



John Arnold BREDEKAMP

Dual Zimbabwean – Dutch Nationality

Arms dealer to

Rhodesia (self-acknowledged sanctions buster) 1970s

Iraq (1980s)

Iran (1980s)

DR Congo (1990; 2000s)

Zimbabwe (1980s, 1990s, 2000s) despite EU and UK sanctions, through his Aviation Consultancy Services Company (ACS)

Part of the “elite network” involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DR Congo, through his participation in / control of the Kababankola Mining Company (KMC) in co-operation with the Zimbabwe Defence Force (Gen. Vitalis Zvinavashe, OSLEG company) and Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa, Speaker of Parliament in Zimbabwe, and apparent heir to Mugabe.

Companies owned or controlled involved in Dr Congo and Zimbabwe:

Breco Company group (www.breco.info)

Aviation Consultancy Services Company (ACS) (Zimbabwe)

Kababankola Mining Company S.p.r.l (KMC) (DRC)

Petraf (Zimbabwe) (Pte)Ltd (Zimbabwe)

Tremalt Ltd

Raceview Enterprises

The following is a fully referenced compilation of information from various sources, largely (re)published on the internet, and a few archival sources. Latest information: 18 November 2003. Last checked 30 January 2004

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Nederlands Instituut voor Zuidelijk Afrika



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BREDENKAMP, John Arnold (Kimberley, South Africa, 11 August 1940)

Born Kimberley, South Africa, 11 August 1940.¹ Moved to Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) as a child. ‘He was educated at Zimbabwean schools but says he was more interested in sports than academic matters.’² Captain of the Rhodesian national rugby team 1965–1968;³ ‘Obsessed with winning, he played with excessive zeal.’⁴

‘Bredenkamp describes himself as an alcoholic who “hasn’t had a drink in 20 years,” and says his father and grandfather were alcoholics too. He did not join a program to stop drinking. “I just got up one morning and quit,” he says. “Some people need programs. They are not strong. I was very strong.” (...) When he was a teenager, his father, a Rhodesian tobacco farmer of modest means, killed his wife and then himself.’⁵

Family

Married 1962⁶ to **Jennifer Lee Scott** (born Krugersdorp, South Africa, 18 June 1942),⁷ reportedly a former Miss South Africa and daughter of Kenneth William Scott.⁸ September 1976: two daughters, born Salisbury 1964 and Groningen 1972;⁹ in 1979 said to live in Belgium with three children.¹⁰ ‘His family life is complex. He has a wife and three grown children but reportedly also has a young son from an extramarital affair.’¹¹

Nationality

Bredenkamp was said to have taken on **Dutch citizenship** in 1970¹² and to have multiple nationalities, including South African, British and Dutch. When he and his family moved from the Netherlands to Belgium in 1976, they all declared their nationality to be Dutch;¹³ in the British and the Swiss company registers Bredenkamp’s nationality was recorded as Dutch in 1979¹⁴ and 1989 at the latest,¹⁵ respectively. Bredenkamp was reported to be ‘not a British

¹ Aliens Register, Municipality of Kapellen, Antwerp (Belgium) [photocopy available at request at NiZA].

² ‘Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close’, *Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 8 April 2001 (quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html), quoting a recent interview with Bredenkamp in the *Zimbabwe Independent*.

³ Breco Group website <http://www.breco.info/management.html>

⁴ Michael Bamberger, ‘Strongman: John Bredenkamp, a rich and powerful former arms dealer, has muscled his way into golf’, *GolfWeb* 1996 services.golfweb.com/si/1996/0903/bredenkamp.html

⁵ Michael Bamberger, ‘Strongman: John Bredenkamp, a rich and powerful former arms dealer, has muscled his way into golf’, *GolfWeb* 1996 services.golfweb.com/si/1996/0903/bredenkamp.html

⁶ Note in Shipping Research Bureau files.

⁷ Aliens Register, Municipality of Kapellen, Antwerp (Belgium) [photocopy available at request at NiZA].

⁸ Notes in Shipping Research Bureau files. According to Boris Johnson, ‘Cowardly whites who help Mugabe’, *The Spectator*, UK, 13 April 2002 (quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr12a_2002.html): ex-Miss Rhodesia.

⁹ Aliens Register, Municipality of Kapellen, Antwerp (Belgium) [photocopy in Shipping Research Bureau files].

¹⁰ Ed Harriman, article on ‘Muller-gate scandal’ (‘Rhodesian arms from illegal tobacco trade’), *Haagse Post*, 16 June 1979, 2427 (in Dutch).

¹¹ Michael Bamberger, ‘Strongman: John Bredenkamp, a rich and powerful former arms dealer, has muscled his way into golf’, *GolfWeb* 1996. services.golfweb.com/si/1996/0903/bredenkamp.html

¹² Michael Bamberger, ‘Strongman: John Bredenkamp, a rich and powerful former arms dealer, has muscled his way into golf’, *GolfWeb* 1996. services.golfweb.com/si/1996/0903/bredenkamp.html

¹³ Aliens Register, Municipality of Kapellen, Antwerp (Belgium) [photocopy available at request at NiZA].

¹⁴ Casalee Commodities (U.K.) Ltd, Company Number 1417715.

citizen' in the UK press (2002).¹⁶ 'I am African. (...) I was a Rhodesian; I am now a Zimbabwean.'¹⁷ On the 6th of November 2003, in the **House of Commons** he was referred to as having a **dual Zimbabwean-Dutch passport**.¹⁸

Private addresses Netherlands – Belgium – UK – Zimbabwe

Took up residence in Eelde (**Netherlands**) on 26 January 1968; name removed from municipal register at Eelde 28 November 1972.¹⁹ Lived in Haren, Westerse Drift 78, until 13 September 1976, when he moved to Kapellen, Antwerp (**Belgium**).²⁰ Information from 1979: Bredenkamp lived in Kapellen, Houtsniplei 3, since 1976.²¹

In 1979 the BBC reported that Bredenkamp and his family 'live in Antwerp's smartest suburb, Schoten, in a large house with tennis courts and extensive grounds'.²² British Company House information 1979, 1983 on Bredenkamp's Belgian address: Dennerlei 30, Schoten.²³

Private address [1989?]: 10 Montpelier Square, London SW7 1JW, **United Kingdom**.²⁴

'He lives now [1996] in a mansion on a golf course in **Sunningdale**, outside London.'²⁵ 'John Bredenkamp's mansion lies at the end of a private road on the outskirts of the Berkshire village of Sunningdale. It is a "millionaire's row" of huge houses and winding drives. Bredenkamp's home is one of the biggest.'²⁶

Zimbabwe 2000/01: 'His splendid residence, **Thetford House**, enjoys a commanding view over the **Mazowe Valley**, about 35 kilometres north of Harare. The capital's residents know when Bredenkamp is in town because they hear his private helicopter transporting him from his home to the city.'²⁷

Tobacco business – Casalee

Trained in tobacco business in Rhodesia as a leaf buyer for Gallaher Ltd. until 1965, seconded to a firm called Tobacco Corporation; transferred to the **Netherlands** in 1967/68 to work for

¹⁵ Orell Füssli 1989/90 (Casalee AG).

¹⁶ "'Arms dealers" met top British diplomats', *The Observer*, 14 December 2002; quoted from: www.buzzle.com/chapters/authors.asp?author=229

¹⁷ 'Statement by John A. Bredenkamp, Founder of the Group', Breco Group website, 2002; <http://www.breco.info/introduction.html>

¹⁸ House of Commons, Hansard Debates for 6 November 2003

www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansard/cm031106/halltext/3116h01.htm

¹⁹ Hugo van der Plas [Southern Africa group Groningen], 'Wapensmokkel naar Rhodesië. Een Groninger connection' (Arms smuggling to Rhodesia: A Groningen connection), *Amandla* (Netherlands), December 1979, 20 (in Dutch).

²⁰ Aliens Register, Municipality of Kapellen, Antwerp, Belgium) [photocopy available at request at NiZA].

²¹ Note in Shipping Research Bureau file from 1986; information received from 1979 BBC Panorama programme collaborator.

²² BBC Panorama, programme on Rhodesian arms embargo busting, 11 June 1979.

²³ Company House, Casalee Commodities (U.K.) Ltd, Company Number 1417715.

²⁴ Note in Shipping Research Bureau file, apparently from 1989.

²⁵ Michael Bamberger, 'Strongman: John Bredenkamp, a rich and powerful former arms dealer, has muscled his way into golf', *GolfWeb* 1996 services.golfweb.com/si/1996/0903/bredenkamp.html

²⁶ Antony Barnett and Paul Harris, 'UK sports agent accused of selling military gear to African despot', *The Observer*, 27 October 2002; www.guardian.co.uk/armstrade/story/0%2C10674%2C820040%2C00.html

²⁷ Andrew Meldrum (in Harare), 'Rugby hero tackles foes of Mugabe: The tycoon behind plans to split farmers', *The Observer*, 25 March 2001 www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0%2C4273%2C4158683%2C00.html

Niemeijer.²⁸ Left Niemeijer in 1976.²⁹ Had started his own tobacco firm, **Casalee**, in 1975/76.³⁰

Bredenkamp's firm developed into a large tobacco group, which, however, was 'not only trading in tobacco'.³¹ From Bredenkamp's own Breco Group website (2002): 'Casalee was primarily a leaf tobacco merchanting company but was also engaged in general trading and an active initiator of counter trade and barter deals. The Casalee Group grew over 16 years to become the fifth largest tobacco merchant in the world and the biggest non-US leaf tobacco company.³² It had companies in Belgium, UK, Switzerland and Southern Africa and elsewhere. (Company names and addresses available at request at NiZA).

'Not only trading in tobacco' – Rhodesia sanctions busting

In **June 1979**, a BBC '**Panorama**' programme was perhaps the first to pay attention to the role of John A. Bredenkamp in arms embargo busting for Ian Smith.³³

From a report in *Africa Confidential* (November 1999): Bredenkamp 'has been vulnerable to political criticism for his acknowledged support for the Ian Smith regime and its secret 'Zephyr' programme, which broke United Nations sanctions against the minority Rhodesian regime. At the height of Zimbabwe's liberation war, Dutch journalists photographed in a Belgian hangar a fleet of Italian Marquetti fighter planes procured by Bredenkamp for the Smith regime.'³⁴ Similar reports were published in a South African newspaper³⁵ and *Punch Magazine* ('Once in charge of the financial affairs of the Rhodesian Defence Forces')³⁶

According to those who in 1979 helped to reveal Bredenkamp's violating the arms embargo on Rhodesia, one of the companies he had set up in or around 1976 was Intabex (tobacco) in Switzerland.³⁷ (**Intabex SA** (Intabex AG) (Intabex Ltd) [Switzerland] – information updated to 1989³⁸).

²⁸ 'Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close', *Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 8 April 2001; quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html; and Breco Group website

<http://www.breco.info/management.html>

²⁹ *Amandla*, Netherlands, December 1979.

³⁰ Michael Bamberger, 'Strongman: John Bredenkamp, a rich and powerful former arms dealer, has muscled his way into golf', *GolfWeb* 1996. services.golfweb.com/si/1996/0903/bredenkamp.html; Breco Group website <http://www.breco.info/management.html> (year of founding Casalee: '1976'; '1975' according to *Haagse Post*, 16 June 1979, and *Amandla*, December 1979). – Bredenkamp's wife and daughters all have 'Lee' as their second given name (Aliens Register, Municipality of Kapellen, Antwerp (Belgium) [photocopy available at request at NiZA]).

³¹ *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, Paris, 21 March 1992, 6.

³² <http://www.breco.info/management.html>

³³ BBC Panorama, Monday, 11 June 1979, 8.10 p.m., report by Robert Denselow; transcript in Shipping Research Bureau files. – N.B. Prior to this, the Swiss Intabex company, reportedly set up by Bredenkamp, had already been accused of breaking Rhodesian sanctions (tobacco) – Later in 1979 the BBC Panorama programme was also broadcasted in the Netherlands (VARA television, 'Er is niets veranderd' [*Nothing Has Changed*], 12 October 1979).

³⁴ 'Zimbabwe/Congo-K – Rhodesia to the rescue: Some of Ian Smith's old friends are helping to finance Mugabe's Congo war effort', *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40 No. 22, 5 November 1999, 5. The magazine most likely referred to material used in the BBC 'Panorama' broadcast of 1979.

³⁵ 'Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close', *Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 8 April 2001; quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html The paper was not the first around that time to use similar wordings.

³⁶ Pete Sawyer, 'All Mugabe's Men', *Punch Magazine*, No. 106 (May 17-30, 2000); quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/may19.html

³⁷ *Amandla*, Netherlands, December 1979.

³⁸ Swiss Company Register 1989 [Orell Füssli 1989/90].

In 1978[?] a complaint was lodged with the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee against Intabex regarding the smuggling of cigarettes from Rhodesia.³⁹

After Zimbabwe had long won its independence, it was reported that ‘the *Casalee* group is not only trading in tobacco. (...) Before independence, the Rhodesian government was under a *United Nations* arms embargo, and it appears that at this time Casalee was working on behalf of Ian Smith’s regime for the purchase of weapons.’⁴⁰

Bredenkamp, in an interview in 1996, ‘**acknowledged that he has broken sanctions**. He admitted to violating United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 1972, in the days when Ian Smith was the president of the country, by buying aircraft for the white-run Rhodesian government that was then waging a brutal civil war with black Rhodesians.’⁴¹

In a later interview granted to the *Zimbabwe Independent* (probably early 2001), he reportedly admitted busting sanctions prior to 1980: “Yes, I was requested by the government of the day to help source supplies and equipment for the beleaguered country and yes, I did so. This has been openly acknowledged,” he said in the interview, which was published recently by the privately owned Zimbabwe Independent newspaper.’⁴²

No corroboration was found for the latter part of an odd allegation on Bredenkamp ‘having been accused of busting United Nations sanctions against Ian Smith’s regime and subsequently against the SA apartheid regime.’⁴³

‘Not only trading in tobacco’ – Arms dealings since 1980: Iran, Iraq

After Zimbabwe’s independence Bredenkamp’s business empire continued to grow, apparently also due to continued controversial arms dealings.

In early 1992, press reports in Switzerland and Belgium were quoted as follows in *The Indian Ocean Newsletter* (Paris): ‘According to a recent inquiry by Swiss news agency, *P. Network*, picked up by the Swiss and Belgian press, the Casalee group is not only trading in tobacco. This firm (...) is alleged to have been involved in a number of *arms deals* and sales of military technology. (...) In 1984, the company figures in an *Arab League* inquiry into *arms sales to Iran*, subtitled document N°22; *Armament Cooperation between Belgium and Iran*. A list adjoining this report gives detailed references of the military equipment sold (notably mines and explosive devices). In March 1991, Casalee and its Italian subsidiary, *Casalee Italia*, were involved in the *Valsella Meccano Tecnica* (VSTM) trial, where the latter was accused of selling arms to Iraq during the period from 1982 to 1986. Casalee is alleged to have made the contacts and to have *delivered* the arms. A Pakistani national convicted of arms trafficking in the United States, *Arif Durrani*, and who admits to having been Iran’s arms agent in Europe during the period from 1981 to 1986, had denounced Casalee as being one of the companies transporting arms to Iran.’

³⁹ *Amandla*, Netherlands, December 1979.

⁴⁰ *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, Paris, 21 March 1992, 6 [corrected], referring in part to ‘a recent inquiry by Swiss news agency, *P. Network*, picked up by the Swiss and Belgian press’.

⁴¹ Michael Bamberger, ‘Strongman: John Bredenkamp, a rich and powerful former arms dealer, has muscled his way into golf’, *GolfWeb* 1996, services.golfweb.com/si/1996/0903/bredenkamp.html

⁴² ‘Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close’, *Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 8 April 2001; quoted from: www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html

⁴³ ‘Zimbabwe/Congo-K – Big Wheels’, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40 No. 10, 14 May 1999, 8.

The French newsletter said that, according to P. Network, among those employed by Casalee were a number of ‘former high-ranking military or secret services personnel’.⁴⁴

Punch Magazine on sale of antipersonnel mines to Iraq. ‘[...] Belgian authorities, which subsequently investigated the allegations, suspected Casalee of being deeply involved with MI5, which historically has special responsibility for former colonies such as Zimbabwe. A few years ago, a Swiss lawyer, Ulrich Kohli, who handled administrative paperwork for Casalee AG, seemed to confirm this. He told a journalist that MI5 were the “organizers” behind Casalee, which had somehow also got itself entangled with arms dealing to Iran. Bredenkamp has always denied that Casalee was involved in the arms trade.’⁴⁵

The denial was repeated in the interview with Bredenkamp “For many years I have not been involved in the arms business at all. What newsmen have done is extract controversial stories from old articles and then sensationalise them,” he said.⁴⁶

In 9 November 1994, a documentary was shown in the British investigative news show *Dispatches*, which, in the words of a golf reporter who interviewed Bredenkamp in 1996, ‘describes, in the kind of detail that is hard to fabricate, Bredenkamp’s immensely profitable night job as a sanctions-breaking arms salesman, a middleman between manufacturers and warring countries. The program details, for instance, how a company owned by Bredenkamp sold land mines to Iran and antiaircraft guns to Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war in the mid 1980s, and how those mines killed British soldiers in the gulf war in 1991. (...) The British news program implies that the reason charges were never brought against Bredenkamp is that he operated with the tacit approval of British and American intelligence organizations.’ (...) “Tell me something: If I had broken sanctions and done all the things that have been reported, do you not think some official would come to the office for a discussion? I have never had anybody come to me and say, ‘You’ve made one dollar illegally.’” (...) Bredenkamp, in the interview in his Jupiter house [*Fla, USA*] (...) admitted to violating United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia in 1972 (...). Finally, even tobacco executives who worked for Bredenkamp routinely heard him speak of arms deals. “He’s always been an arms dealer,” says Brian Murphy of Harare, Zimbabwe, who worked as an executive at Casalee from 1980 to 1988. Any suggestion to the contrary, says Murphy, “is a very big lie.”⁴⁷

Towards the end of the 1990s at the latest, annual updates of the *Landmine Monitor Report* by **Human Rights Watch** and other organisations listed Switzerland as ‘involved [in the past] in

⁴⁴ *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, Paris, 21 March 1992, 6, referring in part to ‘a recent inquiry by Swiss news agency, P. Network, picked up by the Swiss and Belgian press’.

