZI

A teenager who lost both hands to rebels' machetes, Waterloo Camp, Sierra Leone, 1998

President Charles Taylor



Charles Taylor

President Taylor uses many forms of political manipulation. An example uncovered by Global Witness is his use of what is effectively an escort agency in Monrovia. The agency, which has twenty women on its books, is called 'Diakbahnah Movement' and is run by Emma Smallwood, a cousin of President

Taylor, who personally supervises the selection of the women. The women (who are offered scholarships, clothes, an apartment and US\$200) and who are then used to blackmail members of the international community based in Monrovia. Arms smuggled into Liberia are stored under President Taylor's villa in Monrovia Yassa Zoe. This secret bunker is known to Taylor and his close circle as White Flower, his nickname for his mother; stretches the length of Taylor's swimming pool and tennis court.¹³⁷



©ALLABOUTLIBERIA.COM

President Taylor's mansion

March 2001: al Qaeda operatives returned to Liberia from Pakistan



Main name
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed

Liberia Visa
Mohammad D. Keneme


Known as
Kene



Main name
Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani

Liberia Visa
Soulemani M Guessen

Known as
Sule



Main name
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah

Liberia Visa
N/A

Known as
Moustafa

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
MONROVIA

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
Immigration Commander
Roberts International Airport
Margibi County
Republic of Liberia

AIRPORT VISA

MOHAMMAD D. KENEME YEMENESE

is due to arrive in Liberia via
Airport

guest(s) of Mr. Abrahima Bah
Sinkor Telephone No.

You are further directed to allow him

Visa waiver form for Fazul Abdullah Mohammed

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
MONROVIA, LIBERIA

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
Immigration Commander
Roberts International Airport
Margibi County
Republic of Liberia

AIRPORT VISA NO. 011/ BIN

AIRPORT VISA

SOULEMANI M. GUESSEN YEMENESE xxxxxxxx National(s)

is due to arrive in Liberia via Roberts International
Airport without the necessary Entry Visa(s), as a

guest(s) of Mr. Abrahima Bah of 15th Street,
Sinkor Telephone No.

You are further directed to allow him to enter and indicate in his
Passport (s) "SEEN ON ARRIVAL" or grant unto him a period which he
intend(s) to temporarily stay in Liberia, but not to exceed the statutorily required period.

Visa waiver form for Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani

March 2001

March 2001 saw the beginning of a nine month joint diamond buying operation by al Qaeda operatives in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

In March 2001, Ghailani and Mohammed, returned to Liberia. They travelled from Burkina Faso where they had been living under the protection of Burkinabe President Compaore.¹⁴⁶ Their visa waiver forms show that they had been invited by Bah and were using false names and nationalities. Whilst in Sierra Leone and Liberia they used the names Mohammad D. Keneme and Soulemani M. Guessan as is detailed on the waiver forms.

As can be seen from the forms they were claiming Yemeni nationality. This is an unusual security lapse on the part of al Qaeda, as Yemen has no known connections to the diamond trade but is heavily associated with al Qaeda. It would have been far less conspicuous to use West African passports, which they could easily have obtained.^{oo} (Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, a colleague of Ghailani and Mohammed in Kenya and Tanzania who was convicted for the Kenyan embassy bombing, was caught on 7 August 1998 in Pakistan while travelling on a fake Yemeni passport.⁹³) Ghailani and Mohammed were indicted in September 1998 in the United States for their involvement in the bombings of the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.^{pp}

Several eyewitnesses to events have identified Guessan as Ghailani and Keneme as Mohammed.^{137/139} A lawyer employed by Ossaily has stated that Ossaily positively identified one of the two al Qaeda suspects whilst in detention in Antwerp.¹⁴⁷

Ghailani had extensive experience of diamond trading across Africa, and after moving from the Hotel Boulevard to the safe-house set up in late January, he described having carried out such work in Congo-Brazzaville, the CAR and having recently been involved in diamond trading in Uganda and the DRC. He stated that whilst he was in the DRC he had been involved in a diamond mining operation near the Zambian border, and had travelled into UNITA territory

^{oo} Soon after Ghailani and Mohammed arrived they were mistakenly arrested by the Liberian police for illegal diamond trading. However, the Liberian authorities were quickly advised of their arrest and Lieutenant Macifierran Momo Jibba (also known as Jebba), President Taylor's Senior Aide-de-Camp and Battalion Commander of the ATU) ensured their release.¹³⁷.

^{pp} Ghailani told a source in the safe house in Monrovia that he had previously lived in Kenya and Tanzania. Both he and Mohammed spoke Swahili, Arabic and French.¹³⁷.

⁹³ Macky was a director of ASA Diam from 1994 –2000.

^{rr} Bah has stated that on 1 April 2001 he moved to the safe house rented by Darwish and stayed there until 23 July 2001, when he left for Burkina Faso.

in Angola to buy diamonds.¹³⁷

The two operatives initially stayed at the Hotel Boulevard. Ossaily was also staying in the Hotel Boulevard at this time with his girlfriend Nora Vlasselearts, Abbas Jawad Macky⁹⁹ and Ly Samba. After a few days Mohammed left for Kono to oversee the diamond-buying operation there and Ghailani moved to the safe house to oversee the Liberian end of the operation. His role was to move the money and diamonds between Kono and Monrovia.

At this stage in the operation there were concerns by the al Qaeda operatives and Darwish that Ossaily was becoming too high profile in Monrovia. Ossaily had been drinking heavily, was lavishing money on officials and had been making diamond deals on the side.^{137/139} Nassour recalled Ossaily and Vlasselearts to Antwerp and sent out his cousin Zein Nassour to replace him.¹⁴⁸

April 2001:**Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah returns**

Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, the senior al Qaeda commander who had made al Qaeda's first contact with the RUF in September 1998 arrived back in Monrovia in April 2001 to assume control of the operation. He stayed for a short time at the Boulevard Hotel and then moved to the safe house. In the house, Abdullah controlled all of the finances for the two other al Qaeda operatives. Abdullah apparently had a picture of bin Laden in his room and often played Hizbullah promotional videos showing food distribution in Lebanon and terrorist operations against Israeli troops.¹³⁷ By April a number of the key players were staying at the safe house including Bah,^{rr} Ghailani, Abdullah, Macky and Samba.¹³⁷

May 2001: the UN travel ban

On 7 May 2001, the UNSC passed Resolution 1343 which imposed a global travel ban on key individuals responsible for fuelling the conflict in



Hotel Boulevard

Sierra Leone. Both Nassour and Ossaily were placed on the travel ban list. However, in practice the UN travel ban was wholly ineffectual, as a partial copy of one of Nassour's multiple passports shows.

- On 11 July 2001 he received a Schengen one-month visa from the Spanish Embassy in Beirut (15-07-2001 to 15-08-2001; no. E04203114);
- On 18 July, a visa for a French-speaking African country was given.
- On 19 July there is an entry stamp for the Ivory Coast at Felix Houphouet-Boigny airport.
- On 31 October 2001 he received a two-year Schengen visa for Spain from the Spanish Embassy in Beirut (24-11-2001 to 22-03-2003; no. E0513254)

Nassour admits to travelling to Burkina Faso during May 2001 to meet Bah for a diamond deal.¹⁴⁸ At this meeting he gave Bah US\$50,000. Nassour has admitted to Global Witness that this was a bribe but claims the money was to gain access to a Liberian mobile phone contract.¹⁴⁸ Also in early May 2001, Macky came from Antwerp to Monrovia with US\$1.2 million in cash, US\$600,000 of which was a donation to President Taylor's National Patriotic Party (NPP).^{148/ss}

June 2001: al Qaeda audits the books

In June a fourth al Qaeda operative arrived in Monrovia to audit the accounts of the joint diamond buying operation.

In June Abdullah reported to al Qaeda colleagues that there were concerns about missing money and diamonds and that their partners were not fulfilling the deal. It was decided that a fourth al Qaeda operative should be sent to audit the records in Liberia and Belgium.¹³⁷ Belgian government officials have confirmed that from May 2001 telephone records from ASA Diam show that calls were made to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq.¹⁴⁰ Nassour has admitted to calling a Lebanese

BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
MONROVIA, LIBERIA

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
 t: Immigration Commander
 Roberts International Airport
 Margibi County
 Republic of Liberia

AIRPORT VISA NO. 011/

AIRPORT VISA

Ms. FERIEL SHAHIN * LIBANESE *****

is due to arrive in Liberia via Roberts Internat
 Airport without the necessary Entr
 guest(s) of Mr. Abrahima Bah of 15th St
 Sinkor Telephone No.

You are further directed to allow HER to enter and indicate in Her
 Passport (s) "SEEN ON ARRIVAL" or grant unto HER a period which SE
 intend(s) to temporarily stay in Liberia; but not to exceed the statutorily required period.

You are, therefore, directed to advise the appropriate airline accordingly.
 And for so doing, this shall constitute your legal and sufficient authority.

Given under my hand this 16th day of JUNE
 2001, in the City of Monrovia, Liberia

Visa waiver form for Ferial Shahin

minister who was in Iran on personal business¹⁴⁹ but is at a loss to explain the other calls, stating that anyone could have walked into the office and used the phone.¹⁵⁰ Again Global Witness believes this explanation is not credible and notes that the timing would be consistent with the noted concern about missing money and diamonds by Abdullah and the RUF.

In mid June the al Qaeda operative arrived to audit the books. The Liberian visa waiver form is dated 16 June 2001 and is made out to Ms Ferial Shahin, claiming Lebanese nationality.¹⁵¹ As with Mohammed and Ghailani's visa forms, Shahin came as the guest of Bah who had given the completed visa waiver form to Abdullah. The form was apparently faxed to Quetta in Pakistan.^{137/uu} While in Monrovia, Shahin met with Eddie Kanneh, the person then responsible for transferring the RUF's money and diamonds, and the RUF's spokesman, Gibril Massaquoi, presumably as part of this financial investigation. Prior to her arrival in Liberia Shahin apparently spent several days in the office of ASA Diam in Antwerp.¹³⁷

^{ss} This caused the Chairman of the NPP, Cyril Allen, considerable problems, as he was later accused by President Taylor of stealing some of the money and was sacked as NPP Chairman.

^{tt} In December 2001 accusations were detailed by Sesay that Bah had stolen money from the operation.

^{uu} Quetta has no known diamond trading or cutting facilities but it is an al Qaeda operations base.

A source interviewed by Global Witness has confirmed that Shahin stayed for only one week in the safe house. In late June 2001 Shahin left Liberia along with Ghailani and Mohammed. Pakistani intelligence sources have confirmed that the three travelled back to Afghanistan in late June 2001, via Shahrah-e-Faisal, Karachi, Pakistan, where they stayed in a hotel for a few days, and then onto Quetta and over the border to Afghanistan, where their trail was lost.¹⁵²

July 2001


In July Nassour made two trips to Liberia.^{146/137} The first was made in early July when he met President Taylor, however Nassour denies the trip took place. He does admit to making the second trip in mid July.

Nassour’s first trip took place in early July. A visa waiver form dated 9 July 2001 shows that Nassour was a guest of ‘Mr Abrahima Bah’ (see Annex 7 page 90). The main purpose of his trip was to ask the RUF commanders to double their diamond production for which Nassour would pay above market prices.¹³⁷ He was also going to challenge Bah about significant sums of money that had disappeared, however Bah left the day before he arrived.¹³⁷ Over the course of the diamond-buying operation it appears that Bah stole nearly US\$500,000 from Nassour, although Nassour states that the total figure was only US\$40,000.¹⁴⁸ A letter to President Taylor written by Sesay, the RUF interim-commander, dated 31 December 2001 seems to confirm that substantial amounts of money were stolen¹⁵³ (see Annex 7 page 89).

On this first trip Nassour met with President Taylor and gave him a US\$250,000 political donation when they met in Maryland County, where Taylor was on a political rally.¹³⁷ On this trip Nassour also met with the Director of the Liberian Special Security Service (SSS) General Benjamin Yeaten.^{137/148} When interviewed by Global Witness Nassour denied ever meeting with President Taylor.¹⁴⁸ Nassour has admitted that he did travel to Liberia but claims he was not there in early July. However the visa waiver form of 9 July together with eyewitness accounts cast doubt on Nassour’s denials. Entry stamps in his passport confirm Nassour’s second visit to Liberia.^w They show that he arrived Abidjan on 19 July and then went to Liberia on 20 July and then left from Abidjan on 24 July. During the second July trip Nassour claims that President Taylor refused to meet with him and as a result

^w Nassour has confirmed that he has at least three other passports, which were not shown to Global Witness; also the passport that was given to Global Witness was not complete with several pages being left out.

Nassour’s Lebanese passport



he was stuck in Monrovia. He admits that he met Bah and Sesay in the Boulevard Hotel on the first night.¹⁴⁸ Both July trips have been confirmed by a European intelligence report into the events which notes that prior to the second trip Nassour had travelled through Dubai, where he picked up US\$1 million in cash, which he later gave to President Taylor.¹⁴⁶ The same report notes that the al Qaeda operatives, Ghailani and Mohammed, were in Ougadougou at this time staying in the presidential complex, Maison des Hotes, in the district of Zone de Bois. The report notes that the two stayed there until the summer of 2002 having recently arrived from Pakistan and were on their way back to Liberia and Sierra Leone.¹⁴⁶

It is probable that Nassour’s visits to President Taylor, Bah and senior RUF commanders in July 2001 were successful and led to an increase in the production of diamonds by the RUF a theory seemingly confirmed by documentation obtained by Global Witness. In July 2001 a letter sent by Sesay to President Taylor notifies him that following President Taylor’s recommendation the RUF will sell all their diamonds to Nassour. (See opposite.)



General Benjamin Yeaten, Director of SSS


Events in Sierra Leone again seem to confirm this agreement. On 19 August 2001, *The Washington Post* reported that the RUF were 'mining at an unprecedented pace' using 'the forced labour of children and young men to greatly expand their diamond mining.'¹⁵⁴ A fifteen-year-old miner, Salu Ansumana, testified to the conditions of slave labour that existed:

'You can see that we are not rich, if we had money, we would not be here. We are working hard for other people, not ourselves. Now I cannot say any more'.¹⁵⁴

Diamonds were also being mined on a twenty-four hour basis, using arc lights. A RUF commander known as Major Nikol stated: 'We are mining now more than ever.'

