

## ZIMBABWE 2003

# REPORT OF PRESIDENTIAL LAND REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAST TRACK LAND REFORM PROGRAMME, 2000-2002, ('The Utete Report')

[finalised August 2003]

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**Editor's Note:**

**Extracts from the Utete Report were published electronically in *The Herald* in these 23 instalments between 23 October and 25 November 2003**

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The above contained a certain amount of overlap and repetition, while some parts of the report (including tables) were not included in the electronic extracts, but have been included here, taken from a paper version of most of the report in the editor's possession. Some sections of the Utete Report, dealing with the highly controversial issue of multiple ownership of farms by members of the elite, have not been made public.

## **i) Foreword by the Chairman of the Committee**

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT:

Your Committee, having completed the assignment given to it on the 14<sup>th</sup> May 2003, is honoured after three months of intense effort to present the Report of its findings on the Implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, 2000-2002.

In its work, the Committee was guided not only by its Terms of Reference but also by a keen awareness of the self-evident truth that Land Reform cannot begin and end with land re-distribution. Whilst – in Zimbabwe and elsewhere – it is animated by legitimate political imperatives deriving from the quest for justice, Land Reform must, importantly, seek to transform positively people's social and economic circumstances and conditions.

Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme must – as indeed is readily recognised in the relevant policy instruments of Government – power the transformation of the rural economy, raise agricultural production to higher levels, enhance agriculture's contribution to national food security and industrial development and provide a firm platform for more extensive collaborative interaction between the country and its regional development partners.

As it criss-crossed the countryside and interacted with many Zimbabweans, Your Committee was impressed by the people's appreciation of the opportunities already availed them, or prospects for the future under the Land Reform Programme. Precisely because of this broadly shared attitude, there were, and there will probably continue to be, representations concerning various aspects of the Programme including such issues as congestion in some rural communities; certain perceived shortcomings in the manner in which the Programme was implemented in some districts and especially in respect of the A2 model which left many disappointed as they did not immediately benefit as they had expected, and unwelcome and untoward interventions by some elements in land redistribution and administrative processes in some areas.

In its Report, Your Committee sets out its broad findings on the implementation of the Programme and reports in summary fashion on interviews conducted with Government officials, key stakeholders, and beneficiaries of the Programme, at national and sub-national levels. The Committee also identifies certain flaws and shortcomings in Programme implementation and calls for corrective action to be put in train as a matter of urgency.

Equally importantly and consistent with its Terms of Reference, Your Committee proffers suggestions on policy initiatives Government may wish to consider as it grapples with the vital issues pertaining to further refinement of the agrarian reform process coupled with, and in the interest of, enhanced productive performance.

Your Committee has been honoured and privileged to serve.

*Signed:* Dr Charles Utete (Chairman)

## **ii) COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE COMMITTEE AND ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE**

1. The Presidential Land Review Committee was officially inaugurated by His Excellency President R.G. Mugabe on 14 May 2003. It comprised the following members:

Dr. Charles M B Utete	Chairman
Dr. Robbie Mupawose	
Dr. Liberty Mhlanga	
Dr. Tobias Takarvarasha	
Dr. Bonoface Ndimande	
Prof. Rudo Gaidzanwa	
Dr. Mavis Chidzonga	
Dr. Misheck J M Sibanda	
Miss Grace Tsitsi Mutandiro	Secretary

*Administrative Secretariat*

Mr Kossam Mupezeni  
Miss Pauline Mahoya  
Mr Edward O Mamutse  
Mrs Ruth M Chikwira  
Mr Taonga Mushayavanhu  
Ms Nditwani Muleya  
Mr Jabulani Japhet Ndebele  
Mr Alfred Mutiwazuka

**3. The Terms of Reference** given to the Committee were:

- To assess progress achieved in the implementation of the Land Reform Programme as a whole; the extent to which policy objectives of the Programme and principles underlying it, as contained in the guiding documents were achieved and implemented; and recommended measures necessary to address any of its administrative and material shortcomings.
- To outline any on-going challenges and constraints in the implementation of the Programme in order to successfully address the more fundamental agrarian reform agenda; and
- To recommend policy interventions and other measures necessary for the undertaking of targeted crop and livestock production.

In carrying out its work, the Review Committee will need to pay particular attention to the following pertinent issues and make appropriate recommendations to Government:-

- The verification of both the A1 and A2 resettlement programmes;
- The provision of agricultural inputs and support services for the optimal utilization of land;
- The situation regarding the existing infrastructure in the resettled farms and any additional support required in this regard;
- The productive capacity of the resettled farmers and support required therefrom;
- Measures necessary to ensure targeted production for each province and suggest appropriate hectareage for each type of crop, including livestock production;
- The impact of the Programme on former commercial farmers and farm workers;
- The role of agribusiness (including indigenous companies) in the agrarian reform programme;
- The merits of the demarcation undertaken on on-going agricultural concerns via-a-vis productivity and viability considerations;
- Skills required to enhance agricultural productivity and food security;
- The situation on farms not yet settled or demarcated and how these could be incorporated into future land resettlement programmes; and
- The nature of governance in the resettled areas.

**Time Frame**

The Committee undertook its work over a period of three months following its commissioning by His Excellency, President R G Mugabe on 14<sup>th</sup> May 2003.

Data collection commenced in all the Provinces on 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2003. Given operational difficulties, data collection took longer, with the last of the Provincial reports being submitted in the last week of July. The Committee was also constrained by the unexpectedly long time that in the result was required for processing the specialist studies undertaken by members of the Technical Unit.

## PART I: INTRODUCTION

### 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. THE Committee was able to establish, in regard to those who appeared before it at both national and provincial levels, that:

(a) Ministers and other Government officials wholly supported the Programme, stated it to have been successfully implemented in the face of formidable odds, but variously noted numerous obstacles that impinged on the implementation process, including resource constraints, the legal framework, bureaucracy and related operational difficulties.

(b) Beneficiaries of the Programme generally expressed happiness with the outcome of Programme implementation and the manner in which their own lives had begun to be transformed, in some cases reportedly dramatically. Yet complaints were also heard from would-be beneficiaries who were awaiting resettlement as promised by their local leaders, particularly the Chiefs, or who, in the case of applicants for the model A2 plots, had still to be informed as to the fate of their applications or as to whether their plots would be given back to them or replacement allocations made where such plots had been taken over irregularly by other persons or where the farms in question had been "delisted". In addition some former white commercial farmers wrote or telephoned the Committee's Secretariat seeking the latter's intervention to enable them to return to their farms on the basis that they were in compliance with all criteria set by Government in this regard. The Committee referred such cases to Government for review and rectification where deemed warranted.

(c) Representatives of farmers' unions, the financial services sector, and agro-business generally saw land reform as vital for the country's political stability and economic development, while however insisting that agriculture be placed on a properly planned and adequately resourced basis.

2. It should be noted that the process of acquiring and distributing land to the people under the two resettlement models, the A1 and A2, was undertaken in a complex legal framework which rendered the process both difficult and cumbersome. As the Committee went about its work it could not fail to be struck by the number and variety of legal issues that still required resolution in respect of the acquisition procedures; the allocation of land to beneficiaries, especially under the A2 model; the assessment of the value of improvements; and ownership and access to moveable assets on the farms. Inevitably, the Governmental machinery for administering these matters was taxed to the limit.

Above all, there was a major contradiction observed as between the 1992 Land Acquisition Act as amended, which provides for the compulsory acquisition of land, and the provision embedded in the Constitution which requires that such acquisition be confirmed by the Administrative Court. **This contradiction ought to be removed.**

3. (a) The Committee established that nationally a total of 2 652 farms with a combined hectareage of 4 231 080 had been allocated to 127 192 households under the A1 resettlement model as of 31st July 2003. The take up rate by beneficiaries was 97%. As for the A2 resettlement model, the corresponding figures were 1 672 farms amounting to 2 198 814 hectares for 7 260 applicant beneficiaries. The take up rate under this model however ranged from 42% (Manicaland) to 100% (Matabeleland South), with an average take up rate of 66% nationally. This failure by some 34% of applicants to take up their allocations implied a considerable amount of land lying fallow or unused while, ironically, thousands of would-be A2 beneficiaries were pressurising the authorities to be allocated land.

(b) Regarding former farm workers the Committee established that a number had been officially resettled under the Programme, and others had secured employment with the new farmers whilst the remainder opted to either return to their countries of origin or to their rural homes in Zimbabwe. The third category however remained in the farm compounds pending a determination of their fate by the Government.

(c) It was also established that 1 323 white farmers remained with 1 377 farms, amounting to 1 175 607 hectares as at 31st July 2003. The total landholding under this category constitutes about 3% of land in the country, excluding land held by corporate entities. The presence or otherwise of these farmers on the land could not in all cases be verified at the time of the compilation of this Report.

**(i) The Committee recommends that A2 plots not taken up by applicants already notified of their**

availability be allocated to other A2 applicants still on the waiting list subject to the bulk of the land in question being reassigned to, and re-planned for, the A1 model with a view to further decongesting the communal areas.

(ii) The Committee also recommends that the resettlement models be recast with respect to some parts of the country such that the old three-tier model is restored in parts of Matabeleland South.

(iii) The Committee further recommends that a corporate-type model with a component to provide for local community participation is established in plantations, conservancies, safaris and forest areas with particular reference to the two Matabeleland Provinces, Masvingo and Manicaland. The Committee has noted that development in these areas has up until now occurred in a haphazard or segmented manner. Worse, the Fast Track saw what amounted to an attempt to subdivide these areas into individual plots which would clearly be unviable. The Committee calls for a comprehensive policy and approach that would ensure that returns to the country in both local and foreign currency multiply well beyond what has been realised to date.

(iv) The Committee recommends that the issue of leases or other forms of legal title for the beneficiaries of the A2 model be concluded speedily. Such title is vital for assured productive use of the land. The variability in plot sizes and the state of prior improvements on them (including such assets as houses and other infrastructure, etc) should be properly assessed for purposes of determining the quantum of individual lease rentals and other cost recovery measures as may be determined.

(v) The Committee recommends that Government urgently addresses the situation of former farm workers in the farm compounds. Their continued presence on the farms had created numerous problems arising from illegal gold panning, misuse of farm facilities and resources and general criminal activities.

4. Given the historically diverse and pivotal role of women in all aspects of agriculture in the communal lands and the need to strike an overall gender balance in this crucial sector of the economy, measures such as those outlined under the relevant section of Part IV of this Report should be implemented to ensure equity in, and the effectiveness of, the agrarian reform in the country. Moreover, in order to ensure the survival and stability of the growing number of families in rural areas now headed by women and even children as a result of the devastation wreaked on society by the AIDS pandemic, and in the light of the growing phenomenon of the feminisation of poverty among women-headed households, the gender dimension of the agrarian reform needs to be kept uppermost in the transformation of the sector in the context of the Fast Track. The agrarian reform thus constitutes an important vehicle for economically empowering women.

5. Programme implementation was adversely affected by many factors, among them a hostile external political environment, national macro-economic instability, and adverse weather conditions vis-a-vis a largely rain-fed agricultural sector. Other impediments to Programme implementation included limited financial and other resources and administrative difficulties encountered by an over-stretched bureaucratic apparatus suddenly called upon to implement a complex programme in great haste, and in a context that turned out to be exploitable by some through unauthorised and unilateral interventions in the allocation process.

(i) The Committee thus recommends that there be undertaken a major overhaul of the machinery of Government involved in land and agricultural affairs such that these functions are handled by two separate Ministries, a Ministry of Agriculture and a Ministry of Land Affairs.

(ii) The Ministry of Agriculture would deal with all agricultural matters including water development and irrigation. It would also house most if not all of the parastatals currently engaged in agricultural activities of one kind or another. These parastatals themselves would need to be reformed in the manner indicated under Part IV hereunder. In addition the proposed Agricultural Marketing Council (see Part IV) would be so structured as to provide a direct link to the Ministry.

(iii) The Ministry of Land Affairs would have responsibility on all land issues including land registration, resolution of boundary disputes, the proffering of advice to Government on matters of tenure, compensation, farm sizes, land taxation, land subdivisions, distribution and allocation.

(iv) To facilitate the effective functioning of the Ministry of Land Affairs, it is recommended that a semi-autonomous National Land Board be established. The Board would exercise both executive and advisory

**functions vis-a-vis the Ministry.**

**(v) Further, the Committee recommends that the National Land Board be empowered to ensure that land allocated to the people under the Land Reform Programme is fully utilised. Any demonstrated failure over a defined period to use the land productively especially in regard to the A2 model should result in cancellation of leases, and the re-allocation of the land to those willing and able to make use of it.**

6. Provincial profiles in the Programme implementation process reflect fairly similar problems and opportunities around the country. However, some problems were found to be more severe in some provinces than in others. Land use patterns were a major issue in the two **Matabeleland Provinces** as already noted under paragraph 3(ii) and (iii) above and under Part III of this Report. In addition the pressure for land in certain parts of the two provinces considered desirable was extremely intense as shown by the take up rates under the A1 model of 100 percent for Matabeleland South and 120 percent for Matabeleland North. In **Manicaland** while the Provincial authorities cited the problem of land shortage, this Report noted that the province had the lowest take up rate (42 percent as against the national average of 66 percent) under resettlement model A2. More land could be secured for resettlement under the A1 model, with any necessary modifications, on such state-owned land as that at Chisumbanje and Middle Save, some of which land is lying fallow. In **Masvingo** the issue of Plantations and Conservancies and even a national Game Park loomed large in relation to the pressure for land among the people in that Province. In the **Midlands Province** the Programme implementation process left intact some properties that exceeded maximum farm sizes. A review of this situation however would have to take into account land use patterns in the affected areas of the Province. It was noted that not much decongestion had taken place in the districts of Mberengwa and Zvishavane and that some people from these districts had had to seek accommodation in the neighbouring provinces of Matabeleland South and Masvingo. Further, a number of people from the two districts of Gokwe in the same province had been resettled, formally or informally, in Mashonaland West Province. In parts of **Mashonaland West** particularly the areas as adjacent to Harare and the western and north-western parts of the province, the resettlement process appeared to have taken place in a haphazard manner. In **Mashonaland East** the delisting of dairy farms gazetted for acquisition remained outstanding at the time of the compilation of this Report, despite request for such delisting by the PLIC. In **Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West** and parts of **Matabeleland North and South** the pressure for land especially as regards the A2 model was particularly intense to the extent that further efforts will have to be put into the review and refinement of land allocations in these areas. **The Committee recommends the following in addition to the recommendations captured under Paragraph 3 above:**

**(i) Measures be taken to decongest areas in a number of provinces including those mentioned above where pressure for land remains acute.**

**(ii) Action be taken as soon as possible to regularise the situation regarding land which is held under Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements.**

**(iii) A conclusive position be taken on the allocation of land subdivisions to which the LA3 forms were designed to apply. Representations were made by a number of white commercial farmers who had been served with Section 8 but who only had one farm or whose farm was claimed to fall under the agro-industrial category or who surrendered their other farm(s) to Government and had been allowed to make a choice of one farm or sub-division thereof to allow them to continue with farming. Many such persons expressed the view that as they satisfied criteria set by Government in its policy, they should have been allowed to continue farming operations on the property or subdivision in question. A similar view was also expressed by those whose farm or farms were gazetted without an option being given them to retain either one such farm or a subdivision thereof. These matters need to be addressed by Government conclusively and expeditiously to allow for productive use of the land and a sense of certainty about their future for the farmers concerned.**

**(iv) There is need for a countrywide review of plots sizes allocated under the A1 and A2 models to ensure consistency and compliance with policy guidelines.**

**(v) In regard to statutory maximum farm sizes, the Committee, while noting the rationale for these, recommends flexibility in the enforcement of the same taking into account land use patterns viability considerations and the existing infrastructure.**

**(vi) All self-settled land occupiers in any part of the National 'Parks Estate should be removed and the protective game fences restored without further delay.**

**(vii) Efforts be made in Mashonaland East in particular to delist the dairy farms which had been gazetted for acquisition, with a view to restoring viability in this crucial industry.**

**(viii) The Committee urges deliberate and speedy action by Government to resolve with finality all allocation issues arising out of, or outstanding from, Programme implementation. Particular reference is made to the case of applicants for A2 plots whose names were published in newspapers as confirmation of their successfully meeting the criteria for land allocation. It had been indicated, by the allocating authority that all that remained was the allocation of plots but one and half years later, the applicants were still to be allocated such plots.**

7. Related to the above, the problem of uncertainty as to the place of pen-urban areas in the Land Reform Programme appeared to remain unresolved in the period of the Committee's assignment. **It is urged that this uncertainty be removed as it has partly been responsible for the contests for land that the Committee observed or was informed about as its members visited the areas in question.**

8. Production in the resettled areas, while not computed statistically by the Committee, reflected appreciable performance especially under model A1. Beneficiaries made full use of the land allocated to them. In some areas yields realised in crops such as maize and tobacco were quite significant if not impressive. This was especially so given the poor rainfall patterns in the summer seasons covered by the Fast Track. However, a recurring theme in the producing areas was the need for timeous provision of adequate till-age services and inputs of all types.