⁴⁵ Pete Sawyer, ‘All Mugabe’s Men’, *Punch Magazine*, No.106 (May 17-30, 2000); quoted from: www.zimbabwesituation.com/may19.html

⁴⁶ ‘Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close’, *Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 8 April 2001 (quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html), quoting a recent interview with Bredenkamp in the *Zimbabwe Independent*. – Bredenkamp was also said to have ‘always denied’ these arms sales to Iran and Iraq in a somewhat newer *Observer* article (October 2002) which cannot in all respects be considered an independent source of information (‘...it is not the first time Bredenkamp’s activities have caused outrage. He is alleged to have supplied arms to both sides in the Iraq-Iran war of 1980 to 1988, something he has always denied.’ Antony Barnett and Paul Harris, ‘UK sports agent accused of selling military gear to African despot’, *The Observer*, 27 October 2002; www.guardian.co.uk/armstrade/story/0%2C10674%2C820040%2C00.html).

⁴⁷ Michael Bamberger, ‘Strongman: John Bredenkamp, a rich and powerful former arms dealer, has muscled his way into golf’, *GolfWeb* 1996, services.golfweb.com/si/1996/0903/bredenkamp.html

the transit of explosives between Bofors in Sweden and Valsella in Italy through a Swiss office based in Geneva, Cofitec and Casalee AG in Zürich.⁴⁸

In January 1999, questions were asked in the **UK parliament** on contacts between the Department of Trade and Industry and Casalee and its – British-based – owner.⁴⁹ In 2001, Casalee and Bredenkamp were again mentioned in a House of Commons debate, in which reference was made to ‘the activities of Mr. Bredenkamp’s then company, Casalee, [which] were exposed [in 1994] by a courageous Channel 4 “Despatches” programme’.⁵⁰ In a debate in November 2003 the same MP repeated the old allegation that Bredenkamp ‘supplied weapons, including antipersonnel mines, to Iraq during its bloody war against Iran, which were eventually used against British troops in the 1990 Gulf war.’⁵¹

Sale of Casalee – New ventures – Breco

In 1993, Bredenkamp sold Casalee A.G. (‘his Casalee tobacco merchandising business’) to Universal Leaf Tobacco Corp. Inc. (USA) – the largest leaf tobacco company in the world,

Soon after the sale of Casalee Bredenkamp created the **Breco Group of Companies**, ‘a group of private equity companies to trade and invest on a world-wide basis and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. The Group invests in a wide range of sectors on a long-term basis (...).’⁵² Breco⁵³ is reported to be ultimately owned, via an Isle of Man company, by family trusts.⁵⁴ ‘The full extent of his business empire is difficult to ascertain, with many of his companies registered in tax havens like the Isle of Man and the British Virgin Islands. However, his company’s website refers to a network of trading operations in oil, property and food that criss-crosses Africa, Eastern Europe and the Far East.’⁵⁵

In 1994, Bredenkamp entered into the **golf and other sports management** business. From a *GolfWeb* article from 1996, based in part on an interview with Bredenkamp himself: ‘Bredenkamp apparently has left tobacco and weapons and devoted himself to a game he seldom plays. His two-year old sports-management company, **Masters International**, which has 60 employees and offices in Jupiter, Fla., as well as in Johannesburg, London, Moscow, Singapore and Tokyo, represents, among others, two players who competed in the Presidents Cup, **Nick Price** and **Robert Allenby**. (...) Earlier this year Bredenkamp nearly bought a struggling equipment manufacturer, Founders Club, but abandoned the deal when he decided the terms were unfavorable to him. He’s looking at other golf companies and other golfers. Someday he might want to manage golf tournaments, run golf schools and build courses. In

⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch and others, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, May 1999 (similar text in earlier report); quoted from web-version www.icbl.org/lm/1999/switzerland.html

⁴⁹ Questions asked by Mr. Campbell-Savours; answers 18 January 1999. House of Commons, Session 199899 www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990127/text/90127w11.htm

⁵⁰ House of Commons, Hansard Debates for 8 November 2001, Column 408 (Paul Farrelly MP) www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo011108/debtext/1110817.htm

⁵¹ House of Commons, Hansard Debates for 6 November 2003, Column 359WH www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/cm031106/halltext/31106h01.htm

⁵² www.brecointernational.com/

⁵³ Bre[denkamp] Co[mpany].

⁵⁴ Pete Sawyer, ‘All Mugabe’s Men’, *Punch Magazine*, No.106 (May 17-30, 2000); quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/may19.html

⁵⁵ Antony Barnett and Paul Harris, ‘UK sports agent accused of selling military gear to African despot’, *The Observer*, 27 October 2002; www.guardian.co.uk/armstrade/story/0%2C10674%2C820040%2C00.html

the meantime people in the golf business are watching and waiting and whispering, even the high and the mighty.

(...)

For a brief period Masters International represented two of the best players in the world: Price, who was also raised in Zimbabwe, and **Ernie Els**, the South African who won the 1994 U.S. Open. Els became part of Masters International when his business manager, Nic Frangos,⁵⁶ and Bredenkamp launched the company as 50-50 partners. Els speaks for his manager. “They broke up when that deal came up about John being an arms dealer,” Els says, referring to the *Dispatches* report.⁵⁷

Masters International is part of **Breco’s Sports Management and Marketing Division**.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Nic Frangos features extensively on the web.

⁵⁷ Michael Bamberger, ‘Strongman: John Bredenkamp, a rich and powerful former arms dealer, has muscled his way into golf’, *GolfWeb* 1996, services.golfweb.com/si/1996/0903/bredenkamp.html

⁵⁸ www.breco.info/gr_sports.html

Bredenkamp on The Sunday Times 'Rich List'

Every year, the British *Sunday Times* publishes a 'Rich List' of the wealthiest people living in Great Britain. In 1996 Bredenkamp ranked 76th.⁵⁹ 1999: 'A business associate claims that an entry in the UK *Sunday Times* 'Rich List' which puts Bredenkamp's personal wealth at £350 million (US\$560 mn.) is a 'considerable underestimate'.⁶⁰ In 2000[?] Bredenkamp ranked 55th; his wealth was valued at £400m.⁶¹ 2001 – 48th £550m.⁶² 'He was said to be wealthier than Madonna, to have accumulated more money than music impresario Andrew Lloyd Webber, and to be richer than the Queen of England'.⁶³ 2002 – 33th £720m (Tobacco and investments).⁶⁴ 'Bredenkamp is expanding his business empire in Africa with the opening of a new cigarette factory to support his tobacco interests. Based in Berkshire, Bredenkamp, 61, made his original fortune from the £70m sale of another tobacco business, Casalee Group, in 1993. The former Rhodesian rugby captain also has interests in oil, tourism, property and commodities. In total, his various interests have annual sales of well over £250m.'⁶⁵

2003 – *The Zimbabwe Situation* wrote on its website: 'Each year, we have watched the steady climb up the ranks of John Bredenkamp, the controversial Zimbabwean businessman. (...) We went to the Sunday Times website, but the search facility yielded the result "Nothing Found". What could have happened? Mr Bredenkamp has generously sent us an explanation:

"(...) You should be aware that the reason for my not appearing on that list is somewhat self evident i.e. my present residence is no longer in the UK and I am not a UK citizen. The focus of my business activities at the present time is primarily Southern Africa. The fact that I travel to the UK from time to time does not qualify me as a British citizen, nor does it render me British-based, and accordingly I do not qualify for inclusion in the British Rich List. I trust this explanation will assist."

John Arnold Bredenkamp⁶⁶

Back to Zimbabwe: 'In the past year he moved his headquarters to Zimbabwe, where he now spends most of his time' (*The Observer*, March 2001).⁶⁷

2000, 2002: Supporting Mugabe / Zanu-PF in elections

'In Zimbabwe, Bredenkamp has expressed his open support for President **Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF government**. Bredenkamp told the Zimbabwe Independent that his vast business interests and extensive travel experience had made him a friend of politicians and he had no

⁵⁹ Michael Bamberger, 'Strongman: John Bredenkamp, a rich and powerful former arms dealer, has muscled his way into golf', *GolfWeb* 1996 services.golfweb.com/si/1996/0903/bredenkamp.html

⁶⁰ 'Zimbabwe/Congo-K – Big Wheels', *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40 No. 10, 14 May 1999, 8.

⁶¹ 'Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close', *The Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 8 April 2001; quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html

⁶² 'Mixed fortunes for Mugabe's men', *The Sunday Times*, UK, 7 April 2002; quoted from: The Zimbabwe Situation site www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr8_2002.html

⁶³ ZWNEWS.COM, 27 April 2003 www.zwnews.com/issuefull.cfm?ArticleID=6650

⁶⁴ 'Mixed fortunes for Mugabe's men', *The Sunday Times*, UK, 7 April 2002; quoted from: The Zimbabwe Situation site www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr8_2002.html

⁶⁵ 'Mixed fortunes for Mugabe's men', *The Sunday Times*, UK, 7 April 2002; quoted from: The Zimbabwe Situation site www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr8_2002.html

⁶⁶ 'I've moved...', *Zimbabwe News*, 11 June 2003, on The Zimbabwe Situation site www.zimbabwesituation.com/jun12_2003.html

⁶⁷ Andrew Meldrum (in Harare), 'Rugby hero tackles foes of Mugabe: The tycoon behind plans to split farmers', *The Observer*, 25 March 2001 www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0%2C4273%2C4158683%2C00.html

regrets about it. He said he sincerely believed that it was in the “best interests of Zimbabwe for Zanu-PF to win the presidential elections next year.”⁶⁸ ‘Bredenkamp publicly supported Mugabe during the June 2000 parliamentary election and his controversial March presidential election this year. Bredenkamp, 64 [= 60 sic], is understood to have poured **campaign money** into the ruling **Zanu PF’s coffers** on several occasions.’⁶⁹

Bredenkamp in a later statement (more of which is quoted below): ‘I do not and never have provided funds to Zanu-PF. Furthermore, I have been critical of a number of government policies and initiatives, and have advocated and continue to advocate change. (...) I am apolitical and believe that the white people in Zimbabwe, who represent less than 1 per cent of the population, should remain apolitical.’⁷⁰

No longer ‘nothing to do with the oil industry’⁷¹ – Zimalzam, Petraf

‘This year [1999], Bredenkamp offered US\$50 mn. to Zimbabwe’s State-owned fuel distribution company **Noczim** (...) after its Kuwaiti suppliers had refused to extend further credit.’⁷²

‘Bredenkamp has remained loyal to his native [sic] Zimbabwe. Last year [1999] when Zimbabwe was beset with yet another fuel crisis, Bredenkamp, through a company called **Zimalzam**, offered to provide fuel by rail from South Africa. The deal went sour and led to a flurry of allegations of deliberately inflated tenders, over which Zimalzam is now suing. Allegations over inflated or dubious contracts are nothing new in Zimbabwe. Over the years, many of them have centred on **Mugabe** himself, who remains close to Bredenkamp, and who controls a string of businesses and concessions in Zimbabwe through the main political party, Zanu PF.’⁷³

‘Bredenkamp last year moved his headquarters from Europe back to Zimbabwe. One of his companies, **Petraf**, is the only firm bringing fuel into Zimbabwe’⁷⁴

From Bredenkamp’s own Breco Group website: ‘The Group’s petroleum products operations are conducted under the Petraf brand. Petraf Limited has contracts to supply the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe Limited with petroleum products through the port of Beira in Mozambique and the border town of Beitbridge in Zimbabwe. Petraf (Zimbabwe) (Pte)Ltd is a wholesaler and retailer of petroleum products in Zimbabwe. It has recently acquired a number of retail filling stations in strategic locations in Zimbabwe and will be developing convenience shops and fast food outlets at its retail sites. Petraf Limited has continued to

⁶⁸ ‘Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close’, *Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 8 April 2001 (quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html), quoting a recent interview with Bredenkamp in the *Zimbabwe Independent*.

⁶⁹ ‘Mugabe reneges on deal with white “pals”’, *The Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 12 May 2001; quoted from www.samara.co.zw/infoline/may02/13may.htm

⁷⁰ ‘I’m no Zanu PF crony’, Letter to *The Spectator* (UK), 10 May 2002; quoted from: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/may10_2002.html

⁷¹ ‘...I am the Chairman and Chief Executive of a leaf tobacco trading company that has nothing to do with the oil industry and as such am not qualified to comment’; Letter of J.A. Bredenkamp to the Shipping Research Bureau dated 13 September 1993; in SRB files.

⁷² ‘Zimbabwe/Congo-K – Rhodes to the rescue: Some of Ian Smith’s old friends are helping to finance Mugabe’s Congo war effort’, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40 No. 22, 5 November 1999, 5.

⁷³ Pete Sawyer, ‘All Mugabe’s Men’, *Punch Magazine*, No.106 (May 17-30, 2000); quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/may19.html

⁷⁴ *Southern Africa Monthly Regional Bulletin*, Vol.10/03, March 2001; abbreviated report: http://www.gn.apc.org/southscan/mrb_open/MRB_shorts01/mrb_shorts0103.html; full report (subscribers only): southscan.gn.apc.org/mrbfiles/mrbfiles01/mrb0301.html; cf. Andrew Meldrum (in Harare), ‘Rugby hero tackles foes of Mugabe: The tycoon behind plans to split farmers’, *The Observer*, 25 March 2001 www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0%2C4273%2C4158683%2C00.html

supply products to the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe Limited, when its competitors had ceased supplying because of lack of foreign currency. In the current economic climate, the role of Petraf is critical to the Zimbabwean economy. Should Petraf decline the risk, it is most probable that there would be irreversible damage to key Zimbabwean economic sectors. The long-term strategy of the group is focused on growing market share by developing its retail network.⁷⁵

'In Zimbabwe he won a major tender to supply fuel to the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe. He also supplies fuel to Zambia, Malawi and Congo.'⁷⁶

Sponsoring settlement in land invasion crisis, March 2001 / Farm listed, March 2002 / Bredenkamp's rejoinder to allegations, May 2002

In several press articles Bredenkamp was presented as a mastermind behind a controversial plan, floated in March 2001, to solve the **land invasion crisis** in Zimbabwe. The following quotes are from the period 19 March–8 April 2001; Bredenkamp's own **Thetford Farm** had been **listed for seizure** and **delisted**, only to be **listed again** by March 2002.

“SINISTER” is strong language for a diplomat, but that’s how a British Foreign Office official described a plan to solve Zimbabwe’s land invasion crisis. Allegedly the brain child of businessman John Bredenkamp and *allegedly* backed by the Americans the plan would see most farmers lose about one third of their land to the Zimbabwean government, and no doubt to the invaders. Mr Nick Swanepoel, a former CFU president, is also agitating for the plan. (...) (...) the (...) British diplomat who described the alleged plan as sinister also said it seemed “fanciful” which makes it sound like a fairy tale. (...) In fact, Mr Bredenkamp’s whole initiative, if the British Press is to be believed, is based on “fanciful” claims and his relationship with the ruling party and Zimbabwe’s ageing president. Whether that makes it self-serving or not is open to conjecture. It certainly makes it unpalatable to most farmers and to the overwhelming majority of Zimbabweans who don’t want to see organised agriculture sell the country down the river. (...) Certainly the British seem to have made up their minds. They’ve said his plan would be “sinister” but doubt it even exists.⁷⁷

'Farmers in Zimbabwe are to meet to discuss continuing land seizures amid signs of a split in their ranks. [Former Commercial Farmers' Union – CFU – president **Nick Swanepoel**] said white farmers – who have backed land redistribution but oppose seizures – must accept the government’s target and immediately resettle 20,000 families on plots of between two and five hectares with free tillage, seed and fertiliser. The farmers must also drop all legal challenges against the government, he said, to allow Zimbabwe to approach donors including Britain and the U.S. to unblock aid for compensation and help reverse Zimbabwe’s economic crisis. (...) critics say he is trying to turn the union into a branch of the ruling party. They say his drive is cosponsored by John Bredenkamp, a farmer, oil and arms trader with strong links to Mugabe’s party, but Bredenkamp denies the link.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Breco Group website [2002(?)], Group activities > Trading and Manufacturing > Petroleum products www.breco.info/gr_trade_oil.html

⁷⁶ 'Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close', *Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 8 April 2001 www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html

⁷⁷ Brian Latham, Editor, *The Farmer*, 'A sinister fairy tale?', on The Zimbabwe Situation site www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar24.html, 19 March 2001.

⁷⁸ 'Farmers split in Zimbabwe land row', edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africa/03/20/zimbabwe.farmers?related, 20 March 2001.

‘And now the farmers are facing crunch time again. This week the members of the CFU have been asked to approve a deal floated by the Rhodesian sanctions buster, and Mugabe intimate, John Bredenkamp and his ally Nick Swanepoel.’⁷⁹

‘It was Bredenkamp’s role in the campaign to reform the white farmers’ union that revealed him as one of Mugabe’s strategic allies. He bankrolled the drive by Nick Swanepoel to persuade the farmers’ union to accept the loss of nearly half its members’ land. Swanepoel, a former chairman of the Commercial Farmers Union, tried to convince white farmers to drop all legal cases objecting to Mugabe’s ‘fast track’ land seizures. He also called for the union’s leaders to step down and to be replaced by allies of Mugabe.’⁸⁰

‘Bredenkamp has made investments in Zimbabwe worth hundreds of millions of dollars in the tourism, oil and farming sectors and created thousands of jobs. In the past two weeks he was linked to a faction of the CFU led by Nick Swanepoel which has been seeking a negotiated settlement with the government over Zimbabwe’s unresolved land question.’⁸¹

‘The initiative, said to have been drawn up in collaboration with tycoon arms dealer, Mr John Bredenkamp, also suggested that the union stops all litigation against government. Mr Bredenkamp was present at the CFU special congress but snubbed Press inquiries on his involvement in the deal.’⁸²

‘In the past month [March 2001] he has been linked to a faction of the CFU led by Nick Swanepoel, which is seeking a negotiated settlement with the government over Zimbabwe’s unresolved land question. Bredenkamp owns a large estate in Mazowe, which was designated for acquisition by the Zimbabwe government but was later delisted. He, like Rautenbach, has been linked to influential politicians.’⁸³

‘...Swanepoel (...) is backed by the ubiquitous Bredenkamp...’⁸⁴

‘...John Bredenkamp, who helped the Mugabe government by backing attempts by farmer Nick Swanepoel (a fellow Afrikaner) to fix up a deal with the Commercial Farmers’ Union on the resettlement of white-owned farmland.’⁸⁵

One year later, in April 2002 (by that time Bredenkamp’s farm had been listed again) the press raked the episode up. *The Spectator* (UK) wrote on the ‘cowardly whites who help Mugabe’, which was not only meant to refer to the land crisis but to Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC as well – on which more will follow below.