The operation begins to falter

Despite the increase of diamonds there appeared to be problems with Nassour's cash flow into the operation. In late July the occupants of the house in Monrovia had to sell the generator for US\$4,500 to meet the costs of running the house¹³⁷. This cashflow problem resulted in Nassour being unable to meet the payments for



Letter from Sesay (Cisse) to President Taylor confirming Aziz Nassour's diamond monopoly with the RUF July 2001

the diamonds from Sesay. As a result Sesay withheld the diamonds and kept Mohammed hostage in Kono. He was not released until November 2001 when Nassour paid over US\$84,000, using Ly Samba to take the cash into Liberia. Ghailani had refused to leave Liberia without his colleague. Once the money had been paid over Mohammed returned to Monrovia and then both travelled to the Gbatala ATU camp where they were hidden. In early November Abdullah left Liberia.¹³⁷

November 2001: How *The Washington Post* uncovered the al Qaeda connection

In the aftermath of the al Qaeda attacks on the US, *The Washington Post* journalist Douglas Farah^{ww} was in Abidjan following up an unconfirmed intelligence report that Hizbullah Security Chief, Imad Mughniyah was in Abidjan raising funds for Hizbullah (for information on Mughniyah, see opposite). Farah had with him a copy of a *Newsweek* magazine containing the only known picture of Mughniyah, who is on the FBI's most wanted terrorist list, which also includes al Qaeda operatives. He showed the photograph to RUF and Liberian contacts that might have knowledge of Mughniyah's whereabouts in the Ivory Coast. Although no one had seen Mughniyah, one of his sources did recognise the three al Qaeda operatives who were pictured in the same magazine: Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah; Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Fazul Abdullah Mohammed.¹⁵⁵ The source had detailed knowledge of the three men's previous movements and their mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone to buy diamonds. On 2 November 2001 Farah exposed al Qaeda's diamond buying operation in Sierra Leone and Liberia in *The Washington Post*.⁸

The al Qaeda suspects – band on the run

Following the November 2001 articles in *The Washington Post*, the Pentagon began to take a keen interest in al Qaeda's Sierra Leonean diamond-dealing operations. The DIA began to receive multiple and credible intelligence reports of confirmed sightings of the two al Qaeda operatives, Ghailani and Mohammed.¹⁵⁶ By late November 2001, they were seen in Liberia at the ATU training camp at Gbatala, with two other unidentified Arabs.¹⁴⁶ The latter had been brought in by Nassour to train paramilitaries in weapons, assault tactics, laying landmines and the use of the plastic explosive C4.¹³⁷ US Government sources say that the DIA alerted a Special Forces team in Guinea to ascertain the

Imad Mughniyah

In 2001, *The Washington Post* correspondent Douglas Farah received an unconfirmed intelligence briefing that Imad Mughniyah was in Côte d'Ivoire on a fundraising mission.



Mughniyah is a former specialist with the PLO's elite Force 17, as well as working with its Islamist wing – Ayatollah Khomeini's Fatah Islamists. He joined Hizbullah as a bodyguard to its spiritual leader Sheikh Fadlalah and later became head of external operations.⁸⁴ He is credited with the operation that forced the withdrawal of the US-led Multinational Forces (MNF) that came to oversee the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut in August 1982. Mughniyah is also suspected of having planned and supervised the simultaneous suicide bombings of the US marine barracks and the French paratroop headquarters in Beirut on 18 April, 1983. In response to these attacks, which claimed 241 American and 58 French lives, the multinational peacekeeping force withdrew from Lebanon. According to Gunaratna, it was Mughniyah who inspired bin Laden to develop coordinated, simultaneous attacks as a regular modus operandi. Mughniyah also helped al Qaeda develop their agent-handling systems, having specialised in conducting long-range operations – including the suicide bombing of the Jewish community centre and the Israeli consulate in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 respectively.

whereabouts of the al Qaeda operatives.¹⁵⁶ The Pentagon took the intelligence reports so seriously that a Special Forces team was prepared in Guinea in December 2001. The DIA is quoted in *The Washington Post* as saying:

'We had multiple, reliable intelligence reports that those two [Ghailani and Mohammed] and two others were in Gbatala, and we stood a team up for the snatch, but in the end we couldn't get the 100 percent identification we needed to pull the trigger and cause a possible international incident. After about a week, the group stood down.'¹⁵⁶

The current whereabouts of the al Qaeda operatives is still unknown. European intelligence analysts have confirmed to Global Witness that a US intelligence report stated that the identification papers of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed were found on a body at the airport at Kandahar, Afghanistan by US ground troops.⁸⁶

^{ww}Douglas Farah was the West Africa Bureau Chief for *The Washington Post*.



Map of Liberia showing Gbatata

April 2002: The arrest of Samih Ossaily in Belgium

On 12 April 2002, Ossaily was arrested at Brussels airport. During a subsequent search of his flat in Antwerp important documents and evidence were recovered which confirmed the version of events in Liberia and Sierra Leone described by *The Washington Post* and explored in more detail in this report. These included a copy of the Ivorian EUC, photographs from Sierra Leone showing diamond mining activity in RUF territory, a digital recording of an argument between Ossaily and Nassour over money he owed to Ossaily for work in Liberia, a copy of a notepad with the satellite telephone number of Keneme (Mohammed), and a list of specifications for 20 Draganov sniper rifles.¹⁴⁰ In March 2003, the trial began of Ossaily on charges of money laundering, arms dealing, and dealing in UN embargoed diamonds from Sierra Leone.

May-July 2002: Nassour brings three shipments of weapons into Liberia

Although the Sierra Leonean and Liberian diamond dealing operations of Nassour were in disarray, he and others continued to traffic arms to Liberia.^{xx} Information gathered by Global Witness^{yy} indicates that in May and July Nassour paid for two shipments of arms brought into Harper Port, Liberia. He used a French arms trader based in Paris as the supplier. This middleman was a close contact of Bah's, and had previously supplied arms to Liberia in 1998. Both shipments of weapons and ammunition were sourced in Bulgaria and transited via Nice. The May shipment was destined for RUF commander Sam Bockarie. The 30-ton consignment included 20 Glock submachine guns.¹³⁷ The July shipment

consisted of 15 tons of ammunition in three containers. The containers were checked and unloaded onto trucks by Joachim Touah, assistant director of the SSS, Bah, and members of the ATU and SSS. They were driven to Banga for use against the LURD in Lofa County.¹³⁷

In June 2002, a meeting of those involved in the diamonds-for-arms operations took place in Burkina Faso.¹³⁷ At the meeting were Bah, Bockarie, Jewel Taylor (Charles Taylor's current wife), Colonel Jibret, and Mr Jinjerry, President Compaore's Chief of Security. Jewel Taylor had taken her husband's plane to Man airport in Côte d'Ivoire and from there travelled by road through Côte d'Ivoire to Banga in Burkina Faso (confusingly there is also a Banga in Liberia), and finally to President Compaore's farm. The meeting discussed how to deal with the situation in the light of the recent allegations against Nassour and President Taylor, and the forthcoming Sierra Leone War Crimes court. During the meeting Nassour was offered sanctuary in Liberia by President Taylor, in return for investing in Liberian logging deals, including a concession area for himself in the south east of Liberia. The possibility of shooting down a UN helicopter or plane was discussed in order to destabilise the security situation in Sierra Leone and thus delay the work of the court.¹³⁷ This would have been easily achievable with the arms that had been supplied to the Liberians by Nassour. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, is well aware of this potential danger.¹⁵⁷ Global Witness asked Nassour about this meeting and whether he had been in West Africa in 2002, he responded 'I don't think I went' and said that he would check with his travel agent.¹⁴⁸

What was the value of the al Qaeda diamond trading operation in 2000?

Although it is impossible to put a definitive figure on the amount of money made or laundered by al Qaeda there are indications that it was in the range of tens of millions of dollars and possibly much higher. In 2000, the UN Expert Panel on Sierra Leone estimated that the RUF had mined diamonds with a market value of between US\$25 million and US\$75 million, and a World Bank report estimated that diamond exports from Sierra Leone were worth US\$138 million, of which only US\$1.2 million were legal. If the joint trading operation had been buying diamonds from the RUF for ten months (January 2001 – November 2001), four of which were a monopoly, this would have resulted in a significant quantity of diamonds.

Following the September 11 attacks, suspicious transaction reports filed by Artesia Bank on the accounts held by Nassour and

^{xx} For a comprehensive overview of illicit arms trafficking in Liberia see Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper 'No Questions Asked: The Eastern European Arms Pipeline to Liberia', November 15, 2001.

^{yy} See Global Witness report 'The Usual Suspects' March 2003.

Ossaily, showed signs of money laundering¹⁵⁸. Belgian investigators have confirmed to Global Witness that Nassour withdrew US\$20 million in cash from an account controlled by ASA Diam from January 2001 to May 2001.¹⁵⁹ Some of the money was transferred to Beirut passing through the Byblos Bank in London.¹⁴⁰ When Global Witness contacted the London branch of Byblos Bank about Nassour's account the branch manager refused to answer any questions unless representatives of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) were present. Other investigators with access to ASA Diam bank records state that Nassour's ASA Diam account had over US\$1 billion routed through it in 2001.¹⁶⁰ Global Witness believes that for a mid-level diamond dealer, this is an incredibly large amount of money to be circulating through an account, although it is possible that some money from other businesses owned by the Nassour family could have passed through the account.

Reactions to *The Washington Post* exposé Ossaily

On 14 November 2001, Ossaily held a press conference in Antwerp to protest his innocence of trading with al Qaeda, stating that:

'I was born in Sierra Leone. I have been a legal resident of Belgium since 1991. I acquired Belgian citizenship in 1996. Although I am a diamond dealer, I do not have an Antwerp or Belgian licence. This is because I only buy and sell in black Africa. I have licences for Sierra Leone, Liberia and Tanzania. I also have an expert's certificate for Congo, where I have been selling now for nine years.'¹⁶¹

He admits that he was in Liberia from November 2000 until April 2001 working for Nassour but only 'for a couple of days a week, or a couple of days a month, and only for prospecting purposes'. He denied having bought diamonds from RUF rebel forces and smuggling diamonds through Antwerp: 'Wherever I buy or sell I do it legally'.¹⁶¹ Ossaily admitted that he had met Bah, claiming he had met him through 'an American in Monrovia' and that 'Bah offered me to use his (Greenstones) license but I never took him up on it.'¹⁶¹ When asked whether Nassour had connections to a terrorist organisation, he replied that he 'could not guarantee' that Nassour did not.

In subsequent interviews with Belgian investigators, Ossaily admitted to working for AMAL while he was in Lebanon between 1988 and 1989. Nassour admitted to Global Witness that he also worked for AMAL.¹⁴⁸

Bah

Bah denied the allegations in *The Washington Post*. On 9 November 2002, in an interview with the Associated Press, he admitted to working with the RUF but denied any links to al Qaeda: 'I only heard of bin Laden and al Qaeda after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States' However, he admitted that RUF members might 'unknowingly' have sold diamonds to buyers linked to Bin Laden.

The RUF

In reaction to *The Washington Post's* allegations on 2 November 2001, the RUF claimed to have launched a four-member 'internal inquiry' chaired by Omrie Golley, the London-based Chairman of the RUF's Political and Peace Council. He admitted in a BBC interview that it was possible that some RUF members may have unwittingly dealt with al Qaeda.¹⁶²



Omrie Golley

In an email to the former US ambassador to Sierra Leone, Joseph Melrose, he stated that only Bah would have known that the buyers were from al Qaeda, admitting that RUF commanders never questioned the credentials of the diamond buyers introduced to them by Bah, and were perfectly happy to deal with whoever Bah introduced to them.¹⁶³ Golley also admitted that Bah had brought in diamond dealers from Belgium to buy stones under the protection of the Liberian Government¹⁶³. This is confirmed by senior RUF commanders with knowledge of the dealings with Nassour and Ossaily in Sierra Leone whom Global Witness interviewed.¹⁶⁴ Eldred Collins, former head of the RUF's Public Relations Unit also admitted in an interview on Voice of America that the RUF could have unwittingly engaged in diamond transactions with al Qaeda members.¹⁶⁵

The diamond industry: Press releases

As a whole the diamond industry cannot claim ignorance to a link between al Qaeda and diamonds. The first press reports suggesting a connection came as early as 22 February 2001 when evidence from the 2001 trial of al Qaeda suspects began to emerge.¹⁶⁶ Further press reports came out throughout the year quoting references to the link to al Qaeda and diamonds.¹⁶⁷

It was not until the front-page exposé of the Sierra Leone al Qaeda diamond operation in *The Washington Post* that the diamond industry reacted. Three days after the articles were published, a joint press release from WDC and Jewellers of America (JA) was released (6 November 2001).^z The press release yet again

recognised there was a problem in the diamond industry, and yet again sidestepped the industry's own responsibility for taking action, by urging governments to do something.

'Nations involved in the diamond trade – as producers, processors and importers – must construct an effective monitoring system that protects the legitimate supply chain from the small percentage of illicit stones obtained by criminal elements'¹⁶⁸.

This statement does show a tacit recognition of the problem, but the industry has not shown the leadership on this issue that consumers might reasonably expect, by following through with concrete measures to tackle the links between terrorism and diamond trading. Instead, various press statements and industry communiqués mentioned the Kimberley Process. The industry has yet to present the governments that are the participants in the Process with any concrete and serious measures to tackle this problem. De Beers made a similar statement, which again focussed on the role of governments in combating terrorism rather than on what action the full range of companies within the sector could and should be taking.¹⁶⁹

High Diamond Council HRD: Hoge Raad Voor Diamant

On 2 November 2001 Yuri Steverlynck, an HRD spokesman, in an interview with *Agence France Presse*, sought to shield the HRD and Antwerp's diamond industry from any hint of blame, claiming that the HRD had never heard of Islamic terror organisations being funded via the diamond trade.¹⁷⁰ Steverlynck's statement is nothing short of bizarre, given that Belgian military intelligence issued a report into the diamond trade in Antwerp, which highlighted the link between certain Antwerp based diamond traders and Hizbullah in 2000.¹⁷¹ The HRD should be given access to these reports. This report was widely leaked to the Belgian media.¹⁷² Steverlynck went on to claim that neither of the two Lebanese traders [Nassour and Ossaily] mentioned in *The Washington Post* articles were registered in Belgium 'either as members of a diamond market or as diamond traders'.¹⁷⁰

^{zz} Furthermore on 8 November, the JA sent out a letter to its members informing them of *The Washington Post* article. Helpfully it provided 'important facts JA members should convey to the media if they are contacted for comment on the situation.' The letter went on to state that the industry had been working with governments and civil society through the Kimberley Process. November 8 2001 'JA Informs Members of the al Qaeda Ties to Conflict Diamonds'.

These statements point to the weakness of the current system, because even though they are not registered, Nassour and Ossaily are well known within the Antwerp diamond sector.