**(i) Inputs availability and affordability are fundamental to enhanced productivity. It is therefore imperative that practical steps be taken before the onset of the 2003-2004 cropping season to address the current shortages and exorbitant prices.**

**(ii) It is imperative that Government proceed in a co-ordinated manner and with a streamlined implementation machinery cutting across relevant sector Ministries. It is important however that Government should seek to engender the ethos of pride and self reliance amongst the people. In this regard, assistance with inputs should be carefully targeted, such that it is based on definite criteria as to need.**

**(iii) Apart from seed production and fertiliser manufacturing domestically including the exploitation of coal-bed methane resources for fertiliser production (especially ammonium nitrate), it is also critical that value addition to agricultural produce be undertaken as a matter of deliberate policy. For example there is no plausible reason in the country exporting bulky cotton lint instead of weaving it to boost the textiles and clothing industry.**

9. Given the fact that the country is drought prone, the need for a water resource development strategy is compelling. As part of such development and having regard to the agricultural sectors needs, irrigation must be viewed as a national priority. Accordingly, it is imperative to evolve a set of policies that accord irrigation its appropriate place in the country's agriculture. It is equally imperative that governmental institutions involved in water resource development and irrigation be harmonised and streamlined to enhance the effectiveness of their overall impact on the transformation of the sector.

10. The issue of enhanced agricultural production in both the resettled areas and the present communal lands is vital in the interest of both food security and the development of the economy as a whole. In this regard, the Committee has recommended under Part IV of Volume I and Volume II of this Report, a number of measures to be undertaken across the sub-sectors of agriculture which would, it is hoped, lead to such enhanced production. **These recommendations cover in the first instance the need for comprehensive and systematic planning of future agricultural development having regard to the five pillars that appeared to the Committee to be critical for transformation in this regard, namely:**

**Institutional Framework for Agricultural Service Provision;  
Human Capacity and Skills Development;  
Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer;  
Agricultural Inputs and Financial Services; and  
Domestic and International Markets for Agricultural Products.**

Details pertaining to the production of specific crops are also dealt with in the sections of the Report cited above.

**The financial and other resources required to achieve higher levels of production of various crops and other commodities will without doubt amount to massive orders of magnitude. While efforts should be directed to securing and deploying these resources self-reliantly within Government, the collaborative and coordinated participation of the local private sector should be tapped, and the assistance of friendly countries and other development partners sought as a vital complement to national initiatives.**

**(ii) The setting up of the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) out of the present AGRIBANK is long overdue. The new entity, namely, the ADB, should be adequately capitalised. Its sole, or at least pre-eminent, role in financing agriculture should be fully defined in its charter.**

**(iii) There can be no alternative to the Programme's success. It is not possible to move forward without an investment of energy, imagination and material resources into the Programme. Neither stagnation nor regression can be contemplated. Well-targeted and adequate financing of agrarian transformation is therefore a key aspect of the entire Programme. Hence the issues of financing of the land and agrarian reform are taken up as crucial aspects of this Report under Part IV of Volume I and elsewhere under Volume II.**

## 2. BACKGROUND TO LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE

The land question has always been and remains at the core of Zimbabwe's political, economic and social development. Indeed, now as in the past, it remains the root of the political tension within the country and with the former colonial power, Britain. The advent of European settler occupation of Zimbabwe in September 1890 is the genesis of the dispossession of blacks of their land. The 1893 invasion of the Ndebele Kingdom leading to the creation of the Gwaai and Shangani reserves; the 1896-97 Shona and Ndebele first Chimurenga/Imfazwe (war of liberation); the nationalist struggle in the period before and after the Second World War; the second Chimurenga/Imfazwe which gave birth to the independent Zimbabwe in 1980; the contentious Lancaster House Constitutional negotiations and the Agreement in 1979 and, as already stated, the current internal political developments, all bear testimony to the centrality of the land issue in the country's history.

The systematic dispossession realised largely through violence, war and legislative enactments by successive colonial Governments led to the racially skewed land distribution and ownership pattern that until recently was characteristic of Zimbabwe. Having regard to the political and related problems arising from the Boer controlled Witwatersrand gold fields in the Transvaal, Cecil John Rhodes, then Prime Minister of the Cape, and through his British South Africa Company (BASC), became fixated with the idea of developing a second Witwatersrand (Second Rand) to the north of the Limpopo river. The Rudd Concession of 1888, fraudulently obtained from King Lobengula, became the vehicle through which colonialists obtained mineral rights in Mashonaland. This Concession provided Rhodes with the impetus to obtain a Royal Charter in 1889, which, among other things, granted the BASC authority to administer and govern the region that encompasses present day Zimbabwe. The Charter was granted notwithstanding King Lobengula's protestations that he had been deceived. Lobengula repudiated the Rudd Concession stating that he would "not recognise the paper, as it contains neither my words nor the words of those who got it". The response by Queen Victoria to King Lobengula's protestation to this development was that it "would be unwise to exclude white men".

The Rudd Concession was countered by the Lippert Land Concession of April 1889 which reflected competing European interests and German interests and aspirations to acquire territory. This Concession was also deceitfully obtained from Lobengula. With the connivance of the British Government and without Lobengula's knowledge, the Lippert Concession was soon purchased by the BASC. Even so, by the time the Company bought the Lippert Concession it had already made extensive land awards to the settlers in Mashonaland.

Disillusioned at the non-existence of the "Second Rand" in Mashonaland and on the assumption that there existed more gold reserves in Matabeleland, the BASC, on a flimsy pretext, invaded Matabeleland in 1893, destroyed Lobengula's Kingdom, seized and plundered cattle and other livestock and property and subdued the populace. Indeed the Company set up a "Loot Committee" which determined that settlers who participated in the war would be rewarded with a free farm measuring 3000 morgen (6 350 acres) anywhere in Matabeleland however with no obligation to occupy the land; each man was also guaranteed 15 reef and 5 alluvial gold claims, while the "loot" — Ndebele cattle — was to be shared with half going to the Company, the remaining half being divided equally among the men and officers. The *Rhodesia Herald* of July 1893, in urging settlers to pursue the land grab now that gold was unavailable, stated that the dispossessed blacks did —

Not use a large portion of their rich and fertile country and the indemnity for expenses incurred could be paid without hard ships to the natives in farms and mining ground.

Although the existence of the imagined Matabeleland "Second Rand" was to prove yet another illusion, the acquisition of black land had begun in earnest, both for crop and livestock production as well as for speculative purposes. Henceforth the dispersal of the African populace into mostly marginal lands would be embarked upon with a ruthless determination, following the creation of the Gwaai and Shangani Reserves in Matabeleland in 1894.

Historical records of the period leading to the 1896-97 First Chimurenga/Imfazwe, depict a sorry picture of a systematic violation of the rights and dignity of the indigenous people under white domination. Confirming the official sanctioning of this policy, the *Rhodesia Herald* of 19th April 1895 reported thus:

For the Rhodesian it was absurd to take the untutored savage, accustomed as he is from time immemorial to superstitious and primitive ideas of law and justice, and suddenly try to govern him by the same code of laws that govern a people with many centuries of experience and enlightenment.

The 1896-97 war was therefore fundamentally a struggle for the recovery of lost land and dignity.

On account of the settlers' superior firepower, the African resistance fighters of the Chimurenga/Imfazwe were subdued. The rapidity of the establishment of additional "Native Reserves" throughout the country was given impetus with the codification — in the British Government's Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1898 — of the policy of racial segregation. By the same instrument it was provided that:

The Company shall from time to time assign to Natives inhabiting Southern Rhodesia, land sufficient for their occupation and suitable for their agricultural or pastoral requirements.

Invariably, this land was located in marginal and low potential areas.

Land acquisition for speculative purposes was the precursor to land acquisition for agricultural production as an economic activity, its euphemism being "white agricultural policy", which commenced in 1908. However, its successful realisation was predicated on the continued dispossession of the African of his best land and the destruction of his property in the years 1908-14. By 1914, white settlers, numbering 23 730 owned 19 032 320 acres of land while an estimated 752 000 Africans occupied a total of 21 390 080 acres of land. (R. Palmer: *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*: Heinemann 1977) The end of the First World War saw the BSAC embarking on a Land Settlement Policy through the launch of elaborate and extensive campaign of wooing immigrants to Southern Rhodesia. (*British South Africa Company Leaflets* of 1st January 1919). The British Government under pressure to accommodate veterans of the war as well as mitigate the demands on it arising from the post war economic depression, lent support to the campaign. An increase in the settler population necessarily had to be matched with the availability of additional land for the new immigrants.

Prior to the granting of responsible Government to Rhodesia in 1923, the Rhodesian Legislature had been preoccupied with the question of demarcating land for exclusive use by Africans and Europeans. By 1925, fourteen blacks, half of them of South African origin, had purchased farms in different parts of the country. Nine of the farms were subsequently placed under European area jurisdiction.

This concept of segregation informed the provisions of the Terms of Reference of the Morris Carter Land Commission of 1925 and its findings reaffirmed the need for such a policy. The Land Apportionment Act, embodying the greater part of the Commission's recommendations, was enacted in 1930 and brought into effect the following year. It provided for restricted rights of the African to land ownership, to designated Native Purchase Areas.

The apportionment of land stood thus:

*Land Apportionment In Southern Rhodesia In 1930*

CATEGORY	ACRES	% OF COUNTRY
European Area	49,149,174	51%
Native Reserves	21,127,040	22%
Unassigned Area	17,793,300	18.5%
Native Purchase Area	7,464,566	7.8%
Forest Area	590,500	0.6%
Undetermined Area	88,540	0.1%
Total	96,213,120	100%

The land available for African use was now 28 591 606 acres or 29.8 percent for a population estimated at 1 081 000 in 1930. At the same time a European settler population of about 50,000 was allocated 51 percent of the best land. The agricultural economy of the Shona and Ndebele had been reduced to subsistence levels by the late 1930's. A significant reduction in the variety of crops grown was witnessed, accompanied by very low volumes in trade involving the black people. This is in contrast to historical accounts of the pre-colonial and early postcolonial Zimbabwe, which portray a prosperous region with agriculture as its mainstay.

A further wave of new European settlers escaping from post Second World War economic hardships in Europe resulted in the phenomenal rise in the white population from 80 500 in 1945 to 219 000 by 1960. Although some of the new settlers took up white-collar jobs in the cities, many took up farming. As a result, the numbers of Europeans working or owning farms almost doubled from 4 673 in 1945 to 8 632 in 1960. To make way for these new immigrants, recourse was had to the now entrenched policy of wholesale evictions and forced removals of black communities. In the decade 1945-55 at least 100 000 people were forcibly moved into the Reserves, some of which were located in the inhospitable and tsetse-ridden areas such as Gokwe and

Muzarabani.

Blaming this state of affairs on alleged African malpractices, the colonial Government enacted the Native Land Husbandry Act in 1951. The provisions were primarily aimed at enforcing de-stocking and conservation practices on black held land. The policy of segregation had led to severe overcrowding and land degradation in the Reserves, a situation confirmed by, in 1959, a former Land Development Officer in the Native Agriculture Department, one Ken Brown, in "*Land in Southern Rhodesia*", that:

The majority of arable areas in reserves are already so eroded and so exhausted of fertility that nothing short of 12 to 15 year rest to grass will restore them to a state of structure and fertility which would enable economic crop production to commence.

The state of the degradation in the so called native Reserves was further confirmed when the then Catholic Bishop of Umtali, Donal Lamont, asked in June 1959 that:

Can you in conscience blame the African, if eking out a tenuous existence from the poor soil in an over-crowded Reserve, he is swayed by subversive propaganda, while close besides him there lie hundreds of thousands of hectares of fertile soil which he may not cultivate, not occupy, not grace, because although it lies unused and unattended, it belongs to some individual or group of individuals who perhaps do not use the land in the hope of profit from speculation.

With the coming into power of the Rhodesian Front in 1962, any pretence at accommodating blacks was abandoned. Segregation would henceforth be pursued with increasing vigour. This process culminated in the 1969 Land Tenure Act, which, while repealing the Land Apportionment Act, re-enacted and strengthened its provisions by dividing the land in half with 44.9 million acres allocated to each race. The policy was entrenched in a new constitution. These measures led to further overstocking, very high population densities, serious environmental damage, reduced agricultural productivity and poverty in the communal areas. Overcrowding led many people to settle in riverbanks, steep slopes, grazing areas and fragile land, posing great environmental risks.

It is therefore against this background that land ranked highest among the grievances that motivated the indigenous black majority to launch the Second Chimurenga/Imfazwe to free the country from colonial oppression. It is worthy of note that in the period preceding the liberation war, "mwana wevhu/umntwana womhlabati" (child of the soil) became the nationalists' rallying call. Herbert Chitepo, Chairman of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party, put it succinctly when he said:

I could go into the whole theories of discrimination, in legislation, in residency, in economic opportunities, in education. I could go into that, but I will restrict myself to the question of land because I think this is very basic. To us the essence of exploitation, the essence of white domination, is domination over land. That is the real issue. (Herbert Chitepo: Speech on a trip to Australia in 1973)

The land issue was inevitably central to any initiatives aimed at resolving the crisis in Rhodesia. It was a major stumbling block in all pre-independence negotiations initiatives, including those held in Geneva (1976), and Malta (1978). In 1977 Lord Owen and Andrew Young, then British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and US Ambassador to the United Nations respectively, proposed the "Anglo-American proposals," under which their Governments pledged to contribute towards a fund for land reform, including paying compensation to white farmers whose land holdings would be redistributed to landless blacks.

The near collapse of the Lancaster House Conference in 1979 revolved around the land question. The Patriotic Front's position at the Lancaster House negotiations was that the *raison d'être* of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe was the recovery of land of which the people had been dispossessed. It was put to those involved in the talks, that the dispossession without compensation was not a thing of the distant past, but rather an occurrence still within the memories of living people. Further arguing its case, the PF objected to British provisions in the draft Bill of Rights which sought to convert the freedom from deprivation of property into a right to retain privilege and perpetuate injustice whilst upholding the status quo. (Partial record of the Lancaster House negotiations).

The pledge by the British Government, supported by the US Government, to support the new political dispensation by agreeing to the setting up of a fund to finance land reform in a new Zimbabwe broke the impasse at the constitutional talks. Former Commonwealth Secretary General, Sir Shridath Ramphal, in 2002 in

an interview on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) "Hard Talk" programme highlights this fact. In that interview Sir Shridath states that he had "intervened through the American Government." That intervention secured assurances for the PF to resume talks and accept the British constitutional proposals. He added, "the American Ambassador, Mr K Brewster, with the support of Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State, persuaded the President who was Jimmy Carter to make an offer of US assistance in conjunction with other countries including Britain". In its announcement of the agreement that was finally reached, the PF said:

We have now obtained assurances that . . . Britain, the United States of America and other countries will participate in a multinational donor effort to assist inland, agricultural and economic development programmes. These assurances go a long way in allaying the great concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in Government. (Partial record of the Lancaster House negotiations)

Chairman of the Lancaster House Conference, Lord Carrington, acknowledged the centrality of the land issue and the enormity of the resources needed to redress the colonial legacy, in a statement issued on 11th October 1979:

We recognise that the future of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. The costs would be very substantial indeed, well beyond the capacity, in our judgement, of any individual donor country, and the British Government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should however be ready to support the efforts of the Government of Independent Zimbabwe to obtain international assistance for these purposes. (Partial record of the Lancaster House negotiations)

Yet the final agreement did not address the land problem adequately; the PF accepted it on the understanding that the UK, the USA and other donor nations would pay for land needed for resettlement

The then President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, during a Press conference on 16th October 1979, opined over the land issue that it would be impossible for an independent Government in Zimbabwe:

"To tax Zimbabweans in order to compensate people who took it away from them through the gun.