⁷⁹ Old MacDonald (‘a nom de plume of a besieged local farmer’), ‘In the last 13 months our country has been dragged to the gates of hell – Candid Comment’, *The Zimbabwe Independent*, 23 March 2001; quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar26.html

⁸⁰ Andrew Meldrum (in Harare), ‘Rugby hero tackles foes of Mugabe: The tycoon behind plans to split farmers’, *The Observer*, 25 March 2001 www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0%2C4273%2C4158683%2C00.html

⁸¹ ‘Zim tycoon in \$2.8b deal with the Congo’, *Financial Gazette*, 29 March 2001; quoted from: www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar30.html

⁸² ‘“Farming into the Future”’, *The Farmer*, 2 April 2001; quoted from: www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr08_2001.html

⁸³ ‘Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close’, *Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 8 April 2001 www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html

⁸⁴ ‘More of Mugabe’, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 42 No. 8, 20 April 2001, 2.

⁸⁵ ‘The military-financial complex’, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 42 No. 12, 15 June 2001, 2.

A less abashed cooperator is John Bredenkamp (...). Mr Bredenkamp is thought to be close to Mugabe, but especially to Emmerson Mnangagwa, the speaker of the Zimbabwean parliament and Mugabe's heir-apparent. (...) Has Bredenkamp ever raised his voice in protest at anything done by his chums? On the contrary. He is going round offering to buy up some of the most beautiful white farms, on the understanding that he can get the acquisition orders lifted. Then one might mention another Zanu-PF crony, called Billy Rautenbach, who is wanted by Interpol. (...),⁸⁶

John Bredenkamp's reaction (May 2002):

'From Mr John A. Bredenkamp

Sir: I am writing to express my concern about your recent article ('The cowardly whites who help Mugabe', 13 April) that includes a number of statements and allegations in relation to me which are manifestly false.

Your article appears to suggest that I am a silent and cowardly white collaborator who has somehow been responsible in part for keeping President Robert Mugabe in power. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I am a Zimbabwean businessman and serious investor in a number of countries throughout the world. I have created employment for hundreds of people in Zimbabwe and continue to invest in the country at this difficult time. As an investor I have had a long business relationship with many institutions within Zimbabwe and consequently know a large number of politicians. This does not make me 'a Zanu-PF crony', as you choose to label me.

I do not and never have provided funds to Zanu-PF. Furthermore, I have been critical of a number of government policies and initiatives, and have advocated and continue to advocate change. I have gone on the record on this issue. You peddle the perception that I am close to President Robert Mugabe; the reality is totally different. I have not met him or spoken to him for almost 18 years.

I am apolitical and believe that the white people in Zimbabwe, who represent less than 1 per cent of the population, should remain apolitical. This does not mean that I sit on the sidelines. Far from it. I have been actively promoting dialogue between the Commercial Farmers' Union and the government to try to resolve the land issue in Zimbabwe. A blueprint for the resolution of the problem was, in fact, accepted, based on the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI), which I started. I remain committed and continue to give whatever input I can to try to resolve the land issue.

The Bayleys' story is a tragic one. The irony is that during the week in which your article was published the Bayleys spent a number of days in our offices in Harare seeking my help and assistance, which I was only too happy to give. In a report of 21 April, Tommy Bayley wrote, 'We have not given up on the farm and livelihood and are very appreciative of the assistance given to us by family, friends, neighbours, the CFU and Jenni Williams, charity organisations, our lawyers and the executives of Breco/Scottlee who have spent many hours and cellphone calls, at all times of the day and night, working on resolving our problems.' Breco and Scottlee⁸⁷ are my companies.

⁸⁶ Boris Johnson, 'Cowardly whites who help Mugabe', *The Spectator*, UK, 13 April 2002; quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr12a_2002.html

⁸⁷ Breco Group website, Group activities > Leisure Division > Scottlee Resorts: 'Scottlee Resorts is the group's leisure management division, responsible for all operational aspects from design and build through to international marketing' www.breco.info/gr_ld_scottlee.html – N.B. The name of this company obviously derives from that of Bredenkamp's wife, Jennifer Lee Scott.

I continue to help the Bayleys in any way I can and, although not resolved, progress with the authorities is being made. There are over 185 other farmers and their families who have sought our assistance in approaching the authorities. You must understand that I deplore the violence and intimidation occurring on the farms, which I find totally reprehensible.

You should know that my farm, which was bought long before the current troubles, was listed, then delisted and is now relisted. As I write, it remains listed for compulsory acquisition. I have had war veterans threatening to take over the farm and, like the Bayleys, the situation remains unresolved. In these current circumstances I have absolutely no interest in buying further farmland in Zimbabwe. Your article is mischievous and it is plainly wrong to suggest otherwise.

(...) [*On DRC – see next section*]

I wish to stress that I fully support press freedom and the right to publish articles involving sensitive or difficult issues. All I ask is that you do your homework and present a balanced view based on the facts.

John A. Bredenkamp

Chairman, Breco and Masters Group of Companies, Hurst, Berkshire⁸⁸

Around the time of the publication of this reaction in the British press, the Zimbabwean and South African press commented that Mugabe had meanwhile ‘turned against his white supporters’ indeed:

‘President Robert Mugabe has turned on his white supporters and approved the listing of their farms for acquisition as he enters the final phase of his contentious land reform exercise. The Zimbabwe Independent this week learnt that long-time Mugabe ally John Bredenkamp’s 1 300hectare, \$1,75 billion **Thetford estate** in the Mazowe valley 35km north of Harare has been **listed for compulsory acquisition**. Farms owned by commercial farmers who last year thought they had brokered deals to save their properties from acquisition have also been listed. Bredenkamp (62 [= 61]), the country’s richest businessman with a fortune of 720 million pounds, is said to have close links with President Mugabe and Zanu PF.

Bredenkamp bought the farm from the Gulliver family in 1999 after obtaining a certificate of no interest from the government. In September 2000 the farm received a Section 5 order which was withdrawn in October of that year after representations from Bredenkamp that the farm did not qualify for resettlement because it was highly industrialised and had large investments on it. On March 22 the farm was again listed and since then war veterans have been disrupting operations at the farm, sponsoring industrial action last month.’⁸⁹

By early 2003, nothing had changed yet with regard to the listing of Bredenkamp’s Thetford farm, according to a report in the *Zimbabwe Independent* of 14 March 2003: ‘(...) Other government supporters whose businesses have been thrown into doubt by the land reform programme include John Bredenkamp, owner of Thetford Estate, and Nick Swanepoel, owner of Avalon farm, who are both sitting on Section 5 notices, preliminary government notices showing its intention to acquire a property.’⁹⁰

⁸⁸ ‘I’m no Zanu PF crony’, Letter to *The Spectator* (UK), 10 May 2002; quoted from: http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/may10_2002.html

⁸⁹ ‘Mugabe turns on white allies’, *The Zimbabwe Independent*, 10 May 2002; quoted from www.zic.com.au/updates/2002/14may2002.htm

⁹⁰ ‘Govt turns against its white supporters’, *The Zimbabwe Independent*, 14 March 2003; quoted from: www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar15_2003.html

Zimbabwe and D.R. Congo

[1] 1999-2000 – Media revelations; USA; UK House of Lords; UN Security Council

Africa Confidential seems to be the first to have exposed, in its issue of 14 May 1999 and then more extensively in that of 5 November 1999, the central role of Bredenkamp (together with another white Zimbabwean businessman, Billy Rautenbach), in ‘**procuring and transporting military supplies for Zimbabwean and Congolese troops**’, and at the same time setting up ‘financing schemes through which Zimbabwe could invest in Congo’s mining sector, using the profits to defray the cost of military support for President Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s government.’⁹¹

[AC, 14 May 1999, on problems looming for Rautenbach:] ‘...when Kabila was in Harare in November, he appointed Rautenbach chief executive of Congolese State-owned *Gécamines* (...). One business source suggests that Rautenbach might be able to find help from fellow Zimbabwean entrepreneur John Arnold Bredenkamp, who is back in favour with the ZANU government (...). Not only is Bredenkamp active across many sectors, including arms supply to Congo-K, he has very deep pockets.’

[AC, 5 November 1999:] ‘They [Rautenbach and Bredenkamp] are linked into a white business network that includes figures such as Ricky Passaportis. Even in Zimbabwe’s cabinet, the Bredenkamp-Rautenbach partnership and its close links to Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa are drawing fire. (...) ‘This year, Bredenkamp offered US\$50 mn. to Zimbabwe’s State-owned fuel distribution company Noczim (central to the government’s “parallel financing” of the Congo war) after its Kuwaiti suppliers had refused to extend further credit. (...) Although the Bredenkamp-Rautenbach partnership has delivered materiel to Congolese and Zimbabwean forces, it hasn’t produced the needed income for the Zimbabwean government. Bredenkamp claims he is the leading arms supplier to Congo and Zimbabwe but other business people point to new arms-brokers entering the market. (...) Zimbabwe’s war finance effort is also threatened by recent ructions between the Bredenkamp-Rautenbach partnership and Congolese ministers. (...)’⁹²

In February 2000, the **American Defense Secretary William S. Cohen** toured Africa. *Washington Times*: ‘In preparation for the visit, the **Defense Intelligence Agency** recently wrote up a classified report on the arms flow to the Democratic Republic of Congo. According to DIA, Congolese President Laurent Kabila concluded a secret agreement with Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe in October. The deal involves several companies that have formed a joint venture and will allow Zimbabwe, Namibia and Congo to pool their

⁹¹ ‘Zimbabwe/Congo-K – Big Wheels’, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40 No. 10, 14 May 1999, 8; ‘Zimbabwe/Congo-K – Rhodies to the rescue: Some of Ian Smith’s old friends are helping to finance Mugabe’s Congo war effort’, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40 No. 22, 5 November 1999 (quoted), 56; excerpt of the 5 November 1999 piece on www.africaconfidential.com/country.asp?ID=55: Country Articles: Zimbabwe. – On *Africa Confidential* & Bredenkamp in the South African *Sunday Independent*, 8 April 2001: ‘He hogged the international limelight last year [?] after a report in an intelligence magazine, *Africa Confidential*, linked him to the brokerage of arms including helicopters and fighter planes from Bulgaria and elsewhere to the war-ravaged DRC’ (‘Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close’, *Sunday Independent*, 8 April 2001; quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html). There is no reference to Bulgaria in *Africa Confidential*.

⁹² In the article, reference is also made to Rautenbach currently ‘selling all of *Gécamines*’ (...) copper production to Marc Rich Investments Limited’ and ‘all of *Gécamines*’ cobalt production to Glencore, a commodity company founded by Rich but now commercially independent of him’; AC recalls Marc Rich’s history as a tax evader in the USA and ‘leading oil supplier to South Africa’s apartheid regime’.

military and other resources against Jonas Savimbi's rebel forces in Angola. The companies are enriching those nations' leaders with gold and diamonds and also purchasing arms and weapons from a former Rhodesian arms dealer based in Belgium named **John Bredenkamp**, who has been granted an "arms monopoly" by Mr. **Mugabe** (...).⁹³

After the *Africa Confidential* articles, Bredenkamp was named in the **British House of Lords** on 5 April 2000. Lord Joffe, in a debate on the conflict in Central Africa, said, 'Then there is the issue of arms, a subject in which, tragically, British brokers have a bizarre advantage.(...) Controlling direct arms sales, however, is not enough. The Government's forthcoming Bill on strategic export controls must also regulate selling and brokering to all destinations, not just those currently under embargo. Central Africa glaringly shows up that arms to non-embargoed countries find their way to embargoed ones.' Following up on this later on in the debate, Lord Avebury said, among other things: 'I believe that the Government have already decided that they will include brokering in their new legislation. It would be useful to have confirmation from the Minister, when she comes to wind up, that that is the case. I know about the individuals in this country engaged in procuring arms for Eastern Europe and selling them to Zimbabwe and other countries in the regional neighbourhood. The gentleman to whom the noble Lord referred is probably Mr John Bredenkamp, who lives in Sunningdale and who has been referred to recently in *Africa Confidential*.'⁹⁴

In May 2000 the **United Kingdom** imposed an **arms embargo on Zimbabwe**; and on 2 June 2000, the **UN Security Council** requested Secretary-General Kofi Annan to establish a *Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, which was to submit to the Security Council a report on its findings.⁹⁵

Punch Magazine, May 2000:

'(...) [*Mugabe's*] government is being kept in power and its corrupt wheels oiled by the income from **diamonds** that *Mugabe's* military is plundering from the war ravaged Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).(...) Last month, one such player was exposed in the House of Lords. John Bredenkamp of Sunningdale, Berkshire, was named as being involved in brokering substantial arms shipments from countries such as Bulgaria to Zimbabwe for probable use in the Congo. (...) According to **South African intelligence** sources, John Bredenkamp, who administers his world-wide business empire from offices in Hurst, near Reading, is **Zimbabwe's main arms procurer and has provided arms, helicopters and pilots to the Congo**. His personal fortune, owned through off shore trusts, is estimated at well over 440 million pounds. (...) Again, ministers and members of the military are benefiting personally from these deals. A senior Zimbabwean air force executive allegedly has a diamonds-for-arms deal in the bag, and the **Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa**, is also said to be involved. Many believe that Mnangagwa is the man who will step into *Mugabe's* shoes when he eventually goes, as one way or the other he will. A point in Mnangagwa's favour is his close association with none other than John Bredenkamp. (...) The **diamond area** in the Congo has some **10,000 Zimbabwean troops stationed** around it. Reputedly, every week, two chartered jets fly from Kinshasa in the DRC to an airport in

⁹³ *Washington Times*, 18 February 2000; quoted from www.alamogirl.com/0151.htm

⁹⁴ House of Lords, Hansard, 5 Apr 2000, Column 1386f: Central Africa
www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/vo000405/text/0040510.htm

⁹⁵ Request in presidential statement dated 2 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/20), mentioned in letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council
www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm

Belgium, The planes bring with them packets of diamonds, which are then sold on the Antwerp diamond market.⁹⁶

Africa Confidential, May 2000:

In an article on Oryx Diamonds, a new consortium to mine diamonds in Congo-Kinshasa due to be launched on the London Stock Exchange, which details the intricate relationships between various business parties, the Zimbabwe Defence Force, ZANU-PF, and others, Bredenkamp figured only as the owner of a Zimbabwean-registered aircraft leased by Oryx from Bredenkamp's Breco company and seized by Congolese military on 13 March 2000; Bredenkamp's pilot was arrested.⁹⁷

Noseweek, August 2000:

'John Bredenkamp is President Mugabe's main arms procurer and has provided arms, helicopters and pilots to the Congo.'⁹⁸

Focus, September 2000:

'To understand how politics and money work in Zimbabwe one has to begin with the fact that **Zanu-PF** is more than just a political party. It owns two companies, the M & S Syndicate, set up even before independence in 1980, and **Zidco Holdings** (of which M & S holds 55 per cent of the shares), set up straight afterwards. (...) Zidco's directors are the two Joshi brothers, and **Emmerson Mnangagwa** and **Sidney Sekeramayi** the two men who have controlled the Central Intelligence Organisation ever since independence. Both are extremely close to Mugabe. (...)

Mnangagwa has also played a key role in the expansion of **Zanu-PF's financial interests into the Democratic Republic of the Congo**. In May 1999 he admitted that he had introduced a Chinese arms company, two transport companies, a banking group and a power company to Laurent Kabila and that they had all established businesses there. One of Zidco's subsidiaries, the First Bank Corporation, then set up in Kinshasa. In addition two other business associates of Mnangagwa went into business ferrying arms and supplies between Zimbabwe and the DRC, Billy Rautenbach's Wheels of Africa company and the head of the **Zimbabwean army, General Vitalis Zvinavashe**, with his company, Zvinavashe Transport. Mnangagwa then helped to broker an arms deal for Kabila of 21,000 AK47s and US\$53 million of heavy arms, all from China. Mnangagwa also works closely with **John Bredenkamp**, who boasts of being the biggest single supplier of arms to the Congo (...) Zvinavashe and his brother are also directors of **Osleg** (Operation Sovereign legitimacy) which, following the Chinese model, is seen as the economic wing of the Zimbabwean armed forces. Osleg wanted, above all, to get its hands on the mining concessions that Kabila had promised. The first such venture was with Comiex-Congo, producing a new joint company, Cosleg. There followed a joint venture with the Omani-owned Oryx Natural Resources to form Oryx-Zimcon. In January 2000 Oryx Natural

⁹⁶ Pete Sawyer, 'All Mugabe's Men', *Punch Magazine*, No. 106 (May 17-30, 2000); quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/may19.html

⁹⁷ 'Glittering prizes from the war', *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 41 No. 11, 26 May 2000, 14 (Bredenkamp on page 3). More in 'Soldiers of misfortune', *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 41 No. 18, 15 September 2000, 67. – In an undated report entitled *ZANU PF: The New Scramble for Africa* on 'the official website of the Embassy of Rhodesia in Iceland' www.rhodesian.net/zanu_pf_the_new_scramble_for_afr.htm, a lot of the *Africa Confidential* information is repeated without reference to the source; the date the Breco aircraft was arrested is mentioned here as March 3, 2000.

⁹⁸ 'Government arms purchases and the "black empowerment" business: Shake-up or Shaikdown?', *Noseweek* 30, August 2000 www.noseweek.co.za/index.php?PageID=pastarticles&article_id=4

Resources bought Petra diamonds and rechristened it **Oryx Diamonds** in which Zidco holds 237,000 shares.⁹⁹

WorldNetDaily, December 2000: (...) In the British House of Lords, one of the pro-Mugabe white tycoons was recently named John Bredenkamp of Sunningdale, Berkshire. Bredenkamp (...) was found to have been a key figure in sending arms from a former Soviet-dominated east European regime to Zimbabwe for use in Angola and Congo. (...) Bredenkamp has helped supply Zimbabwe with arms, helicopters and even armor. (...) Tracey Kinchen, a former [British MI6 intelligence](#) agent, told *WorldNetDaily*, “In the past, we worked with some of Bredenkamp’s satellite companies like Casalee, Zimalzam, Breco Services, Masters International in several of our former colonies. (...) There has also been speculation that Bredenkamp has helped Mugabe hide the president’s financial assets in Zimbabwe, the UK and Holland. (...) “Additionally, Mugabe tried to set up a front company concerning his new diamond interests in the Congo [*i.e. Oryx Diamonds*] and float stock on the London exchange. But that attempt failed,” added Kinchen.¹⁰⁰

Disputed inside Zimbabwe

By the end of 2002 Bredenkamp, who owns ‘exclusive game parks in the southern African bush’,¹⁰¹ came under fire from Zimbabwean activists: ‘Businessman and international financier John Bredenkamp, never far from controversy, is faced with protest from activists campaigning for a boycott of his **flagship tourism investment** in Zimbabwe, **Sanyati Lodge** in the Zambezi Valley. A group calling itself Zimactivism has been sending emails to tour operators asking them not to sell Sanyati Lodge as a tourist destination. “Whilst Sanyati Lodge is beautiful, one can’t say the same for John Bredenkamp’s activities”(...).¹⁰²

[2] 2001, Jan.-June – Media revelations; Bredenkamp comments; First Report of UN Panel of Experts

Further detailed information on Bredenkamp’s involvement in Zimbabwe and in Congolese mining, and some comments apparently elicited by journalists, surfaced early 2001.