Apparently in December 2001, the HRD did request the Belgian Public Prosecutor to carry out an investigation into the connection between al Qaeda and the Belgian diamond trade. Global Witness is still awaiting clarification on the status and results of the investigation. The European Commission has been strangely silent on the whole matter. In December 2001 the HRD stated in a letter:

'The Story in *The Washington Post* surprises us as a certification scheme has been in place in Sierra Leone since 2000. Following peace negotiations between the Government and the RUF that started last May, the United Nations deployed a peace force in the Northern diamond fields of Kono. As for Liberia, the UN issued an embargo on diamonds. Since that date no diamonds have been imported from Liberia. In these circumstances we find it very difficult to understand how someone could succeed to increase the RUFs diamond production since June and to commercialise it through Liberia, as the article suggests.'¹⁷³

The presentation of the situation in the HRD's statement is misleading on three counts. Firstly, because the HRD and the Belgian Government had already made several complaints to the UN and the Sierra Leonean Government over the ineffectual implementation of Sierra Leone's certification scheme.¹⁷⁴ Secondly, the UN peacekeeping forces deployed in the diamond mining areas of Koidu in May 2001, UNAMSIL, had no mandate to stop diamond mining; in fact, it had the opposite effect in that its deployment gave people an element of protection. According to a senior UN official quoted in *The Washington Post* on 19 August 2001, 'It is not in [UNAMSIL's] mandate, it is up to the [Sierra Leonean] Government to do what it has to do, to do its job. If they didn't mine, what would all the demobilised combatants do, with no jobs and no skills? There is only mining'.¹⁵⁴ Thirdly, the UN embargo on Liberia may have ensured that no diamonds with the provenance of Liberia entered Antwerp, however, as Peter Meeus would have known at the time, all diamond importers had to do was to declare a different country of provenance to customs in order to circumvent the ban, and import diamonds legally into Antwerp. The Kimberley Process, which is now operational, should help to

prevent false declarations of origin from being made and accepted.

The responses from the mainstream industry discussed above underscore again the industry's failure to take concerted action against traders involved in trafficking conflict and illicit diamonds. Instead, they chose to try to deflect the blame for this traffic, and the responsibility for taking action against it, onto national governments. Global Witness believes that, in response to credible reports of al Qaeda's links with the diamond industry, the industry should have put in motion an independent investigation into the allegations. Instead, they engaged in a public relations exercise aimed at denying any real problem existed.

What the Liberian Government had to say

On 3 November 2001, the Liberian Government issued the following statement:

'The Liberian Government views (*The Washington Post's*) claims as part of an organised smear campaign intended to discredit this administration and bring it to international disrepute. The Liberian Government is not aware of the presence of any operative of al Qaeda in Liberia and reiterates its unequivocal condemnation of terrorism.'¹⁷⁵

On 23 July 2002, in response to questions from US Congressmen regarding the al Qaeda allegations, Taylor issued an official statement denying the accusations:

'Liberia will never, can never tolerate the presence, knowingly of any connections to al Qaeda operatives in Liberia. We do understand that the al Qaeda people are very sophisticated people and they do have some links, directly we may not know.'¹⁷⁶

He goes on to assure the US Government:

'One thing we do know that if you call yourself al Qaeda or you resemble, or even you try to smell like al Qaeda, we will catch you here. We don't have the mechanism to try al Qaeda people here because they are maybe too big for us, but if it is against American interest, we will turn them over to the Americans.'¹⁷⁶

On 12 November 2002, President Taylor banned the wearing of T-shirts of bin Laden in Liberia on pain of imprisonment and being considered a terrorist.¹⁷⁷

US Government reaction to how diamonds have funded al Qaeda

Investigations by both European intelligence officials and military intelligence analysts in the United States, who have actively investigated the link between al Qaeda and diamonds, support the evidence presented in this report and the information first published in *The Washington Post*. However, reaction to the story by the United States Government has been confusing. Information pertaining to al Qaeda's revenue streams and means of evading targeted financial sanctions should arouse considerable interest with the United States Government. The reaction seems in part symptomatic of the major structural problems relating to the sharing of information and regional analysis among the various bodies forming the US intelligence community. For instance, whereas the DIA found the al Qaeda reports credible enough to send a special forces team to Guinea, the CIA took over two months from the date of publication in November 2001 to confirm the existence of the safe house in Monrovia.¹²⁹

On 13 February 2002, the US Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management held a hearing on the 'US Government's role in fighting the conflict diamond trade.' Responding to the RUF's admission that they may inadvertently have sold diamonds to al Qaeda, Joseph Melrose, the former US Ambassador to Sierra Leone, stated:

'In my opinion [the RUF's] admission indicates that such sales took place between rebels and al Qaeda, although they may or may not have had the formal backing of the organisation. What is still in question is whether it was a deliberate effort on the part of some or all of the RUF to assist al Qaeda to move resources in a manner that would be untraceable to support the actions of al Qaeda or simply a case of selling the illicit stones to whoever offers the best price. Whichever the case, it makes little difference since the net effect is the same, terrorist organisations have benefited from this situation.'⁶⁹

Alan Eastham, the former Special Negotiator For Conflict Diamonds at the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs of the State Department also gave evidence to the Subcommittee. However, in his testimony, Eastham refuted the claims of links between the diamond trade and al Qaeda:

'In contrast to the popular image, experts in the diamond business tell me it is hard

to make a lot of money trading diamonds. The business is very capital-intensive, a business where it takes a great deal of money to make a lot of money because the margins at each step in the trade are ordinarily fairly small. Second, it is expertise-intensive, a business in which you have to know what you are doing in order to profit from those small margins. Third, it is a hard business to enter, because it is a relatively small and somewhat insular industry based on personal relations and a high degree of trust among traders. Most of the traders at particular stages of the trade and in particular segments of the business all know one another, by reputation if not personally. These characteristics of the trade argue against the possibility that a terrorist group could enter the industry, or if they did through front organisations or companies, that they could make a great deal of profit trading diamonds. Shady or unusual practices soon become generally known in the legitimate diamond trade. However, there is another risk: that diamonds are being used to hoard 'wealth' and avoid legitimate banking circles by terrorists. The possible use of diamonds by terrorists falls within this category, along with other forms of criminal activity including drug smuggling, theft, fraud, and tax avoidance.¹⁷⁸

Unfortunately, it appears that Eastham's sources of information about the industry have painted him a picture designed to protect it from any closer scrutiny rather than a strictly accurate one. In fact, this account of the reasons why al Qaeda could not have infiltrated the diamond industry is factually wrong. Firstly, because the profit margins between the different trading stages are extremely large, especially in Africa. A trader buying rough diamonds in Angola for US\$250 a carat could sell the same stones for three times that amount in Antwerp, if they were in a suitable assortment. Secondly, the claim that the industry is 'expertise-intensive' is not true. A novice attending a two to three week diamond course would have sufficient training to value diamonds to market prices.

Eastman's point about the insular and close-knit nature of the diamond industry is accurate, however, what it suggests is that the legitimate traders in the industry must know the identities of the conflict diamond traders. Nassour, for example, is a well-known figure in the industry.¹⁷⁹ The fact that, given this, the industry has failed to denounce publicly a single member of their trade who has dealt in conflict diamonds is a

damning indictment of their professed commitment to increase transparency and accountability. Until the perception – and reality – of the industry as inherently secretive and underhand changes, it will continue to be targeted by groups involved in criminal or even terrorist activities, such as al Qaeda.

On 8 April 2002 the CIA responded in writing to a series of questions that had been asked at an earlier 'Worldwide Threat Hearing', held by the Select Committee on Intelligence in Washington DC on 6 February 2002. One question, No. 14 asked:

'The mining and sales of diamonds by parties to armed conflicts – particularly Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – are regarded as a significant factor fuelling such hostilities. These diamonds, known as 'conflict diamonds,' comprise an estimated 3.7 percent to 15 percent of the value of the global diamond trade. Do you have any information that conflict diamonds are being used to subsidise the activities of terrorist groups, including al-Qa'ida?'

The CIA's written reply was:

'We are aware of the press reports alleging Al-Qa'ida ties to the African diamond trade – the most notable being *The Washington Post* article "al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade" from November 2001. We are vigorously attempting to verify these reports; most of our information to date does not support the allegations.

We are also exploring charges that some ethnic Lebanese elements in Africa with long standing involvement in the diamond trade are providing support to Hizbullah.¹⁸⁰

This reply is contradictory to the facts, particularly the evidence entered in US courts on the linkage between diamond trading activities and senior al Qaeda operatives.

In January 2003, Global Witness began receiving reports that members of the US National Security Council (NSC) were actively briefing Congressional Members and Committees that there is no link to diamonds and al Qaeda. However there is ample evidence that terrorist, rebel and criminal organisations such as the RUF in Sierra Leone, UNITA in Angola, various armed factions in the DRC, organised crime networks from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), South American drug

cartels, global Mafia members, and convicted arms smugglers are all using rough diamonds as a form of international currency for transferring assets and raising funds. The question appears more to be: why would al Qaeda not be using rough diamonds to fund its operations? As the Interpol representative on the UN Expert Panel on Liberian sanctions, Harjit Singh Sandhu, stated in reference to al Qaeda during an open meeting of the Security Council in November 2001:

‘Wherever diamonds are, be it Angola, be it in Sierra Leone or any place, definitely they will try to use that channel. That is common sense.’¹⁸¹

If the CIA, FBI, DIA and NSC have information confirming or denying that al Qaeda have involvement in the diamond trade, they should make this information available. However, if, in fact, they simply do not have sufficient evidence either to confirm or refute the allegations, then it is their duty to investigate further until they do. Conventional electronic intelligence-gathering techniques employed by the CIA and NSA will not uncover evidence of the conflict and illicit diamond trade, only human intelligence (HUMINT) can do so. However, CIA attempts to verify the claims made by *The Washington Post* do not inspire confidence in their ability to monitor and investigate the diamond trade appropriately.

Conclusion

The success of al Qaeda’s diamond operations in Kenya, Tanzania, Liberia and Sierra Leone as explored in Part Three of this report underlines the urgent need to strengthen the Kimberley Process. Government participants and industry must now recognise and accept the need for an effective monitoring mechanism as an integral part of the Kimberley Process. The current measures in the Kimberley Process do represent a step in the right direction in stemming the trade in conflict diamonds, but are utterly inadequate in preventing terrorist networks such as al Qaeda from operating within the legitimate trade.

Part Four: The Global Response to September 11

Pre-September 11 anti-terrorist efforts

*This section will briefly summarise the response of the international community to the al Qaeda attacks on the United States in 2001.*¹⁸²

In response to the growing threat posed by terrorism, the UN developed and adopted a total of 12 conventions and protocols on terrorism, including one on combating the financing of terrorist activities.¹⁸² The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism requires countries to take measures to stop the financing of terrorism, makes it an offence if funds are provided or collected to be used to commit offenses as defined within any of the other UN treaties to suppress terrorism or:

‘any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act’.¹⁸³

In December 1994, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a resolution outlining the following four concrete steps to fostering international cooperation in combating international terrorism:

- Collecting data on existing multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements;
- Developing a compendium of national laws and regulations to prevent terrorism;
- Carrying out an analytical review of international legal instruments that exist on international terrorism;
- Reviewing possible ways the UN could assist countries in organising workshops and other activities to combat terrorism.

The UNGA also created the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) in 1999 to conduct research on terrorism trends, promote international cooperation and assist in improving their abilities to investigate terrorism in order to prevent future terrorist acts¹⁸⁴.

The UN response post-September 11

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, on 28 September 2001 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1373. This 'unequivocally' condemned the acts of September 11 and outlined specific measures that states should take to prevent such acts from occurring in the future, building on previous conventions related to combating terrorism¹⁸⁵. However, resolution 1373 has a broader mandate since it was issued under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, which automatically makes it internationally legally binding.¹⁸⁶

The resolution called for nations to work together in preventing future terrorist attacks, prohibits states from giving any form of support to terrorists, and makes carrying out terrorist acts a criminal offence in national laws and regulations. However, significantly, it also calls on states not only to refuse to assist or participate in terrorist acts but also to prevent 'the financing of acts of terrorism'. It outlines several measures that countries must take to stop the financing of terrorism including making it a criminal offence to provide or collect funds to be used for carrying out terrorist acts; freezing funds and other financial assets of individuals who have committed or tried to commit terrorist acts (as well as entities that are owned and controlled by such people); and prohibiting any person or entity within a country from assisting terrorists by providing financial assets, funds, economic resources or related services.¹⁸⁵

Resolution 1373 also aims to promote information sharing about the activities of terrorists or terrorist networks, and to encourage governments to become parties to existing international conventions and protocols that aim to combat terrorists, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Money laundering is identified (along with transnational organised crime, illicit drugs, illegal arms-trafficking, illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other 'potentially deadly materials') as being closely connected with international terrorism. The UN thus recognised the need for increased coordination on the national, subregional, regional and international levels to respond to these threats.¹⁸⁵

The resolution also established a Counter-Terrorism Committee, comprised of all members of the Security Council, which was charged with implementing the resolution. Since its creation, the committee has served several purposes. Its work has previously focused on promoting an international consensus on how to combat terrorism, and

working for the effective international implementation of the 12 anti-terrorism conventions.¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, the committee has monitored and provided assistance to countries to establish regulations to implement all aspects of the resolution so as to combat terrorism and prevent terrorist financing. As of 15 April 2002, the Counter-Terrorism Committee claimed it had received reports from 143 states regarding compliance with resolution 1373, had reviewed, and given feedback to 62, and was in the process of reviewing the remainder of the reports. Fifty states were reported as not yet having submitted a report, and the committee was following up on these countries. Furthermore, the committee reported that it would be evaluating the legislative/regulatory actions taken by all governments to combat terrorism and would continue dialogue with them to ensure action on all measures covered by resolution 1373.¹⁸⁸

In October 2001, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also created the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism with the mission of developing recommendations for steps the UN can take to combat terrorism. This group has brought together relevant expertise from the key UN agencies, programmes and departments as well as independent expertise. The group's [first] report was issued on 10 September 2002 and outlined a 'three-pronged strategy' for addressing terrorism, which Kofi Annan has endorsed.¹⁸⁹ The basic principles underpinning the strategy are that terrorism should be seen as 'an assault on basic rights' and that in all cases the fight against terrorism must be 'respectful of international human rights obligations'.¹⁸⁹

The main aims of the strategy are as follows. Firstly, to 'dissuade' potential terrorists from committing terrorist acts by establishing effective norms, implementing relevant legal instruments and carrying out communications efforts in order to build an international consensus around the fight against terrorism. Secondly, to 'deny groups or individuals the means to carry out acts of terrorism'.¹⁸⁹ The main ways envisaged of achieving this are by providing support to the Counter-Terrorism Committee's efforts to monitor whether countries are complying with Security Council Resolution 1373, and by using appropriate legal instruments to tackle the transnational crime, drugs trafficking and money laundering which provide terrorists with revenue.¹⁹⁰ Thirdly, to promote 'broad-based international cooperation' to combat terrorism that involves subregional, regional and global organisations.

Specific measures taken by the UN against bin Laden, al Qaeda and the Taliban

Anti-terrorism efforts have targeted bin Laden, al Qaeda and the Taliban, both prior to and following the September 11 attacks. Security Council Resolution 1267, which was passed on 15 October 1999, strongly condemned Afghanistan, and especially those areas controlled by the Taliban, for sheltering and training terrorists and for planning terrorist acts. The resolution called on the Taliban to comply with previous UN resolutions by no longer providing safe haven and training for bin Laden and other international terrorists and also called on the Taliban to surrender bin Laden.