"Really the British cannot have it both ways. They made this an issue and they are now making vague remarks mixing rural development aid with the question of land compensation . . . The two are separate . . . The British paid money to Kenya. That the future Government of Zimbabwe must pay compensation is a British demand and the British must promise in London to make the money available."

As part of the Declaration of Rights, the British inserted Section 16 of the Draft Constitution which sought to prohibit the compulsory acquisition of property of any description except under the authority of law which required the acquiring authority to give reasonable notice of its intention to acquire the property in question.

The property could only be acquired in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, and town and country planning.

In the event of compulsory acquisition, the acquiring authority would be required to pay prompt and adequate compensation.

As part of the Declaration of Rights, section 16 would be entrenched for a period of 10 years from the date of independence.

During this period any amendment to the Constitution would be on the basis of a 100 percent parliamentary vote (i.e. every Member of Parliament supporting any such amendment).

In response to these attempts to perpetuate the status quo on land ownership, the Patriotic Front (PF) objected vehemently to the restrictions imposed on land acquisition.

It argued that such entrenchment of the Declaration of Rights, was unduly restrictive of the sovereignty of the Parliament of Zimbabwe and that it granted a veto to the minority, contrary to democratic norms and in contradiction to the basic objective of the national liberation struggle itself.

Furthermore, the concept of willing seller-willing buyer precluded the possibility of a planned and systematic

process of land reform in the country.

At independence in 1980 the agricultural sector comprised three sub-sectors.

The large-scale commercial farming sub-sector of 6 000 white farmers, owned 15,5 million hectares, more than half of which lay in the high rainfall agro-ecological regions where the potential for agricultural production is greatest.

On the other hand was the small-scale commercial farming sub-sector comprising 8 500 black farmers who held 1,4 million hectares of agricultural land located mostly in the drier agro-ecological regions where the soils are also poor.

White commercial agriculture was typically characterised by a lot of land that was unutilised or underutilised, held by absentee landlords or just left derelict for speculative purposes.

Clearly the history of colonialism in Zimbabwe had been largely a story in which Europeans had used their control over land to secure for themselves a position of economic and political dominance.

No black Government could be expected to uphold this racially skewed land structure.

Addressing the Catholic IMBISA Plenary Assembly in Harare, on 30 July 2001, President R G Mugabe described the situation obtaining in the country, which however was no different to that at pre-independence, thus:

"As in the past, the basic of conflict in contemporary Zimbabwe is the unresolved national question of land.

"It is also the basis of peace and all other rights that we wish for in a democracy. Its solutions would enable us to end the two-nation, two-race model we inherited from colonialism.

"It would create opportunities for everyone and give a stake to the majority of our people; indeed it is the way to the recovery of our economy. This is why Land Reform is at the heart of the current struggle. We cannot relent on this one and we hope the Church will stand with and by us in resolving it.

### **3. CONTEXT, POLICY AND THRUST OF THE FAST TRACK LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAMME July 2000-August 2002**

At independence, the Government of Zimbabwe sought to redress the inherited colonial legacy of glaring and skewed racial inequalities in land distribution. Yet, between 1980 and 1990 Government managed to acquire only 3,5 million hectares and resettled 71 000 households. The communal areas still remained congested, overstocked and overgrazed. Pressure was mounting on Government to accelerate its land reform programme.

Under the Lancaster House Constitutional provisions, no meaningful land reform programme could take place. The Constitution obligated Government to acquire land on a willing seller-willing buyer basis during the first ten years of independence. Where land was offered to Government, in most cases it was expensive, marginal and occurred in pockets around the country, making it difficult to effect a systematic and managed land reform. Moreover, land supply failed to match the demand for land for resettlement. Added to these complicating factors was the absence of international support to fund land acquisition.

The composition of Parliament at the time of 80 Common Roll seats for blacks and 20 for whites made any constitutional amendment virtually impossible. The diametrically opposed political imperatives for the victorious black Government and the defeated white opposition minority made the possibility of any far-reaching amendment an impossible feat.

In a bid to speed up the process of land acquisition and resettlement, Government passed the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, following the introduction in 1990 of Constitutional Amendment Number 11. These legal instruments had the effect of freeing Government from the willing seller-willing buyer clause. The process however, remained slow, cumbersome and expensive largely because of the commercial farmers' resistance. For example, when Government designated 1471 farms for compulsory acquisition in December 1997 a total of 1393 objections were received of which 510 were upheld. The exclusions were farms either owned by indigenous black people, Churches, or plantation farms, or those with the Zimbabwe Investment Centre permits and single owner farms being used productively. For the remaining 883 farms Government had to go through lengthy judicial processes. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) representing white farmers was opposed to meaningful land redistribution. Remarks by the late Vice President Cde J M Nkomo to a gathering of the CFU are instructive.

"I don't think we are being reasonable if we say you commercial farmers, who own the best and the bulk of Zimbabwe's land because of history, should share part of it with the indigenous, displaced and landless blacks who are the majority." (Joshua Nkomo addressing Commercial farmers in Matabeleland, *Sunday Mail* 9 July 1989).

The British Conservative Government under John Major had agreed to assist with further funding for land reform, in 1996. However, with the coming to power of Tony Blair's Labour Government in 1997 matters came to a head. The Labour Government refused to advance the process of land reform, in effect revoking Britain's obligations as per the Lancaster House understanding. In a letter to the Zimbabwe Minister of Agriculture, Mr Kumbirai Kangai, then Secretary of State for International Development, Ms Claire Short stated thus:

"I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new Government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonised not colonisers."

This unprecedented stance by the British Government marked the beginning of worsening relations between the two Governments. No further funds were made available for Zimbabwe's land reform programme.

Disappointed at the pace of land redistribution, the people responded, bringing pressure to bear on Government by resorting to vigorous protests and land occupations. In an unprecedented move, villagers in Svosve communal areas in June 1998 occupied Igava Farm vowing to stay on until Government had made a written undertaking to resettle them. The villagers cited poor soils and congestion as factors that had compelled them to occupy white farms contiguous to their villages. Similar and widespread occupations of white commercial farms followed at Nyamandhlovu in Matabeleland, Nyamajura in Manicaland and Nemamwa in Masvingo. The villagers reluctantly complied with the Government's order for withdrawal from the occupied farms. The first salvo by a land hungry and increasingly restless peasantry had however been fired. More was to follow.

*Referendum on the Draft Constitution*

In February 2000, a referendum was held on a Draft Constitution that could have formed the basis for a lasting solution of the land issue. The rejection of the Draft Constitution strengthened the Government's resolve to embark on an accelerated land reform programme.

#### *Overtures from the former colonial power*

At the bilateral level, for historical and moral reasons, Zimbabwe expected most co-operation and support from Britain. This expectation was premised on Britain's dominance over the political economy of Zimbabwe as a former colonising power and a major beneficiary out of the exploitation of the country's rich natural resources. Furthermore, the voluntary undertaking made at the Lancaster House and the subsequent agreements of British Conservative led Governments of Prime Ministers Mrs Margaret Thatcher and Mr John Major, recognised obligations devolving upon the British Government to fund land reform in Zimbabwe.

However, records indicate that the British Government only committed 40 million pounds sterling from 1980 to 1996. Owing to the stringent conditions whereby the British Government only disbursed counterpart funds to match Zimbabwean funds, of the 40 million pounds sterling only 37 million was utilised. As already indicated, the Government also had to contend with legal restrictions that were entrenched in the Lancaster House Constitution intended to protect private property rights. As intended by the British Government, in effect the Lancaster House Constitution sought to perpetuate minority privilege at the expense of the just aspirations of a dispossessed black majority.

In April 2000, the British Labour Government, for the first time accepted responsibility to assist Zimbabwe acquire land for resettlement following a meeting between President Mugabe and the British Foreign Secretary, R. Cook in Cairo, Egypt, brokered by President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. An invitation to Government for talks in London was subsequently extended. However the London Ministerial meeting produced no tangible outcome. The British put conditionalities on the release of 36 million pounds sterling promised to Zimbabwe in an earlier land reform programme. While Britain demanded that farm occupations and violence were to end first the Government of Zimbabwe insisted on financial assistance without any conditionality.

Sir Shridath's response in the already cited BBC programme gives context to this turn of events. Asked whether Zimbabweans "were let down by the British" he said, "Britain let them down. Britain did not fulfil its promises and they found all sorts of ways to wriggle out and that was very unfortunate and that is what has led to some of the bitterness . . ."

#### *Overtures from the international community*

The desire for an all-inclusive collaboration in addressing the land issue saw the Government of Zimbabwe engaging the international donor community and other interested parties. Contact was established with the European Union (EU) and other donors under the auspices of the UN. Talks between President Mugabe and the EU Commissioner for Development, Mr Joao Pinheiro, in January 1998 culminated in the hosting of the 9 to 11 September 1998 Land Donor Conference in Harare. In his inaugural address to the Land Donor Conference, President Mugabe highlighted the growing impatience of black Zimbabweans over the slow pace of land reform and warned that:

If we delay in resolving the land needs of our people they will resettle themselves. It has happened before and it may happen again.

This was not a self-fulfilling prophecy, but a description of reality of what had already happened. The Svosve case mentioned above being but one illustration.

Represented at the conference were 48 countries (including Britain) and some international organisations. Basic principles and the framework for international assistance for the Land Reform Programme were agreed upon. To this end, a task force of major donors was to be established to work out the modalities for a two-year Inception Phase, the precursor of Phase II of a donor supported land acquisition and resettlement programme. During this period, several alternative approaches of land redistribution would be tested and tried on 118 farms on offer. However, Britain refused to join the task force, but instead insisted that a consulting firm undertake an initial economic returns analysis of the programme and assess how far it would alleviate poverty among the poor in Zimbabwe. These dilatory tactics effectively killed the Inception Phase in its tracks.

In September 2000, President Mugabe met the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in New York and discussed the land issue in Zimbabwe and possible role for the UN. A Technical Mission to Zimbabwe under the aegis of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was dispatched in October that year. The mission was

mandated to carry out a technical review into measures necessary for a "sound technical process to take the land reform forward".

The UNDP Technical Mission's findings confirmed the Government's long held view of the existence of a broad agreement among all interested parties in Zimbabwe that "land reform is a political, social and economic imperative, which requires immediate attention".

The UNDP Technical Mission conceded that while a framework for the legal and administrative process for compulsory acquisition of land through the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 was in place, Government had failed to acquire that land principally on account of technical and administrative considerations arising from legal challenges launched by white commercial farmers.

As a follow-up to the UNDP Technical Mission and the subsequent visit of its Administrator, Mr Mark Malloch Brown, in December 2000, written communication was exchanged with the Government. Through this medium, Government was given the assurance that the UN Secretary General's consultations with Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and other regional leaders as well as key western donors, including the World Bank, gave him confidence that the UNDP could generate the requisite support for the Land Reform Programme. However, as was previously the case, conditionalities were placed on Government once more. The Secretary General could only persuade the donor community to come on board once "outstanding law and order issues are being brought under control". Government was therefore requested to make a choice between continuing with its Fast Track Land Reform Programme and adopting "a more systematic, investment-backed approach", which the UN supported. In the letter, Mr Brown conceded that the second approach entailed a slow start, and the delay of resettlement until confidence-building measures were put in place to secure a resumption of donor funding.

Government through the Foreign Minister, Dr I S G Mudenge, responded in March 2001 to Mr Brown agreeing with most of his proposals. It, however, rejected the second approach, which would have entailed the abandonment of the Fast Track. It was also put to Mr Brown that if the donor community had responded timeously with the required resources to implement the agreement reached at the 1998 Land Donor Conference, and, had the commercial farmers not resorted to legal actions aimed at frustrating the Land Resettlement Programme, significant progress could have been achieved by that time. Government indicated that a unique opportunity had been missed.

It is worth noting that while expressing disquiet over unrelated political questions and conditionalities from some donors, Government accepted the following proposals submitted by Mr Brown:

"(i) Enhancement of capacity in Government and other stakeholders in the Land Reform Programme to speed up consultations, land delivery, settler emplacement and support.

(ii) Encouragement of continuing dialogue between Government and other national stakeholders.

(iii) Encouragement of prominent Zimbabwean citizens and institutions to put up a revolving fund to acquire land for resettlement.

(iv) Establishment of a land reforms technical team within the UNDP office in Harare to assist the Government in capacity building and planning and land reform. It was emphasised that the team should not seek to restart the ongoing Fast Track programme, but only to enhance its capacity to deliver land to the poor within the objectives, targets and timeframe of the Government programme.

(v) Establishment of a Land Reform Trust Fund, subject to further consultations."

At the same time Government appealed to the UN Secretary-General "for urgent assistance by the various UN Agencies, as well as willing donors and NGOs, to assist the resettled farmers who find themselves in dire need of infrastructure and social facilities".

Following yet another round of consultations with the UN the UNDP Resident Representative in Harare, Mr J Victor Angelo, responded in July 2001 to the Government's response to the March 2001 communication by proposing the setting up of yet another Assessment Team to visit Zimbabwe. Principally, the Assessment Team would "produce a comprehensive report with all necessary technical information and will make recommendations on the possible establishment of an information mechanism for the Land Reform

Programme". The proposed assessment was envisaged as part of a "possible partnership building process between the Government of Zimbabwe, the donor community and local stakeholders". It was further envisaged that such an assessment would be useful in establishing the facts as far as the Fast Track programme was concerned.

The Government rejected the proposal which appeared to be a further attempt to delay addressing a very urgent and highly volatile land issue.

#### *The Nigerian Initiative within the Context of the Commonwealth*

Concerned at the widening rift between Zimbabwe and EU countries led by Britain, President Obasanjo suggested that friends of Zimbabwe and Britain in the Commonwealth intervene to break the impasse over the land issue. The initiative was conceived after a meeting between President Mugabe and his Nigerian counterpart on the margins of the Group of 15 Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, in June 2001. Subsequently, a Committee of 9 Commonwealth Foreign Ministers met in Abuja, Nigeria, from 6 to 7 September 2001 under Nigeria's chairmanship. The Abuja ministerial meeting, then perceived as a breakthrough, concluded as follows:

Land is at the core of the crisis in Zimbabwe, which cannot be separated from other issues of concern to the Commonwealth, such as the rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy and the economy. A programme of land reform was therefore crucial to the resolution of the problem.

Britain reaffirmed its commitment to a significant financial contribution to land reform programme and undertook to encourage other international donors to also make contributions.

Agreement of the meeting that the land question could only be resolved in terms of the laws and constitution of Zimbabwe.

In turn, Zimbabwe reaffirmed its commitment to carry out its Land Reform Programme within the country's constitutional and legal framework. The undertaking and assurance that henceforth no further farm invasions would occur was also given. Government also promised to speed up discussions with the UNDP to facilitate the latter's efforts to mobilise international support for the Land Reform Programme.

As agreed at Abuja, the Committee of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers met in Harare from 25 to 26 October 2001, in order to advance the process, with the Government proceeding to fulfil the commitments it had made under the Agreement. As a result, a marked reduction of political tension was immediately realised within the country.

On the contrary, Britain did not honour any of the commitments made at Abuja. No financial or material benefits accrued to the country following these exchanges.

#### *Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme*

Against the background of the land occupations by the impatient landless people; absence of international support for land reform notwithstanding Government's desire to engage the former colonial power and the international community; the rejection of the 2000 Draft Constitution partly as a result of British influenced political opposition; and the continued legal challenges by the white commercial farmers, Government embarked on the Fast Track.

The Programme, which was launched on 15 July 2000 was designed to be undertaken in an accelerated manner and with reliance on domestic resources. The programme was a fundamental departure from previous philosophy, practices and procedures of acquiring land and resettling people.

The following were the norm elements of the Fast Track:

Speeding up the identification for compulsory acquisition of not less than 5 million hectares of land for resettlement;

Accelerating the planning and demarcation of acquired land and settler emplacement on this land;

The provision of limited basic infrastructure (such as boreholes, dip tanks and access roads) and farmer support services (such as tillage and agricultural inputs);

Simultaneous resettlement in all provinces to ensure that the reform programme was comprehensive and evenly implemented;

The provision of secondary infrastructure such as schools, clinics and rural service centres as soon as resources became available.

#### *Policy Framework*

Consistent with previous policy pillars, the framework for the Fast Track was based on the compelling national economic and social imperatives, of poverty eradication and faster economic development. With agriculture as the cornerstone of the country's economy, land was therefore viewed as the engine for economic growth, as per the popular slogan, "land is the economy, and the economy is the land."