[19 January 2001:] ‘Sources within **Gecamines** [*Générale de carrières et des mines*], the DRC’s State-owned mining company, say that a **company led by John Bredenkamp** has been granted **rights** to operate **Kababankola mine** near Kakanda and also rights to mine several other, as yet unspecified, deposits near Kakanda and Kambove. These two mining centres are in the “Group Centre” of **Gecamines** with the town Likasi as its headquarters. The new company has been granted the right to operate the concentrators of Kakanda and Kambove by paying a nominal rental to Gecamines, who will retain control of the giant hydro and pyrometallurgical complex in Likasi. **John Bredenkamp** is thought to be the **main supplier of [ordnance]** to the DRC war machine.

⁹⁹ ‘Inside Zimbabwe Inc’, *Focus* 19, September 2000, www.hsf.org.za/focus19/focus19refozanu.html (Helen Suzman Foundation, Parklands, South Africa).

¹⁰⁰ Anthony LoBaido, ‘African Powderkeg – Surviving Mugabe’s communist reign: White powerbrokers prop up regime while Anglo remnant struggles’, *WorldNetDaily* 10 December 2000, www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=19102

¹⁰¹ International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ‘The Adventure Capitalist’, from the 11 part series ‘Making a Killing: The Business of War’, The Center for Public Integrity, 28 October 2002 www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Weapons/Adventure_Capitalist_MAK.html

¹⁰² Vincent Kahiya, ‘Bid to boycott Bredenkamp’s Sanyati Lodge’, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 29 November 2002; quoted from: www.zimbabwesituation.com/dec1b_2002.html

This resource is one of the key elements in the revival plan of Gecamines and this is thought to be the second time that the DRC government has been forced to install a Zimbabwean as head of key mining assets to repay military obligations with the influence of **Emmerson Mnangagwa**, currently Speaker of the Zimbabwe Parliament, and the **Zimbabwe Chief of Staff, General Vitalis Zvinvashe**.¹⁰³

[28 February 2001:] ‘The assassinated president of the Democratic Republic of Congo, **Laurent Kabila**, gave a **diamond mine** to **Namibia** as a reward for military support, (...) In order to handle the diamond mine at Tshikapa in the south of the DRC along the border with Angola August 26 Holding Namibia set up a front company called August 26 Holding Congo with two Namibian directors. Nghimtina said the rights were granted for five years as from 1999 following the signing of a cease-fire. (...) Nghimtina strongly denied reports that link Namibia’s diamond interests in Congo to a man accused of having helped procure weapons for Ian Smith in Rhodesia while the colony was under an economic embargo. The alleged arms dealer, John Bredenkamp, is now one of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s main business allies.

Two **Namibian newspapers have linked Bredenkamp** to one of the directors of a subsidiary of August 26 Holding, Windhoeker Maschinen Fabrik. But Walter Hailwax, who is also the honorary Belgian consul, this week declined to comment on the reports.¹⁰⁴

[25 March 2001:] ‘Mugabe strives to make it appear that his chief enemies are Zimbabwe’s whites. But his regime’s **dealings with Bredenkamp** make it clear that when it comes to money Mugabe doesn’t care where it comes from. (...) Bredenkamp defends his dealings with Mugabe, saying his business has required close relations at the very top with both the Smith and Mugabe governments. (...) He maintains he is working to find a middle ground in Zimbabwe at a point when the country is bitterly polarised, and that he is attempting to help it out of its economic crisis. One of his companies, **Petra**, is the only firm bringing fuel into Zimbabwe. His critics claim he is simply making money as the supporter of a corrupt regime. (...) Although businessmen say Bredenkamp is critical of Mugabe, he rejects the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. Instead, he is said to favour Mugabe associate Emmerson Mnangagwa.¹⁰⁵

[29 March 2001:] ‘Zimbabwean billionaire businessman John Bredenkamp this week formed a joint venture project with **Gecamines**, the State-owned mining company in the DRC, to mine cobalt and copper in and around the DRC’s Katanga province. The Zimbabwean tycoon hopes to invest US\$50 million (\$2.8 billion) in the venture, named Kababankola Mining Company (KMC), over time. Bredenkamp will control a majority 80 percent stake in KMC through his firm called Tremalt Limited. The tycoon’s partners in Tremalt Limited are Collin BlytheWood, who will be managing director of KMC, and another businessman known as Gary Webster. Bredenkamp is the chairman of KMC while both BlytheWood and Webster are directors of the joint venture firm.(...)¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Own Correspondent, ‘Bredenkamp given new concessions’, The Zimbabwe Situation site, 19 January 2001 www.zimbabwesituation.com/jan21.html

¹⁰⁴ ‘Defence Defends Congo Kinshasa Mine’, *The Namibian*, 28 February 2001, quoted from: www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/congo/2001/0228diam.htm

¹⁰⁵ Andrew Meldrum (in Harare), ‘Rugby hero tackles foes of Mugabe: The tycoon behind plans to split farmers’, *The Observer*, 25 March 2001 www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0%2C4273%2C4158683%2C00.html

¹⁰⁶ ‘Zim tycoon in \$2.8b deal with the Congo’, *Financial Gazette*, 29 March 2001; quoted from: www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar30.html

[8 April 2001:] ‘Harare Zimbabwe’s two fabulously wealthy business tycoons, John Bredenkamp and **Billy Rautenbach**, seem to share one thing in common a penchant for adventurous enterprises, often in war zones, and an unabashed willingness to exploit political connections with the power of the day(...). Mining industry sources believe that Rautenbach is playing some role in Bredenkamp’s new enterprise with Gecamines, though Bredenkamp has denied this through his spokesperson in Harare, Collin BlytheWood, who said Bredenkamp had never worked with Rautenbach and had no business dealings with him. What is certain is that Bredenkamp has effectively eclipsed Rautenbach as leader of Zimbabwe’s investments in the DRC since the latter fell out of favour with the late President Laurent Kabila, who accused him of siphoning off too much of Gecamines’ profits. “There can be no doubt that Rautenbach used to be the key link for Zimbabwean business in Congo. No one can dispute that this role has now been assumed by Bredenkamp,” said a senior Zimbabwean government official who spoke on condition of anonymity. BlytheWood said Bredenkamp would over time invest \$50million in his joint venture with Gecamines, named Kababankola Mining Company [*et cetera; from above-quoted Financial Gazette article.*]¹⁰⁷

[20 April 2001:] ‘Harare insists that the Congo-K intervention will pay off. Some of ZANU-PF’s business supporters are active there, notably multimillionaire and Mnangagwa-ally John Bredenkamp, who is now operating a joint venture to export cobalt and copper with Congo’s State-owned *Gécamines*, in its still lucrative *Groupe Central* division. Bredenkamp and his associates are putting some business muscle behind new **President Kabila II, whom Bredenkamp has accompanied** on several recent foreign trips.’¹⁰⁸

In **April 2001** the first findings of the *Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* were presented to the United Nations Security Council; the report was published in May 2001.

‘III. Links between the exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the conflict 109–212

B. Financing the war 125–172

A special case: Zimbabwe

156. Zimbabwe has financed its involvement in the conflict in two different ways: (a) by using the defence budget — the bulk of Zimbabwe’s military expenses seem to be covered by the regular budget; (b) by indirect financing of the war through direct payment by some Congolese entities, mainly companies. (...)

162. As promised, Mr. Al Shanfari started investing in Sengamines and used the **Breco group of companies of John Bredenkamp** to transport mining equipment to the mines. As the technical and financial partner, Oryx was to receive 40 per cent, OSLEG 40 per cent and COSLEG 20 per cent. As the need for money grew, Mr. Al Shanfari decided to launch Oryx on London’s Alternative Investment Market under the name Oryx Diamonds. Upon strong objections from various stakeholders, Oryx Diamonds was withdrawn from the market. The new statute of the company does not mention the name OSLEG. [*Note: The distribution of shares is as follows: Oryx 49 per cent, COMIEX 33 per cent, MIBA 16 per cent and Congolese partners 3 per cent.*] The Panel was informed, however, that the increase in the shares of COMIEX as seen in the new statute was meant to preserve the interests of Zimbabweans. The Panel was also told that payment would be made to the Government of

¹⁰⁷ ‘Zim tycoons stay rich by keeping heads close’, *The Sunday Independent*, South Africa, 8 April 2001; www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr10_2001.html

¹⁰⁸ ‘More of Mugabe’, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 42 No. 8, 20 April 2001, 2.

the Democratic Republic of the Congo only after the loan taken for this operation (about \$25 million) was repaid.

Attribution of concessions

164. According to some sources, a very recent (26 February 2001) concession of cobalt and copper in Kambove-Kakanda was to be given **KMC Group** of the Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach. According to very reliable sources, different ministers had signed the concession two days before the assassination of the late President Kabila and only his signature was missing. The trade unionist of Gecamines has indicated that the cession was completed, but President Joseph Kabila told the Panel that the deal has not been signed yet. If it is signed, there could be a rapprochement of activities.

165. This case shows rapprochement of the activities and interests of some **Zimbabwean businessmen, and a possible link between arms dealing and mining** activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Indeed Mr. Bredenkamp is said to have an interest in this venture, although he was alleged to be an arms dealer. In November 2000, a month after the departure of Mr. Rautenbach from Gecamines, Mr. Bredenkamp is said to have established a direct link with Mr. Rautenbach. According to three reliable sources, Mr. **Rautenbach**, Mr. **Bredenkamp** and Mr. **Munangwana** [*sic*], the current Speaker of the House of Zimbabwe, Chairman of ZANU-PF and director of many companies belonging to ZANU-PF, met with the late President Kabila to negotiate this contract of the central part of the Gecamines concessions. The Panel does not draw any conclusions, but wishes to highlight the quality of the people involved in the negotiations, their past records, current activities and position in Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁹

More was published in *Africa Confidential* again, in June 2001:

‘Business, diplomatic and logistical help also comes from John Bredenkamp (...). In March, **Bredenkamp’s Tremalt company** formed a joint venture, **Kababankkola¹¹⁰ Mining Company (KMC)**, with the Congo-K government’s *Gécamines*. KMC is owned 80 per cent by Tremalt, 20 per cent by *Gécamines*. KMC’s Managing Director, Colin BlytheWood, insists that the partnership is “strictly business”. On President Joseph Kabila’s recent trips to Western capitals, he often sat with Bredenkamp at private meetings; they are said “to get on famously”.¹¹¹

[3] 2001, July-Dec. – UK House of Commons; UN Panel of Experts Addendum

On 8 November 2001, Bredenkamp was named as the main arms supplier to Zimbabwe in a **debate on the Export Control Bill in the British House of Commons**. ‘Using parliamentary privilege, Paul Farrelly (Lab, Newcastle under Lyme) singled out John Bredenkamp, a United Kingdom resident.’¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, with letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm; ‘published in May’: Conseil de sécurité, 4437^e séance – matin et soir; Communiqué de presse CS/2229 www.un.org/News/frpress/docs/2001/CS2229.doc.htm (in French).

¹¹⁰ Should read Kababankola.

¹¹¹ ‘The military-financial complex’, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 42 No. 12, 15 June 2001, 2.

¹¹² Michael Kallenbach, Parliamentary Correspondent, reports on the debates at Westminster: Weapons dealer ‘runs business from Berkshire’, *The Telegraph*, 9 November 2001, [news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;?sessionid\\$CEUX5YAAAAVAXQFIQMFSFF4AVCBQ0IV0?xml=/news/2001/11/09/npar09.xml](http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;?sessionid$CEUX5YAAAAVAXQFIQMFSFF4AVCBQ0IV0?xml=/news/2001/11/09/npar09.xml)

‘Paul Farrelly (Newcastle-under-Lyme): (...) If you will bear with me for a short while, Madam Deputy Speaker, I should like to use a concrete example of a situation where I believe that we would all like arms dealing to be captured, but I am not quite sure whether it would be, and would appreciate the Minister's advice. (...) Some doubts were nevertheless raised that the courts might not uphold orders placed on such nefarious people, as the language of the Bill is not sufficiently precise. Therefore it is important in this debate to state that it is the will of Parliament that, as far as possible, such traffickers in death be captured by the Bill.

At this time of the terrible conflict in Afghanistan, it is important that we do not forget other regions of the world where irresponsible arms dealing, against the will of the international community, is leading to death and destruction. I am thinking particularly of the terrible civil war in the Congo, where other African states that should know better are systematically looting a country that is already on its knees. Zimbabwe is one of the vultures at that feast—or rather, Robert Mugabe's henchmen are profiting while that war bankrupts their own country.

It is a little known fact that the main arms supplier to Zimbabwe and its adventure in the Congo is a UK resident, who runs his huge business empire from the royal county of Berkshire - from genteel Ascot and Windsor, to be precise. I should like to use his example to illustrate why the House should support the Bill, and to place in context my request for clarification from the Minister of the Bill's precise scope.

Outside the sports pages, hon. Members would not find much reference to that gentleman, Mr. John Bredenkamp, in the UK press. With a fortune estimated at £400 million, he has deep pockets, expensive libel lawyers and a dangerous reputation. He is also extremely clever and careful, and does not readily leave end-user certificates lying around. Therefore it is safer for the press to chronicle his handling of sports stars—including Ernie Els and Francois Pienaar among many others—through his sports agency, Masters International, than his handling of arms. However, Mr. Bredenkamp has long had form of a distinctly unsporting kind, and he is exactly the sort of person based in this country whom the Bill should tackle.

A former tobacco farmer, captain of the Rhodesian rugby team and member of Rhodesian special forces, Mr. Bredenkamp was a key figure in sanctions busting, so long ago, for Ian Smith, and when the regime changed he quite simply changed his allegiance. In 1994, the activities of Mr. Bredenkamp's then company, Casalee, were exposed by a courageous Channel 4 "Despatches" programme.

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. (...) [*part 18:*]

Paul Farrelly: (...) The activities of Casalee have been well documented but, although he denies it, Mr. Bredenkamp is one of the major suppliers of arms to Mr. Mugabe. He is a key backer of ZANU-PF, and of a potential successor to Robert Mugabe. His companies are reliably believed to have supplied arms and equipment used by the Zimbabwean army, the Interahamwe, and the MaiMai tribesmen in eastern Congo. Many of those arms subsequently have found their way back to war veterans, and have been used in attacks on white-owned farms.

In return, Mr. Bredenkamp has been a major beneficiary of Mr. Mugabe's largesse in Zimbabwe and the Congo. He is a major mover and shaker in southern Congo, and he has been awarded valuable diamond, cobalt and other mineral concessions. He has recently come to the attention of the United Nations panel investigating profiteering from the war in the Congo.

My hon. Friend the Minister has rightly said that the Bill should complement international co-operation between the UK, Europe and the UN in curbing arms dealing in world trouble

spots. However, the matter of the scope of the technical assistance provisions in the Bill is relevant in connection with the very clever way in which Mr. Bredenkamp has structured his African involvement.

Mr. Bredenkamp runs his master company, Breco Services, from Berkshire. His African activities are run through several separate companies based in Harare, in particular through one called ACS International. **Mr. Bredenkamp therefore appears to break no UK laws, embargoes or restrictions**—however formal or informal—by ostensibly keeping all his African arms-dealing activities offshore. Although UK policy is not to license arms sales to Zimbabwe, Mr. Bredenkamp is clearly able freely to subvert that policy.

I should be grateful for an assurance from my hon. Friend the Minister that the Department of Trade and Industry, by means of the Bill, will have the necessary powers, in conjunction with the Home Office and the Foreign Office, to investigate empires such as Mr. Bredenkamp's. I hope that it will use those powers to take such measures as are necessary to curb organisations that are structured in the same clever way.

I hope too that my hon. Friend the Minister will assure the House that the relationships between Mr. Bredenkamp and any similar organisation will also be allowed to be examined under the Bill, as will the role of any UK company, including British Aerospace, in the supply of arms and military logistics to world trouble spots. The House will remember the controversy regarding the sale of Hawk aircraft parts to Zimbabwe by British Aerospace.

Finally, there is one further twist with regard to Mr. Bredenkamp on which I should appreciate my hon. Friend's learned advice. Mr. Bredenkamp has rights of residence in the UK, but I understand that **he is not a British passport holder. Instead, he holds Zimbabwean and Dutch passports.** Is he caught under the definition of the Bill as a United Kingdom person who would then be subject to the technical assistance provisions?