The resolution also called for freezing of funds and other financial assets directly or indirectly controlled or owned by the Taliban and established the creation of a Security Council committee to focus on implementation of these measures.¹⁹¹ Resolution 1333, adopted on 19 December 2000, demanded that the Taliban close all terrorist training camps and implemented an arms embargo aimed at preventing 'the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control'. This resolution also requested that a committee of experts be formed to recommend to the Security Council how to monitor implementation of these measures.¹⁹²

Resolution 1363, passed on 30 July 2001, requested that the Secretary General create a mechanism to monitor implementation of the measures against the Taliban and al Qaeda, and called for assistance to states, in particular those bordering Afghanistan, to help them to implement the various measures against the Taliban and al Qaeda adopted by the UN.¹⁹³ This led to the establishment of a UN monitoring group composed of five experts, and a Sanctions Enforcement Support Team, comprising 15 members, to ensure that the sanctions against the Taliban and al Qaeda are enforced. The Monitoring Group's mission was to monitor implementation of the Security Council measures against bin Laden, al Qaeda and the Taliban, and those individuals and entities associated with them, and make recommendations regarding implementation.

However, global financial sanctions only came into force on 16 January 2002, with the adoption of resolution 1390 (2002), imposing financial and economic sanctions, a travel ban and an arms embargo on bin Laden, members of al Qaeda, the Taliban and their associates and associated entities. In their first report to the Secretary General, the Monitoring Group noted that:

'al-Qa'idah [sic] and its associates appear to have diversified the movement and security of their finances by acquiring commodities such as gold and diamonds, and by using alternative remittance systems in addition to the formal banking system'.¹⁹⁴

In Section IV of the report, which deals with the freezing of financial assets, the panel notes that:

'as a result of the freezing of assets that has been and continues to be carried out globally, there are allegations that al-Qa'idah, for now at least, may be diversifying financial aspects of its assets into gold, diamonds and other precious stones, for example lapis lazuli and sapphires'.¹⁹⁵

They go on to state that:

'to date the Group has not been able to substantiate these allegations, but has commenced detailed investigations into these alternative methods of financing'.¹⁹⁵

In relation to the trade in rough diamonds being used a possible source of terrorist revenue and asset transfer, the report 'welcomes' the progress being made with the Kimberley Process¹⁹⁶. However, the Monitoring Group echoes the reservations expressed by the [date] US General Accounting Office (GAO) report into the Kimberley Process:

'The Group would suggest, however, that participating States strive for greater accountability and transparency as suggested in the report by the United States General Accounting Office'.^{197/198}

In addition, reporting on a visit to Belgium, and on meetings with the High Diamond Council (HRD) and Belgian Government officials, the Monitoring Group expressed its concern that

'even with effective controls and their conscientious operation, the diamond trade might be abused to provide a vehicle for money-laundering and moving financial assets around the world by al-Qa'idah and its associates'.

Four months later, the Monitoring Group released their second report. It stated that:

'despite initial successes in locating and freezing some US\$112 million in assets

belonging to al-Qa'idah and its associates, al-Qa'idah continues to have access to considerable resources' and that, 'moreover since the adoption of resolution 1390 (2002) only about US\$10 million in additional assets has been frozen'.

It goes on to note that the consequence of tighter controls over traditional financing channels has been al Qaeda's new strategy of both relocating its financial operations and diversifying its revenue streams and channels of money laundering:

'A large number of States in Europe, north America and elsewhere have taken steps to tighten banking regulations and to better locate, trace and block financial transactions. These regulations impose new requirements on banks to 'know their customers' and to review and report on all suspicious transactions. This has led al-Qa'idah to transfer much of its financial activities to Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Also, the terrorist organisation is turning increasingly to alternative banking mechanisms, including the use of informal remittance systems, such as *hawala*.'

In their third report to the Secretary General of 16 December 2002, the Monitoring Group again underlined this point:

'The global effort to combat the financing of terrorism continues to face many challenges, stemming from the complexities of international financial transactions and the uneven application of regulatory and control measures. Many countries are imposing strict new anti-terrorism financing regulations on their domestic banking, as well as on correspondent banking and "offshore financial centres". But serious problems remain, and al-Qa'idah is still able to receive money [...] Al-Qa'idah has also adjusted its tactics to rely more heavily on local sources of funding.'¹⁹⁹

African responses to terrorism

Many countries in Africa are suffering from different forms of terrorism. The existence of al Qaeda in Africa mirrored the rest of the world. Africa has been a major target for al Qaeda activity over the past decade. The African Union (AU), which has a membership of 53 states, condemned the terrorist attacks of September 11 and called for international action against terrorism to be carried out through the UN.

The AU also established the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism as its main mechanism for fighting terrorism.²⁰⁰ The convention prohibits countries from 'organising, supporting, financing, committing or inciting to commit terrorist acts' or providing 'safe havens and visas to terrorists'.²⁰¹ The Convention requires that countries implement measures to prevent terrorist acts and the establishment of terrorist networks through national legislation and cooperation with other member states in combating terrorism through information-exchange and other joint activities.²⁰² At a special anti-terrorism conference held in Algiers in September 2002, the AU announced that more than 15 states (the number needed to ratify the Convention before it goes into force) have ratified the Convention and thus the Convention has come into effect. Those countries that have now ratified the Convention are: Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mali, Rwanda, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Senegal, South Africa, Sudan and Tunisia.

The European Union response to terrorism

Following the September 11 attacks, the EU stepped up its efforts to fight terrorism and committed to working closely with the United States in building an international anti-terrorism coalition. The EU adopted a Plan of Action to fight terrorism that was focused not only on ensuring the protection of its citizens but also more broadly on addressing the root causes of terrorism. On 31 May 2002, the European Council issued a new regulation that placed restrictive measures on bin Laden, al Qaeda and the Taliban. As part of efforts to implement UN resolution 1373, the assets of terrorists or their associates in the EU have been frozen, a special anti-terrorism unit called Europol has been established and a common definition of terrorism as well as a list of terrorist organisations developed.²⁰³

In addition, the EU has concentrated its efforts on building an international coalition against terrorism through diplomatic efforts with developing countries and regions, especially with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership promotes cooperation between the EU and countries such as Algeria and Lebanon on a wide range of issues, including efforts to fight money laundering, drugs trafficking and terrorism. The EU has an ongoing process to examine how to provide technical aid and assistance to help countries implement Resolution 1373.²⁰⁴

The European Commission has also issued a new European Directive on money laundering, which should provide a common framework for including the trade in high commodity items such as diamonds and gold within existing anti-money laundering systems; the Directive should be implemented by 15 June 2003.²⁰⁵

The United States' response to terrorism

Combating terrorism has become a major focus for United States policy makers post September 11, and a significant element of US efforts to combat terrorism is through the disruption of terrorist financing and asset laundering networks, as is discussed in more detail below. Another bulwark of US anti-terrorism efforts has been strengthening the federal government's powers to track down terrorists and prevent future terrorist attacks. Immediately following the September 11 attacks, the United States Congress took action to combat terrorism by passing the United States Patriot Act,^{aaa} which was signed into law by President Bush on 26 October 2001. The Patriot Act gives federal officials increased authority to 'track and intercept communications' for the purposes of law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering. It also has provisions to prevent foreign terrorists from coming into the United States, especially from Canada and allows authorities to detain and deport foreign terrorists and those that provide support to them.

Combating terrorist financing

United States efforts to tackle the funding of terrorist groups involve a wide range of government agencies, including the Department of the Treasury and the National Security Council. The Department of Treasury has taken the lead role in coordinating efforts to tackle terrorist financing, including tracing financial trails. The Treasury has formed Operation Green Quest, an interagency task force comprised of the US Customs Service, the Secret Service, IRS Criminal Investigations Division, the Department of Justice, the FBI and other agencies. This task force is charged with investigating the financing of terrorism.²⁰⁶

Immediately following the September 11 attacks, the United States government identified known terrorists and terrorist entities, froze their assets in the US and collaborated with other countries to apply those freezes globally.²⁰⁶ In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the United States has sought to build an international anti-terrorist coalition, including

regional political entities such as the EU and the AU. Over 160 countries have put blocking orders in force on hundreds of bank accounts worth more than US\$70 million.²⁰⁶

The United States Treasury Department believes that these actions are making it increasingly difficult for terrorists to use the mainstream banking and financial sector to finance their activities. However, as a result of this crackdown, US policymakers believe that there is a real danger that terrorists will look more and more at financing their activities by smuggling bulk cash or other instruments. However, smuggling is both costly and difficult and, as the next section examines in more detail, the Patriot Act should also make money laundering more easily identifiable and seizures of terrorist assets more likely.²⁰⁶

The Patriot Act and Terrorist Financing

The Patriot Act contains provisions aimed at identifying and blocking terrorist revenue streams. Part III of the Patriot Act is known as the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001. Under the Act, the federal government's authority is strengthened in three key areas to combat money laundering and corruption: regulations, criminal sanctions and forfeiture.²⁰⁷ On the regulatory side, the Act gives the treasury secretary increased powers to regulate US financial institutions, especially their relationships with individuals and entities. The measures include requirements that securities brokers and dealers, commodity merchants, pool operators and businesses file suspicious activity reports (SARs). The Act also imposes additional 'special measure' and 'due diligence' requirements, creation of customer identification standards and record-keeping, and increased exchange of information among financial institutions and law enforcement agencies. In addition, financial institutions are required under the Act to create their own anti-money laundering programs staffed with at least one compliance officer, and to establish policies, procedures and controls, including an independent audit component and other measures.²⁰⁷

The Patriot Act also strengthened existing criminal sanctions and introduced new forms of sanction. It increases the penalties for terrorist acts and for crimes that terrorists might perpetrate and also contains new sanctions against money laundering. For example, laundering in the United States of any proceeds from foreign crimes of violence or political corruption is outlawed. Other measures include increasing the penalties for counterfeiting and making it illegal to launder proceeds from

^{aaa} Non-governmental organisations have expressed concerns that the Patriot Act has implications for civil liberties.

cybercrime or to provide support to a terrorist organisation. The Act also gives the federal government the authority to prosecute fraud that involves American credit cards and 'endeavours to permit prosecution of money laundering in the place where the predicate offense occurs'.²⁰⁸

Thirdly, the Act establishes two new types of forfeitures and changes several procedures related to confiscation. It enables all of the property of any individual or entity that is involved in or plans domestic or international terrorist acts to be confiscated, as well as any property 'derived from or used to facilitate domestic or international terrorism'.²⁰⁸ In terms of forfeit-related procedures, the Act established the mechanism 'to acquire long arm jurisdiction, for purposes of forfeiture proceedings, over individuals and entities' and it allows confiscation of property located in the United States 'for a wider range of crimes committed in violation of foreign law'.²⁰⁸ It also allows US enforcement of foreign forfeiture orders, calls for the seizure of 'correspondent accounts held in US financial institutions for foreign banks who are in turn holding forfeitable assets overseas', and 'denies corporate entities the right to contest a confiscation if their principal shareholder is a fugitive'.²⁰⁸

The Patriot Act and the diamond trade

Because of the Patriot Act, the United States government is able to develop and enforce regulations to implement the Kimberley Process certification scheme for rough diamonds without having to have new legislation passed in Congress.^{209/bbb} The Patriot Act requires financial institutions to implement anti-money laundering programs to prevent funds from being used illegally to finance criminal enterprises and the Act's definition of financial institutions includes dealers 'in precious metals, stones and jewels'.²¹⁰ Under Section 352 of the Act, businesses are required 'to assess their relative risk for exposure to exploitation, and then to implement institutionalised programs to address those risks, including identifying business partners when appropriate'. Thus, dealers in precious stones and metals are required to develop internal policies and procedures to prevent money laundering, assign officers to oversee compliance, implement employee training programmes and develop an independent audit function to evaluate the policies and procedures. The diamond industry has developed its own proposals for implementing Section 352 of the Act.²¹¹

The US Department of Treasury, which is responsible for implementing Section 352, has not yet issued final rules requiring that the

jewellery industry establish anti-money laundering programs. The Treasury Department has developed a preliminary code of Federal regulations that has been distributed to the jewellery industry for comment and it is expected that the final rules will be finalised and published over the next few months. The jewellery industry will be required to comply with the rules within 90 days after they are published.²¹²

The Terrorism Financial Review Group

The FBI has also played a role in the war against terrorism and in efforts to cut off terrorism financing. Following the September 11 attacks, the FBI were forced to recognise the need for a more coordinated, holistic strategy for tackling the financing of terrorism. This has led to the creation of the Terrorism Financial Review Group (TFRG), an interagency group focused on dismantling terrorist financing networks. The TFRG has two main missions. Firstly, to carry out a financial analysis of the 19 hijackers, including information on their financial support structure. Secondly, to carry out financial investigations that will predict and prevent terrorist attacks. According to FBI Director Robert Mueller, since its inception, the TFRG's mission has expanded to involve 'a broader effort to identify, investigate, prosecute, disrupt and dismantle all terrorist-related financial and fundraising activities'.²¹³

Significantly, during FBI Director Mueller's recent testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services (19 September, 2002), he recommended that 'the criminal forfeiture laws should be amended to treat all electronic funds, as well as diamonds, gold and other precious metals, as fungible^{ccc} property for the period of the applicable statute of limitations'.²¹³

Council on Foreign Relations Report on Terrorist Financing

The Council on Foreign Relations created an Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing charged with assessing the effectiveness of US efforts to combat terrorism. This Task Force is comprised of leading experts on terrorist financing, foreign policy, law enforcement, intelligence gathering and finance. On 25 November 2002, the CFR published 'Terrorist Financing, Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.'

^{bbb} Unfortunately this opportunity to move swiftly was not taken up by the US government; instead legislation is still under negotiation as of March 2003. This was a significant factor in the delay of the full implementation of the Kimberley Process.

^{ccc} Fungible means goods or commodities that are freely interchangeable, exchangeable or substitutable.