The Fast Track was initially targeted at de-congesting communal lands. In the later stages it was extended to incorporate the creation of an indigenous commercial farming sector.

#### *Land Identification and Acquisition*

During this phase, land was acquired compulsorily in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act (chapter 20:10) as amended. The following categories of land were targeted for acquisition:-

Derelict, and under-utilised land  
Land under multiple ownership  
Foreign owned land  
Land contiguous to communal areas.

Exclusions fell into the following categories:-

Plantation farms engaged in the large-scale production of tea, coffee, timber, citrus fruit, sugar cane etc.  
Agro-industrial properties involved in the integrated production, processing and/or marketing of poultry, beef and dairy products and seed multiplication.  
Properties with Export Processing Zone (EPZ) permits and those with Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC) certificates.  
Farms belonging to church or mission organisations.  
Farms subject to Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements.

#### *Land Acquisition Procedures*

Land Acquisition Procedures are as detailed in Annexes A and B.

#### *Maximum Farm Size Regulations*

Statutory Instrument 419 of 1999, sets out the maximum permissible land sizes per natural region whilst under Statutory Instrument 288 of 2000, land cannot be transferred unless there is conformity with the Maximum Farm Size Regulations. The stipulated Maximum Farm Sizes are as follows:

Table 3

NATURAL REGION	MAXIMUM SIZE
I	250
IIa	350
IIb	400
III	500
IV	1 500
V	2 000

#### *2.4 Legal Framework*

The legal framework governing land acquisition had to be significantly amended to take account of the rapidly changing policy environment in which Fast Track was being implemented. The Constitutional Amendment Number 16 of 2000, as already stated, placed the financial obligations of paying compensation for the land acquired on the British Government. Government, on the other hand, was obligated to provide full compensation for any improvements on land the acquired properties.

Similarly the Land Acquisition Act underwent changes to ensure conformity with the new Constitutional provisions. The Rural Land Occupiers (Protection) Act was also enacted to protect land occupiers on land not yet acquired by Government.

#### *Constraints in the Land Acquisition Process*

Notwithstanding the facilitative effect of the legislative amendments enacted by Government, the land acquisition process was still fraught with a number of procedural impediments (See Annexes A and B)

#### *Swaps and Subdivisions*

The Land Acquisition Act as amended provides, the option for a landowner to offer land in substitution for a farm or farms gazetted for compulsory acquisition [using the LA3 Form]. Several landowners entered into agreements with Provincial Governors resulting in the signing of LA3 forms. Also available was the option for a landowner to offer the subdivision or portion of the gazetted farm. Such subdivisions had to conform to the maximum farm size regulations. In both instances, the onus lay with the landowner to present their offer to the relevant PLIC.

Under the same spirit of swaps and subdivisions, a group of white farmers came up with the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI). ZJRI was offering 1 million hectares of land, which turned out to be part of land already acquired by Government for resettlement. The initiative however collapsed because of mutual mistrust and misunderstanding.

Whereas ZJRI took the negotiating route, a more radical group of commercial farmers calling itself Justice for Agriculture (JAG) emerged in June 2002. This group was opposed to any accommodation with Government and mounted a legal challenge to the land reform process.

#### *One-Man-One-Farm Policy*

The Government adopted the one-man-one farm policy at the inception of the land reform and resettlement programme and continues to uphold this policy. In the case of a single owned farm being acquired due to its being contiguous to a communal area, Government undertook to provide the affected farmer with another elsewhere around the country.

#### *Resettlement Models*

In the Fast Track phase, two resettlement models were used, Model A1 and Model A2. Model A1 was intended as decongesting communal lands. Settler selection and emplacement for A1 was the responsibility of the PLIC and DLICs.

Model A2 was aimed at creating a cadre of black commercial farmers and was based on the concept of full cost recovery from the beneficiary. Settler selection was made on the basis of applications submitted to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.

#### *Institutional Framework For Policy Formulation*

At the national level, the Fast Track land reform programme received policy direction from the Cabinet Committee On Resettlement And Rural Development (CRD). This committee, was chaired by the Vice President and comprised all relevant Cabinet Ministers. The major role of CRD was policy formulation and the co-ordination of rural resettlement and development. A sub-Committee, the National Land Task Force, assisted the CRD.

Land identification was co-ordinated by the National Land Identification Committee chaired by the Office of the Vice President. This Committee was replicated at all the governance levels as indicated above, with PLICs being chaired by Provincial Governors whilst DLICs were chaired by District Administrators.

## **PART II: CONSOLIDATED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMMEDIATE MEASURES PERTAINING TO PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION**

### **4. A SELECTION OF VIEWS ON PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION**

1.0 The Committee paid a courtesy call on Honourable Vice President Joseph Msika in his capacity as Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development.

2.0 The Committee also interviewed Ministers, Provincial Governors and senior Government officials who played a critical role in the implementation of the Fast Track Programme to speak to aspects over which they had exercised executive authority.

3.0 The Committee met the Council of Chiefs and representatives of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veteran Association to hear their reactions to the programme.

4.0 **The Honourable Vice President, Ministers, Governors, Chiefs and War Veterans** expressed their satisfaction over the conclusion of the implementation of the programme, noting that it had corrected past colonial imbalances in land distribution and proved an effective tool in empowering a hitherto racially disadvantaged sector of society.

4.1 **The Vice President** however stated that although the programme had been concluded satisfactorily, experience had demonstrated that implementation had been in some instances at variance with agreed policies and procedures.

4.2 Examples of such instances of variance from policy and procedures were: cases of multiple farm ownership; land swaps and other offers of land commonly referred to as LA3 forms which had not been processed by the responsible Ministry; the issue of farms protected through Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements (BIPA), and those subject to protection through the Zimbabwe Investment Centre and the Export Processing Zones Authority agreements.

5.0 **Ministers and their officials** outlined to the Committee the processes involved in the implementation of the programme.

5.1 Some Ministers emphasised the point that the acquisition of land was fraught with legal impediments, which rendered the process slow and cumbersome. The bulk of the farms gazetted had not gone through all the processes stipulated under the Land Acquisition Act. However Government was determined to acquire the 11 million hectares gazetted and in fact settlement of people on the land was in progress. In consequence it was stated that a Bill to simplify the acquisition process and to legally secure the 11 million hectares altogether was in preparation. Some Ministers regretted the fact that at Independence in 1980 Government did not nationalise all the land which would have gone a long way in obviating the problems encountered in the land acquisition process.

5.2 Asked about the status of the LA3 forms the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement stated that Government had taken a position on the matter and would proceed by way of offer letters under the A2 model.

6.0 **Provincial Governors** were generally satisfied with the manner in which the Programme had been implemented. However, they raised concern over a number of policy and administrative issues. They expressed frustration at being marginalised in the land allocation exercise, in some cases even by junior officials.

6.1 The Governors also expressed dissatisfaction at the dissolution of PLIC and DLICs by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, which decision had been conveyed through the Provincial Lands Officers. The purported dissolution had resulted in fresh occupations and haphazard allocations of land especially in such provinces as Mashonaland West, Matabeleland North and Manicaland. The situation had however been subsequently rectified by way of the reinstatement of the Committees at the behest of Vice President Msika.

6.2 The Governors further observed that there was no uniform mechanism for the selection of beneficiaries for the A2 resettlement model with offer letters being generated from the Head Office of the Ministry of Lands,

Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, the Provincial Governors' Offices, or even the District Administrators' Offices.

6.3 Regarding the status of LA3 forms, Governors expressed concern that having been given authority to engage the farmers in negotiation and to recommend approval, no response had been received from the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement as of 27 May 2003.

6.4 Asked by the Committee about the situation in Gonarezhou Game Park, the Governor of Masvingo Province stated that the Ndali people who had been moved out of the area in the 1960s had moved back to their original homes. The community had since been formally settled and as far as the Province was concerned, all that remained was the delimitation of plots. The Minister of Environment and Tourism however expressed concern over this development due to the tripartite agreement on the Transfrontier National Park and thought that the matter would be resolved through discussions by the Province and the Ministry.

6.5 Finally Governors were of the opinion that Certificates of No Present Interest (CONPIs) were being abused by certain individuals or companies as a way of hindering the land acquisition process. In Matabeleland North province prospective buyers were presenting to the authorities CONPIs instead of the sellers of the land as per the regulations. The Governor therefore expressed concern at the irregular manner in which the certificates had been issued and was also querying the bona-fides of the would be buyers.

7.0 **Representative of the Council of Chiefs** commended His Excellency the President and Government for embarking on the Fast Track Programme which sought to empower the majority of the landless people. Generally, the A1 resettlement programme was said to have been implemented satisfactorily. Chiefs however stated that some elements had played a disruptive role in the DLICs resulting in confusion in the land allocation exercise. They expressed the view that they should have been allowed to play a central role in the identification of beneficiaries and the land for resettlement on account of their being the "owners" of the land.

7.1 Chiefs noted that some of their areas had not been decongested. In some cases people from urban areas had been resettled on land that chiefs would have preferred taken up by their subjects.

8.0 **The leadership of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association** expressed their happiness that Government had headed the call for land redistribution.

8.1 They however complained over some aspects of programme implementation where some of their members had not benefited as had been promised. They also alleged that land was allocated on regional lines in some Provinces.

9.0 **Beneficiaries of the A1** scheme expressed happiness with the Fast Tract and land allocated to them. Many of those whom the Committee met stated that even against the unfavourable weather conditions in the 2002 to 2003 agricultural season, they had harvested better yields than in the past.

9.1 A1 beneficiaries indicated that they required inputs such as seed, fertilizer and tillage services and that during the last cropping season, inputs had been given in a haphazard manner and in inadequate quantities. They also called for the upward revision of the size of plots in the A2 schemes of Matabeleland North and South given the state of agro-ecological zones IV and V.

9.2 The lack of infrastructure and other social services such as schools and clinics in some A1 resettlements was also highlighted in discussions with beneficiaries.

9.3 Concern was also registered over the activities of agro-processors by the beneficiaries of both A1 and A2. They alleged that exorbitant interest rates were being charged by such companies and that the applicable conditions were unfavourable to the newly settled farmers.

9.4 The issue of security of tenure was of great concern to A2 beneficiaries. Absence of leases was negatively affecting investment on the allocated land and hence productivity.

10.0 **Representatives of the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU), the Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU) and the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)** also appeared before the Committee.

10.1 The ZFU and ICFU were happy with the land reform programme and had indicated certain areas of

concern that had been communicated to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.

10.2 The CFU stated that current land policies, combined with the lack of security and a collateral base for credit had had a negative effect on the production of most commodities by both the existing white large-scale farmers and the new A2 farmers.

10.3 They also expressed concern over the fate of LA3 subdivisions. It was stated that speedy processing of these for could have assured the white farmers of security of tenure.

11.0 **Seed-houses, financial institutions and agro-processors** proffered suggestions on a variety of production and financing issues while calling for the optimal utilisation of land.

11.1 They also stressed the need for the country to maintain its position as the traditional prime seed producer in the Region. To that end, it was suggested that more land for growing seed be secured and that twinning arrangements between the old and the new farmers be introduced.

11.2 **The Acting Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe** stated that the Central Bank did not prescribe forms of collateral or sectoral lending limits often cited by banks as constraints to lending to farmers. Most banks had however decided to fund farmers through intermediaries due to lack of collateral on the part of new farmers. This approach had created its own problems since banks did not have mechanisms of establishing whether the funds were made available to the intended beneficiaries.

11.3 **Representatives of the Bankers Association of Zimbabwe** urged Government to address the issue of title deeds pertaining to acquired farms since most former white farmers having discharged their obligations with Commercial Banks, still held their deeds.

11.4 **A prominent banker** who appeared before the Committee at a different stage during the Committee's work, stated that banks welcomed the Land Reform Programme which represented the re-ordering and restructuring of the economy and its means of production. He stated that the challenge for banks was to work out mechanisms to support agriculture on the basis of "enlightened self-interest" along the lines already shown by some private companies. To that end it was necessary for banks to support agriculture in an innovative way while ensuring the security of depositors' funds.

11.5 **The Head of an agro-processing concern** stated that a lot of opportunities existed for the value addition for the various agricultural products that are grown in the country. Value addition could significantly enhance the agricultural sector's potential to earn foreign currency.

## 5. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

### 1.0 Resettlement Models and Take Up Rates

Two resettlement models were implemented during the Fast Track namely Model A1 and Model A2. Model A1 was for the generality of landless people, with a villagised and self-contained variant. Model A2 on the other hand was a commercial settlement scheme comprising Small, Medium and Large-Scale Commercial settlement. A third model, namely the peri-urban was yet to be implemented.

#### Statistical Data

Table 1. Total number of farms per Province, including gazetted and delisted farms

Province	Total Number of farms as per Government figures	Total Number of farms as established by District Teams	Gazetted Farms Number of farms	Gazetted Farms Hectareage	Total Number of Delisted Farms
Midlands	1 092	1 347	791	997 213	95
Masvingo	657	649	649	2 662 147	196
Mat. South	750	922	397	2 191 211	61
Mat. North	670	670	481	1 405 709	102
Mash. East	1 170	1 126	912	1 108 943	196
Mash. West	2 228	2 028	1 792	1 162 508	185
Mash. Central	892	859	778	756 664	86
Manicaland	1 299	1 534	622	554 713	91
Total	8 758	9 135	6 422	10 839 108	1 012

Source: Provincial profiles

Table 1 shows that the total number of farms in the country as supplied by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement officials was 8 758 while the total number of farms as established by the District Data Collection Teams was 9 135. Reasons for the variations are explained in detail in the Provincial profiles.

Table 1 also shows that out of a total of 8 758 farms, 6 422 farms had been gazetted while 1 012 farms had been delisted by 31 July 2003.

Table 2. Allocation Patterns and Take up rates per Province

Province	Model A1	Model A1	Model A2	Model A2	No. of Households/ beneficiaries	No. of Households/ beneficiaries	% Take up Rates	% Take up Rates
	No. of farms	Hectares	No. of farms	Hectares	A1	A2	A1	A2
Midlands	306	513 672	106	181 966	16 169	229	90	48
Masvingo	211	686 612	170	753 300	22 670	773	95	79
Manicaland	246	195 644	138	77 533	11 019	463	92	42
Mat. South	226	683 140	65	191 697	8 923	271	100	100
Mat. North	258	543 793	65	142 519	9 901	191	120	94
Mash. East	382	302 511	319	250 030	16 702	1 646	93	45
Mash. West	670	792 513	568	369 995	27 052	2 003	97	50
Mash. Central	353	513 195	241	230 874	14 756	1 684	89	73
Total	2 652	4 231 080	1 672	2 198 814	127 192	7 260	97	66

Source: Provincial profiles

Table 2 shows that a total of 2 652 farms, 4 231 080 hectares in extent, were allocated to A1 model while a total of 1 672 farms, 2 198 814 hectares in extent were allocated to Model A2.

A total of 127 192 households were settled under Model A1 while a total of 7 260 beneficiaries were settled under Model A2.

*Table 3. Allocation Patterns by Gender per Province*

Province	Model A1	Model A1	Model A1	Model A1	Model A2	Model A2	Model A2	Model A2
	Number of Males	%	Number of Females	%	Number of Males	%	Number of Females	%
Midlands	14 800	82	3 198	18	338	95	17	5
Masvingo	19 026	84	3 644	16	709	92	64	8
Mash. Central	12 986	88	1 770	12	1 469	87	215	13
Mash. West	21 782	81	5 270	19	1 777	89	226	11
Mash. East	12 967	76	3 992	24	*	*	*	*
Mat. South	7 754	87	1 169	13	215	79	56	21
Mat. North	7 919	84	1 490	16	574	83	121	17
Manicaland	9 572	82	2 190	18	961	91	97	9
Total	106 986	82	22 723	18	6 043	88	796	12

Source: Provincial profiles

\* The breakdown of figures by gender for Mashonaland East Model A2 were not readily available.

\* The totals of both males and females on Table 3 exceed figures on Table 2 by 2 517 for Model A1 and are less by 421 for Model A2. The explanation is that the break down of figures by gender for Mashonaland East Model A2 is not included. There had been instances of double counting by allocation authorities when categorising allocations by gender.

Statistics above indicate that the number of females allocated land under the Fast Track was very low country wide. Women-headed households who benefited under Model A1 constituted only 18% while women beneficiaries under Model A2 constituted only 12%.

#### *Unofficially settled farms*

A total of 367 farms were unofficially settled countrywide.