I should appreciate advice on that question, as I am sure that the House would agree that the Bill should be able to rein in precisely those activities that I have described—activities that mean that merchants of death use our country as their base, to the detriment of peace and stability in the rest of the world.¹¹³

Replying to Paul Farrelly MP, **Minister Nigel Griffiths** said: 'My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly) referred to some specific examples, but as he knows, I cannot comment on individual cases. However, he raised an important point of principle on which I think the House will want to have the Government's views on record. I can assure my hon. Friend and the House that the Bill will give us the power to control UK citizens and anyone operating in the UK, which I think was the point that he was making. He was concerned about someone who was not a UK citizen who was a trafficker and broker in arms to arms-embargoed destinations such as Zimbabwe. Such people will be caught. That is important.'¹¹⁴

From a report that referred to the above debate: 'Paul Farrelly (...) told the House of Commons in November 2001: "Although he denies it, Bredenkamp is one of the major suppliers of arms to Mugabe. His companies are reliably believed to have supplied arms and equipment used by the Zimbabwean army, the Interahamwe [as the militia force responsible for the genocide in Rwanda is known], and the MaiMai tribesmen in eastern Congo.(...) This report also quoted objections by Bredenkamp against these allegations: 'In a statement

¹¹³ House of Commons, Hansard Debates for 8 November 2001, Column 407f
www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo011108/debtext/1110817.htm,
www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo011108/debtext/1110818.htm

¹¹⁴ House of Commons, Hansard Debates for 8 November 2001, Column 416
www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo011108/debtext/1110820.htm

to ICIJ, **Bredenkamp accused Farrelly** of making “manifestly false and maliciously defamatory allegations under the cloak of parliamentary privilege.” He said he had complained to the British government and challenged Farrelly to repeat the allegations outside of Parliament.’¹¹⁵

In December 2001, Paul Farrelly MP again asked questions in the **UK House of Commons**:

Paul Farrelly: ‘Is my right hon. Friend aware of the recent United Nations report which identified the people profiteering from the war in the Congo? It included on its list a Mr. John Bredenkamp, a UK-based arms supplier to Zimbabwe. Will she ensure that her Department, with the Foreign Office and the Department of Trade and Industry, makes every effort to halt the disgraceful activities of people such as Mr. Bredenkamp?’

Clare Short [*The Secretary of State for International Development*]: I am aware of the UN report, but I was not aware that a UK resident had been named in it. I undertake to make inquiries and to write to my hon. Friend.’¹¹⁶

Also in December 2001, the **UN Panel of Experts** published an Addendum to its report.

‘IV. Exploitation of the natural resources 1555

Copper and cobalt 3035

30. Gécamines, the largest mining operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and once wholly State-owned, has holdings in government-controlled Katanga Province, which contain one of the largest concentrations of high-grade copper and cobalt in the world. Embezzlement, theft and pilfering, mismanagement and a lack of reinvestment transformed it from the pillar of the Congolese economy, once earning 70 per cent of the country’s hard currency in exports, into a dilapidated enterprise with production now at only one tenth of its former capacity.

31. Although Australian, United States, Canadian, Belgian and South African companies have established joint ventures in Gécamines’ concession areas, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has primarily relied on it as a means to ensure the continued support of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean **Billy Rautenbach** was named the Managing Director of Gécamines in November 1998 during a visit to Harare by **President Laurent-Désiré Kabila**. According to this deal, some of Gécamines’ best **cobalt-producing areas** were also transferred to a joint venture between Mr. Rautenbach’s **Ridgepoint Overseas Development Ltd.** and the Central Mining Group, a Congolese company controlled by Pierre-Victor Mpyoyo, then Minister of State. Mr. Rautenbach also acted as Managing Director of the joint venture, a blatant conflict of interest. The Panel has information that President Kabila’s decision to appoint Mr. Rautenbach a man with no mining experience but

¹¹⁵ International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ‘The Adventure Capitalist’, from the 11 part series ‘Making a Killing: The Business of War’, The Center for Public Integrity, 28 October 2002 www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Weapons/Adventure_Capitalist_MAK.html. – Press reports from November 2001 only summarised what had been said in parliament itself (Michael Kallenbach, Parliamentary Correspondent, reports on the debates at Westminster: Weapons dealer ‘runs business from Berkshire’, *The Telegraph*, 9 November 2001 [news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;?sessionid\\$CEUX5YAAAAVAXQFIQMFSFF4AVCBO0IV0?xml=/news/2001/11/09/npar09.xml](http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;?sessionid$CEUX5YAAAAVAXQFIQMFSFF4AVCBO0IV0?xml=/news/2001/11/09/npar09.xml)); ‘UK: Armed and dangerous’, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 42 No. 23, 23 November 2001, 8).

¹¹⁶ House of Commons, All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes and Genocide Prevention, Sessional Update – January 2002–April 2002: 1. Parliamentary Questions and Debates; 19th December, Oral Question to the Secretary of State for International Development on conflict reduction in the Democratic Republic of Congo; quoted from: www.appggreatlakes.org/downloads/sessional_2002janapril.doc

with close ties to the ruling ZANU-PF party in Zimbabwe was made at the request of President Robert Mugabe during that visit.

32. However, President Kabila **replaced Mr. Rautenbach with Georges [sic] Forrest**, a Belgian businessman, in March 1999, reportedly after the former failed to pay the Government's share of the profits from the joint venture. President Kabila accused him of transferring profits to a shell company, as well as stockpiling cobalt in South Africa. Shipments of cobalt had allegedly been seized in Durban to pay Gécamines' South African creditors. Mr. Rautenbach has since taken legal action against the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

33. Under Zimbabwean pressure, in January 2001 **John Bredenkamp's Tremalt Ltd.** formed a joint venture with Gécamines, the Kababancola Mining Company (**KMC**). In a 25-year agreement, KMC acquired rights to a concession representing the richest Gécamines holdings. Mr. Bredenkamp, who pledged to invest \$50 million in the mining operations, controls 80 per cent of this venture. Profits from his company's share will be split between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (68 per cent) and Tremalt (32 per cent).

34. The management of Gécamines changed hands again following an audit of all State-owned enterprises. The Minister to the Presidency, who has oversight for all public enterprises through his other post as Minister of the Portfolio, supervised an audit of these enterprises early in 2001. The audit reportedly revealed gross mismanagement and led to the firing of senior management officials at these enterprises in August 2001. A relative of the Minister was subsequently appointed to an influential post in the new management committee of Gécamines.

35. As in the past, Gécamines still continues to serve as a source of revenue for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, Gécamines' revenue-generating capacity no longer stems primarily from actual production, as it did during the early years of President Mobutu's regime. Instead, revenue mainly flows from the initial payments pledged by potential foreign joint-venture partners in return for the granting of concessions. The Panel has established that the amount of the payment is one of the primary considerations for the cash-strapped Government in granting concessions. As a result, unsustainable and environmentally hazardous mining operations currently characterize Gécamines' copper and cobalt mining activities. The future of what was once the giant of the country's economy appears bleak.

V. The link between exploitation of resources and the continuation of the conflict 56104 **The allies 6190**

Zimbabwe 7682

76. According to information available to the Panel, there are **five main factors** at play, which helped to shape the Zimbabwean objectives in its involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. **One** determining factor is Zimbabwe's desire to assert its role within SADC. (...) A **second** factor lies in Zimbabwe's ailing economy and political system. The results of the gross mismanagement of the economy, unchecked public expenditure, corruption and one-party rule are apparent and are reflected in falling standards of living. Like the land appropriation policy, a military campaign was seen as a means to rally public support for the State's leaders. The **third** factor is that Zimbabwe had supported President Kabila's AFDL in 1996 (...). The **fourth**, and most notable, factor was the lesson learned from Zimbabwe's military involvement in the civil war in Mozambique. As a revolutionary and freedom fighter, President Mugabe had pledged military forces to that country, only to find that South African businessmen moved in to monopolize the market after the Zimbabwean withdrawal. Government leaders were determined not to make the same mistake in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There is yet a **fifth** factor, which the

Panel has heard from a number of analysts. The declining exchange rate, the failing Zimbabwean mining industry, and the critical energy shortage in Zimbabwe have left few sources for personal enrichment by Government officials. These officials started looking to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

78. The key figure in Zimbabwe's commercial involvement is **Emmerson Mnangagwa**. Viewed as a loyal member of ZANU-PF by President Mugabe, Mr. Mnangagwa first became involved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo when President Mugabe sent him in 1998 to investigate the state of the Zimbabwean forces there. Mr. Mnangagwa, the architect of the commercial activities of ZANU-PF, used his leverage on President Kabila, and drew up the first plans for Zimbabwe's commercial designs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It was during that phase, in 1999, that **Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSLEG)** was conceived, following the summit held in Windhoek in 1999, at which the allies had demanded compensation for their involvement in the conflict.

79. OSLEG represents the commercial side of the **Zimbabwe Defence Forces** in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its directors are predominantly top military officials. (...) The constraints of governmental controls and regulations and a functioning legal system to enforce them are often absent. As a result, the Zimbabwean army has been successful in enticing investors, often with offshore companies, to bankroll and make operational its joint ventures. This pattern now characterizes all of the Zimbabwean exploitation activities, whether with MIBA, Gécamines, SOCEBO or the relatively recent SCÉM.

80. It is important to note that the Government of Zimbabwe views these exploitation activities as legitimate commercial ties with a neighbouring sovereign State, to whose aid it had come under the SADC Treaty's collective security provision. The Government of Zimbabwe in fact went to great lengths initially to promote these commercial ventures to its citizens, at times exaggerating their profitability in order to justify the continued Zimbabwean presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after the immediate threat to the Kinshasa Government had subsided. The revenues from these ventures have yet to have a positive impact on Zimbabwe's weakened economy, however. The reason for this is that Zimbabwe's holdings in the Democratic Republic of the Congo seem to be controlled by top military and party officials who are also the direct beneficiaries.

81. In this regard, the Panel has learned that Zimbabwe is currently restructuring its commercial activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by reducing the direct involvement of the military and increasing the role of concerned ministries. The indirect involvement of the military would however continue through various management boards.¹¹⁷

[4] 2002, Jan.-June – Belgian Senate; Media reports; UK investigation; Bredenkamp rejoinder

Bredenkamp's dealings were also discussed in expert hearings arranged by the Great Lakes Inquiry Committee of the **Belgian Senate** (February–July 2002).¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ *Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, UNSC S/2001/1072, 13 November 2001, with letter dated 10 November 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council; www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/5794631D1C7695DCC1256B0A004CEC3D; published in December: Conseil de sécurité, 4437^e séance – matin et soir; Communiqué de presse CS/2229, 14 December 2001 www.un.org/News/frpress/docs/2001/CS2229.doc.htm (in French).

¹¹⁸ Senate of Belgium, Session 20012002, Great Lakes Inquiry Committee, Report of Hearings: [1] 22 February 2002 (morning): Mr. François Misser, journalist, co-author of *Les gemmocraties: L'économie politique du diamant africain*; www.senate.be/crv/GR/gr11.html (in Dutch and French); Mr. Misser's statement doesn't seem

Then, in late February, just prior to the presidential elections in Zimbabwe, there were ‘reports’ referred to by the *Zimbabwe Independent* (1 March 2002), on Bredenkamp apparently wanting to sell off his Congolese interests:

‘Panic is setting in among diamond dealers with links to the Zimbabwe government who fear that a defeat for President Robert Mugabe could jeopardise their interests in the region. (...) The news followed **reports this week** that **John Bredenkamp**, who is exploiting diamond and cobalt deposits in the DRC, had recently put together plans to sell off his claims. Bredenkamp tried to sell his cobalt and diamond concessions last month but the move was blocked by the Congolese who were unhappy about it, especially after Zimbabwe had played a key role in ensuring the ceding of the claims to the businessman, the source said. According to a **United Nations Security Council Report**, under pressure from Zimbabwe **Bredenkamp’s Tremalt Ltd** in January last year formed a joint venture with Gécamines, called Kababancola Mining Company (KMC). In a 25year agreement, KMC acquired rights to a concession representing the richest Gécamines holdings, the report said. Bredenkamp pledged to invest \$50 million in the mining operations, which translated to 80% of the venture. Profits were to be split between the government of the DRC (68%) and Tremalt (32%). Gécamines is the largest mining operation in the DRC and has holdings in government-controlled Katanga province which contain one of the largest concentrations of high grade copper and cobalt in the world. (...)’¹¹⁹

Also just prior to the elections *Africa Confidential* speculated that ‘Whoever wins the vote, the relationships between Oryx Chief Executive Thamer Al-Shanfari, Bredenkamp and senior Zimbabwean politicians and soldiers such as Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa and Lieutenant General Vitalis Zvinvashe will draw more scrutiny. If Mugabe wins, Mnangagwa is likely to succeed him with the backing of the army and the intelligence services; Bredenkamp and Al-Shanfari will prosper.’ The magazine added, however, that ‘If Mugabe loses, they face a much more uncertain future, although we hear that Bredenkamp has been **offering funds**, indirectly, to **MDC** luminaries.’¹²⁰

Reference was made in March 2002 to the **UK government** planning an investigation into Bredenkamp:

‘British **military equipment** is reaching Zimbabwe despite an arms embargo. Parts for Hawk jets made by **BAE Systems**, formerly British Aerospace, have been supplied through a third country. There is no suggestion that BAE Systems knew the parts were going to Zimbabwe. In a separate development, the Foreign Secretary has ordered an inquiry into

to contain original information beyond that which has been quoted elsewhere in this file – When talking on the Belgian/Namibian link referred to above in which John Bredenkamp was also involved (February 2001), Misser referred to ‘the Namibian newspaper, *Die Republikein* of February 2000’; [2] 1 March 2002 (morning): Mr. Erik Kennes, researcher, Africa Institute (Africa Museum); www.senate.be/crv/GR/gr13.html (in Dutch and French) – Bredenkamp’s name popped up during the discussion after Mr. Kennes’s statement, as ‘a Belgian name’; [3] 5 July 2002 (morning): Mr. Georges Berghezan, researcher Africa and arms transports, Grip [*GRIP is a Belgian independent organisation for research and information on disarmament, the arms trade, conflict prevention and European defense economics*]; www.senate.be/crv/GR/gr35.html (in Dutch and French) – again, Bredenkamp was only named in passing in the discussion on ‘Belgians, possibly trying to bear upon the Congolese situation’.

¹¹⁹ ‘Diamond dealers fear Mugabe defeat’, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 1 March 2002, quoted from:

www.genocidewatch.org/newsmonitor

¹²⁰ ‘Election arithmetic: Robert Mugabe’s last stand is a key test of Africa’s political resolve’, *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 43 No. 5, 8 March 2002, 34; partly also on the internet:

www.africaconfidential.com/country.asp?ID=55: Country Articles: Zimbabwe.

allegations that **John Bredenkamp**, a British resident, is supplying arms to the Mugabe regime.¹²¹

Bredenkamp and his companies **reacted** to various allegations in, among other places, a letter to a British newspaper and company websites.

May 2002, reacting to The Spectator [‘Mr Bredenkamp’s mining operations in the Congo benefit greatly from the incursion of Zimbabwean troops, which is a kind of joint-stock venture by Zanu-PF and its business friends’¹²²]: ‘It is correct that a company within the group of which I am chairman is involved in a joint venture to mine cobalt and copper in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This is a transparent arrangement, which has been legally validated by the Mining Convention to which the DRC government is a party and is supported by presidential decree. These documents are public documents. United Nations Panel representatives have visited our mining operations. We have had no negative feedback from them.

It is incorrect to say that the Zimbabwean government is a party to any of these agreements. It is not and never has been. Furthermore, the continuation of the project in no way depends upon Zimbabwe continuing to have troops or any other presence in the DRC. The mining operation has no connection with Zanu-PF. It is a private venture.’¹²³

The KMC Kababankola Mining Company put a ‘Company Profile’ on its website¹²⁴ (undated [2002], after ‘early 2002’).

Rather more vague is the reference to **Bredenkamp’s arms dealings** on his Breco website (undated, 2002): ‘Representative for aircraft manufacturers – In respect of defence procurement, John Bredenkamp is a passive investor in a company which acts as a representative to or consultant for established European and North American aircraft manufacturers in Southern Africa with valid Government approved export licences. John Bredenkamp is not involved in any day-to-day activities of the company.’¹²⁵

[5] Bredenkamp seeking to clear name – November 2001, March 2002

‘Two British-based businessmen, named by the UN as notorious for **supplying arms to Africa’s most bloody war zones**, have sought advice from British diplomats to help clear their names (...). The disclosure will be highly embarrassing for the Government’s so-called ethical foreign policy and has prompted **calls for a Parliamentary inquiry** into the nature of repeated contacts between the British Government and former soldier **Andrew Smith** and businessman **John Bredenkamp** over the past two years. (...)

Both men have been recently exposed in The Observer for their role in supplying weapons and supplies to the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Both were also ‘named and shamed’ in a United Nations report into the illegal looting of minerals and resources from

¹²¹ Philip Sherwell and Brian Latham, ‘Fear and fraud grip Zimbabwe poll’, *The Telegraph*, UK, 10 March 2002 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/03/10/nzim10.xml (quoted from Google cache).

¹²² Boris Johnson, ‘Cowardly whites who help Mugabe’, *The Spectator*, UK, 13 April 2002; quoted from www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr12a_2002.html

¹²³ ‘I’m no Zanu PF crony’, Letter to *The Spectator* (UK), 10 May 2002; quoted from: www.zimbabwesituation.com/may10_2002.html

¹²⁴ www.kababankola.com/profile.html

¹²⁵ Breco Group website [2002]: Group activities > Trading and Manufacturing > Representative for aircraft manufacturers www.breco.info/gr_trade_aircraft.html

the country. Bredenkamp, who lives in Berkshire, has been barred from entering the US, and Smith, a former captain of the Royal Engineers, faces UN claims that one of his companies was involved in mercenary-style operations in the eastern region of Congo. Bredenkamp held two face-to-face meetings with British High Commission staff in Harare. The first was on 14 November last year and the second on 11 March this year. British officials have declined to comment on what was discussed. However, The Observer has established that at the second meeting Bredenkamp was seeking advice on how best to clear his name of some of the charges of arms dealing made against him by **British MP Paul Farrelly** during debates in the House of Commons. (...)

Conservative **Shadow Foreign Secretary Michael Ancram** called for an investigation into the circumstances of the meetings.

MPs have also condemned the news. 'I find it extraordinary that British commission officials have been meeting two businessmen of highly questionable background. One of them is not even a British citizen,' said **Liberal Democrat MP Norman Lamb**, who has asked a series of parliamentary questions on the subject. Lamb has also highlighted links between **Bredenkamp and BAE**.¹²⁶

[6] Blacklisted as a Mugabe supporter by the US and others, March 2002

International punitive measures hit Bredenkamp in the aftermath of the rigged March 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe:

'Zimbabwe's nomenklatura and their business friends now face tightening economic "smart" sanctions from the **European Union** and **United States**. Instead of widening the range of sanctions against Harare after the 1012 March election, the EU and US strategy is to hit the regime's tiny elite and their financiers increasingly hard. (...) Proffering advice to ZANU-PF's elite were some of the most experienced sanctions-busters in the region who had worked for Ian Smith's rebel regime and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Among the wealthy and well-connected individuals and companies under scrutiny by the EU and USA are:

- (...)
- **Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa** (...); Mnangagwa's key business associates are two white Zimbabweans, **Billy Rautenbach** (...) and British-based **John Bredenkamp**; and (...)
- Lieutenant General **Vitalis Zvinvashe**: Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Force (...); the family companies are run by his brother Augustine, a business partner of South African sanctions-buster **Marc Rich**; (...)
- (...)
- **John Arnold Bredenkamp**: one of Zimbabwe's wealthiest businessmen; close to Mnangagwa; Managing Director, Kababankola Mining Company, which has a majority stake in *Gécamines' Groupe Central* in Congo; majority holdings in Breco group of companies, Scot[t]lee Resorts, Midwest Aviation and Trading (agency for major Western defence suppliers); he is threatening legal action against a South African newspaper which alleged he has financial links with Mugabe.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ 'Arms dealers' met top British diplomats', *The Observer*, 14 December 2002; quoted from: www.buzzle.com/chapters/authors.asp?author=229

¹²⁷ 'The nomenklatura', *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 43 No. 6, 22 March 2002, 2; shortened version: www.africaconfidential.com/country.asp?ID=55; Country Articles: Zimbabwe.