The report found that:

'al Qaeda's global fund-raising network is built upon a foundation of charities, non-governmental organisations, mosques, websites, intermediaries, facilitators, and banks and other financial institutions'.²¹⁴

According to the report, al Qaeda is using several channels to move its funds around; the global financial system; the Islamic banking system; the hawala system, as well as other money transfer mechanisms, using as a cover a network of businesses and charities around the world. The Task Force also concludes that al Qaeda employs:

'such time-honored methods as bulk cash smuggling and the global trade in gold and other commodities to move and store value'.²¹⁵

According to the report, despite US action to combat terrorism post September 11:

'The Task Force determined that after an initially robust attempt to curtail financing for international terrorism, the Bush administration's current efforts are 'strategically inadequate' to assure the sustained results we need to protect U.S. security'.²¹⁶

The Task Force therefore recommended that the President appoint a special presidential assistant to lead the effort to combat terrorist financing. The report's other major recommendation was that the US should spearhead efforts to create an international organisation that would solely focus on investigating terrorist financing.²¹⁷

The G-7 response to terrorism

In October 2001, the G-7 Finance Ministers put forward an Action Plan to Combat the Financing of Terrorism, which outlines immediate actions that should be taken to cut off terrorist revenues and to prevent the international financial system from being exploited for terrorism financing.²¹⁸ The Action Plan calls for freezing of the assets of terrorists, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the UNSC Resolutions and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. All the G-7 countries have signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism and submitted reports to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee on actions they have taken to implement Resolution 1373.²¹⁸

The G-7 is also advocating the development of international standards to combat terrorist financing, principally by calling for the strict application of those UN instruments aimed at curbing terrorism, and by requesting the international FATF to establish special recommendations targeting terrorist financing (the activities of the FATF are examined in more detail below). They have also urged international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Co-Operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC).^{ddd} The Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), created in 1997 and comprised of 21 members, is also working to combat money laundering. APG's purpose "is to facilitate the adoption, implementation and enforcement of internationally accepted anti-money laundering standards as set out in the 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force." Activities include promoting the development and enforcement of legislation, undergoing mutual evaluation on anti-money laundering efforts and carrying out information exchange to promote law enforcement.

These regional bodies are being asked to collaborate with the FATF in developing an effective approach for evaluating compliance with standards against money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF has developed eight recommendations on terrorist financing, and the G-7 is encouraging all countries to undergo a self-assessment to ensure compliance with the FATF's recommendations.²¹⁹ It is also supporting the FATF's efforts to identify those countries that have failed to implement appropriate measures for combating terrorist financing.²¹⁸

G-7 is supporting initiatives by the IMF and World Bank to support countries in their efforts to implement anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing measures, and G-7 countries will give technical assistance bilaterally to help countries that are committed to taking action to combat terrorism. The IMF will evaluate anti-terrorist financing measures, as part of their Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs) and their assessments of the legal, regulatory and supervisory systems of offshore financial centres. The IMF and World Bank are also considering ways of assessing whether countries are meeting the FATF 40 recommendations and eight special recommendations as part of overall list of standards to be examined.²¹⁸

^{ddd} The GCC is a member of the FATF. Member states of the GCC include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The FATF

The FATF on money laundering is an international organisation set up under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It was created by the G-7 Summit in Paris in 1989 to promote a coordinated international strategy for combating money laundering.²²⁰ FATF has adopted 40 recommendations that outline a comprehensive approach towards tackling money laundering, and which involve the criminal justice system and law enforcement, regulation of the financial system and international cooperation. When combined with the FATF's Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (see below), these recommendations are intended to 'set out the basic framework to detect, prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts'.²¹⁹ FATF member countries as well as non-member countries have used these recommendations as a basis for establishing anti-money laundering programmes.²²⁰

Since September 11, FATF has broadened its focus to tackle the financing of terrorism, drawing upon its previous efforts on money laundering. It adopted eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing at a special plenary meeting that was held in Washington DC on 30 October 2001.²²¹ The recommendations have now become internationally recognised, as constituting the standard practice countries should adopt to prevent their financial systems from being exploited by terrorists, and not only FATF member countries but also many non-FATF countries have committed to implementing them. In fact, over 80 non-FATF countries have provided reports to FATF evaluating their compliance with the recommendations.

The special recommendations call on states to do the following:

- Immediately ratify and implement the 1999 UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as well as implement the Security Council Resolution 1373 and other resolutions dealing with the prevention and suppression of terrorism financing;
- Make terrorism financing, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations a crime and ensure that these offenses are categorized as 'money laundering predicate offenses';
- Carry out measures to freeze funds or other assets of terrorists, and those who finance terrorism and terrorist organisations, and adopt measures that will give authorities the powers 'to seize and

confiscate property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations';

- Ensure that financial institutions, businesses or other organisations that are required to take anti-money laundering actions, report in a timely manner to the competent authorities any funds that they 'suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect [...] are linked or related to, or are to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist organisations';
- Work cooperatively with other states in combating terrorist financing by promoting information exchange and providing assistance to other countries related to criminal, civil enforcement and administrative investigations, inquiries and proceedings that involve terrorism financing, terrorist activities and terrorist organisations;
- Ensure that they are not providing safe havens for individuals who are charged with terrorism financing, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations and that procedures are developed to extradite such people wherever it is possible;
- License or register those individuals or legal entities that provide transmission of money or value services in a manner that is consistent with the FATF recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions, and ensure that those who illegally carry out these types of services face administrative, civil or criminal sanctions;
- Require money remitters and other financial institutions to provide 'accurate and meaningful originator information', which includes name address and account number on funds transfers and other related messages, and to provide this information throughout the payment chain. Financial institutions should also closely scrutinise and monitor for any fund transfers that are deemed to be suspicious or fail to have complete originator information;
- Take action to prevent entities, especially non-governmental organisations, from being used for financing terrorism.²¹⁹

At the June 2002 Plenary Meeting of FATF, the first self-assessment on the Special Recommendations was conducted to evaluate how effectively FATF members were implementing the recommendations. Overall, the assessment demonstrated that the FATF

members had made significant headway in implementing the recommendations. As of June 2002, almost all of the FATF members were fully or partially complying with almost all of the recommendations and progress is continuing to be made to put in place the needed anti-terrorist financing measures.²²¹

The FATF and diamonds

On 14 February 2003, the FATF's 2002-03 report on money laundering and terrorist financing found that the gold and diamond sectors showed:

'Considerable vulnerability to being exploited for money laundering and [...] for terrorist financing' because of their high value, portability and the ease with which they can be traded worldwide.²²²

The report highlighted the need for 'security in all phases of the diamond industry' and cited in particular the 'breakdown of central controls in some diamond producing areas of western Africa' as a major reason for the 'leakage' of diamonds from the legitimate trade to the illicit market, estimated by one expert in one region at as high as between 5-10 % of annual production.²²³

The report claimed that several FATF members had concrete examples of 'the criminal use of the diamond trade for money laundering', of which it outlined several different typologies, ranging from the simplest typology of 'direct purchases of the diamonds with criminal proceeds' to more complex types of laundering involving using diamond trading as 'a smokescreen for the laundering of proceeds generated by other criminal activity, especially

illegal narcotics trafficking and various types of fraud'.²²³

Moreover, several FATF members found indications of links between terrorist financing routes and illicit diamond trading, including 'an alleged attempt to purchase 2kg of precious stones with funds originating from the al Qaeda terrorist group and through a former minister of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan'.²²⁴ One of the anonymous examples of diamond trafficking from Africa cited in the report appears to be the case of Aziz Nassour and his dealings with the RUF and al Qaeda, as detailed in Part Three of this report.²²⁴ Significantly, while the report says that it is not possible to ascertain the degree to which terrorists are using the diamond trade, it also stresses that, as the same typologies are used for both terrorist and non-terrorist money laundering:

'It can be assumed that terrorist groups may be exploiting the same channels for moving funds or obscuring the links to their activities as those used by non-terrorist groups'.²²²

Finally, in terms of the international response to the illegal trafficking of high-value commodities such as diamonds, the FATF admitted that the current measures to combat money laundering do not appear to be being enforced by all members to the same degree, and that:

'at least one delegation admitted that the diamond and gold trade were not well known or understood in his jurisdiction and called for additional attention to be paid to this area'.²²²

Conclusion


Any understanding on the part of international and national authorities of how terrorist organisations operate and thus any effective international or national action to combat terrorist acts requires an understanding of the sources and methods of financing used by terrorists. Currently, the institutional understanding of how terrorist networks have used, and continue to use, diamonds and other high value commodity items to fund their operations appears worryingly weak. As this report has demonstrated, al Qaeda has already shown its willingness and ability to take advantage of weak states, corrupt institutions, existing criminal networks as well as the lack of transparency and the insularity of the trade in precious commodities, particularly diamonds, to fund its terrorist operations.

The Kimberley Process regime of import/export controls on rough diamonds is to be welcomed because it has already resulted in significant changes in practice within the highly secretive diamond industry. Some of the government participants have shown a serious commitment to the KPCS. However, to date, both the industry and governments have consistently failed to address the issue of diamonds being used as a source of terrorist revenue and asset transfer. What is most alarming, is that for the past few years ample evidence has emerged of the substantial and significant use of rough and polished diamonds by Hizbullah and other international criminal organisations and networks: indeed, much of the information presented in this report about al Qaeda's diamond-trading operations has been in the public domain for over two years. Global Witness believes that the penalty the diamond industry will have to pay for their inaction is greater government oversight in the future.

Despite the evidence, the diamond industry and governments have either claimed that the problem was too minor or too difficult to solve, or worse, adopted a 'see-no-evil' mentality, which has allowed the illicit trade in diamonds to flourish. No longer can the diamond industry claim ignorance. As the international crackdown on terrorist financing systems intensifies, al Qaeda will be forced even more urgently to seek alternative sources of revenue and means of asset transfer. The recent FATF report on money laundering discussed in this report stressed that the diamond sector's vulnerability and attractiveness to criminal networks made 'security in all phases of the diamond industry a critical necessity'.²²⁴

Global Witness believes that if the current lack of credible controls in the diamond industry goes unaddressed, then the result will be deeper terrorist infiltration into the high-value diamond business.

Governments and the industry must now recognise that diamond trading is an increasingly significant form of funding for terrorist groups like al Qaeda. They must take immediate and decisive action to tighten the controls on the diamond trade envisaged under the Kimberley Process, by implementing an independent monitoring mechanism and controls at the source of extraction. A continued failure to act would mean losing an important battle in the ongoing war against terrorism.



RUF mining in Kono, 1999



Village graffiti in Guinea, March 2001



Annex 1 Nassour Diamond Trading Network in Africa

Annex's 1-5 have been researched and prepared by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS)
Italiëlei 98 A, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium, Tel + 32 3 2250022, Fax + 32 3 2310151

Diamond Exports of Comptoirs Licensed by RCD-Goma in 2000 (000 US\$)

Source: RCD-Goma Department des Terres, Mines et Énergie, Goma DRC, March 2001.

Month	Belco Diamant	Superstars	N-Frères	Victoria Diamond	Zahraa Diamond	Maysaa Diamond	Sahar Diamant
Feb	505						
Mar	427						
Apr	578						
May	231						
Jun		38	37	6			
Jul					719	156	104
Oct					678	956	420
Nov					671	332	281
Dec	773				57	230	242

It is not known whether the N-Frères comptoir, or export company, was connected to Aziz Nassour or his cousins. The comptoirs Zahraa, Maysaa and Sahar are assumed to have been used by Nassour since these were the only comptoirs that were officially active during his monopoly. The fact that RCD-Goma recorded no diamond exports during August and September seems odd considering that productivity is generally very high during these months, and that the war for Kisangani, in which Rwanda and RCD-Goma were victorious, had been waged several months earlier in April and May 2000. However, an important consideration when reviewing these statistics is the issue of reliability. The figures provide only a vague reference to the actual activities of the comptoirs, since the latter would systematically undervalue their export declarations. Furthermore, smuggling by unlicensed dealers cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy. Occasionally, RCD-Goma would seek to sell diamonds outside of the networks controlled by the Rwandans, and RCD-Goma officials would also keep their personal diamond interests secret from other members of the rebel organisation.

Estimated Value of Rough Diamond Imports to Belgium by Country of Provenance and Year (Values in Millions of US\$)

Sources: Estimates of import values obtained through interviews in Central Africa with government authorities and diamond dealers, as well as with diamond companies in Antwerp that either deal with, or compete against, the five firms mentioned above.

	Sierra Gem	Triple A	African Star	ASA Diam	Amira Aya
Congo-Kinshasa 2001	15	5	0.1	3.5	0
Congo-Kinshasa 2000	55	40	1	14	10
Congo-Kinshasa 1999	95	60	0	0	20
Congo-Kinshasa 1998	55	30	0	0	5
Congo-Brazzaville 2001	70	10	10	0	0
Congo-Brazzaville 2000	35	10	0	0	0
Congo-Brazzaville 1999	0	0	0	0	0
Congo-Brazzaville 1998	0	0	0	0	0.5
Cent.African Rep. 2001	15	0	0	0	0
Cent.African Rep. 2000	15	0	0	0	0
Cent.African Rep. 1999	15	0	0	0	0
Cent.African Rep. 1998	15	0	0	0	0
Tanzania 2001	2	0.2	0	0	0
Tanzania 2000	5	0	0	0.1	0
Tanzania 1999	0	0	0	0	0
Tanzania 1998	0	0	0	0	0

Central Africa

The five companies listed above did not import diamonds to Belgium from Angola, Uganda or Rwanda from 1998-2001.

Sierra Gem operates a bureau d'achat in the Central African Republic, named Primo. This bureau d'achat has been the country's second largest diamond exporter since 1998. Faze Khalil el Ali is the head of the Primo office according to the CAR Ministry of Mines. The laundering of conflict diamonds from Congolese rebel groups by companies operating in the CAR has been exposed, but Primo has not been implicated.

Sierra Gem is also one of the biggest comptoirs in the DRC. It operates Primogem, while Triple A operates Millenium. There are fewer than ten active comptoirs licensed by the DRC government, and most of these will hire out space on their licences to other Belgian companies that were not large enough to pay for a license. As a result, many different buyers operate under a single licence, and are financed by Belgian companies that apparently have no other connection to licence holders such as Primo Gem or Millenium. This relationship is outlined below.