#### *Take up Rates*

The take up rates for Model A1 were very high giving a national average of 97% while Model A2 registered a national average of 66%.

Reasons for the low take up rates under Model A2 are varied and they include: failure by officials to inform successful applicants; some being discouraged by lack of developed infrastructure on their farms; resource constraints and the location of allocated farms in zones which are being contested in court.

## *2.0 Ownership Patterns After Fast Track*

*Table 4 Land ownership Patterns Prior to the Fast Track (as at 30 June 2000)*

Category	Area (Million hectares) as at June 2000	% of total land area
Large Scale Commercial	11.8	30
Small Scale Commercial	1.4	4
Communal Resettlement Area	16.4	41
Resettlement Area	3.7	9
National Parks & Urban	6.0	15
State land	0.3	1
Grand Total	39.6	100

Source: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Development

A total of 11.8 million hectares was occupied by Large Scale Commercial Farms while the Communal area occupied a total of 16.4 million hectares as at June 2000.

Following the implementation of the Fast Track a new picture has emerged with respect to land ownership patterns as shown on Table 5 below.

*Table 5 Land ownership Patterns after Fast Track (as at 31 July 2003)*

Category	Area (Million hectares) as at 31 July 2003	% of total land area
A1	4.2	11
A2	2.2	6
Old Resettlement Area	3.7	9
Communal	16.4	41
Large Scale Commercial	2.6	6
Small Scale Commercial	1.4	4
National Parks & Urban	6.0	15
State land	0.3	1
*Other	2.8	7
Total land Area	39.6	100

Source: Provincial Profiles

\* Other refers to land that has been acquired for resettlement under Model A1 and A2 but has not yet been taken up by those allocated plots.

Table 6. Ownership Patterns Per Province after the Fast Track (as at 31 July 2003) \*

Province	White Owned Farms			Indigenous Owned ***			Corporate			Churches			Parastatals			A2		
	No of Farms	No of Farmers	Hectares	No of Farms	No of Farmers	Hectares	No of Farms	No of Farmers	Hectares	No of Farms	No of Farmers	Hectares	No of Farms	No of Farmers	Hectares	No of Farms	No of Beneficiaries	Hectares
Midlands	341	356	245 220	392	405	276 705	122	126	217 974	18	6	10 811	35	4	35 007	106	229	181 966
Masvingo	90	68	169 105	78	63	69 896	247	82	687 050	10	5	5 630	19	3	362 023	170	773	753 300
Manicaland	319	288	145 688	213	205	83 389	197	171	279 337	18	16	7 495	49	9	98 101	138	463	77 533
Mash Central	95	92	73 414	58	58	48 758	60	50	72 066	3	3	1 302	5	4	3 651	241	1 684	230 874
Mash East	174	174	130 329	189	141	60 505	25	10	16 488	4	4	878	7	2	6 582	319	1 646	250 930
Mash West**	265	265	322 302	141	141	164 944	22	22	14 517	2	2	1293	4	4	5 352	568	2 003	369 995
Mat South	39	43	56 005	202	222	145 111	6	6	19 588	4	4	5 909	4	3	5 787	65	271	191 697
Mat North	54	46	33 544	167	105	89 382	64	42	57 173	5	5	8 584	30	13	56 283	65	191	142 519
Total	1377	1332	1175607	1 440	1 340	938 723	743	509	1364173	64	45	41 902	153	42	572 786	1 672	7 260	2198814

Source: Provincial Profiles

\* This table refers to commercial or potentially commercial farm land

\*\* The total hectarage for 68 farms in Mash West could not be established

\*\*\* Indigenous refers to black farmers who purchased their farms before or during the Fast Track

### 3.0 Production Patterns 2002-2003 Summer Season

Evidence gathered throughout the country indicates that some new farmers realised significant yields in the 2002-2003 season. Some of the beneficiaries interviewed particularly those growing commercial crops like tobacco, paprika, cotton stated that they had become instant millionaires after marketing their produce whilst others were able to purchase livestock for the first time in their lives.

It was generally observed that the resettled farmers had ventured into the production of cash crops such as soya beans, paprika, tobacco and cotton. Some newly resettled farmers in Manicaland and Mashonaland East provinces had also ventured into horticulture.

Whilst the 2002/2003 national production figures are not available production patterns for the period 1999 to 2001 are shown on tables 7 to 10.

Table 7. Maize: Production figures 1999-2001

Period	Area planted (ha)			Production (tonnes)		
	Commercial Farms	Communal Lands	Resettlement Schemes	Commercial Farms	Communal Lands	Resettlement Schemes
1999	160 875	1 217 115	100 000	662 244	854 344	90 000
2000	160 577	1 112 540	100 000	680 942	808 709	130 000
2001	155 888	984 100	100 000	532 389	893 940	100 000

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 8. Soya beans: Production figures 1999-2001

Period	Area planted (ha)			Production (tonnes)		
	Commercial Farms	Communal Lands	Resettlement Schemes	Commercial Farms	Communal Lands	Resettlement Schemes
1999	49 565	3 006	360	117 339	3 021	324
2000	55 202	4 748	700	132 494	2 363	560
2001	53 259	10 000	750	129 893	10 000	900

Table 9. Cotton: Production figures 1999-2001

Period	Area planted (ha)			Production (tonnes)		
	Commercial Farms	Communal Lands	Resettlement Schemes	Commercial Farms	Communal Lands	Resettlement Schemes
1999	32 987	253 047	24 500	48 084	129 575	19 600
2000	31 031	225 438	26 000	47 111	171 453	23 400
2001	31 574	320 000	33 000	45 854	208 000	26 400

Table 10. Tobacco: Production figures 1999-2001

Period	Area planted (ha)			Production (tonnes)		
	Commercial Farms	Communal Lands	Resettlement Schemes	Commercial Farms	Communal Lands	Resettlement Schemes
1999	69 238	3 047	6 823	169 136	1 260	4 886
2000	65 282	3 697	7 507	180 984	2 507	6 751
2001	56 145	4 000	6 825	154 320	2 815	4 766

#### *4.0 Former Farm Workers*

4.1 Regarding former farm workers, the Committee's interview with the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare revealed the following:

That Government had put in place legislation obliging the former commercial farmers to pay severance packages to their former workers through a Restitution Fund.

That Government had adopted a policy of non-payment of compensation for improvements before the former commercial farmers had produced proof of payment of severance packages to former farm workers.

That some of the former farm workers who had been paid their severance packages had since left for their places of origin

That a number had been accommodated in the resettlement programme especially under Model A1.

4.2 In all provinces the Committee was able to establish that:

a large number of former farm workers still remained on the farms occupying farm compounds and that they were reportedly unwilling to work for the newly resettled farmers preferring to be engaged in gold panning activities which they considered to be more lucrative. Whilst unwilling to take up employment, they remained a burden to the new farmers in terms of water and electricity usage;

some former farm workers had charges of theft of crops and vandalism of farm equipment levelled against them; and some were employed by the newly resettled farmers while others were still employed by the white commercial farmers who retained subdivisions or whose properties had not been acquired.

## 6. ISSUES IN PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

1. Given its complexity and pace of implementation, the Fast Track Programme was inevitably in the execution attended by numerous problems and difficulties some of which have already been covered in the earlier sections of this Report. Not least of these was a hostile external environment characterised by a relentless foreign media campaign of vilification of the Government and the Programme and the imposition of sanctions against the country by the United Kingdom and its European Union partners; the so-called White Commonwealth — Australia, Canada and New Zealand — and the USA. Simultaneous with the imposition of what were euphemistically termed "smart sanctions" against certain prominent persons in the public and private life of Zimbabwe was the drying up of foreign currency inflows relating to foreign direct investment, official development assistance and certain trade and other concessions.
2. The hostile external reaction vis-a-vis Programme implementation was matched, indeed partly fuelled, by the resistance to that process internally by many of the white commercial farmers. Both individually and through their association, the Commercial Farmers Union, they fought in the courts and by way of political and media campaigns in Zimbabwe and virtually world-wide to derail the Programme and to discredit the Government. The more extreme elements grouped themselves around an organisation known as Justice for Agriculture whose uncompromising stance represented a counterweight to the efforts of those, mainly the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative, who sought an agreed formula with Government as a way forward.
3. The Programme was also implemented in a period of poor performance and decline in the national economy. Most of the main macro- economic indices had for some time shown a marked downward slide characterised by, for example, low investment levels; rising rates of unemployment; declining national output partly due to the closure of some enterprises; reduced tourism and export receipts; a seemingly endemic depreciation of the exchange rate of the national currency coupled with the emergence of a pervasive and apparently resilient "parallel" foreign exchange market; and, above all, an escalating inflationary spiral that had by the second quarter of 2003 risen above 300%. The impact of this environment on Programme implementation, especially when taken together with low rainfall patterns in the same period, could only be such as to place additional difficulties on the realisation of the Programme's objectives.
4. Further, while, as often stated, agriculture is the backbone of the economy, there is however a reciprocal relationship of backward and forward linkages between it and other sectors, especially manufacturing industry. Needless to say while agriculture feeds local industry with various essential raw materials, industry in turn produces, among other things, some of the equipment, machinery, fertilisers, and chemicals required in agriculture.
5. For both old and new farmers, but particularly the latter, the prevailing macro-economic environment, and in particular the relentless capital equipment and input price inflation, represented a serious challenge if not a major obstacle to the significantly increased production on the land envisaged under the Programme.
6. Yet other factors impinging on Programme implementation, themselves in various degrees reinforced by the above, arose out of the particular, if not indeed unique, circumstances of the Programme's launching and certain deficiencies in Programme planning, administration and management.
7. The launching of the Fast Track Programme in July 2000 following, in rapid order in the same year, the voters' rejection of the draft new constitution in February; Parliament's amendment of the Lancaster House Constitution in respect of the land issue in April; the general elections in June; the appointment of a new Government in June/July and the mounting of widespread land demonstrations by veterans of the liberation struggle and other land-hungry communities throughout this and other land-hungry communities throughout this period, gave hardly much of an opportunity to the authorities to plan in the necessary detail the requisite strategic perspective on Programme implementation.
8. While Government had recast and enunciated its land policy in successive versions from 1990, in conjunction with the removal of the restrictive strictures of the Lancaster House Constitution, (see Government of Zimbabwe, *The National Land Policy 1990; Policy Paper on Land Redistribution and Resettlement in Zimbabwe, 20 September 1996; and Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase II: A Policy Framework and Project Document, September 1998*), these policy documents had not anticipated the reach, depth and accelerated pace that was to constitute the Fast Track implementation mode.
9. New institutions located at central Government, provincial and district levels, including those highlighted

elsewhere in this Report, were thus hurriedly set up to spearhead implementation of the Programme in collaboration with the relevant Ministries and under the overall superintendence of Cabinet.

10. The main tasks of the agencies in question, as shown under Part I above, included land identification, land use planning and demarcation, development of basic infrastructure, settler selection and placement and provision of inputs and other forms of assistance to enable settlers to make a start at production on their new plots.

11. The range of activities outlined above challenged the system as regards the marshalling of the requisite financial resources, the deployment of personnel with the skills and orientation the situation called for, the co-ordination of operations and the creation of effective — if even temporary — administrative and governance mechanisms in the newly resettled sites.

12. In these and related areas, availability of the resources in question, on the one hand, and some of the activities "in the field", on the other, not infrequently fell shy of requirements. Budgetary allocations for the Programme remained woefully inadequate. So also those for infrastructure, tillage and inputs, as detailed elsewhere in this Report.

13. As for problems of administration and management, the section on *Provincial Profiles* in this Report cites instances where some provincial or district officials acted, ultra vires, by, for example, allocating land to individuals of their choice or by delaying or failing to forward letters of offer of land to successful applicants for plots demarcated for the A2 resettlement model. In one such case Government had to dismiss the offending district official.

14. These problems were compounded by the activities of certain persons who, though lacking any official status or authority, nonetheless proceeded to allocate land, mainly in districts adjacent to the main towns and cities: the rural districts close to Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Gwanda being perhaps the most affected.

15. Some persons interviewed by the Committee's Provincial Teams also reported that certain prominent persons of various status locally or nationally were guilty of "political interference" that allegedly resulted in land allocations and/or related activities that favoured some groups or individuals as against others. Allegations of political regionalism were also heard particularly as regards the contested zones cited in the paragraph immediately above.

While such reports might have been dismissed as unsubstantiated or as mere hearsay, the Committee however took note of them particularly where they were repeated by persons in positions of authority such as Provincial Governors and/or Provincial and District Administrators. Some Provincial Governors made the point that although they chaired the PLICs they lacked the executive authority to direct Programme execution. They also claimed that their work was rendered more difficult by conflicting instructions and directives from central Government Ministers and even junior officials of key Ministries. Yet such claims sometimes stood in sharp contrast to those from other witnesses to the effect that some Governors had themselves allocated land irregularly.

**16. These irregularities seemed essentially to point to an unwieldy Programme implementation machinery. The welter of Ministries, departments, parastatals, committees, subcommittees, informal groups, task forces and related organs that somehow had a role to play in Programme execution not only made for a dispersed authority and decision-making arrangement, it also opened the way for some individuals to exert influence on the processes of Programme execution beyond what might have been possible under a more close-knit and centralised structure. For this reason the Committee recommends, as stated in more detail under Part IV of this Report, that consideration be given to the establishment of a National Land Board that would administer all land affairs subject to necessary political accountability arrangements.**

17. It should further be noted in regard to the complaints and allegations cited above that the Committee lacked the time and the means to investigate with the degree of thoroughness that would otherwise be required, all of the specific claims and allegations that were brought to its attention. The Committee did not however ignore them. Instead, whenever the Committee had reason to conclude that a prima facie case existed with respect to given allegations or claims that the Committee was itself not able to investigate in detail as indicated above, it promptly referred them to Government for urgent attention. As noted hereunder in the next Chapter of this Report, Government took the Committee's representations in hand and transmitted to the Committee its

response on actions either already under way or proposed to be taken to restore normality.

18. A particular issue which in the result was investigated and acted upon by Government even as the Committee's assignment was yet to be concluded was the alleged ownership of, or claim to, more than one farm by some beneficiaries of the Programme including those in leadership positions in Government and the ruling party thought to fall in this category. A procedure had been established early in the life of the Committee — and following indications of possible such multiple land holdings — in terms of which a special Government Task Force unit would probe into the allegations and report to Government for its consideration and corrective action where this was warranted. It is against this background that in late July 2003 the President himself while addressing a regular meeting of the ruling party's top decision-making body, the Politburo, issued a directive in which, as reported in the press, he "ordered top ZANU-PF officials with multiple farms to relinquish them within two weeks" (*The Herald*, 31 July 2003). This in fact was but one among several such statements the President had issued on the matter in the immediately preceding weeks.

19. Programme implementation had also to grapple with conceptual issues in the interpretation of policy. For example, given that policy sought to "decongest" communal lands whose carrying capacity for both human and livestock requirements had been exceeded, complaints were received by the Committee from people who felt, sometimes insisting vehemently, that the Land Reform Programme should be for the benefit of the rural population to the exclusion of those in wage employment in industry.

20. This interpretation of policy seemed sound and unexceptionable having regard to the need for land redistribution and for a development thrust that aims to transform the lives of the rural population who, broadly, constitute the bulk of the poorest people in the country and whose role in the national liberation struggle moreover was so critical to its victory.

**21. However, in a country where the bulk of wage workers maintain a firm foothold in the rural areas as a form of insurance against the hazards of unemployment, relatively low cash incomes, and the general insecurity of wage employment and beyond, it may be inescapable that in the short to medium term these workers will continue to "play it both ways".**

**22. In any event, the issue of wage workers' entitlement to land - if such it is - begs the question as to:**

**(a) How long land, a finite resource, can be regarded as available to all, even if only as a principle of policy; and, related to this,**

**(b) Whether the attainment of a truly transformed rural economy is possible where men in wage employment in industry intermittently return "home" (*kumusha/ekhaya*) to lend a hand to their wives who struggle against heavy odds to raise family incomes on the land.**

**It seems safe in general to conclude that these issues must increasingly assume prominence as a factor of major importance in the context of policy makers' quest for a more balanced national economic developmental paradigm.**

23. The effort to decongest some of the communal lands had also to confront certain practical problems such as the phenomenon whereby some households, having been allocated new cropping or grazing land close to their original settlements, did not surrender their entitlement to the latter but instead "annexed" their new plots to the old and then settled down to a routine of, in effect, commuting between the two sites.