‘**Washington** has added the Anglican bishop of Harare and Zimbabwe’s richest businessman, who is a UK resident, to its list of Robert Mugabe’s close associates subject to sanctions. The Americans say the listing of politicians, generals and senior civil servants as banned from the US, and the freezing of their assets there, is designed to punish those who help keep Mr Mugabe in power or who profit from his rule. The spouses and children of those named are also barred from the US. (...) The **travel ban** and **freezing of assets** may be particularly painful for those who do business in America. These include **John Bredenkamp** (...) Part-time UK resident (...)’.¹²⁸

‘As well as the travel ban, **Washington** is in consultation with western Europe and other countries to impose further measures against the targeted individuals. (...) Businessmen (...) **Billy Rautenbach** and **John Bredenkamp** are also on the list. (...) Washington’s expanded black list the 15nation European Union (EU) and Switzerland have already taken similar steps is meant to drive home the world’s revulsion over a deeply flawed March 911 Zimbabwean presidential election, officially won by Mugabe. The EU is also set to expand its blacklist and sanctions to include the expulsion from European colleges and universities of children of the targeted leaders. The group has already frozen the overseas assets of the Zimbabweans and banned the importation of any material which the government can use for internal repression.’¹²⁹

The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists elicited a **reaction from Bredenkamp**: ““The U.S. Department of State has tried me and judged me in a manner which affects my fundamental rights as an individual,” Bredenkamp said. “The basis on which this judgment has been made has not been shared with me and I have been given no opportunity to be heard in this matter.””¹³⁰

More recently, in January 2003, the implementation of EU measures was questioned by a Member of the European Parliament (Geoffrey Van Orden, MEP, see below).

[7] 2002, July-Dec. – ‘Final Report’ UN; UK Government investigation; Media

On 21 October 2002, the UN Panel of Experts published its ‘Final Report’, in which it concluded that ‘Despite the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), “**elite criminal networks**” have become so deeply entrenched that continued illegal exploitation of the country’s natural resources is assured, independent of the physical presence of foreign armies’,¹³¹ and recommended sanctions against several companies and persons involved.

‘III Government-controlled area 2264

¹²⁸ ‘Washington Adds Bishop of Harare to Sanctions List’, © Guardian Newspapers Ltd, 30 March 2002, quoted from: www.buzzle.com

¹²⁹ ‘US bans bankers, business leaders’, *The Financial Gazette*, 28 March 2002, quoted from www.samara.co.zw/infoline/newsflash.htm

¹³⁰ International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, ‘The Adventure Capitalist’, from the 11part series ‘Making a Killing: The Business of War’, The Center for Public Integrity, 28 October 2002 www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Weapons/Adventure_Capitalist_MAK.html

¹³¹ ‘DRC: Focus on UN Panel report on the plunder of the Congo’, United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN), Nairobi, 21 October 2002 ‘(This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations)’; www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=30525&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes

The elite network 2534

30. Among the businessmen in the elite network, a Belgian national, **George Forrest**, pioneered the exploitative joint venture agreements between private companies and Gécamines. Mr. Forrest owes his commercial ascendancy to his longstanding ties to the establishment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. One of his companies also makes and markets military equipment. Since 1994, he has owned 100 per cent of New Lachaussée in Belgium, which is a leading manufacturer of cartridge casings, grenades, light weapons and cannon launchers. In a flagrant conflict of interest, Mr. Forrest was appointed Chairman of Gécamines from November 1999 to August 2001 while his private companies negotiated new contracts with the explicit intention of using Gécamines' assets for personal gain. During that time he built up the most wide-ranging private mining portfolio in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He benefits from strong backing from some political quarters in Belgium where some of his companies are based. His operations have been strongly criticized (one Belgian diplomatic cable referred to Mr. Forrest running a "strategy of attrition" in the mining sector of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and have recently come under the scrutiny of the Belgian Senate's investigation into resource exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

31. The techniques used by Mr. Forrest have since been replicated by Zimbabwean-backed entrepreneurs **John Arnold Bredenkamp** and Mr. **Al-Shanfari**. Mr. Bredenkamp, who has an estimated personal net worth of over \$500 million, is experienced in setting up clandestine companies and sanctions-busting operations. Mr. Al-Shanfari has gained privileged access to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its diamond concessions in exchange for raising capital from some powerful entrepreneurs in the Gulf such as Issa al-Kawari who manages the fortune of the deposed Amir of Qatar. Also working with ZDF is a convicted criminal based in South Africa, **Nico Shefer**, who has arranged for Zimbabwean officers to be trained in diamond valuation in Johannesburg. Mr. Shefer's company, Tandan Holdings, has a 50 per cent stake in Thorntree Industries, a joint venture diamond-trading company with ZDF.

32. Zimbabwean **Billy Rautenbach** headed a joint venture cobalt-mining company and was Chief Executive of Gécamines from November 1998 to March 2000. Although stripped of his cobalt concessions in Katanga, Mr. Rautenbach told the Panel that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had offered his company, Ridgepointe International, mining rights to Gécamines concessions at Shinkolobwe, which include substantial deposits of uranium, copper and cobalt. Mr. Rautenbach's representatives said that any new agreement would be subject to the new mining code of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and any uranium mining operations would be open to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Strategies and sources of revenue 3553

Asset stripping of State mining companies 3641

39. **Tremalt Ltd.**, represented by **Mr. Bredenkamp**, holds the rights to exploit six Gécamines concessions containing over 2.7 million tons of copper and 325,000 tons of cobalt over 25 years. Tremalt paid the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo just \$400,000, but the estimated worth of the six concessions exceeds \$1 billion. The joint venture running the concession is the Kababankola Mining Company, in which Tremalt has an 80 per cent share to Gécamines' 20 per cent. Under this agreement, the Panel has learned that Gécamines derives no direct financial benefit. Although Tremalt representatives told the Panel that they have invested \$15 million to date, there are no signs of substantial investments having been made on the concessions, nor has any schedule of investment in the form of a business plan been released to Gécamines.

40. Like Oryx, Tremalt insists that its operations are not linked to ZDF or the Government of Zimbabwe. However, the Panel has obtained a copy of the **confidential profit-sharing agreement**, under which Tremalt retains 32 per cent of net profits, and undertakes to pay 34 per cent of net profits to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 34 per cent to Zimbabwe. This profit-sharing agreement was the subject of a confidential memorandum from the Defence Minister, Mr. Sekeramayi, to President Mugabe in August 2002. Tremalt also undertakes to provide the Congolese and Zimbabwean militaries with motor vehicles, trucks, buses and cash payments as necessary. These are to be subtracted from the two countries' part of the profit share. A forum has been established between **Tremalt and ZDF** to plan strategy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and "look after the interests of the Zimbabweans". Meeting monthly, the forum's main members are General Zvinavashe, Brigadier Moyo, Air Commodore Karakadzai, Mr. Bredenkamp, the Managing Director of KMC, Colin BlytheWood, and the Director of KMC, Gary Webster.

41. Gécamines officials told the Panel that the National Security Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mwenze Kongolo had pressured their negotiators to agree to the joint venture contract despite its negative implications for the State company's finances. The ultimate owners and beneficiaries of Tremalt are hidden behind a web of trusts and private holding companies **registered in the British Virgin Islands and the Isle of Man** to whose records the Panel was not allowed direct access.

Tremalt Ltd. (John Bredenkamp) 46

46. Tremalt's 80 per cent stake in KMC gives it management control over day-to-day administration and longer-term strategic decisions about exploiting the concession. Tremalt also procures equipment for ZDF and the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the cost of which it deducts from their share of KMC profits. Although Ridgepointe International, run by Mr. Rautenbach, the previous foreign investor in the Kababankola concessions, had to operate with much more dilapidated processing plants, it generated more than \$20 million profit within 18 months of taking over. Industry analysts say that Tremalt's claimed losses of more than \$13 million from February 2001 to July 2002 are not credible.

Using the corporate facade as a cover for criminal activities 5153

51. Some members of the elite network running joint ventures are linked to the smuggling of precious metals and gems, arms trafficking, illegal foreign exchange trading and money-laundering. The Panel has received extensive documentation and firsthand testimony explaining the mechanics of these criminal operations.

52. Sengamines supplements its revenues by laundering diamonds smuggled from Angola and Sierra Leone. Sengamines also smuggles its own diamonds out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Panel has learned of specific instances, times, places and persons involved. For example, in March 2001, Mr. Al-Shanfari instructed his security chief to smuggle diamonds from the Sengamines concession to Johannesburg, South Africa, and deliver them to Ken Roberts, the chief executive of Serengeti Diamonds.

53. Sengamines has also served as a front for illegal foreign exchange transactions using several routes into and out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most of the latter involved breaking the country's foreign exchange laws and profiting from arbitrage between differential exchange rates for the United States dollar and Congolese franc in Kinshasa and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, respectively. In one example, on 13 March 2000, Oryx officials in Kinshasa loaded an **aircraft belonging to Mr. Bredenkamp** with eight crates of Congolese francs for shipment to Harare. The Panel also has documentation substantiating information that an Oryx employee regularly transported parcels of United States dollars (\$500,000 at a time) that were withdrawn from the Oryx account at Hambros Bank, London, to Kinshasa without declaring them to the Congolese authorities; at Kinshasa the money was changed into Congolese francs and further transported to Harare and the

eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Oryx employees said they were asked to pay Mr. Mwangagwa a commission on these transactions which contravened Zimbabwe law. Despite repeated claims by Mr. Bredenkamp's representatives that he has no business relationship with Mr. Al-Shanfari, the Panel has received a document dated January 2001 and jointly signed by Mr. Bredenkamp and Mr. Al-Shanfari guaranteeing a \$1.5 million loan to Oryx Natural Resources from Python Services Ltd.

Mining revenues and the military 5458

56. John Bredenkamp, who has a history of clandestine military procurement, has an investment in **Aviation Consultancy Services Company (ACS)**. The Panel has confirmed, independently of Mr. Bredenkamp, that this company **represents British Aerospace, Dornier** of France and **Agusta** of Italy in Africa. Far from being a passive investor in ACS as Tremalt representatives claimed, Mr. Bredenkamp actively seeks business using high-level political contacts. In discussions with senior officials he has offered to mediate sales of British Aerospace military equipment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mr. Bredenkamp's representatives claimed that his companies observed European Union sanctions on Zimbabwe, but British Aerospace spare parts for ZDF Hawk jets were supplied early in 2002 **in breach of those sanctions**. Mr. Bredenkamp also controls **Raceview Enterprises**, which supplies logistics to ZDF. The Panel has obtained copies of Raceview invoices to ZDF dated 6 July 2001 for deliveries worth \$3.5 million of camouflage cloth, batteries, fuels and lubricating oil, boots and rations. It also has copies of invoices for aircraft spares for the Air Force of Zimbabwe worth another \$3 million.¹³²

From the UN IRIN press release quoted above: 'The "key strategist" for the Zimbabwean branch of the network was said to be Speaker of Parliament and former National Security Minister **Emmerson Mnangagwa**, with his key ally being ZDF Commander Gen. Vitalis Zvinavashe. Among the businessmen in the **elite network**, the Panel cited a Belgian national, **George Forrest**; Zimbabwean-backed entrepreneurs **John Bredenkamp** and one **Al-Shanfari**; a "convicted criminal based in South Africa", **Nico Shefer**; and three Lebanese "clans" Ahmad, Nassour, and Khanafer.'

On the recommendations proposed: 'The Panel decided that an embargo or moratorium banning the export of raw materials originating in the DRC "does not seem to be a viable means of helping to improve the situation of the country's Government, citizens or natural environment", noting that this would require massive technical and financial aid for the population to offset the humanitarian impact of such restrictive measures. However, concerned that if it did not recommend any punitive measures and thereby encourage a continuation of the exploitation by different criminal organisations, the Panel proposed imposing certain restrictions on business enterprises and individuals, ranging from travel bans to freezing of personal assets to barring of access to banking facilities. (...) The Panel insisted that governments of countries whose individuals, companies and financial institutions were involved in activities in DRC should assume their share of responsibility. It proposed adherence of business enterprises to Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development guidelines as a mechanism for bringing violations to the attention of governments of countries where the enterprises were registered. (...).'¹³³

¹³² *Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, with letter dated 15 October 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, and annexed letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Chairman of the Panel of Experts addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2002/1146), 16 October 2002; quoted from www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/UNID/706B89B947E5993DC1256C590052B353

¹³³ 'DRC: Focus on UN Panel report on the plunder of the Congo', United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN), Nairobi, 21

Most *press reports* on the Final UN Report that can be found on the internet are mere summaries of the Panel's findings, and are not repeated here.

The Observer, UK: 'Bredenkamp who voluntarily co-operated with the UN over the report has angrily rejected the conclusions that he has been involved in "illegal exploitation" of Congo's natural resources. **He has written to the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan protesting** that much of the material in the report is flawed and stating that he aims to contest vigorously his inclusion on any sanctions list. Whatever the final outcome, the weight of evidence obtained by the UN suggests Bredenkamp faces a struggle to clear his name. (...) Britain's imposition of an arms embargo on Zimbabwe appeared not to dampen Bredenkamp's enthusiasm to help prop up Mugabe's brutal regime. A year after the embargo was passed, Bredenkamp boosted his ever-expanding fortune by concluding a multimillion-pound contract to supply Mugabe's armed forces with military equipment. An invoice obtained by the UN and dated 6 July, 2001, reveals that one of Bredenkamp's Zimbabwean companies, **Raceview Enterprises**, was supplying Mugabe's air force with £2.3m of camouflage cloth, batteries, fuel, boots and army rations. Most controversially, the UN says it has other documents that prove Bredenkamp provided £2m of aircraft spares to the Zimbabwean air force. While Bredenkamp is not a British citizen he carries a **Zimbabwean and Dutch passport** the fact he uses Britain as a base for his business activities will be an embarrassment for Ministers who vigorously fought for European Union sanctions against Mugabe. But potentially the most damaging revelations for the British Government are claims by the UN that Bredenkamp benefits from a working relationship with Britain's largest and most important defence contractor, **BAE Systems** (formerly British Aerospace). The report discloses that Bredenkamp is an investor in an African company called Aviation Consultancy Services. While the firm's name sounds innocuous, it is in fact one of the most important arms trading groups in Africa brokering deals between defence firms and governments. One of ACS's major clients is BAE Systems, and the UN claims Bredenkamp has used his involvement with ACS to offer to broker sales of BAE military equipment to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The report also claims that BAE **breached European Union sanctions** by supplying spare parts for Zimbabwean Hawk jets early in 2002.

Both BAE and Bredenkamp deny they have been involved in busting sanctions, but The Observer has learnt that the **House of Commons select committee on arms exports is to launch an investigation** into the UN allegations. It has described the matter as 'of grave concern'. Opposition MPs have also tabled parliamentary questions to the Government to explain the exact nature of the relationship between BAE and Bredenkamp. (...) But it is his involvement in the Congolese mining industry along with his arms trading that now threatens to derail his business ambitions. The UN claims that one of his British Virgin Islands companies, **Tremalt**, has been illegally exploiting minerals in Congo, such as uranium, cobalt and copper. Bredenkamp denies any wrongdoing and claims all his mining interests are above board. Back in the Home Counties, a woman who answered the phone at Bredenkamp's mansion last week said he was travelling, but could not say whether he was abroad or in Britain. Should the UN Security Council accept the UN report's findings, such freedom to roam is a luxury Bredenkamp may not enjoy for long.¹³⁴

October 2002 '(This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations)'; www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=30525&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes

¹³⁴ Antony Barnett and Paul Harris, 'UK sports agent accused of selling military gear to African despot', *The Observer*, 27 October 2002; www.guardian.co.uk/armstrade/story/0%2C10674%2C820040%2C00.html

Also in *The Observer* a special report on **Oryx Natural Resources**, with references to **Bredenkamp**: ‘It reads like a bad novel. A diamond mining firm in darkest Africa is a **front organisation for the Zimbabwean army**. The firm, which mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a country ripped apart by years of conflict and from where the Millennium Diamond came, has links with a UK-based arms dealer who supplies Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. (...) But then Oryx is no stranger to controversy. Its short history is a study in crisis management. Oryx hit the headlines last year when the BBC claimed a lieutenant of Osama bin Laden was one of its shareholders. The BBC retracted the claims, but faces a claim for damages of up to £15 million. Certainly Oryx had links with Mugabe. When it tried to float in the UK in June 2000, Oryx’s prospectus revealed a firm close to Mugabe owned a 20 per cent stake in the mining firm. A press outcry ensued and the float was pulled. Oryx claims the firm linked to Mugabe is no longer a shareholder. The UN disagrees. ‘The [UN] Panel has now obtained documentary evidence that Oryx is being used as a front for the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF) and its military company, **OSLEG**.’ (...) If this was not damning enough, the report **links Oryx to John Bredenkamp**, the Berkshire-based millionaire, named in Parliament as ‘the main arms supplier to Zimbabwe’. The UN says it has a document detailing a \$1.5m loan agreement signed by Bredenkamp and Oryx’s chief executive, Thamer Bin Said Ahmed Al-Shanfari. In addition, the UN has evidence that a plane owned by Bredenkamp and used by Oryx was loaded with Congolese francs bound for Harare, in contravention of the DRC’s exchange rate policy. There are other damning claims, notably those linking Oryx to Avient Air (...).