Together with his father Ibrahim Khalil Nassour, and his brothers Aziz Ibrahim Nassour and Mohamed Ibrahim Nassour (see graph), Khalil Ibrahim Nassour formed the company Diamonds for Ever in 1984. Diamonds for Ever went bankrupt in 1999. A new Diamonds Forever exists now in Lebanon in which Khalil Nassour also plays a role. This company had an account at the ABN AMRO affiliate in Antwerp.²²⁵


Declared Destinations in Belgium for Diamonds Exported by Primogem and Millenium (October 2001-June 2002)

Source: DRC Government


Primo Gem	Millenium
General Trading Diamond Company	AK Diam
MAC Diamond Diamonds	Ghassan Dagher
Mackie Diamonds	Jatin Diamond
Marjan Diamond	KNA Diamonds
Mouradiam	MAC Diamond
Natural Diamond Corporation	Mouradiam
RBS Diamond	Murad & Sons Diamonds
Sierra Gem	Natural Diamond Corporation
Talib World Diamonds	Sana Diam
Yakar	Talib World Diamonds Yakar

Annex 2: Aziz Nassour diamond company links¹³⁰


Directors 1




Directors 2



Annex 3: Aziz Nassour's familial relationship in diamond trade¹³⁰



Annex 4: Original Partners in Aziz Nassour diamond trading network¹³⁰



Annex 5: Comparison of EUC as used by Valerie Cherny with that found in Samih Ossaily's flat in Antwerp

Certificat d'achat (Abidjan 26/05/2000):Valery Cherny		Autorisation pour livraison (Abidjan 29/01/2001): Nataco Holding	
Ammunition 7.62 x 39 mm	5,000,000	Ammunition 7.62 x 39 mm	5,000,000
Grenade Launcher M93 30 mm	50	Grenade Launcher M93 30 mm	50
30mm Bombs for M93 Launcher	10,000	30mm Bombs for M93 Launcher	10,000
Thermal Image Binoculars	20	Thermal Image Binoculars	20
Thermal Image Weapon Sights	20	Thermal Image Weapon Sights	20
RPG-26 Launcher or M80 Launcher	50	RPG-26 Launcher or M80 Launcher	50
Grenade for RPG-26 or M80	5,000	Grenade for RPC26 or M80	500
PG-7-0G-7 Grenades	1,000	PG-7-0G-7 Grenades	1,000
Ammunition 9x19mm Parabellum	1,000,000	Ammunition 9x19mm Parabellum	1,000,000
AGS-17 Grenade Launcher	50	AGS-17 Grenade Launcher	50
Grenades for AGS-17	1,000	Grenades for AGS-17	1,000
Night Vision Monocular	50	Night Vision Monocular	50
GP Kastyor Launcher	80	GP Kastyor Launcher	80
45 Pistol or CZ 99 9mm Para Pistol	2,000	45 Pistol or CZ 99 9mm Para Pistol	2,000
RPG-7	200	RPG-7	200
Sniper Gun 12.7mm	50	Sniper rifle cal. 12.7mm	50
Ammunition 2 cal. 12.7	5,000	Ammunition 2 cal. 12.7	50
Sniper Gun cal 7.9 mm	50	Sniper rifle cal 7.9mm	50
Ammunition cal. 7.9mm	5,000	Ammunition cal. 7.92mm	5,000
Sniper cal 7.62 x 51 (308)	70	Sniper cal 7.62 x 54	70
Ammunition cal 7.62 x 51 mm	50,000	Ammunition 7.62 x 54mm	5,000
AK-47 Assault Rifle	10,500	AK-47 Assault Rifle	10,500
PK/ms	200	PK/mc	200
Ammunition PK/Ms	2,000,000	Ammunition PK/Ms	2,000,000
Pallard	2,000	Pallard	2,000
40mm Grenade for Pallard	10,000	40mm Grenade for Pallard	10,000
60mm	50	60mm	50
Rounds for 60mm	1,000	Rounds for 60mm	1,000
		PG-7-0G-7 Grenade	1,000
		Ammunition 9x19mm	1,000,000
		Grenades for AGS-17	1,000
		GP Kastyor Launcher	80
		Pistol?????? 9mm PARA	2000
		RPG-7	200
		Sniper Gun 7.62 x 54 mm	50
		Ammunition 7.62 x 54 mm	5,000
		AK-47 assault rifle	10,500
		PKMS 7.62 machine gun	200
		Ammunition for PKMS-7.62 x 54	2,000,000
		Ammunition 7.62 x 39 mm Ball	5,000,000
		Thermal Image Weapon (NSPU I)	20

Annex 6: Definitions of Terrorism

European Union

Taken from 'Council Common Position as of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism.' (2001/931/CFSP) *Article 1, 3:*

'For the purposes of this Common Position, 'terrorist act' shall mean one of the following international acts, which, given its nature or its context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, as defined as an offence under national law, where committed with the aim of:

- (i) seriously intimidating a population, or
- (ii) unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or
- (iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation:
 - (a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;
 - (b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
 - (c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
 - (d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
 - (e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
 - (f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;
 - (g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, explosions or floods the effect of which is to endanger human life;
 - (h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life;
 - (i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed under (a) to (h); directing a terrorist group;
 - (j) participating in the activities of a

terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the group.

For the purposes of this paragraph, 'terrorist group' shall mean a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist acts. 'Structured group' means a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of a terrorist act and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership, or a developed structure.'

African Union

Taken from the Organisation of African Union (now African Union) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism: *Article 1, 3:*

3. "Terrorist act" means:

- (a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
 - (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
 - (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
 - (iii) create general insurrection in a State.
- (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).'

South African Government

Taken from: South Africa Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2002:

"terrorist act" means an act, in or outside the Republic,

- (a) that is committed
 - (i) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause, and

- (ii) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organisation to do or to refrain from doing any act, whether the person, government or organisation is inside or outside the Republic, and
- (a) that –
- (i) causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence,
 - (ii) endangers a person's life
 - (iii) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public,
 - (iv) causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private property, if causing such damage is likely to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of subparagraphs (i) to (iii), or
 - (v) causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, including, but not limited to: an information system; or a telecommunications system; or a financial system; or a system used for the delivery of essential government services; or a system used for, or by, an essential public utility; or a system used for, or by, a transport system, other than as a result of lawful advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that does not involve an activity that is intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of subparagraphs (i) to (iii),

but, for greater certainty, does not include conventional military action in accordance with customary international law or conventional international law.'

United Nations General Assembly

Taken from General Assembly Resolution 54/110 Measures to eliminate international terrorism:

- '1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed;
2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political,

philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them.'

Definition in UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism:

- '1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
 - (a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or
 - (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.'

Arab League

Taken from Arab League Accord to Fight Terrorism, April 22, 1998^{eee}

'The Main Principles Of The Accord:

1. Commitment to high moral and religious principles, above all the rules of the Islamic Shari`a and the human heritage of the Arab Nation, which condemns violence and terrorism and stresses the defence of human rights and cooperation between societies for the sake of peace.
2. Commitment to the rules of the covenant of the League of Arab States, of the UN, International Law and all other related international agreements. These are all the wellspring of international society in its pursuit of peace and security for all.
3. Differentiation between terrorist crimes and the struggle against foreign occupation and aggression, according to the principles of International Law.
4. Intensification of the Arab cooperation and coordination in the judicial security fields, and the creation of a common ground for this coordination by accepted bases to the judicial means of operations.
5. Coordination between the terms of this accord and the laws and steps taken by every individual state, in order to fulfil the common national aims of this accord.'

^{eee} Source: Translated by Reuven Paz, ICT, from al-Ayam (Qatar), from Jewish Virtual Library, <http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/arabacc.html>

HOTEL BOULEVARD

P. O. BOX 2027
MUSKOGEE, LOUISIANA TEL. (225) 227-2440 FAX: (225) 226-2879

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS

CUSTOMER: ALI DARWISH
ADDRESS :
ROOM NO. : 201
RATE USD : 80.00
DATE IN : 01/29/01
DATE OUT : 02/06/01

DATE	ROOM	RATE	DESCRIPTION	DEBIT	CREDIT	BALANCE
01/29/01	200	08.29	ACCOMMODATION	80.00	0.00	80.00
01/30/01	200	07.11	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	89.00
01/31/01	200	08.27	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	98.00
01/30/01	200	08.76	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	107.00
02/01/01	200	07.62	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	116.00
02/02/01	200	07.11	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	125.00
02/03/01	200	10.29	BAR/REST.	10.00	0.00	135.00
02/04/01	200	11.55	BAR/REST.	1.00	0.00	146.00
02/05/01	200	11.49	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	155.00
02/06/01	200	11.76	BAR/REST.	10.00	0.00	165.00
02/06/01	200	11.88	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	174.00
BALANCE						174.00

NUMBER OF DAYS: 9
ACCOMMODATION: 80.00
TAX: 0.00
BAR/REST.: 84.00
DEPOSIT: 0.00
BALANCE: 174.00

HOTEL BOULEVARD PAID IN FULL
DATE: 02-12-01
SIGNATURE

Hotel Boulevard Bill for Ali Darwish.
29 January to 6 February 2001

HOTEL BOULEVARD

P. O. BOX 2027
MUSKOGEE, LOUISIANA TEL. (225) 227-2440 FAX: (225) 226-2879

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS

CUSTOMER: IBRAHIM BALADE
ADDRESS :
ROOM NO. : 204
RATE USD : 70.00
DATE IN : 01/31/01
DATE OUT : 02/06/01

DATE	ROOM	RATE	DESCRIPTION	DEBIT	CREDIT	BALANCE
01/31/01	200	07.42	ACCOMMODATION	420.00	0.00	420.00
02/01/01	600	04.29	LAUNDRY	9.00	0.00	411.00
02/02/01	600	04.41	LAUNDRY	9.00	0.00	402.00
02/03/01	600	04.42	LAUNDRY	9.00	0.00	393.00
02/04/01	600	10.92	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	384.00
02/05/01	200	10.40	BAR/REST.	14.00	0.00	370.00
02/06/01	200	11.11	BAR/REST.	18.00	0.00	352.00
02/06/01	200	10.77	BAR/REST.	10.00	0.00	342.00
02/06/01	200	11.87	BAR/REST.	12.00	0.00	330.00
02/06/01	600	04.42	LAUNDRY	4.00	0.00	326.00
02/06/01	600	04.49	LAUNDRY	9.00	0.00	317.00
02/06/01	600	04.46	LAUNDRY	9.00	0.00	308.00
02/06/01	600	11.61	BAR/REST.	4.00	0.00	304.00
02/06/01	200	11.65	BAR/REST.	14.00	0.00	290.00
02/06/01	200	11.67	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	281.00
02/06/01	200	11.74	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	272.00
BALANCE						272.00

NUMBER OF DAYS: 6
ACCOMMODATION: 420.00
TAX: 0.00
BAR/REST.: 108.00
LAUNDRY: 21.00
DEPOSIT: 0.00
BALANCE: 272.00

HOTEL BOULEVARD PAID IN FULL
DATE: 02-13-01
SIGNATURE

Hotel Boulevard bill for Ibrahim Bah - aka Ibrahim Balade.
31 January to 6 February 2001

HOTEL BOULEVARD

P. O. BOX 2027
MUSKOGEE, LOUISIANA TEL. (225) 227-2440 FAX: (225) 226-2879

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS

CUSTOMER: ALI NASSOUR
ADDRESS :
ROOM NO. : 201
RATE USD : 80.00
DATE IN : 02/15/01
DATE OUT : 03/03/01

DATE	ROOM	RATE	DESCRIPTION	DEBIT	CREDIT	BALANCE
02/15/01	200	10.61	ACCOMMODATION	80.00	0.00	80.00
02/16/01	200	10.62	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	89.00
02/17/01	200	10.63	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	98.00
02/18/01	200	10.64	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	107.00
02/19/01	200	10.65	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	116.00
02/20/01	200	10.66	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	125.00
02/21/01	200	10.67	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	134.00
02/22/01	200	10.68	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	143.00
02/23/01	200	10.69	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	152.00
02/24/01	200	10.70	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	161.00
02/25/01	200	10.71	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	170.00
02/26/01	200	10.72	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	179.00
02/27/01	200	10.73	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	188.00
02/28/01	200	10.74	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	197.00
02/29/01	200	10.75	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	206.00
02/30/01	200	10.76	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	215.00
03/01/01	200	10.77	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	224.00
03/02/01	200	10.78	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	233.00
03/03/01	200	10.79	BAR/REST.	9.00	0.00	242.00
BALANCE						242.00

NUMBER OF DAYS: 18
ACCOMMODATION: 80.00
TAX: 0.00
BAR/REST.: 162.00
DEPOSIT: 0.00
BALANCE: 242.00

HOTEL BOULEVARD PAID IN FULL
DATE: 03-15-01
SIGNATURE

Hotel Boulevard bill for Aziz Nassour.
15 February to 3 March 2001

Room 416 MR. Simon

External Parts topics

1. Anti-hemorrhoid
2. Benzyl benzate
3. Calamine
4. Gentian Violet
5. Iodine providone
6. Neomycin
7. Tetracycline eye ointment/drops

Dressings

1. Elastic Bandage non-adhesive
2. Cotton Wool
3. Hydrophilic gauze bandage
4. Gauze Compress
5. Tape adhesive
6. Alcohol
7. Elastic bandage adhesive

26a

JAN 17 2001 18:22 PAGE: 01

request
Y quote for medical stuff for Africa
2 more sent quote if don't do
medical stuff

Handwritten fax sent to Shimon Yelenik in room 416 in Marriott Hotel in Miami, Florida on 16 January 2001 requesting medical supplies.

Room 416 MR. Simon

Medical Supplies

1. Diapering bags
2. Examination gloves
3. Thermometer
4. Syring and needles
5. Surgical blades
6. Physicians Set
7. Stethoscope / Standard
- 8.

26b

JAN 17 2001 18:11 PAGE: 01

Handwritten fax sent to Shimon Yelenik in room 416 in Marriott Hotel in Miami, Florida on 16 January 2001 requesting medical supplies.

Room 416 MR. Simon

Tablets

1. Acetylsalicylic acid 325mg tabs
2. Chloramphenicol
3. Chloroquine phosphate
4. Ciprofloxacin
5. Diazepam 5mg tabs
6. Ferrous Sulphate
7. Folic Acid
8. Gliclazide 500mg
9. Ibuprofen
10. Multi-Vitamin
11. Oral Rehydration Salts (sachets)
12. Paracetamol 500mg
13. Quinine Sulphate 300mg
14. Tetracycline tablet caps
15. Vitamin B tabs
16. Aspirin
17. Septrin

26c

JAN 17 2001 18:16 PAGE: 01

Handwritten fax sent to Shimon Yelenik in room 416 in Marriott Hotel in Miami, Florida on 16 January 2001 requesting medical supplies.

Room 416 MR. Simon

Injectables

1. Ampicillin powder 500mg
2. Benzyl penicillin benzathine
3. Benzyl penicillin procaine
4. Chloroquine sulphate 5ml supps
5. Diazepam 5mg
6. Dexamethasone
7. Gentamycin sulphate
8. Quinine
9. Tramadol
10. Vitamin B12
11. Water for injections
12. Anti-itching
13. Pain killers

Infusions

1. Saline (Dextrose) 5% 500ml plus Set
2. Haemaccel plasma substitute 500ml
3. Sodium chloride 0.9% 500ml plus Set
4. Infusion sets

26d

JAN 17 2001 18:16 PAGE: 01

Handwritten fax sent to Shimon Yelenik in room 416 in Marriott Hotel in Miami, Florida on 16 January 2001 requesting medical supplies.

Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone

December 31, 2001

Dear Sir,

I write to inform you that I am not a part of what Eddie Kanneh did. I trusted Eddie that's why I appointed him as Ambassador to Liberia from our Movement.

Sir, Eddie Kanneh is now in the Ivory Coast living with Sekou, the Field commander of our friend in Guinea.

Sir, we would like you to please reconsider your decision about us not being allowed in Liberia again.