24. In addition, the Committee was informed of some instances where even though surrendered, the vacated sites were being allocated to new settlers by some traditional authorities with little regard to the imperatives of official policy and procedures. It would thus seem that land redistribution, or the refinement thereof, must in future be undertaken *simultaneously* with communal land re-planning and reorganisation.

25. Apart from the above, Government has also enunciated a policy of One Person One Farm. The definition of "person", however, remained vague. It was not clear whether for example it covered both natural and juristic persons and if so what regulatory mechanisms would need to be employed to assure compliance.

26. The matter is advanced some way, though not conclusively in a Report of a Parliamentary Committee which called on Government to enact into law "the one-household-one farm policy and (to apply) it across the board to obviate concentrating ownership of land in a few blacks with resources." (See Parliament of Zimbabwe, *Second Report of the Portfolio Committee on Lands Agriculture Water Development Rural Resources and resettlement. Third Session-Fifth Parliament, 11 June 2003*, pp 2 and 20).

**27. The choice of the household as the unit of reckoning of the one person one farm concept is probably a good working formulation even though it too is riddled with some definitional difficulties of its own, including the question as to what is encompassed by "household" in a society where polygamy is fairly widely practised, or where single adults (unmarried, divorced, etc) also constitute "households" for policy purposes. The definition is also silent on corporate entities. Yet it is a useful point of departure, as regards natural persons, and is an improvement on the conceptual vagueness referred to above.**

**28. The issue could be further refined in the context of a new agency established for purposes of monitoring and overseeing land policy implementation and administration (see paragraph 16 above).**

29. Set procedures were at times not followed in the implementation of the Fast Track resulting in confusion among operatives at the local level as to the direction of policy. An example of this is a written directive issued in early 2002 by a junior official of one ministry ordering the Provincial officers of the same Ministry to list all plantations, conservancies and other properties for gazetting. The order had apparently not been cleared with the body tasked to run the Programme, namely the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development. At times the process of gazetting properties appeared needlessly costly to the fiscus. The extensive gazetting of properties that were excludable by Government's own policy criteria falls in this category. Many of these would, not infrequently, then be "delisted" via the same Government Gazette and the same newspapers in which they had been "listed" in the first place. Perhaps more egregiously, properties owned by the Government itself were sometimes listed for acquisition and later, upon review, delisted, all this due perhaps to the fact that the local land identification committees did not realise that the properties concerned belonged to the State.

30. Then too, Government's issuance to willing sellers of farms of *certificates of no present interest* to indicate its lack of interest in acquiring the parcels of land in question in terms of the pertinent provisions of the applicable statute should perhaps have been held in abeyance during the Fast Track Programme's implementation as, in some instances, such certificates were issued after settler placement on precisely some of such land. The settlers so affected naturally resented the fact of having in consequence to be moved to new sites to start all over, assuming alternative and acceptable land was found for them. Nor did they relish having to run the gauntlet of court-mandated eviction orders as squatters upon successful application for such orders in the courts by the land purchaser concerned.

31. Finally, in the course of its work the Committee drew Government's attention to a number of problem areas that the Committee felt required early resolution, including:

**the issue of leases or other forms of legal title for beneficiaries of the A2 model, taking into account, among other things, the fact that, on the one hand, such title is vital for assured productive use of the land and, on the other hand, the variability in plot sizes and the state of prior improvements on them (including such assets as houses and other infrastructure, etc) should presumably be properly assessed for purposes of determining the quantum of individual lease rentals;**

**the speedy processing of allocation of land to outstanding applications under the A2 model given the clamour for this among some of those affected;**

**the resettlement of households on waiting lists for plots, especially in the Provinces of Manicaland and the Midlands. Plot allocations could be effected on, inter alia, some of the land originally meant for the A2 model but much of which is lying fallow as a result of the relatively low take up rate under that model (40-45%);**

**the establishment of formal machinery of governance in all resettled areas especially those under the A1 model given the weak, makeshift, authority structures in existence and the social problems being encountered in some of them as a result;**

**the final processing of LA3 forms or the adoption of other mechanisms to accommodate those commercial farmers who, having satisfied Government's applicable criteria, either sought to retain one farm or completed the said forms to indicate acceptance of a subdivision of their original farm;**

**the creation as a matter of urgency of a unit to safeguard the infrastructure and other valuable assets on acquired properties especially in the new A1 areas.**

**The need to address speedily the issue pertaining to informal settlers on designated or non-designated farms who are not protected by the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection) Act.**

32. As its review of the Programme progressed the Committee on several occasions found reasons to draw the attention of Government to certain problems including those listed above affecting, or resulting from, Programme implementation that called for clarification of policy, resolution of contradictions or the taking of necessary action. Many of these issues have been referred to in preceding chapters and are also alluded to variously in this report.

Government responded to the Committee's inquiries both in writing and by way of actions to resolve irregularities or to address contraventions of the law or of policy and procedures. A final comprehensive report from Government was given as the Committee was concluding its review and is inserted in the next chapter.

## **7. CLARIFICATION AND REAFFIRMATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICY ON LAND REFORM AND RESETTLEMENT**

### *1. Policy Issues*

1.1 The following are policy guidelines that were put in place to guide the implementation of Land Reform and Resettlement Programme.

#### *(a) Land Identification*

The identification of land for resettlement has been guided by the following five principles: derelict land; under utilized land; land under multiple ownership; foreign owned land; and land near communal areas. The principles were essentially administrative guidelines meant to assist Land Identification committees in carrying out their work. They were neither a legal requirement nor conclusive criteria for land identification.

However, there was a general presumption (but not necessarily an exception) against the acquisition of properties in the following categories: single owned land; properties with the bilateral Investment Protection Agreements; properties with Zimbabwe Investment Centre permits, church owned properties, agro-industrial properties, plantations and approved conservancies. In some instances, properties falling under these categories were identified for acquisition for resettlement and any other purposes, more so if they violated the maximum farms size regulations and were contiguous to the communal areas. Owners of such land were expected to be assisted by Government to access other land if they intended to continue farming.

#### *(b) The Policy of Maximum Farm Size*

As far as the A2 model scheme was concerned Government prescribed the amounts of land that could be allocated to beneficiaries under the following categories: large scale commercial farming scheme; the medium scale commercial farming scheme; the small scale commercial farming scheme; and the peri-urban scheme, with prescribed farm sizes depending on agro-ecological regions. Maximum farm size regulations notwithstanding, there is current rethinking in Government that there may be need for flexibility, especially on the basis of enhancing viability and productivity.

#### *(c) One Person One Farm Policy*

While this has been the concept, the understanding in reality has been the pursuit and implementation of the policy of one household one farm.

Indigenous farmers who bought multiple farms prior to the Land Reform Programme were, however, not affected by this policy. At this stage, they are, also not targeted for compulsory acquisition. Any beneficiary of the land resettlement programme whether on A1 or A2 models with more than one piece of land is expected to surrender excess land. Already quite a number of such beneficiaries are complying with this policy, and extra land accruing from this process, will be made available for resettlement, particularly to A1 settlers. So far, a total of 24 562 hectares have been recovered from this exercise, which is still ongoing. Once the exercise is complete the full hectareage recovered from multiple beneficiaries will be made public by an appropriate government authority. Difficulties are, however, being encountered in instances of polygamous marriages and spouses who are both ex-combatants. In these instances, female spouses would like to retain the ownership of land in their own right. Government has still to firmly pronounce itself on this matter.

#### *(d) Lease Agreement*

The issue of the lease agreement is being vigorously pursued and a draft lease agreement which has provision for the concept of lease to buy for A2 farmers is complete. It is anticipated to be finalized before the start of the next agricultural season. For A1 farmers, the issue of tenure is still under consideration, although indications are that the tenure system is likely to be similar to the one obtaining for communal areas.

#### *(e) Farm Workers*

Those former farm workers who chose to pursue farming were resettled alongside communal farmers from congested areas. Some chose to be employed by the newly resettled farmers while the majority of immigrant elderly workers opted to be repatriated to their original homes. A small number of the farm workers resettled in adjacent communal areas. Regrettably, a sizeable number of farm workers remained on the resettled farms, pursuing other ways of economic survival, notably gold panning and poaching. For this category of workers, the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare is organising them for redeployment into areas where there is a shortage of labour. It has to be underlined that Government enacted a special Statutory Instrument that ensured that all affected former farm workers were given their terminal benefits by the former white commercial farmers.

*(f) Country to Country Agreements*

While in principle, all farms covered by country-to-country bilateral investment agreements were exempt, Government is currently reviewing this policy, especially as it emerged that some of these agreements were still to be ratified by Parliament. An ad hoc Cabinet committee has been set up to thoroughly examine the whole issue, paying particular attention to possible criteria for delisting such as the level of investment following the signing of the agreement, whether the properties concerned are under EPZ/ZIC status or are agro-industrial in nature; and the proximity of the properties to communal areas. The ad hoc Cabinet Committee is expected to conclude its work in the very near future.

*(g) Policy on Continuous Gazetting of Farms*

Following the conclusion of the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme, the policy of wholesale gazetting is being discontinued. However, to cater for some farms that may become available from the Presidential Land Review exercise and to correct errors of delisting as well as to address the need for more land for resettlement from time to time, a policy of targeted gazetting is being pursued.

*1.2 Responses To Specific Issues Raised By the Presidential Land Review Committee*

*(a) Buka Audit Report*

The Buka Report will not be published, as it was a preliminary report and a working document for Government within the context of the implementation of the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme. The material shortcomings of the resettlement programme highlighted in the Report are being corrected appropriately.

*(b) Governance Issues in Resettled Areas*

**All land under resettlement areas fall under the jurisdiction of Rural District councils established in terms of the rural District council Act (Chapter 29:13). All resettlement areas are being incorporated into existing wards and where necessary, new wards will be created under appropriate ward Development committees as lower tiers of governance and development under the Rural District councils.**

Furthermore, the resettlement areas are being placed under the relevant traditional authorities or chiefs, in terms of the Traditional Leaders Act (Chapter 29:17). So far, government has experienced teething problems with respect to the demarcation of some units falling under traditional leaders particularly in Manicaland, Mashonaland Central and Mashonaland East provinces. The Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National housing is establishing a Special Commission to resolve these and other challenges relating to governance in the new resettlement areas in the whole country and the terms of reference for the commission are being prepared. The Committees of Seven will be phased out as local level governance systems provided in the Rural District Council Act and the Traditional Leaders Act become operational. In the interim, the PLICs are to continue resolving conflicts that are found in the resettlement areas in conjunction with the Rural District Councils and the Traditional leaders.

*(c) Ownership of Infrastructure and Equipment on Acquired Farms*

All buildings under the A1 model of resettlement are government property and are to be managed by the Common Property Management regimes and reserved for use as schools, clinics and community centres. For the A2 farms, immovable infrastructure used for processing agricultural commodities in the form of tobacco barns and cattle handling facilities like dips is owned by the beneficiary of the plot who should allow other farmers on the same farm access to the infrastructure on a cost recovery basis.

**All water sources in resettlement areas fall under the Water Act and administered under the Zimbabwe national Water Authority (ZINWA) or the Sub-Catchment Councils. This is to ensure equitable allocation of water for agricultural, mining and industrial use. Individuals are not allowed to own water**

**in dams on their properties. ZINWA has been instructed to take full control of all medium size and large dams while the respective Sub-Catchment Councils will take control of the small dams.**

*(d) Fate of LA3 Forms*

A special committee of responsible Ministries and Government departments is being set-up to pursue negotiated settlements and make assessments of LA 3 forms, including interviewing those commercial farmers who are still interested in pursuing farming through this option as opposed to contestation in courts. Such an exercise is to be followed by legislative amendments to the Land Acquisition Act. Affected farmers will be given offer letters and allocated either parts of their original farms or given alternative land elsewhere in the country.

*(e) Resettlement in Contested Zones*

Administratively, there have been unforeseen problems in some areas of the Mashonaland provinces, notably:- Gwebi/Hunyani, Mazowe, Beatrice and Goromonzi. Responsible government ministries and provincial as well as DLICs have recently agreed that the land in question be demarcated into A1 and A2 plots by AREX.

A special inter-ministerial committee of Ministers co-ordinated from the Office of the President and Cabinet is overseeing this process to ensure that the allocation of land is undertaken in an objective and transparent manner.

*(f) Fresh Farm Invasions and Defiant Settlers in Gonarezhou National Park*

**Government takes cognisance of the fact that some settlers came in during the "jambanja" era and will need to be resettled on alternative land. It is appreciated that the Land Review Committee has revealed the existence of extra land in some provinces. Illegal occupants will be relocated to such areas as a matter of urgency. Any new farm invasions are being firmly dealt with in accordance with the law.**

**Government stance on National Parks and Gazetted Forests is that such areas should be exempted from acquisition and resettlement. With particular reference to the Gonarezhou National Park, the Provincial Governor of Masvingo in his capacity as Chairman of the PLIC is in the process of finding alternative land to resettle the families currently occupying Gonarezhou National Park.**

*(g) Dual and Multiple Allocations.*

**When A2 allocations started, manual registration systems were used in the Provinces, which account for some of the double allocations as well as the abuse of the Offer Letter as well as "Allocating Authority" powers by various local offices.**

**When allocations were centralized, a computer system was introduced which is centred on name(s) and I.D. numbers. The programme does not accept re-entries of the same name and I.D. number. Currently, allocations are being entered into the system and the exercise will be finished by end of September 2003. SIRDC is also assisting the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in improving the system.**

**As far as the records of A1 allocations kept by the Ministry of Local Government, Public Construction and National Housing are concerned, these are fully computerized, and very few problems are being encountered. The ultimate aim is to integrate the two systems to avoid double allocations from A1 and A2 Schemes.**

*(h) Peri-Urban/Green Zone Resettlement Schemes*

The peri urban policy which is being finalised is intended to create space for the development of peri-urban agriculture or green belts around urban areas, and to build the capacity and competence of local authorities to plan for the efficient use of peri-urban land and at the same time accommodating urban expansion. Local authorities have identified farms for acquisition by government for urban expansion. The Ministry of Local Government has established Technical committees to ensure that these developments take place in consistency with the Regional and Town Planning Act.

*(i) Delisting of Dairy Farms in Mashonaland East*

**Mashonaland East Province has the highest number of delisted farms totalling 185, many of which are dairy farms. Farms recommended for delisting have been delisted in line with the recommendation, and the farmers as indicated by the Province were allocated appropriate plots. Government will pursue this matter with the Province to its logical conclusion.**

***(j) Withdrawal of Offer Letters from Mashonaland East***

A total of 721 (not 400) uncollected offer letters were taken by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement from Mashonaland East Province. This was due to the fact that it had taken too long for the letters to be distributed to beneficiaries. Some of these date back to November 2001. The issue was raised with the Province in early March 2003 and the Province was given until 31st March 2003 for the letters to be distributed, but even after the deadline of 31 March 2003 had expired, the 721 letters had still not been distributed/collected. Consequently, the Ministry decided to reallocate the land to other needy applicants.

However, after going through the list of uncollected letters and the beneficiary list from Mashonaland East Province, it was discovered that most of the plots had been allocated to at least two different applicants. In the end, the list of uncollected letters could not be used for reallocation. This was communicated to the province and rationalisation of allocations in Mashonaland East is currently underway.

***(k) Winter Wheat Programme***

**For the winter wheat programme for 2003, Government's objective was to have 100 000 ha under winter wheat. This was based on the quantity of seed available and a carry over of 1 000 tonnes from the last winter programme. However, the actual planted crop was about half the hectareage planned, largely due to the following constraints:-**

**Inadequacy of local fertilizer supply due to limited NRZ wagons to ferry phosphates from Dorowa Minerals, pyrites from Iron Duke Mine and sulphur imported through the ports of Beira, Maputo and Durban;**

**Load shedding introduced by ZESA which affected fertilizer production companies notably ZFC, Windmill and Sable Chemicals; and**

**Inadequate supply of fuel to the farmers on time due to foreign currency shortage in the economy.**

**Towards the end of harvest the fuel situation will have improved following the deregulation of the oil industry. NOCZIM will service critical sectors namely government, public transport and agriculture while private oil companies will cater for the rest of economy.**

***(l) Targeted Production and Inputs-supply***

**Government is pursuing a planned and targeted production budget and inputs needed to achieve the desired quantity of crops to ensure food security and the generation of adequate foreign currency through export production. It has also identified the number of farmers to grow certain types of crops and the amount of land that is going to be put under each and every crop, estimated the tonnage to be produced and inputs required for each crop. Furthermore, the national seed requirements have been identified as indicated in the accompanying table.**

**Seed Requirements**

Crop	Projected National Requirements (Metric Tonnes)	Domestic Seed Availability (Metric Tonnes)	Shortfall (Metric Tonnes)
Maize	87 500	32 000	55 000
Sorghum	2 000	650	1 350
Mhunga	1 500	40	1 460
Rapoko	1 000	0.5	999.5
Sugarbeans	2 700	180	2 420
Groundnuts	60 000	100	59 900

**NB** The shortfalls indicated above reflect quantities of seed that should be imported.

Government has been supportive of the Fast Track resettlement exercise with a total of \$77,64 billion injected during 2002-2003 for crops and livestock inputs, and a further \$18,96 billion for irrigation schemes. Government support amounts to \$96,6 billion, including additional amounts allocated under the supplementary budget. As happened during the last season, the private sector is expected to compliment Government efforts through contract farming and input support schemes.