As for the veracity of the claims, Oryx refutes those linking it to the ZDF. It says it provided the UN with its share register which clearly shows there can be no links with the Zimbabwean army. Oryx says it co-operated with the UN, handing over corporate documents and highlighting damaging inaccuracies in an earlier draft report, but to no avail. As for the illegal foreign exchange transactions and diamond smuggling claims, Oryx offers detailed rebuttals which appear to show the UN has confused the situation. The company admits Bredenkamp guaranteed a loan on behalf of a friend working for Oryx, but denies it has a relationship with the alleged arms dealer. It admits to doing business with Avient which it claims is the only company operating aircraft large enough to transport mining equipment in the DRC. Al-Shanfari, it says, donated only \$500 to Sekeramayi. The UN, though, doesn’t seem interested in Oryx’s denials. Nor does it seem in a hurry to publicise any documents to back up its claims. Oryx now has four months to persuade the UN it is wrong or its mine will close. History shows there are few successful precedents for persuading the UN to change its mind. Whatever the truth, the closure of the mine would be a tragedy. It has created 1,200 jobs, two schools and a hospital in an area where few thought it possible. ‘In the villages around the mine there is money for the first time,’ White said. After seeing its flotation pulled in mysterious circumstances, after being libelled by the BBC and attacked by El Pais, Oryx believes the UN report is the latest development in a smear campaign designed to force it out of business. White said: ‘There’s a continual disinformation campaign driven by commercial competitors.’

This could be paranoia or a PR smokescreen, designed to smother the allegations. Or it might be true. Only if the UN publishes its evidence will the real Oryx be exposed.’¹³⁵

¹³⁵ Jamie Doward, ‘The carat and the UN’s stick: It’s a dark tale that links arms, Africa, smuggling, gems – and billions of dollars’, *The Observer*, 27 October 2002 media.guardian.co.uk/Observer/business/story/0,6903,819824,00.html

Bredenkamp, with KMC and Tremalt, contested the UN report in a press release of 22 October 2002, referred to in a later press statement, occasioned by UN Security Council Resolution 1457 (2003) – quoted below, see 3 February 2003.

Oryx Natural Resources has published its response on the company website. ‘The report is highly inflammatory in the presentation of information and riddled with unsubstantiated and undocumented allegations.’¹³⁶

On 27 October 2002, the South African *Mail & Guardian* reported that the **UK government** ‘has announced that it will look into the UN report’s allegations involving UK-based companies and individuals, including John Bredenkamp (...). Bredenkamp who voluntarily cooperated with the UN over the report has rejected the report’s conclusions and has written a letter of protest to Annan.’¹³⁷ From the **debate in the House of Lords**, 1 November 2002:

‘1.15 p.m.

Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, it is reassuring to know of the action being taken today. I hope that the Government will now lose no time in acting against Oryx, which is UK-based, and against John Bredenkamp and his firms, ACS, Tremalt, Ridgepoint International and any affiliates that they may have in the UK. Oryx is reputed by the UN panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources, to which reference has been made, to have or to have had an account in Hambros Bank in London. Since the original European Commission regulations were made and the common position agreed in July, the House would be glad to know whether a report could be made on action taken to freeze assets and obstruct money laundering. On 8th October, when I asked about Oryx, the Minister said:

“we will continue to examine ways in which we may seize the assets of those who are on the banned list”. [Official Report, 8/10/02; col. 220.]

We would like to know what, if anything, has happened, if it can be said publicly. (...)

Lord Avebury: (...) The noble Baroness also mentioned the UN expert panel report. Here we have a particular responsibility because there are organisations and individuals who are operating from this country. She particularly referred to Oryx, a company whose machinations we have discussed several times on the floor of the House in debates on both DRC and Zimbabwe.

I should like to draw the attention of the Minister particularly to paragraph 53 of the report which states that Oryx transported eight crates of Congolese francs for shipment to Harare on 13th March 2000 in an aircraft belonging to Mr John Bredenkamp. His name will be familiar to the Minister as a person who lives in Sunningdale, Berkshire and whose address has been given to the Foreign Office on previous occasions. Yet he apparently continues his activities with impunity. The Minister also mentioned the account of Oryx in Hambros Bank, London. That was used to transport parcels of United States dollars, which had been withdrawn from the bank, and sent to Kinshasa, without declaring them to the Congolese authorities. At Kinshasa that money was changed into Congolese francs and transported to Harare and the eastern DRC. On another occasion Oryx employees said that they were asked to pay Mr Emerson Mwangagwa a commission on those transactions, which contravened Zimbabwe law. Mr Mwangagwa is the speaker of the Zimbabwe Parliament. He is the same gentleman who refuses to answer questions about the torture and ill treatment of MPs when they were addressed to him by the Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. He

¹³⁶ Website Oryx Natural Resources www.oryxnaturalresources.com/UNissues

¹³⁷ ‘DRC: Continuing reaction to UN panel report’, United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN), Nairobi, 28 October 2002
www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=30626&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes&SelectCountry=DRC

has ignored all the letters. This is also the gentleman who is illegally diverting the resources of the DRC.

Another aspect of Mr Bredenkamp's activities is that he is said to be the agent for British Aerospace in Zimbabwe. The expert panel report accuses him of having facilitated or organised the sale of 3.5 million dollars of goods to the Zimbabwe defence in July 2001, and to have organised the delivery of spare parts for the Hawk jets owned by the Zimbabwe Air Force early in 2002. Has Mr Bredenkamp been, or is he going to be, questioned by the police about those activities? (...)

Lord St John of Bletso: My Lords, I intervene briefly to give my total and undivided support to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, in those two Motions. As noble Lords are aware, there is a total case of despair in Zimbabwe. Normally in countries where there are cases of natural disaster - particularly the famine in Zimbabwe - the police and army come to the help of the nation. Sadly, the police and army in Zimbabwe are mere puppets of the ZANU PF. Clearly, sanctions have to be targeted and it has been made clear in Europe that we would not want the more general sanctions to affect particularly the poor in Zimbabwe. I am pleased that the issue of Oryx has been raised. I hope that the Minister will give us encouragement about more decisive action to be taken against Oryx, as well as John Bredenkamp. (...)

1.45 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Amos): (...) As to the three individuals named and featured in the recent UN expert panel report on the exploitation of resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC, I agree that the way in which resource exploitation has fuelled conflict in the DRC is deplorable. We have given our full support to the work of the panel. The report makes a number of recommendations which we shall have to study with fellow UN Security Council members. We shall consider what further action is appropriate once the Security Council has studied the report. Indeed, there may be a number of other, more significant, names mentioned in the report which we shall need to look at.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, surely we do not have to wait for the Security Council to meet in cases where criminal activities are alleged. That applies particularly to Mr. Bredenkamp.

Baroness Amos: My Lords, the allegations have to be investigated. I am not saying that we have to wait for the Security Council to meet to take action. Given that all noble Lords agree that multilateral action is better than unilateral action, it is important that the Security Council meets to consider the report and for there to be joint UN action in respect of the recommendations made in it. We are already engaged in discussions with our UN colleagues on this issue.¹³⁸

More in the press, November 2002:

'The British government has launched a **formal investigation** into allegations that a white Zimbabwean businessman one of the richest men in Britain has broken UK and European sanctions by supplying aircraft parts to the Zimbabwean air force.

The allegations against the international financier **John Bredenkamp** have been made in a United Nations report into the "illegal exploitation of natural resources" in the Democratic Republic of Congo, published last month.

In the past few days both the foreign secretary, **Jack Straw**, and the defence secretary, **Geoff Hoon**, have confirmed in parliamentary answers that an investigation has been launched. In the first answer to the Tory MP Michael Ancram, Mr Straw said: "We are

¹³⁸ House of Lords, UK, debate on Zimbabwe, 1 November 2002, Column 455f; quoted from: www.zimbabwesituation.com/nov10_2002.html

aware of allegations of past arms dealing activities by Mr John Bredenkamp.” (...) The report says he is an active investor in a brokering concern called Aviation Consultancy Services, which acts as an agent in Africa for major European defence contractors, including BAE Systems. BAE Systems supplied 12 Hawk jets to Zimbabwe in the early 1980s, but an arms embargo was imposed on the country in May 2000 in protest at the violent treatment of President Robert Mugabe’s opponents. The EU followed suit in February this year.

The UN report says: “Mr Bredenkamp’s representatives claimed that his companies observed European Union sanctions on Zimbabwe, but British Aerospace spare parts for Hawk jets were supplied early in 2002 in breach of those sanctions.”

The panel cites internal documents, which the Guardian has seen, from one of Mr Bredenkamp’s companies, Raceview Enterprises, which supplies logistics to Zimbabwe’s defence forces. A memorandum dated May 17 2001 details aircraft spares worth \$3m (£1.9m).

In a lengthy explanation sent to the Guardian, Mr Bredenkamp’s spokesman agreed that ACS acted as a broker for Raceview, which reached a general supply agreement with the air force in August 2001. But he said the aircraft spares were legitimately exported from European manufacturers and not from BAE Systems or the UK.

The spokesman enclosed a letter from ACS to the air force in April this year saying that because of the EU embargo two suppliers (whose names have been blanked out) had decided to suspend all shipments to Zimbabwe. The country has aircraft from Italy, Spain and France.

Although BAE Systems acknowledge that ACS is “one of our many advisers in Africa” it denies supplying Hawk spares in breach of sanctions. “We did not supply any spares to Zimbabwe and we do not believe any were delivered, because we believe Zimbabwean Hawks are not flying and have not been for two years,” Richard Coltart, BAE’s head of news, said.

“We investigated these allegations and made sure we hadn’t done anything wrong, even by accident.”

Zimbabwean newspapers have suggested that the Hawk spares were bought from Kenya.

In reply to the report’s allegations that Mr Bredenkamp’s companies had improperly exploited Congo’s natural wealth, his spokesman said the conclusions were “either false or inaccurate, and in context maliciously defamatory”.

“Many of the statements and allegations contained in the report are substantially at odds with the considerable information and documentation voluntarily provided,” the spokesman said.¹³⁹

More questions followed in the **British parliament** later in November 2002:

[1] **‘Norman Lamb (North Norfolk):** When can we expect a ministerial statement on the United Nations panel of experts’ report on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? The report talks of a multibillion dollar corporate theft of the country’s resources and names 12 British-based companies and individuals for violating Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development guidelines on ethical matters. Some of the companies feel strongly that they have been named without evidence, but in respect of others—I mention John Bredenkamp in particular—there appears to be pretty damning evidence. The Government have said that they have asked for further

¹³⁹ David Pallister and Tania Branigan, ‘UK Inquiry Into Jet Parts for Mugabe’, *The Guardian*, 8 November 2002 www.guardian.co.uk/armstrade/story/0,10674,835942,00.html or www.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4542138,00.html

information from the UN and that a substantive response is expected. When can we expect to see that?

Mr. Cook: (...) I shall certainly draw the hon. Gentleman's remarks to the attention of my right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for International Development and ensure that we communicate with him as soon as we have that further information from the United Nations.¹⁴⁰

[2] *'Hawk Jets – Norman Lamb:* To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent reports he has received from the UN, regarding the supply of Hawk jet spare parts to the Democratic Republic of Congo; and what conclusions have been reached as a result. [87238]

Mr. Rammell: We have seen no reports from the UN on this matter. We are still in discussion with the UN about the allegations in the UN panel report on exploitation of resources in the DRC. The Security Council is considering the extension of the panel's mandate to allow discussion to continue.

Mr. John Bredenkamp – Norman Lamb: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the answers of 18 November, *Official Report*, columns 9–10W, where the two meetings between Mr. John Bredenkamp and British High Commission officials in Zimbabwe took place; when the meetings took place; who was present at each of these meetings; who spoke to Mr. Bredenkamp in each of his two telephone calls; and what items were addressed in (a) the two meetings and (b) the two telephone conversations between Mr. Bredenkamp and officials. [82515]

Mr. Rammell [holding answer 25 November 2002]: The two meetings between British High Commission officials and Mr John Bredenkamp took place in the High Commission in Harare. The meetings were held on 14 November 2001 and 11 March 2002 respectively, and both at Mr Bredenkamp's request. The discussions were held in confidence, and covered a range of issues. During them, British officials neither encouraged, nor expressed support for, Mr Bredenkamp's business activities. I am withholding details of who was present at these meetings, and further details of what was discussed, including in the telephone conversations, under exemption 1b of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information (Information which would harm the conduct of international relations or affairs) and exemption 14b (information the disclosure of which without the consent of the supplier would prejudice the future supply of such information).¹⁴¹

[8] Discussion on EU sanctions against Mugabe and supporters, Jan. 2003

On 21 January 2003, Mr **Van Orden MEP** sent a letter to the British **Foreign Secretary Jack Straw**, President of the Council of the EU George A. Papandreou, Secretary General of the Council of the EU Javier Solana, EU Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten and UK Ambassador to the EU Sir Nigel Sheinwald KCMG. From the letter:

'(...) I understand that **COREPER** [*European Council's Permanent Representatives Committee*] will tomorrow discuss the Council Common Position concerning restrictive measures against Zimbabwe, with a view to renewing EU sanctions at the General Affairs and External Relations Council on Monday 27 January. (...) If there is to be any prospect of bringing about change for the better in Zimbabwe, the international community needs to demonstrate unambiguous resolve and ensure that its measures against the Mugabe regime are fully effective. In recent months we have seen the EU's sanctions only too often undermined

¹⁴⁰ 14 November 2002, www.privycouncil.org.uk/output/page6.asp

¹⁴¹ Hansard, Column 552W

www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo021216/text/21216w13.htm

through the complicity of a Member State. For example, in August 2002, Mugabe's banned police chief Augustine Chihuri was granted a visa to attend an Interpol conference in Lyon (...). If there had been a determination to make sanctions work, ways would have been found to ensure that none of these breaches could have taken place. (...) It is clear what the EU and its Member States need to do. Sanctions must be renewed and extended. The following measures are proposed:

1. The travel ban to include all members of Mugabe's regime, and their families, as well as those business leaders that are keeping the regime in place. There is no shortage of ideas as to who should be banned. The New Zealand Government, for example, started with a list of 20 names but now includes 142. (...)
4. Economic links to be curtailed. (...)
5. Publication of details of assets held abroad by banned Zimbabweans.

Alongside targeted sanctions there should be implementation of the recommendations made in the United Nations Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (October 2002). The report shows that Zanu PF is deeply involved in the plunder of the Congo and recommends that a travel ban and financial restrictions should be placed on John Bredenkamp, Emmerson Mnangagwa and Vitalis Zvinavashe amongst others. While the latter two names are on the EU list, Mr Bredenkamp is still free to operate from within the EU and to come and go at will. (...) As a first step there should be greater international congruence in the lists of banned Zimbabweans so that they are all equally extensive and comprehensive. (...)¹⁴²

[9] 2003 – Bredenkamp statement; Amnesty International report on arms exports; UN Panel renewed mandate and report of October 2003; again UK House of Commons

After the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1457 (2003) of 24 January 2003¹⁴³ Bredenkamp, with KMC and Tremalt, issued another press statement dated 3 February 2003:

'The following statement is issued today by Kababankola Mining Company S.p.r.l. ("KMC"), Tremalt Limited ("Tremalt") and Mr John Bredenkamp ("Mr Bredenkamp").

"KMC, Tremalt and Mr Bredenkamp ("The KMC Parties") note the terms of reference of the new six-month mandate for a UN panel of experts ("The Panel") investigating the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as outlined in Security Council Resolution 1457 (2003) ("The Resolution").

In their Press release of 22 October 2002, the KMC Parties made it clear that a number of statements and allegations contained in the Reports of the Panel were either false, inaccurate or misleading. Furthermore, the KMC Parties took great exception to any allegation of wrongdoing and in particular any involvement in the "illegal exploitation of the natural mineral wealth of the DRC", specifically cobalt and copper. Their position in these respects remains unchanged, as does their intention to vigorously contest their inclusion in the list of companies and individuals recommended for sanctions by the Panel.

¹⁴² Letter Geoffrey Van Orden MEP, Brussels, to The Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, London, 21 January 2003; quoted from Zimbabwe Information Centre site www.zic.com.au/news/2003/eu23012003.htm

¹⁴³ On this resolution, see 'Introduction', *Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, with letter dated 23 October 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council; www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/4b8c50fce6c39577e1256dcd004f6ddc?OpenDocument

In the Resolution, the Security Council has requested that “the Panel provide to the individuals, companies and States named (in previous reports), upon request, all information and documentation connecting them to the illegal exploitation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s natural resources’. The KMC Parties welcome this UN offer to provide them with information and documentation about allegations made about them and plan to respond in detail by 31st March 2003, the date set by the Security Council for submissions. However, the ability of the KMC Parties to meet this date will be wholly determined by the timely release by the Panel of the above-mentioned data.

As on previous occasions, the KMC Parties will be available at all times to assist the Panel in its ongoing enquiries and to answer any questions that the Panel may wish to put to them. The KMC Parties also note the acknowledgement in the Resolution that the Panel, which is not a judicial body, does not have the resources to carry out an investigation whereby these findings can be considered as established facts and that the due process of law in regard to KMC, a DRC registered joint venture with Gecamines, is vested in the government of the sovereign state of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As such, the KMC Parties will make themselves available to the relevant DRC authorities to assist in any matters they may wish to resolve.¹⁴⁴

Bredenkamp featured in an Amnesty International report on arms exports and human rights violations of May 2003, with special emphasis on violations of the UK arms embargo:

‘5. United Kingdom

5.5 Holes in the Controls

5.5.1 Arms Brokering and Trafficking

There is growing evidence that UK arms brokers and shippers are among those responsible for deliveries of small arms, light weapons and ammunition into conflict and human rights crisis zones. Amnesty International is therefore extremely concerned at the inadequacy of current UK government proposals to regulate the activities of UK brokers and shippers.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

(...)

Zimbabwe

In October 2002, a report of the United Nations Security Council accused two UK residents, John Bredenkamp and Andrew Smith, of illegally providing services and military equipment to the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF) for use in the DRC. The UN said that Bredenkamp (...) was breaching EU and British sanctions against Zimbabwe through his arms brokering company Aviation Consultancy Services (ACS), in which he holds an active investment. [Note 218: For all quotes from the UN, see: Letter dated 15 October 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, New York, 15 October 2002]

ACS had offices in South Africa, Zimbabwe and the UK, and has worked with Smith’s company Avient Air. According to the UN, ACS has acted as a representative for major European arms contractors such as Agusta of Italy and BAE Systems of the UK. In the early 1980s, BAE supplied 12 Hawk jets to the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF). But the UK and the EU respectively imposed an arms embargo on the country in May 2000 and February 2002. Contrary to those arms embargoes, the UN Report alleged that BAE spare parts for the ZDF Hawk jets, worth \$3 million, were supplied by ACS in 2002. In addition, the UN obtained copies of invoices from Raceview Enterprises, a company controlled by

¹⁴⁴ ‘Press statement 3rd February 2003: KMC and Tremalt respond to UN Security Council Resolution 1457 (2003) re DRC Panel’, Lubumbashi, DRC; Breco Group website, Bulletin Board www.breco.info/news.html

Bredenkamp, for deliveries worth \$3.5 million of camouflage cloth, batteries, fuels and lubricating oil, boots and rations.