Sir, you are our father and without you we are nowhere so please consider us as we cannot get anything from Freetown.

We wish you a Happy New Year.

Your son,

Gen. Issa Cisse
(Supreme Commander)
RUF/SL

Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone

December 31, 2001

Dear Sir,

We received with great surprise the news that Sam was in Burkina Faso along with Gen. Abraham Bah.

Sir, we the leadership knows that Sam being in Burkina Faso was the sole work of Gen. Abraham Bah because he stole more then \$800.000USD from the sale of our gem stone that was given him to give to you. Maybe you don't know but anywhere we see Gen. Abraham Bah we will catch him. So Mr. President we are asking you to please not allow Gen. Bah to come to Liberia again.

May God bless you Sir.

We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Your son,

Gen. Issa Cisse
(Supreme Commander)
RUF/SL

Letters from RUF interim leader Issa Hassan Sesay to President Charles Taylor

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
MONROVIA, LIBERIA

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
attn: Immigration Commander
Roberts International Airport
Harbel, Margibi County
Republic of Liberia

AIRPORT VISA NO 011/212

AIRPORT VISA

Mr. FERIEL SHAHIN * LIBANON ***** Nationality

is due to arrive in Liberia via Roberts International Airport

without the necessary Entry Visa(s), as guest(s) of Mr. Abraham Bah of 15th Street, Sinkor Telephone No.

You are further directed to allow him to enter and indicate in his Passport (s) "SEEN ON ARRIVAL" or grant unto him a period which he intend(s) to temporarily stay in Liberia, but not to exceed the statutorily required period.

You are, therefore, directed to advise the appropriate airline accordingly. And for so doing, this shall constitute your legal and sufficient authority.

Given under my hand this 14th day of June 2001 in the City of Monrovia, Liberia

Note: A. The validity of this Visa is Three (3) months as of the date hereof and of a single journey only.

B. This document is not valid without the Official Stamp of the Commissioner

Visa VIP waiver forms for Liberia for Ferial Shahin

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
MONROVIA, LIBERIA

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
attn: Immigration Commander
Roberts International Airport
Harbel, Margibi County
Republic of Liberia

AIRPORT VISA NO 011/212

AIRPORT VISA

Mr. SOULEMANI M. GUESSEN * TOGOGNE ***** Nationality

is due to arrive in Liberia via Roberts International Airport

without the necessary Entry Visa(s), as guest(s) of Mr. Abraham Bah of 15th Street, Sinkor Telephone No.

You are further directed to allow him to enter and indicate in his Passport (s) "SEEN ON ARRIVAL" or grant unto him a period which he intend(s) to temporarily stay in Liberia, but not to exceed the statutorily required period.

You are, therefore, directed to advise the appropriate airline accordingly. And for so doing, this shall constitute your legal and sufficient authority.

Given under my hand this 6th day of March 2001 in the City of Monrovia, Liberia

Note: A. The validity of this Visa is Three (3) months as of the date hereof and of a single journey only.

B. This document is not valid without the Official Stamp of the Commissioner

Visa VIP waiver forms for Liberia for Soulemani M Guessen. Guessen is Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
MONROVIA, LIBERIA

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
attn: Immigration Commander
Roberts International Airport
Harbel, Margibi County
Republic of Liberia

AIRPORT VISA NO 011/212

AIRPORT VISA

Mr. AZIZ NASSOUR * Libanone ***** Nationality

is due to arrive in Liberia via Roberts International Airport

without the necessary Entry Visa(s), as guest(s) of Mr. Abraham Bah of 15th Street, Sinkor Telephone No.

You are further directed to allow him to enter and indicate in his Passport (s) "SEEN ON ARRIVAL" or grant unto him a period which he intend(s) to temporarily stay in Liberia, but not to exceed the statutorily required period.

You are, therefore, directed to advise the appropriate airline accordingly. And for so doing, this shall constitute your legal and sufficient authority.

Given under my hand this 9th day of July 2001 in the City of Monrovia, Liberia

Note: A. The validity of this Visa is Three (3) months as of the date hereof, and of a single journey only.

B. This document is not valid without the Official Stamp of the Commissioner

Visa VIP waiver forms for Liberia for Aziz Nassour

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
MONROVIA, LIBERIA

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER
attn: Immigration Commander
Roberts International Airport
Harbel, Margibi County
Republic of Liberia

AIRPORT VISA NO 011/212

AIRPORT VISA

Mr. MOHAMMAD D. KENEME * YEMOUDE ***** Nationality

is due to arrive in Liberia via Roberts International Airport

without the necessary Entry Visa(s), as guest(s) of Mr. Abraham Bah of 15th Street, Sinkor Telephone No.

You are further directed to allow him to enter and indicate in his Passport (s) "SEEN ON ARRIVAL" or grant unto him a period which he intend(s) to temporarily stay in Liberia, but not to exceed the statutorily required period.

You are, therefore, directed to advise the appropriate airline accordingly. And for so doing, this shall constitute your legal and sufficient authority.




Given under my hand this 6th day of March 2001 in the City of Monrovia, Liberia

Note: A. The validity of this Visa is Three (3) months as of the date hereof and of a single journey only.


B. This document is not valid without the Official Stamp of the Commissioner

Visa VIP waiver forms for Liberia for Mohammad D Keneme. Keneme is Fazul Abdullah Mohammed

Annex 8: Graphs



I2 charts showing al Qaeda diamond deals in Sierra Leone and Liberia in 1998 and 2000



I2 chart schematic showing how al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade in Africa from 1993 to 2001

References

- 1 'Al Qaeda Funded by "blood diamonds": Illicit stones traded to pay for terror operations, UN says' Mike Blanchfield, *The Ottawa Citizen*, 9 February 2003
- 2 Global Witness Report, *A Rough Trade*, December 1998
- 3 *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, 21 October 2001
- 4 US House of Representatives discussion draft legislation, 25 February 2003
- 5 Resolution 1373 (2001) – Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts S/RES/1373 (2001) which was adopted by the Security Council on 28 September 2001
- 6 'Bin Laden's financial empire said to stretch from ostrich raising to diamonds', Donna Abu-Nasr, *Associated Press*, 18 September 2001.
- 7 Digital file from the Court Reporters Office, Southern District of New York, Transcripts of the trial are available at the website *Cryptome.org*
- 8 Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade Douglas Farah, *The Washington Post*, 2 November 2001
- 9 Report on Money Laundering Typologies, *FATF*. 14 February 2003, p 22
- 10 Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, London, Hurst & Company, 2002, p 23
- 11 Ibid, p 24
- 12 Ibid, p 23
- 13 Bruce Hoffman, *Rethinking terrorism and Counter Terrorism Post September 11 2001*, lecture at RUSI, London, 12 June 2002
- 14 Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, London, Hurst & Company, 2002, p 57
- 15 Al Qaeda Structure, Special Report, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 26 July 2001
- 16 Blowback by Phil Hirschhorn, Rohan Gunaratna, Ed Blanche, and Stefan Leader, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 26 July 2001
- 17 Al Qaeda Recruitment by Ed Blanche, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 18 December 2001
- 18 Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, London, Hurst & Company, 2002, p 60
- 19 Ibid, p 146
- 20 Ibid, p 147
- 21 Ibid, p 148
- 22 *The New York Times*, Michael Wines, 6 December 2002.
- 23 Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, London, Hurst & Company, 2002 p 148
- 24 Ibid, p 149
- 25 Ibid, p 163-164
- 26 Ibid, p 61
- 27 'Bankrolling bin Laden', Mark Huband, *Financial Times*, 28 November 2001
- 28 Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, London, Hurst & Company, 2002, p 19
- 29 Day 29 United States vs Usama bin Laden, Government Exhibit GX-305
- 30 Blood Diamonds and Oil, *New Scientist*, 29 June 2002
- 31 Gems and Gemology, 'Gem Resources of Afghanistan' <http://www.gems-afghan.com/int-magazines.htm>
- 32 Romancing the Stone, *Montreal Gazette*, Tanya Goudsouzian, 6 June, 2002
- 33 Beautiful Gems Help Alliance Pay for 5-Year War, *Seattle Times*, 21 November 2001
- 34 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, *Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2002-2003*, p 19, 14 February 2003, Paris, France
- 35 Al Qaeda's Road Paved with Gold, Douglas Farah, *The Washington Post*, 17 February 2002
- 36 Al Qaeda Gold Moved to Sudan Douglas Farah, *The Washington Post*, 3 September 2002
- 37 Ralph Joseph, *The Washington Times*, 6 October 2002
- 38 Al Qaeda invests in Gold Market, Marc Roche *Le Monde*, 23 October 2002
- 39 Tanzania's Precious Minerals Boom: Issues In Mining and Marketing, Research Paper, March 2001
- 40 Day 8 21 February 2001, United States Of America v. Usama Bin Laden
- 41 Underground Trade: Much Smuggled Gem called Tanzanite Helps Bin Laden Supporters, *The Wall Street Journal*, Robert Block and Daniel Pearl 16 November 2001
- 42 Tainted Gems, Brian Ross, *ABC World News Tonight*, 14 December 2001
- 43 The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role In Money Laundering, *Interpol*, January 2000
- 44 Al Qaeda's Gold: Following the Trail To Dubai, Douglas Farah, *The Washington Post*, 18 February 2002
- 45 Hezbollah: Between Tehran and Damascus. Gary C. Gambill and Ziad K Abdelnour Volume 4 No 2 February 2002, *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*
- 46 Nabih Berri, Lebanese Parliament Speaker, Vol 2 No 11 *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* December 2000
- 47 *The Daily Star* 24 August 2002
- 48 AMAL had an armed militia wing from 1975
- 49 *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* (New York)

- February 2002
- 50 UN Monitoring Mechanism on Violation of Angolan Sanctions, Reports – various 2000-2002
- 51 Small Arms Survey 2002 by Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/>
- 52 Information given by Chris Gordon, Diamond Expert and member of Angolan UN Monitoring Mechanism, 2001 to 2002.
- 53 Angolan Diamond Smuggling: The part played by Belgium ('Algemene Dienst Inlichting En Veiligheid (Adiv)'), Service General Du Renseignement Et de la Security (Sgr), July 2000
- 54 Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, S/2000/203, 10 March 2000
- 55 Chris Gordon, UN expert panel member, Interview with General Badua, Luanda, Angola, 2000 and 2001
- 56 'Les familles de onze libanais executees ont receptionne hier dix corps a Beyreuth,' La Tempete des Tropiques N 1684 19 March 2000
- 57 'In the Party of God, Hezbollah sets up operations in South America and the United States', Jeffrey Goldberg, *The New Yorker*, 28 October, 2002
- 58 *Financial Times* 28 October 2002
- 59 Ezziddeen Diamonds, 2 Hoveniersstraat, Floor 9, Office 915, Tel 03.231 1663 Fax 03 2261223, Email VAT@BE-423 668 779
- 60 Global Witness investigation, March 2002, Namibia
- 61 Namibian Minerals Act, 1992
- 62 Global Witness investigation, South Africa, 2002
- 63 Conflict Diamonds Are Forever, *The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists* 2002.
- 64 Global Witness meeting with the sightholder. October 2002, London.
- 65 Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, William Reno, *Cambridge University Press*, 1995
- 66 Diamonds and War in Sierra Leone: Cultural Strategies for Commercial Adaptation to Endemic Low-Intensity Conflict, Casper Fithen, University of London, Doctorate in Philosophy, 1999.
- 67 Ibid p 124
- 68 Global Witness investigation, March 2000
- 69 Testimony of Joseph H. Melrose, Former American Ambassador to Sierra Leone, Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 13 February, 2002
- 70 Testimony of John E. Leigh, Ambassador of Sierra Leone to the United States, Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 13 February, 2002.
- 71 'War and Peace in Sierra Leone, Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection by Lansana Gberie', The Diamonds and Human Security Project, Occasional Paper 6, Series Editor Ian Smillie, Partnership Africa Canada
- 72 Fithen, 1999, p 124
- 73 Ibid, p 125
- 74 Ibid, p 126
- 75 Interview with Douglas Farah February 2003
- 76 Fithen, 1999, p 127
- 77 Les prolongements du conflit israelo-arabe en Afrique noire: le cas du Sierra Leone, Stephen Ellis, *Politique Africaine*, (1988), no 30, p 69-75
- 78 Global Witness interview with William Reno. August 2002.
- 79 'The Heart Of The Matter Sierra Leone', Diamonds & Human Security, Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, Ralph Hazleton, January 2000, Partnership Africa Canada
- 80 Les prolongements du conflit israelo-arabe en Afrique noire: le cas du Sierra Leone by Stephen Ellis, *Politique Africaine*, (1988), no 30, p 69-75
- 81 'The Lebanese Community in the Ivory Coast: a Non-native Network at the Heart of Power', *Didier Bigo in The Lebanese in the world: A century of emigration*, edited by Albert Hourani and Nadim Shehadi, 1992 p 509
- 82 Ibid, p 21
- 83 Ibid, p 23
- 84 Hizbollah in Lebanon; The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, Magnus Ranstorp, London, Macmillan, 1997, p 68
- 85 Executive summary Dept. Of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 18 November, 1998
- 86 Meeting with European intelligence analyst, November 2002.
- 87 Day 5, 14 February 2001 Court Reporters Office, Southern District of New York,
- 88 United States v Usama bin Laden et al., S (7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS)
- 89 Ex-Osama aide recalls founding of al Qaeda, Dawn International, 29 November 2001
- 90 Day 9 United States Of America v Usama Bin Laden, Et Al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023
- 91 Day 29. 16 April 2001, Testimony of Mohamed Ali M.S. Odeh Questioning by Mr Schmidt.
- 92 A Portrait of Wadiah El Hage, accused Terrorist, PBS Frontline.
- 93 The Embassy Bombings Trial – A Summary, Oriana Zill.
- 94 Ibid.