*(m) Measures Being Taken to Mitigate Maize Seed Shortage*

With particular reference to the anticipated shortage of maize seed, the following contextual position needs to be stated.

The national requirement for maize is 2.2 million mt annually, both for human and livestock consumption. The minimum hectareage to be put under maize is 1.8 million ha, given the average yield of one (1) mt/ha.

For the 2003/2004 summer season Government is targeting 3.5 million had of maize. This requires 87 500 mt of seed maize. Due to this expanded areas under cultivation and the increased number of farmers as a result of the resettlement programme, seed supply estimates indicate a serious deficit. This has to be analysed within the context that he 2002/2003 season was characterized by dry spells that affected the production of most of the maize seed crop in the country.

An inventory of seed stocks was carried out on the varieties and quantities available and the current seed situation is an reflected in the table below

*Maize available for the 2003-2004 agricultural season*

SEED CIMPANY	TYPE OF SEED	SEED QUANTITY IN TONNES	NATIONAL REQUIREMENT	SHORTFALL
Seed Co	Hybrid	20 000		
Seed Co	OPV	3 000		
Agricura	Dwarf Hybrid	20		
Pioneer	Hybrid	1 900		
Monsanto	Hybrid	1 700		
NTS	OPV	600		
Pannar	Hybrid	4 000		
Pannar	OPV	200		
ARDA		75		
GRAND TOTAL		31 495	87 599	56 005

**In order to address the seed shortage in the short and medium-term, Government is pursuing the following:**

**(i) Farmers are being encouraged to plant the carry over seed, which they did not use last season. An inventory on seeds, which remained with farmers from last season, was also undertaken and it is anticipated that about 60% of households have carried over an average of 15kgs of maize seed per household. Currently AREX is carrying out a survey countrywide to verify this information.**

**(ii) A Fire Fighting Programme has been put in place, which involves the immediate planting of multiplication seed at agricultural colleges/institutes/stations and ARDA Estates. This will be for short season varieties and Open Pollinated Varieties (OPVs) to be ready for the 2003-2004 planting season, as indicated in the accompanying Table.**

**Winter seed Multiplication (Fire Fighting Programme)**

Institution	Maize	Hectares to be planted	Contracting Company
ARDA	Matuba	100	Seed Co
ARDA	ZM 421	200	National Tested Seeds
ARDA	AC 71	500	Agpy (Agricura)
Chibero Agricultural College	Matuba	5	Seed Co
Mlezu	Matuba	4	Seed Co

(iii) The third short-term strategy is to import seed. A total of 56 005 mt of maize seed need to be imported. Seed can be imported from countries with similar agro-ecological conditions. A survey carried out indicates that about 15 000 mt of seed maize could be available for importation from the SADC region and also from other countries. Private companies have been requested to use their own offshore resources to import seed. An

application has been made to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe for allocation of foreign currency for the importation of seed.

(iv) In the medium-to-long-term. Government will intensify maize seed production by A1 and A2 farmers on a targeted and planned basis. In addition, seed houses, agricultural institutions and ARDA will be encouraged to actively participate in maize seed production.

It should also be added that Government has since put in place a Cabinet Task Force on Inputs Supply and Distribution whose terms of reference include the following:-

- a. review the status of the supply of inputs and tillage services for the 2003/2004 agricultural season;
- b. establish strategies to meet the shortfalls in the short, medium and long-term perspectives;
- c. put in place effective and efficient mechanisms to distribute inputs and tillage services to would-be beneficiaries; and
- d. clear any bottlenecks besetting the timely mobilization and distribution of inputs and services.

The membership of the Task Force comprise the following:-

Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing (Chairman)  
Minister of Finance and Economic Development.  
Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement  
Minister of Industry and International Trade  
Minister of Rural Resources and Water Development  
Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare.

## **PART III**

### **8. PROVINCIAL PROFILES**

The Profiles relate to the findings of the Review Committee in regard to the implementation of the Programme in all of the country's administrative provinces, namely:

- (i) Manicaland
- (ii) Mashonaland Central
- (iii) Mashonaland East
- (iv) Mashonaland West
- (v) Masvingo
- (vi) Matabeleland North
- (vii) Matabeleland South
- (viii) Midlands

#### **(i) MANICALAND**

##### *1. Background*

Manicaland Province has seven administrative districts: Buhera, Chimanimani, Chipinge, Makoni, Mutare, Mutasa and Nyanga. Of these districts, Buhera is 100% communal.

The Province has an area of 36 459 square kilometres and a population of 1 566 899. Its population density is 42 people per square kilometre where the national average is 31 persons per square kilometre.

The Province spans all the five natural Regions 1, 11, 111 and IV and V. There is therefore a capacity for a range of agricultural activities from the high rainfall areas of Vumba Highlands in Region 1 to the dry and hot areas of Middle Save in Region V.

Agricultural production consists of subsistence tillage on one hand, and commercial activities, on the other. Tea, coffee, timber, horticulture, seed potato and dairy farming account for most of the agricultural output.

The drier parts of the province grow cotton, sorghum and millet.

##### *2. Statistical Data*

###### *Land Acquisition and Allocation*

The Fast Track in Manicaland Province saw a total of 273 176,87 hectares allocated to 13 000 households in both the A1 and A2 resettlement models. These allocations were well received by all beneficiaries who were interviewed. All stakeholders concurred that Government had managed to empower the majority of the indigenous people and had restored their dignity through the land redistribution exercise. The chiefs, war veterans and the rank and file of the people spoke highly of the land acquisition and said the programme was long overdue.

*(Statistical tables omitted)*

##### *3. Emerging Issues From the Review*

###### *3.1 Peculiar features*

A well-known feature of Manicaland Province is its mountainous terrain. The districts of Nyanga, Chipinge, Chimanimani, Mutasa and parts of Mutare and Makoni have mountains and rock out-crops. Farms in the districts are therefore small and measure only 150 hectares or less in some cases. Land acquired for resettlement during the Fast Tract was generally inadequate.

In Chimanimani district, more than 60% of the land is under commercial timber plantations. Furthermore, the bulk of commercial farming land, 588 689 hectares, was acquired before the Fast Track. Consequently there were 62 400 people on the official waiting list requiring land in Manicaland.

###### *3.2 Institutional Arrangements*

The Implementation of the Fast Track including the task of land identification was carried out by PLICs and DLICs chaired by the Provincial Governor and the District Administrators respectively. Disagreements and even

conflicts sometimes affected the work of these committees. Such conflicts were reported to have been especially acute in the district of Makoni, Mutasa, Chipinge and Chimanimani.

The lack of cohesion and consensus among Committees resulted in some allocations or sub-divisions of plots being undertaken outside of the framework of the institutional machinery.

### *3.3 Impact of Fast Track on Decongestion in Communal Areas.*

The Provincial Governor, the Chiefs and those interviewed agreed that the impact of the resettlement programme on decongestion in communal areas was quite negligible. This was attributed to the following reasons, among others:

Land shortage in the Province;

Failure by the new settlers to surrender their communal homes and land holdings.

Others reasons for the low plot take up in other districts included: resource constraints and unviable plot sizes e.g. 10 hectare plots given out to settlers in Middle Save, Chipinge district, where these should have been 40 hectares or more.

Views were expressed that the 40 000 hectares lying idle in Chisumbanje and Middle Save state land should be allocated to new farmers.

### *3.4 Settler Emplacement*

The District teams established that the policies and procedures for the allocation of land under both A1 and A2 had not been adhered to in certain instances. For example, under the Model A1, instead of all allocations being done through the DLICs, other players such as Committees of Seven, War Veterans, traditional leaders, councillors and political leaders ended up allocating land unprocedurally and under unclear circumstances. In the case of Model A2, it was discovered that some allocations were made directly from the Ministry of Land in Harare without prior recommendations from the PLIC.

On the whole, some 3 310 households remained unofficially settled on 84 farms throughout the Province.

### *3.5 Farm Sizes*

Some of the acquired farms in the Province were allocated before proper planning and demarcation had taken place. Proper survey was therefore carried out in retrospect resulting in unviable plots being carved out. In some instances, the planners received arbitrary instructions on settlement models from the DLICs. This brought about haphazard demarcation in districts like Chimanimani, Chipinge and Nyanga where some plots are as small as 2,5 hectares for self-contained A1 Model.

### *3.6 Plot Take up Rates*

The average plot take up rates for Model A1 and A2 were 92% and 42% respectively. Take up problems under A2 are particularly conspicuous in Chimanimani where 79% (81 plots) of all allocations are on Border Timbers properties which are covered by a Bilateral Investment Protection Agreement. Mutasa district, which has the second lowest take up rate, has 68% of its A2 plots located on timber plantations. Beneficiaries felt that it was imperative for Government to enunciate a comprehensive policy on plantation farms and estates.

Other reasons for the low plot take up in other districts included: resource constraints and unviable plot sizes e.g. 10 hectare plots given out to settlers in Middle Save, Chipinge district, where there should have been 40 hectares or more.

### *3.7 Co-Existence Between Commercial and New Farmers*

Peaceful co-existence between the former commercial farmers and resettled farmers was, to a large extent, observed in most of the Province. Most of the land in the Province was acquired through dialogue between the white commercial farmers and the DLICs and PLIC. The process led to acquisition by consent. Consequently there are 119 sub-divided farms, some of which await processing of the LA3 forms by the Ministry of Lands.

Collaboration between the former commercial farmers and the new settlers manifests itself through outgrower's programmes, mainly on the tea and coffee production in Chipinge, and through tillage and production of seedbeds for tobacco, largely in Mutare and Makoni districts.

Instances of discord were generally isolated. Disputes and disharmony often arose from:

Boundary demarcations between new settlers and former commercial farmers.

Grazing for domestic animals;

Utilisation of farming equipment; and

Priority claims over fruit and crops by former commercial farmers who asserted that they had not yet been paid compensation and that therefore the agricultural produce was theirs.

### *3.8 Former Farm Workers*

A total of 1 080 former farm workers from an estimated 90 000 were accommodated under the Model A1 scheme. Some of the remainder are still employed on the sub-divisions held by the commercial farmers, and others are now employed by A2 farmers.

Others still, remain in farm compounds as informal or unofficial settlers. A number went back to their original homes.

### *3.9 Agricultural Inputs and Support Services*

Beneficiaries acknowledged receipt of the Government co-ordinated inputs support services particularly for the production of annual crops like maize. Responses from those interviewed revealed that most of the new farmers did not have adequate resources to start off agricultural production.

It was however evident that these inputs were either inadequate or belatedly distributed, or both. Further, the input package did not cater for farmers engaged in specialist areas such as horticulture, seed potatoes, tea, coffee and citrus farming.

Extension services from AREX are not yet visible in newly resettled areas despite the recruitment drive by the agricultural agency.

Tillage services from the District Development Fund were said to be hardly adequate to cover all deserving beneficiaries.

### *3.10 Infrastructural Support*

Establishment of infrastructural units, so far realised, includes 33 satellite primary and secondary schools, construction of a classroom block at Whitgift School in Mutare district, drilling of 110 boreholes and the rehabilitation of 43 dip tanks in the newly resettled areas.

Most of the beneficiaries who were interviewed expressed the view that the above-mentioned fell far short of the essential infrastructure needed in the new areas. The actual requirements include 35 schools, 14 clinics, 584 km of road, 495 boreholes and 49 dip tanks. All these accessories were planned for and their respective bids submitted by the districts in 2001, but to date no response has been received from central Government.

### *3.11 Governance*

The Committees of Seven were generally in existence in the newly resettled A1 farms. However, the Committees were often not effective and hence the prevalence of thefts of irrigation equipment, fences and components of homesteads such as window frames, roofing material and door-frames.

Service provision in Fast Track areas by Rural District Councils is yet to be felt according to the results of interviews. The problem is attributed to cash flow problems as RDCs are having difficulty in collecting unit tax from the new farmers.

## *4. Specialised Agro-Activities*

The findings established that the Province had come up with sector specific initiatives to facilitate access to specialised agro-activities by indigenous people, which would not adversely affect these enterprises. Proposals have been submitted to a sub-committee of Minister who were to look into the continued viability of tea, coffee, timber and dairy.

### *4.1 Timber/Forestry*

A Provincial sub-committee on Forestry set up the Provincial Governor for Manicaland had negotiated and facilitated the release of 16 232 hectares of land for the resettlement programme. The sub-committee also made the following recommendations, which were adopted by the PLIC:

- (a) that 500 hectares of land be adopted as a minimum viable plot size;
- (b) the need to maintain current land use for the viability of the timber sector;
- (c) Consider the options of:
  - (i) making shares in timber firms available for sale at market prices to indigenous individuals/groups e.g. employees, community trusts, indigenous consortiums;
  - (ii) smart partnerships in the form of joint ventures between established timber companies and new indigenous farmers or out-growers;
  - (iii) Providing, on a smaller scale, inputs technical advice and markets to new players by established timber companies.
- (d) Making unplanted land owned by timber firms available for resettlement and timber production by new farmers.

#### *4.2 Tea/Coffee*

According to the Provincial sub-committee on Tea and Coffee, a total of 7 000 hectares were under the two cash crops. Of this total, 4 250 hectares were in Chipinge district alone. Most of the production is under commercial farmers and only 4% is being grown by small scale out-growers.

The Provincial sub-committee on Tea and Coffee, which was set up to look into strategies on how the sector could sustainably take on board new indigenous players, facilitated the offer of 1 397 hectares for the resettlement programme by Tanganda , Ariston Holdings and Eastern Highlands Tea plantation.

Further the sub-committee recommended a comprehensive outgrower schemes, which would see the tea companies providing the following to new farmers and other outgrowers:

- support establishment of nurseries;
- offer seedlings at below cost to the new growers;
- offer technical services and input assistance to resettled new farmers; and
- transport green leaf to processing facilities at cost.

For the out-grower scheme to take off and grow at the expected rate, Government was expected to play its part by providing the following to the new out-growers:

- tillage assistance;
- resident extension officers;
- infrastructural development in the form of roads; and
- low cost loans.

#### *4.3 Dairy*

The Province boast two milk factories, one in Mutare and the other in Chipinge. The dairy plants were reported to be operating at 30% capacity and receiving an annual intake of 18.4 million litres where normal milk delivery should be around 61.3 million litres a year. The reduction for milk production was attributed to resettlement on some of the dairy farms and escalating prices for stock-feeds. The 4 900 Provincial dairy herd is nearly half of the 8 200 needed to bring the milk output to required levels.

A sub-committee on the Dairy Sector Reforms was set up. Its key terms of reference were to work out strategies for enhancing milk production; supply of milk to dairy factories; and to submit recommendations for increasing the participation of indigenous people and new farmers in commercial dairy production.

#### *4.4 Environment Problems*

The data collection teams found evidence of heavy siltation along the Save River and to some extent on the Osborne Dam, Odzi River.

In the case of Osborne Dam, people are still settled in the Odzi catchment area and are said to be engaged in agricultural practices, which contributed to soil erosion. The siltation of the Save River has occurred over the years due to the long running stream bank cultivation, general deforestation and overgrazing.

Some gold panning was observed at Premier Estate in Mutasa district, adding to land degradation, abandonment of farming activities by the panners and creation of serious physical hazards for both people and animals.