In a first reaction, BAE Systems acknowledged that ACS was “one of our many advisers in Africa”. But it denied supplying Hawk spares in breach of sanctions. Bredenkamp says that the spares were legitimately exported from other European manufacturers. [Note 219: The Guardian, 8 November 2002] In the UK, these reports prompted some members of parliament to ask serious questions about British involvement in Zimbabwe arms supplies. [Note 220: Quoted in The Guardian, 8 November 2002]

Under the draft secondary legislation the government does not intend to introduce controls on all UK brokers wherever they are located, despite this being promised in its election manifesto in 2001. The new proposal is that if ‘any part of the deal’ by UK residents and registered companies takes place within UK territory, then it will require a licence, but if the brokering takes place totally “offshore” or “extraterritorially”, then it will only become illegal if the deal involves the transfer of torture equipment, embargo breaking and long-range missiles.

However, these proposals are still too weak. The UK and other governments usually only implement arms embargoes after time-consuming multilateral consultations and when the human rights violations in a potential recipient country are already at crisis levels. A UK-based arms broker seeking involvement in a questionable arms transaction in a crisis zone would be aware of the possibility that his application might be refused, and could simply choose to conduct his business abroad before an embargo is implemented to avoid any form of UK control or scrutiny.

Those potential transactions that the UK government needs to control most would thus escape the proposed system of UK regulation. For this reason, Amnesty International has been consistently calling for full extraterritorial application of the law on arms brokering – similar to that which is already accepted by the UK government for trafficking in illegal drugs, child and sexual bondage, landmines and corruption of foreign officials.

Currently the UK government is proposing to keep a record of all those who apply for licences to broker, but the list will fall short of an official register with eligibility criteria.¹⁴⁵

In late **October 2003** a further **Panel of Experts** report was released by the UN Security Council. In the main text, individuals and companies were no longer named. ‘Human rights organisations urge that their identities should be revealed’.¹⁴⁶ The names of Bredenkamp and companies were, however, listed in an Annex (see below). From the UN report:

I. Introduction

1. On 24 January 2003, the Security Council adopted its resolution 1457 (2003) renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Under that six-month mandate, the Panel was requested to verify, reinforce and update its earlier findings and, as necessary, revise the annexes attached to its previous report (S/2002/1146, annex) of 16 October 2002. In that regard, the Panel was asked to pursue a dialogue with individuals, companies and States referred to in the report, exchange information with those parties, assess actions taken by them and compile their reactions for publication as an attachment to the report. (...)

II. Reactions to the Panel’s last report

¹⁴⁵ Amnesty International, *A Catalogue of Failures: G8 Arms Exports and Human Rights Violations*, 19 May 2003 www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3443.htm or www.conflictdiamonds.ca/library/ior00303.htm

¹⁴⁶ ‘Goudroof financiert oorlog in Congo’, *Het Parool*, Netherlands, 28 October 2003.

9. As Council members are aware, the publication of the annexes in the Panel's last report (S/2002/1146) created strong reactions by entities named therein. The annexes brought together two groups of companies and individuals. First, annexes I and II comprised individuals and companies that were involved in natural resource exploitation in a way which could be linked directly with funding the conflict and the resulting humanitarian and economic disaster in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Many of the parties were either members of one of the elite networks described in the Panel's last report or enjoyed close business relations with them. Even where business activities involved the payment of taxes to rebel administrations and therefore might seem to be legitimate, none of those funds were used to benefit the communities in which mineral exploitation was occurring. Instead the taxes went to fund the elite network's military activities. Secondly, there were those parties that, while having only indirect commercial ties to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, still bore a responsibility to ensure that those links did not, albeit inadvertently, contribute to funding and perpetuating the conflict. They comprise annex III of that report. (...)

11. The publication of the Panel's report in October 2002 also raised a great deal of interest in the media and among observers of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region. The international business community in particular acknowledged that companies could not avoid their responsibilities in a country suffering from conflict, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Investors and financiers took a keen interest in the activities of corporations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with which they were dealing. Companies themselves commented that their responsibilities extended further than they had previously acknowledged. Supply chains for raw materials, in particular, came into sharp focus and prompted some of those named to reassess their activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

12. It is also important to note the significant difference between those companies and individuals listed in annexes I and II to the Panel's last report and companies listed in annex III. Annexes I and II list companies and individuals about which the Panel had information indicating that their commercial activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had contributed, either directly or indirectly, to funding conflicts, especially in the eastern and north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Companies listed in annex III, however, were included because of apparent breaches of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, a non-compulsory code of business ethics. It was also a means of characterizing their involvement in exploitation activities that were less directly linked to conflict and therefore involved more indirect ties to the main protagonists. Such companies appear to have benefited from the chaotic environment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through, for example, the acquisition of concessions or other contracts from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on terms that were more favourable than they might have received in countries where there was peace and stability.

13. In discussing the work that the Panel has undertaken in respect of the companies and individuals named in the annexes to its October 2002 report, it is noteworthy that a total of 157 parties were involved. Of those, reactions from 119 were received, representing three quarters of the total. Meeting those parties was a major logistical and time-consuming undertaking, especially in view of the limited time of the Panel's mandate, its small size and the complex nature of the issues involving a number of the parties. In the interest of due process, each party was allocated as much time as was necessary to ensure that the dialogue with the Panel covered in detail all the issues involved, thereby maximizing the possibility of achieving a resolution satisfactory to both sides. When necessary, follow-up meetings were held.

14. Prior to starting its substantive work, the Panel sought guidance from the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat on handling reactions and responses from individuals and entities.

The Office subsequently issued a note that guided the Panel in all its exchanges with such parties. One of the key issues on which the Office provided guidance to the Panel was the release of information to companies and individuals, as required by paragraph 12 of resolution 1457 (2003). It recommended that information and documents could be handed over provided that such release did not place at risk the safety of Panel members, its staff or its sources, did not violate a duty of confidentiality owed to a source or did not compromise the Panel's internal decision-making. Accordingly, the Panel was very careful to take full account of the security of its sources and the issue of confidentiality when it was selecting what information and documents it could release. In following the principle of due process, the Panel strove to provide as much information as possible to parties in discussions and communications with them.

Standard of proof

15. The Panel is an independent fact-finding body established by the Security Council, which reports and provides recommendations to it. As the Panel has no judicial recourse, it can only gather information from voluntary sources. Over the course of the last three years, it has established an extensive network of information sources both in the Great Lakes Region and in countries with links to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It does not have the legal powers available to a Government, for example, in a criminal or civil investigation. Consequently, when assessing whether the behaviour of an individual or company was inappropriate and therefore warranted inclusion in the annexes, a standard of proof based on "reasonableness" or "sufficient cause" was applied. In essence, for any particular party the Panel has acquired information indicating that, prima facie, a party has been engaged in conduct related to business dealings linked to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, either directly or indirectly, that do not meet generally accepted international standards of corporate behaviour or governance. The Panel used its judgement in assessing the importance and relevance of that information to come to considered views and opinions. In the case of the companies listed in annex III, the Panel has used the principles of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as appropriate benchmarks. (...)

Results of dialogue and work with parties

22. The overarching goal of the dialogue was to achieve a resolution of the issues that led to parties being listed so that they can be removed from the annexes. (...)

Category I Resolved (...)

Category II Provisional resolution

29. Category II comprises companies, together with their owners or proprietors, that have reached provisional resolutions with the Panel that are dependent on the companies fulfilling commitments on corporate governance that will only occur after the end of the Panel's mandate. All the matters of substance have been resolved. It is only a matter of going forward with improved controls and procedures that is required. As a result, the Panel has asked the NCPs responsible for implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in the countries concerned to monitor compliance. A total of eight parties comprising two business groupings have been referred to NCPs in Belgium and the United Kingdom (see annex I to the present report).

Category III Referred for updating or further investigation

30. Category III comprises companies, together with their owners or proprietors, which have been referred to NCPs for updating or further investigation. They are cases where the Panel has been unable to achieve resolution for one of several reasons. The most frequent reason is that the company concerned has rejected the Panel's contention that there are issues that need to be addressed relating to its activities in or with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For example, a company has refused to accept that it has a responsibility to do what it can to avoid providing support, even inadvertently, to rebel groups in conflict areas where

it may be operating or have business interests. The category also includes companies that do not appear to have met their own self-imposed best practice principles. Given that the OECD Guidelines are codes of good business ethics, the Panel believes it is important for such apparent failures or lapses to be investigated further. In addition, there are companies that are involved in legal actions the outcome of which is very unlikely to be known before the end of the Panel's mandate. During such legal processes, information may come into the public domain that may be relevant to an assessment of the concerned companies' involvement with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Consequently, the open files have been referred to the NCPs of the countries where they are incorporated. A total of 13 dossiers, covering 18 companies, have been referred to the OECD NCPs in Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom (see annex I to the present report).

Category IV Referred for further investigation (...)

Category V Parties that did not react to the Panel's report (...),¹⁴⁷

From Annex I (Resolution overview):¹⁴⁸

CATEGORY II RESOLVED CASES SUBJECT TO NCP MONITORING COMPLIANCE

No.	Name	Country	Annex	Annex No.	Remarks
1	Kababankola Mining Company	Zimbabwe	III	48	UK NCP
	Tremalt Ltd	UK BVI	I	25	
	Tremalt Ltd	UK BVI	III	80	
	Bredenkamp John	UK/Zimbabwe	II	11	

On 6 November 2003, Bredenkamp came up once again in the UK **House of Commons**:

'Paul Farrelly (Newcastle-under-Lyme): (...) I shall make some brief remarks about the Committee's recommendations on extraterritorial controls on arms trafficking and brokering, with particular reference to an international arms dealer based in the UK. I raised my concerns about that dealer with my hon. Friend the Minister during the passage of the **Export Control Act 2002**. (...) Since I was elected two years ago, I have repeatedly raised the issue of military supplies and arms being supplied to Zimbabwe, both for internal repression and to support its military adventures in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I have highlighted the activities of one **John Arnold Bredenkamp**, who holds a dual **Zimbabwean-Dutch passport** but is resident in the UK—indeed, he has residence rights here. He is certainly not small fry, but is one of the Mugabe regime's biggest arms suppliers, from small-calibre weapons right up to—it is reliably understood—MiG Hind attack helicopters from parts of the former Soviet Union. Cleverly, Mr. Bredenkamp supplies those arms via Zimbabwe-incorporated companies, so they are not directly exported from the UK,

¹⁴⁷ United Nations Security Council, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, with letter dated 23 October 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, and letter dated 15 October 2003 from the Chairman of the Panel of Experts to the Secretary-General;

www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/4b8c50fce6c39577c1256dcd004f6ddc?OpenDocument

¹⁴⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, with letter dated 23 October 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, and letter dated 15 October 2003 from the Chairman of the Panel of Experts to the Secretary-General;

www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/4b8c50fce6c39577c1256dcd004f6ddc?OpenDocument – References are to Annexes in the Final Report of October 2002 (S/2002/1146).

but his business empire is firmly based in this country—in Berkshire—and he well known in military and intelligence circles.

When the Export Control Act 2002 was passing through the House, my colleagues and I were naturally concerned to establish whether its provisions and sanctions would catch the activities of those such as Mr. Bredenkamp. The Minister who is to wind up today's debate assured me that they would, saying that:

“My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Paul Farrelly) referred to some specific examples, but as he knows, I cannot comment on individual cases. However, he raised an important point of principle on which I think the House will want to have the Government's views on record. I can assure my hon. Friend and the House that the Bill will give us the power to control UK citizens and anyone operating in the UK, which I think was the point that he was making. He was concerned about someone who was not a UK citizen who was a trafficker and broker in arms to arms-embargoed destinations such as Zimbabwe. Such people will be caught. That is important.”—[*Official Report*, 8 November 2001; Vol. 374, c. 416.]

At a distance, those so inclined might want to quibble about semantics, especially about the meaning of “courts”. As my question and the debate thereafter show, however, there can be no doubt about the meaning of the assurance that the Bill would catch people such as those I described. I do not want to embarrass my hon. Friend the Minister—the legislation and its implementation are complicated, and I am certain that his assurance was given in good faith—but I have to tell him that his assurance was incorrect because, under the legislation, people like Mr. Bredenkamp will continue to operate with impunity from a UK base. It is simply wrong that people like him can cleverly organise their affairs to outwit legislation and to make a mockery of arms control legislation.

Nigel Griffiths: My hon. Friend is simply wrong.

Paul Farrelly: I repeat that I am certain that the assurance was given in good faith, but the record is in *Hansard* for everyone to see.

Nigel Griffiths: I am not correcting the *Hansard* reference, but my hon. Friend's mistaken interpretation of the current and future state of the legislation.

Paul Farrelly: For the first time in my two years in the House, I am grateful to be told that I am mistaken. I look forward to my hon. Friend's concluding remarks. Given hon. Members' contributions today, however, it is fair to say that the question still stands: when will something be done about merchants of death such as Mr. Bredenkamp who are operating from the UK? When I have asked that question outside the context of the Act, the answer has generally been, “Bring us the evidence and we will have a look.” That brings me to another aspect of the effectiveness of our arms control regime.

Mr. Bredenkamp is well known. He is one of the UK's richest people—one only has to look at *The Sunday Times* guide to the rich every year—and he has a long track record of arms dealing. (...) He was named in a recent United Nations panel report as one of those who are supposed to have profited from the tragic war in the DRC by looting the country of its precious minerals, which is the price for his arms supply to Zimbabwe. The hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) may be interested to know that he has also been a BAE Systems agent in Zimbabwe. Given the position of the hon. Gentleman's hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary on the Mugabe regime, I am sure that he will be as concerned as I am if BAE Systems is exporting arms to Zimbabwe in return for the use of Hawk jets, which are being used to prosecute the war in the DRC. I mention this history because any arms control regime needs to be proactive, not just reactive, if it is to deal with merchants of death.

Given that my hon. Friend the Minister corrected me, will he state the Government's position on UK-based individuals who are trafficking arms abroad by whatever

mechanisms? Will he also agree to calls made by hon. Members here today and by the Quadripartite Committee for the scope of the Act and its implementation to be extended to cover such individuals?

Mr. Berry: I understand that it is correct to say that section 4 of the Export Control Act 2002 gives the Government the power to exercise full extraterritoriality, but that under secondary legislation, it specifically will not cover trafficking and brokering unless part of that transaction takes place in the UK. Is that my hon. Friend's understanding? That may help to clarify the Minister's response later.

Paul Farrelly: The problem is indeed the scope of the secondary legislation to give effect to the Bill.

4.4 pm

Sitting Suspended for Divisions in the House.

4.28 pm

On resuming—

Paul Farrelly: I was just saying how important it is for any arms control regime to be seen to be proactive and not merely reactive. I do not want the Chamber to misunderstand my comments today. I welcome the Act and congratulate my hon. Friend the Minister on the effort that he has put into a complicated piece of legislation, the implementation of which is also complicated. However, confusion and misapprehension remain as to how easy it may be for clever and resourceful individuals and businesses—such as those involved in the arms business—to evade the provisions, particularly by relocating offshore.

I hope that I am simply confused and wrong. In view of the Minister's comments, I would be grateful if he wrote to me to clarify the position of individuals such as Mr. Bredenkamp, who have UK residence rights but who organise their affairs so that no transaction takes place in the UK. Will they fall under the new legislation, which is to be enacted on 1 May? If not, as part of a learning process, will the Government consider extending the legislation?¹⁴⁹ **[Answers?]**

House of Commons

18 Nov 2003 : Column 195WH

Mr. Robathan [Robathan, Mr Andrew (Con), Blaby]: (...)

[John Bredenkamp] has been mentioned in the House on many occasions. As well as many other allegations, it was reported in May 2000 that he provided half the initial capital for a diamonds-for-arms deal that involved the Zimbabwean defence force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The UN panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Congo uncovered a memorandum of understanding signed by **Emmerson Mnangagwa**, the Speaker of Zimbabwe, guaranteeing a \$1.5 million loan to Oryx Natural Resources from Python Services Ltd., one of Bredenkamp's companies. Bredenkamp is registered in the UK as a director of 11 companies. It is highly likely that Mugabe's personal wealth, and that of other ZANU-PF officials, is held offshore through companies owned in part by Bredenkamp.

18 Nov 2003 : Column 196WH

¹⁴⁹ House of Commons, Hansard Debates for 6 November 2003

www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/cm031106/halltext/31106h01.htm

Bredenkamp represents **Tremalt**, a company owned by trusts registered in the British Virgin Islands and the Isle of Wight. Tremalt is believed to procure military equipment and provide cash payments to Zimbabwean and Congolese defence forces. Bredenkamp acts as Tremalt's representative at monthly meetings with **Vitalis Zvinvashe**, head of the Zimbabwean armed forces. That shows his close personal relationship with ZANU-PF.

Furthermore, according to a report by the same UN panel on 16 October last year, Bredenkamp's **Raceview Enterprises** supplied the Zimbabwean defence force with \$3.5 million-worth of military supplies. Our great ally, the USA, whose President is coming here today, has banned Bredenkamp from entry. However, he is not banned from the UK. Why not?

Does the Minister share my disappointment that, in the latest UN panel report on corruption in the Congo, Bredenkamp somehow succeeded in having his name removed from the list of people recommended for a travel ban and financial restrictions? Apparently, Bredenkamp has also recently met the British high commissioner in Harare. Could the Minister tell us why, without hiding behind some nonsense about the code of practice on access to Government information, as happened with a recent parliamentary question?

The Minister and the Government have it within their power to undermine the backers of the dictatorial regime in Zimbabwe. Many of the same men backed Ian Smith. Why has the Minister not taken action against people who so clearly profit from the evil of Mugabe's regime?¹⁵⁰

[NO ANSWERS FOUND – CHECKED January 30 2005]

¹⁵⁰ House of Commons Debates for 18 Nov 2003 (Hansard)
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/cm031118/hallindx/31118-x.htm>

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