- ⁹⁵ <http://www.terrorismcentral.com/Library/Incidents/USEmbassyKenyaBombing/Indictment/Count1.html> p.17.pt (t)
- ⁹⁶ www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/10/18
- ⁹⁷ Government Exhibit 636 C p 7
- ⁹⁸ Government Exhibit 636 C p 16
- ⁹⁹ Government Exhibit 636 D p 13
- ¹⁰⁰ Government Exhibit 636 C p 3
- ¹⁰¹ Government Exhibit 636 A p 4
- ¹⁰² Government Exhibit 1B117/7E-141
- ¹⁰³ Government Exhibit 1B117/7E-101
- ¹⁰⁴ Government Exhibit 1B117/7E-114
- ¹⁰⁵ Government Exhibit 1B117/7E-105
- ¹⁰⁶ Government Exhibit 1B117/7E-122
- ¹⁰⁷ Government Exhibit 1B117/7E-124
- ¹⁰⁸ Diamonds in the Central African Republic: Trading, Valuing and Laundering, Christian Dietrich, The Diamonds and Human Security Project, Occasional paper # 8. Series editor. Ian Smillie, p 4
- ¹⁰⁹ 1B117/7E-64
- ¹¹⁰ 1B117/7E-6
- ¹¹¹ 1B117/7E-10
- ¹¹² 1B117/7E-11
- ¹¹³ 1B117/7E-20
- ¹¹⁴ Government Exhibit GX 305 p 10
- ¹¹⁵ Day 29, 16 April 2001 Court Reporters Office, Southern District of New York
- ¹¹⁶ Additional Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA, S/2002/486, 9 April 2002
- ¹¹⁷ Christopher Aaron, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 9 September 2002
- ¹¹⁸ Lessons from Ivory Coast's Descent Into Anarchy, All Africa, *Africa News*, 6 December 2002 & Liberia Accused of Providing Troops to aid Ivorian Rebels Defence and Foreign Affairs Daily, 24 January 2003
- ¹¹⁹ Letter dated 26 October 2001 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia (S/2001/1015)
- ¹²⁰ The Bulgarian authorities speak of a NOTACO Holding
- ¹²¹ IPIS research, January 2002
- ¹²² Statements made by prosecution witness Jamal al-Fadl in Southern District Court of New York 6 February 2001
- ¹²³ Al Qaeda's New Leaders, Six Militants Emerge From The Ranks to Fill Void, Statesen Schmidt and Douglas Farah, *The Washington Post* 29 October 2002.
- ¹²⁴ Meeting with European Military analyst, December 2002
- ¹²⁵ Personal communication with Stephen Ellis August 2002
- ¹²⁶ Personal communication with member of UN Liberian Expert Panel
- ¹²⁷ An axis connected to Ghaddafi, Douglas Farah, *The Washington Post*, 3 November 2001
- ¹²⁸ Meeting with European Military intelligence analyst, December 2002
- ¹²⁹ Interview with Douglas Farah, August 2002
- ¹³⁰ Bijlagen bij het Belgisch Staatsblad – Ondernemingen (Belgisch Staatsblad, Brussels/Belgium) 'Addenda with the Belgian State Monitor – Enterprises'
- ¹³¹ Final Report of The Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 8 October 2002, S/2002/1146
- ¹³² Interview with Samih Ossaily, IPIS vzw, January 2002
- ¹³³ La Opinion de Tenerife 24 November 2001
- ¹³⁴ *Airwise.com* 22 November 2001
- ¹³⁵ *El Mundo*, Jose L. Lobo, 2 November 1999
- ¹³⁶ Ministry of the Interior, Direccion General de la Policia, 2001
- ¹³⁷ Global Witness interviews with member of Charles Taylor's inner circle, July & August 2002, West Africa
- ¹³⁸ Enquiries to Sabena archive
- ¹³⁹ Telephone interview with Ali Darwish, December 2002
- ¹⁴⁰ Meeting with Belgian government officials, June 2002
- ¹⁴¹ Report of the General Secretariat of the Organisation of American States on the Diversion of Nicaraguan Arms to the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia, 6 January 2003
- ¹⁴² Personal communication with Douglas Farah, August 2002
- ¹⁴³ Personal communication with Douglas Farah, 24 March 2003
- ¹⁴⁴ Darwish and Bah Hotel Boulevard bill, January 2001
- ¹⁴⁵ List of Persons Subject to Travel Restrictions Pursuant to Resolution 1343 (2001) On Liberia
- ¹⁴⁶ Summary of European intelligence report into al Qaeda diamond transactions, December 2002
- ¹⁴⁷ Communication with Belgian lawyer representing Samih Ossaily, November 2002
- ¹⁴⁸ Global Witness interview with Aziz Nassour, Beirut, September 2002
- ¹⁴⁹ BBC transcript of Nassour interview, 2002
- ¹⁵⁰ Personal communication between Aziz Nassour and Douglas Farah, *The Washington Post*, November 2002
- ¹⁵¹ Liberian visa waiver form for Ferial Shahin, 2001
- ¹⁵² Personal communication with Pakistani businessman, August 2002
- ¹⁵³ Issa Hassan Sesay letter to Taylor, 31 December 2001

- ¹⁵⁴ Rebels in Sierra Leone Mine Diamonds in Defiance of UN Captured Children and Conscripts Used as Labourers, Douglas Farah, *The Washington Post*, 19 August 2001
- ¹⁵⁵ Meeting with Douglas Farah, November 2002
- ¹⁵⁶ Report says Africans harboured al Qaeda, Douglas Farah, *The Washington Post* 29 December, 2002
- ¹⁵⁷ Interview with UNAMSIL Military Commander, Brigadier James Ellery, Freetown, December 2002
- ¹⁵⁸ Flow of Money linking Antwerp diamond dealer to Bin Laden, Dimitri Antonissen, *De Nieuwe Gazet*, 23 May 2002
- ¹⁵⁹ Meeting with Belgian government officials, August 2002
- ¹⁶⁰ Meeting with Belgian investigator, November 2002
- ¹⁶¹ Samih Osaily Press Conference, Antwerp Magistrates Court, Casper Naber, 16 November 2001
- ¹⁶² Sierra Leone rebels probe al Qaeda link, Mark Doyle, *BBC News*, 2 November 2001
- ¹⁶³ Email from Omrie Golley to Joe Melrose, 22 August 2002
- ¹⁶⁴ Interviews with senior RUF personnel by Global Witness, Freetown, Sierra Leone, March 2002
- ¹⁶⁵ RUF denies terrorist links, IRIN, 5 November 2001
- ¹⁶⁶ Witness links two embassy bombing defendants Phil Hirschhorn, *CNN.com* 22 February 2001
- ¹⁶⁷ Witness offers alibi for bombings trial defendant, Phil Hirschhorn, *CNN.com* 17 April 2001
- ¹⁶⁸ JA/WDC Statement re: al Qaeda connection, 6 November 2001
- ¹⁶⁹ De Beers Statement. 6 November 2001
- ¹⁷⁰ 'Antwerp Industry "very surprised" by bin Laden report', *Agence France Presse*. 2 November 2001
- ¹⁷¹ De Diamantsmokkel Vanuit Angola de Rol Van Belgie.
- ¹⁷² Belgium Accused Continuing Sale of Unita Diamonds, *Panfrican News Agency*, 24 April 2001
- ¹⁷³ Website of Diamonds View, December 2001
- ¹⁷⁴ Personal communication between Belgian Government members, the HRD and Global Witness, 2001
- ¹⁷⁵ Liberian Government denies connection to al Qaeda, *Agence France Presse*, 3 November 2001
- ¹⁷⁶ Government Denies al Qaeda Connection, *The News (Monrovia)*, 23 July 2002
- ¹⁷⁷ Liberian Government bans bin Laden T-Shirts, *Allaboutliberia.com* 12 November 2002
- ¹⁷⁸ Testimony of Allan Eastham, Former US Special Negotiator on Conflict Diamonds, Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 13 February, 2002
- ¹⁷⁹ Personal communication with former De Beers Director, February 2002
- ¹⁸⁰ CIA reply to Select Committee on Intelligence, 8 April 2002
- ¹⁸¹ Common Sense suggests al Qaeda network may have used illegal diamond sales to move money, expert says, *Associated Press* 5 November 2001
- ¹⁸² Action Against Terrorism website: www.odccp.org/odccp/terrorism.htm.
- ¹⁸³ International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Article 2
- ¹⁸⁴ Action Against Terrorism website: www.odccp.org/odccp/terrorism.html
- ¹⁸⁵ S/RES/1373 (2001) 28 September 2001
- ¹⁸⁶ Economic Agendas in Armed Conflict, FAFO, 2002, p 11
- ¹⁸⁷ Addressing Security Council, Secretary-General Endorses Three-Pronged Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UN, 4 October 2002
- ¹⁸⁸ Security Council, Briefed by Chairman of Counter-Terrorism Committee, Stresses Need for All States to Report on Anti-Terrorism Efforts, Security Council press release and report 15 April, 2002
- ¹⁸⁹ Report of the UN Policy Working Group on the UN and Terrorism, 6 August, 2002, p 2
- ¹⁹⁰ Security Council Considers Terrorists Threats to International Peace, Security, UN Press Release, 10 October, 2002
- ¹⁹¹ Security Council resolution 1333 (2000) on the situation in Afghanistan – S/RES/1333 (2000)
- ¹⁹² Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) on the situation in Afghanistan – S/RES/1267 (1999)
- ¹⁹³ Security Council resolution 1363 (2001) on the situation in Afghanistan – S/RES/1363 (2001)
- ¹⁹⁴ Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan, 5 February, 2002
- ¹⁹⁵ S/2002/ 541 p 7
- ¹⁹⁶ S/2002/ 541 p 3
- ¹⁹⁷ International Trade: Critical Issues Remain in Deterring Conflict Diamond Trade, United States General Accounting Office, June 2002, (GAO-02-678)
- ¹⁹⁸ S/2002/541 p 8
- ¹⁹⁹ S/2002/1338 Third report of Monitoring Group established pursuant to UNSC resolution 1363 (2002)
- ²⁰⁰ New African Convention Against Terrorism, Sapa-AFP, 12 September 2002
- ²⁰¹ AU Convention on the Prevention and

- Combating of Terrorism, Article 4
- ²⁰² AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Article 5
- ²⁰³ EU action in response to 11 September 2001: one year after. 9 September, 2002, and 11 September attacks: The European Union's Broad Response, European Union website, <http://europa.eu.int/>, 3 June, 2002
- ²⁰⁴ EC external assistance facilitating the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1373: an overview, Commission Staff Working Paper, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 25 February 2002
- ²⁰⁵ Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering
- ²⁰⁶ Testimony of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Treasury to Financial Services Committee, US House of Representatives, 19 September 2002
- ²⁰⁷ CRS Report for Congress. The United States Patriot Act: A Sketch, 18 April, 2002
- ²⁰⁸ Ibid, p 4
- ²⁰⁹ 'Getting Ready for the Post-Conflict Era', *Diamond Intelligence Briefs*, 18 October 2002
- ²¹⁰ The United States Patriot Act, Title III
- ²¹¹ Diamond Industry Proposes Rules to Comply with US Anti-Terrorist Legislation, *Diamond Intelligence Briefs*, 15 July, 2002, p 2426
- ²¹² 'Patriot Act compliance expected by summer', Hedda T Schupak, *JSK-Jewelers Circular Keystone*, 5 March 2003
- ²¹³ Testimony of Robert S Mueller, III, Director of FBI to the US House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, 19 September, 2002
- ²¹⁴ Terrorist Financing, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 November 2002, p 1
- ²¹⁵ Ibid, p 2
- ²¹⁶ Ibid, p V
- ²¹⁷ Ibid, p 3-4
- ²¹⁸ G-7 Combating the Financing of Terrorism: First Year Report, *G-7 Report*, 2002
- ²¹⁹ 'Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing', *FATF*, 31 October 2001
- ²²⁰ See <http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/>
- ²²¹ 'FATF Calls on All Countries to Join Combat Against Terrorist Financing', FATF press release, 10 September 2002.
- ²²² 'Report on Money Laundering Typologies', *FATF*, 14 February 2003, p 24
- ²²³ Ibid, p 22
- ²²⁴ Ibid, p 23
- ²²⁵ Foundation document of Diamonds For Ever 14 December 1984



global witness

Global Witness' previous publications

also available on our website: <http://www.globalwitness.org>

- The Usual Suspects – Liberia's Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone – Why it's Still Possible, How it Works and How to Break the Trend**
published March 2003
- "Logging Off – How the Liberian Timber Industry Fuels Liberia's Humanitarian Disaster and Threatens Sierra Leone"**
published September 2002
- "Deforestation without limits – How the Cambodian government failed to tackle the untouchables"**
published July 2002
- "All the Presidents' Men – The Devastating Story of Oil and Banking in Angola's Privatised War"**
published March 2002
- "Branching Out – Zimbabwe's Resource Colonialism in Democratic Republic of Congo"**
published February 2002
- "Can Controls Work? – A Review of the Angolan Diamond Control System"**
published December 2001
- "Taylor-made – The Pivotal Role of Liberia's Forests and Flag of Convenience in Regional Conflict"**
published September 2001
- "The Credibility Gap – and the Need to Bridge It Increasing the pace of forestry reform"**
published May 2001
- "Review of the Sierra Leone Diamond Certification System and Proposals and Recommendations for the Kimberley Process for a Fully Integrated Certification System (FICS)"**
published April 2001
- "Conflict Diamonds – Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and Control of Diamonds"**
published June 2000
- "Chainsaws Speak Louder Than Words"**
published May 2000
- "Timber Takeaway – Japanese Over-consumption – the Forgotten Campaign"**
published March 2000
- "The Untouchables – Forest crimes and the concessionaires – can Cambodia afford to keep them?"**
published December 1999
- "A Crude Awakening – The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola's Civil War and the Plundering of State Assets"**
published December 1999
- "Made in Vietnam – Cut in Cambodia How the garden furniture trade is destroying rainforests"**
published April 1999
- "Crackdown or Pause – A Chance for Forestry Reform in Cambodia?"**
published February 1999
- "A Rough Trade – The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict"**
published December 1998
- "Going Places – Cambodia's Future on the Move"**
published March 1998
- "Just Deserts for Cambodia – Deforestation & the Co-Prime Ministers' Legacy to the Country"**
published June 1997
- "A Tug of War – the Struggle to Protect Cambodia's Forests"**
published March 1997
- "Cambodia, Where Money Grows on Trees – Continuing Abuses of Cambodia's Forest Policy"**
published October 1996
- "RGC Forest Policy & Practice – the Case for Positive Conditionality"**
published May 1996
- "Corruption, War & Forest Policy – the Unsustainable Exploitation of Cambodia's Forests"**
published February 1996
- "Thai-Khmer Rouge Links & the Illegal Trade in Cambodia's Timber"**
published July 1995
- "Forests, Famine & War – the Key to Cambodia's Future"**
published March 1995

Global Witness Ltd P O Box 6042 London N19 5WP United Kingdom
telephone: + 44 (0)20 7272 6731 fax: + 44 (0)20 7272 9425 e-mail: mail@globalwitness.org <http://www.globalwitness.org/>
ISBN 1 903304 11 3

Global Witness is a British based non-governmental organisation which focuses on the links between environmental and human rights abuses, especially the impacts of natural resource exploitation upon countries and their people. Using pioneering investigative techniques Global Witness compiles information and evidence to be used in lobbying and to raise awareness. Global Witness' information is used to brief governments, inter-governmental organisations, NGOs and the media. Global Witness receives no funding for this project from any government or public funds. Global Witness has no political affiliation.

i2 Limited's award-winning software has helped Global Witness in the preparation of this report. i2 software is used as standard by enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide. The software allows organisations to undertake complex investigations involving huge and varied datasets, providing visualisation and analysis tools which are used by 1500 organisations in 90 countries. i2 Limited has very generously supplied this software to Global Witness, along with intensive support and consultancy.