## ii) MASHONALAND CENTRAL

### 1.0 Background

1.1 Mashonaland Central Province comprises the following seven districts: Bindura, Guruve, Mazowe, Mt Darwin, Muzarabani, Rushinga and Shamva. It has a total population of 998 265 and covers an area of 28 347 sq km (2002 census). The Province mostly lies in the agro-ecological region II, which is good for cropping and intensive livestock production. The Province also has some small portions falling in regions III and IV which are good for semi-intensive farming and semi-extensive farming respectively. Region IV is found on the part of the province where Zimbabwe Borders Mozambique. Rushinga is the only district in the Province that does not have commercial farms.

### 2.0 Statistical Data

2.1 The Province had a total of 712 officially settled farms out of 778 gazetted farms. As at the end of July 2002, 14 756 households had been settled under the A1 Model, while 1 684 had been allocated land under the A2 Model. The full statistical data is as detailed below:

#### 2.2 Number of Farms in the Province

DISTRICT	DEPT OF LANDS	LAND REVIEW COMMITTEE	GAZETTED FARMS	WHITE OWNED FARMS NOT GAZETTED	DE-LISTED FARMS
Bindura	148	149	128	2	14
Guruve	78	76	73	2	22
Shamva	74	74	64	2	9
Mazowe	478	431	412	33	28
Mt Darwin	31	39	24	1	NIL
Muzarabani	83	90	77	9	13
Rushinga	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Total	892	859	778	49	86

It will be observed that the number of farms as given by the Department of Lands is different from that found by the Committee's Data Collection Teams. This is due to the fact that the Department of Lands had not taken into account a number of subdivisions and amalgamations which had occurred.

Some farms were listed in two districts by the Department of Lands.

Mt Darwin has 8 farms belonging to former co-operatives which were omitted from the Department of Lands list.

In the case of Muzarabani some of the names of farms did not appear on the farms list.

Reasons for de-listing farms were that some of the farms were indigenous owned, agro-industries, single-owned properties, and those properties covered by country-to-country agreements.

#### 2.3 Hectarage and Take up Rates

(Statistical table omitted)

The take up rates for the peri-urban scheme near Shamva were low because of the prevalence of gold panning. The panning had rendered whole tracts of land unworkable for agricultural purposes.

#### 2.5 Allocation Patterns by Gender

(Statistical table omitted)

#### 2.6 Farms Officially and Unofficially Settled

DISTRICT	No OF FARMS	SETTLED FARMS Officially	SETTLED FARMS Unofficially	SETTLED FARMS Total	UN-DEMARCATED FARMS
Bindura	149	121	4	125	1
Guruve	76	59	1	60	2
Shamva	74	41	3	44	3
Mazowe	431	330	45	375	4

Mt Darwin	39	22	1	23	NIL
Muzarabani	90	80	5	85	2
Rushinga	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Total	859	653	59	712	12

Out of the 59 unofficially settled farms in the Province, 45 were in Mazowe district.

### *2.7 Land Ownership Patterns After the Fast Track (Statistical table omitted)*

### *3.0 Emerging Issues*

#### *3.1 Reactions of the People to the Land Reform Programme.*

3.1.1 Interviewees expressed great satisfaction and excitement about the land reform programme as it provided many people with access to land. Some settlers indicated that they had made more money than they had expected in just one season. The programme is therefore achieving one of its major goals of economically empowering the previously disadvantaged black Zimbabweans.

3.1.2 There is, however, still a major concern as regards security of tenure in the resettlement areas. Interviewees expressed the view that the process from listing to final acquisition took too long to the extent that some individuals were already on the farms before they were fully acquired. This, according to some interviewees, leads to a sense of insecurity.

3.1.3. Generally, A1 plot holders were satisfied with their allocations. A few however, expressed the wish to be promoted to A2 plots.

3.1.4. Most of the beneficiaries indicated that they had basic farming skills and, at the same time, expressed the need to be trained in farm management, marketing and use of irrigation equipment. They therefore bemoaned the services of AREX, which were said to be very inadequate.

3.1.5 Most interviewees were of the view that the Government inputs support scheme should exclusively support A1 farmers, whom they considered to be more deserving. This sentiment was expressed in cognisance of the limited capacity of the Government's inputs support scheme.

3.1.6 Most farmers expressed dismay at their inability to access loans from banks because of lack of collateral. This lack of resources is one of the factors negatively affecting production levels.

#### *3.2 Institutional Arrangements*

3.2.1. The general observation was that most of the problems encountered were generated either by political interference or bureaucratic delays in land allocations. This resulted in many people settling themselves unofficially. This also led to the low take up of plots by A2 beneficiaries. The disregard of laid down procedures led to conflicts over plots, farmhouses and other infrastructure on farms.

3.2.2. As at the end of July 2003, there was still a sizeable number of former commercial farmers who, after having been served with Section 8 notices, still remained on the gazetted properties.

#### *3.3 Land Allocation*

3.3.1 Some members of the District Land Identification Committees were accused of allocating land to themselves. In addition, certain individuals within the committees were also accused of usurping the powers of the committees by allocating land single-handedly.

3.3.2. Double allocation and multiple ownerships had occurred in many districts. A2 farmers who previously owned A1 farms had not surrendered them. Unofficial land occupations were continuing on some farms as of July 2003.

#### *3.4 Decongestion*

3.4.1 The major objective of the Fast Track was to decongest the communal areas. On the basis of the Team's findings, it is clear that further work should be undertaken to decongest a number of districts in the Province.

This situation was worsened by some land reform beneficiaries who maintained dual homes i.e. both in the communal areas and in the new resettlement schemes owing to the uncertainty of tenure referred to earlier. More land could be secured from the surrender of additional plots obtained irregularly as indicated above.

3.4.2 The case for Rushinga where there were no commercial farms warranted special attention.

### *3.5 Productivity*

3.5.1 Productivity on most farms ranged from good to moderate. Good harvests during the last season were realised in maize, cotton, tobacco, soya beans and sugar beans. Muzarabani did particularly well in tobacco production. Generally A1 plot holders had better yields than A2 plot holders. It was also revealed through interviews that production was not as high as expected due to the inadequate supply of inputs. This also affected this year's (2003) winter wheat crop. It was noted with great concern during the visits that gold panning was negatively affecting farming activities.

### *3.6 Provision of Agricultural Inputs*

3.6.1 One of the issues associated with productivity is the supply of agricultural inputs. The shortage of inputs such as seed and fertiliser was a major setback to the new farmers. Non-availability of tillage services was yet another major setback. The DDF loan facility failed to meet the growing demand for farmers. In some cases inputs were supplied late impacting negatively on productivity.

3.6.2 There was generally a persistent appeal by settlers for Government to assist with resources for a whole gamut of farming activities.

### *3.7 Role of Agro-Business*

3.7.1 Complaints were made against Agro-Business companies which were alleged to be charging exorbitant interest rates. Some of these companies were also leasing citrus plantations on acquired farms, a development which led to complaints by communities around the plantations that they were not gaining anything out of the arrangement.

### *3.8 Tenure*

3.8.1 The issue of security of tenure was of great concern to most settlers, especially those on A2 plots. It was pointed out that lack of clarity on the issue of tenure was negatively affecting investment decisions on the allocated land and hence productivity.

### *3.9 The Environment*

3.9.1 Illegal gold panning is rampant, especially in Shamva district. A2 peri-urban plots near Shamva town have been ravaged by gold panning. The panning is so extensive as to render whole sections of land unsuitable for cropping.

3.9.2 There was also uncontrolled cutting down of trees in some resettlement area either for selling in the cities or for tobacco curing.

### *3.10 Infrastructure on the Farms*

3.10.1 The infrastructure on the farms was found to be in various states of disrepair. The infrastructure was also a source of conflict where some of the settlers were refusing to share.

3.10.2 Safe drinking water for resettled farmers was a problem on most of the A1 plot holders as they sourced their water from dams, rivers and open wells. Some satellite schools were established but construction of new structures needed to be embarked on since pupils were attending classes in workshop buildings, farm houses or tobacco barns. During demarcations, stands for business centres were not catered for. The road network that links up the farms needed urgent attention.

### *3.11 Governance*

3.11.1. There were two administrative arrangements in the A1 resettlement schemes. There was the Committee of 7 with its own chairman and there was also a village Head. Role definitions between the two were not clear, culminating in role conflict in many cases.

### *3.12 Former Farm Workers*

3.12.1 Some of the former farm workers were given packages and left for their communal homes. However, the majority of farm workers still remained on the farms.

3.12.2 A small number of the farm workers benefited from the resettlement programme. It was revealed by the interviewees that the majority former farm workers were not interested in working for the new farmers. It was also observed that former farm workers were reluctant to work for the new farmers preferring to engage in gold panning which paid more. This resulted in a shortage of farm labour in the Province. There were numerous cases of former farm workers who were arrested for vandalism and theft of farm equipment and crops. There were allegations that some of the former farm workers were committing these crimes in league with their former employers.

### *3.13 Issues peculiar to Mazowe District*

3.13.1 Mazowe district experienced an inordinate number of cases of offer letters being sent directly to beneficiaries by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, without the involvement of the Lands Committee. This resulted in some conflicts as the Lands Committee felt that its role of recommending beneficiaries had been usurped by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement's direct involvement.

3.13.2 Individuals who had participated in the initial land occupations in Mazowe were still awaiting to be allocated land as of July 2003.

3.13.3 From the interviews conducted, the people from Chiweshe were of the view that they were greatly disadvantaged as they claimed that more land in Mazowe was allocated to people from Harare than to them.

3.13.4 Mazowe Citrus Estates consisting of 13 farms, each with its own title deeds, had seven of its farms served with section 8 and six with section 5. Six farms had already been settled under the A2 scheme. Following the acquisition of these farms, the viability of the Estate, according to the Managing Director, had been negatively affected. There was a 5-year development plan in place which was now difficult to implement as a result of the current status.

3.13.5 Forrester Estates, comprising 14 farms, is covered by a country-to-country agreement. The estates are owned by a German company. However, there were still settlers on 5 of the farms who were either officially or unofficially settled.

### iii) MASHONALAND EAST

#### 1. Background

Mashonaland East has nine administrative districts viz: Chikomba, Goromonzi, Marondera, Mudzi, Murewa, Mutoko, Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe (UMP), Seke and Wedza. Three of the districts (Mutoko, Mudzi and UMP) had no commercial farms.

The population of the province was 1 125 355 as at the last census of 2002. The province lies in agro-ecological regions IIA to IV and is suitable for intensive crop farming, dairy, horticulture and the production of small grains.

#### 2. Statistical Data

There were 1 135 farms in the province. As at the end of July 2003, 912 farms were gazetted for resettlement. Of the gazetted farms, 701 farms were allocated for resettlement during the Fast Track, 17 942 demarcations were made under the A1 Model on 382 farms while 3 683 A2 allocations were made on the remaining 319 farms.

Table 1: Land Acquisition.

DISTRICT	NO. OF FARMS BY GOVERNMENT	NO. OF FARMS BY DIST TEAMS	NO. OF FARMS GAZETTED	NO. OF FARMS UNGAZETTED	NO. OF FARMS DE-LISTED
CHIKOMBA	192	192	148	44	23
GOROMONZI	255	257	243	14	76
MARONDERA	334	274	181	93	15
MUREHWA	126	128	107	21	17
MUTOKO	1	1	NIL	NIL	NIL
WEDZA	49	64	49	14	7
SEKE	214	219	184	27	58
TOTALS	1 171	1 135	912	213	196

Explanations for variances:

District teams used figures supplied by AREX. Variances between the two figures is explained as follows:  
AREX counted subdivisions on single farms, and some plots which teams did not consider farms;  
Some farms were counted in more than one district;  
AREX figures included farms taken up by urban development;  
Teams discovered some farms not on official lists.

#### Reasons for de-listing.

Of the 196 farms recommended for de-listing, 64 were on account of their being indigenous owned, 73 being diary farms, and 16 being covered by BIPA. The remainder were either Government institutions, conservancies, single-owned and agro-industries.

Table 2: Allocation patterns

(Statistical table omitted)

In the districts of Chikomba, Goromonzi and Seke, more land had been allocated to the A2 model, while in Marondera, the allocation between A1 and A2 was almost 50/50. The proximity of these districts to urban centres was said to be one factor influencing such an allocation.

No. of sub-divisions refers to the demarcations made on the ground by Area.

Some members of the DLIC are said to have taken advantage of their membership to allocate themselves more than one plot.

Table 3: Take up levels.

(Statistical table omitted)

The take up level in A1 and A2 model were 93% and 45% respectively.

Take up in A2 farms was generally low in A2 farms due to the following reasons.

1. Some of the farms were under litigation in the courts.
2. The land allocated was not suitable for the intended farming activities.
3. Farmers met resistance from occupiers.
4. Some 300 successful applicants did not collect their offer letters.

*Table 4: Unofficial Settlements (Hectares).  
(Statistical table omitted)*

There are 2 970 unofficially settled families in the province. Almost half of these (1452) are in Goromonzi district, and are concentrated on two farms (i.e. Caledonia and Chishawasha B) along Arcturus road. These occupiers include families from urban areas and former farm workers. Teams observed that some urban workers were commuting to work in Harare from these two farms.

*Table 5: Ownership patterns after the Fast Track.  
(Statistical table omitted)*

The hectareage figure is incomplete as information on some farm sizes could not be obtained.

### *3. Issues emerging out of Interviews.*

#### *3.1 Acknowledgements/Reactions of the people.*

Mashonaland East interviewees were happy with the land reform programme and felt that it was long overdue. People expressed satisfaction that there was empowerment for the indigenous Zimbabweans.

Chiefs and the traditional leadership were generally happy about the programme, but complained that very few of their people were resettled.

Settlers and Officials said the process of demarcation and allocation was affected by the fact that there were people on the ground resulting in more people being settled than the assessed carrying capacity of the given farms.

Settlers pointed out that some people (politicians and war veterans) used their positions to influence the allocations either of unequal plot sizes or by changing some farms from A1 Model to A2.

Officials and beneficiaries were agreed that the land allocated was too small and has tended to limit farming activities. Settlers said they needed more land to cater for their livestock, with A1 beneficiaries expressing preference for the self-contained model. The province as a matter of principle did not adopt this model.

Officials and the provincial leadership were agreed that the land acquired for resettlement is insufficient, as there are over 35 000 applicants on the waiting list for A2. There were also substantial numbers on the DLICs lists waiting for A1 allocations.

There was also acknowledgement by officials and the provincial leadership that at some point in the exercise, it became a "numbers and desk exercise", resulting in unviable demarcations.

Both A1 and A2 farmers expressed the need for some form of tenure to be put in place, to enable beneficiaries to have access to finance and make substantial investments on the allocated land.

#### *3.2 Institutional Arrangements.*

Allocation of A1 plots was the responsibility of the DLICs whilst that for A2 was done by the PLICs

This dispersal of authority to allocate land led to contradictions in some cases. The provincial leadership complained that the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement made some allocations without recourse to the Province creating confusions and conflicts.

It was also said that the Ministry issued directives which went against decisions of the Provincial and/or District Committees. The Province's decisions on cases to do with occupiers on A2 farms were cited as examples where the Ministry then issued contradictory directives.

Also cited were cases of how to handle cases of downsizing and/ or land offers by white commercial farmers;

the Province had entered into agreements on the basis of policy directives, which the Ministry later either ignored or treated as the Province's unilateral decisions.

Officials and settlers expressed concern over the lead time between listing and final acquisition and/ or de-listing. The issue of how to deal with occupiers on de-listed' and/or downsized farms has become a challenge.

### *3.3 Decongestion Of Communal Areas.*

There was consensus among officials, traditional leaders and settlers that there was no significant impact on decongestion in the Province as a whole, and especially in the districts of Mudzi, UMP and Mutoko as a result of the Fast Track programme. 457 households from Mutoko, 438 from Mudzi and 384 from UMP were allocated land in the other districts in the Province. Some districts are said not to have honoured a provincial arrangement to allocate land to people from the 3 districts. These three districts have over 9 000 applicants on their waiting lists. The impact on decongestion was said to be minimal mainly due to the following:

Some people who initially occupied the land were not necessarily from the adjacent communal areas.

Most land was taken up by urban dwellers who were occupiers.

Some families did not relocate as a unit to the new farms due to lack of infrastructure in the new farming areas.

There are cases where the traditional leadership reallocated the vacated land to new villagers and former commercial farm workers. Allegations were to the effect that the leaders were benefiting financially from such transactions.

There was already congestion in the new A1 areas as some settlers were allocated land on grazing areas.

Livestock in communal areas still had insufficient grazing.

### *3.4 Productivity.*

Maize was the major crop grown last season by both A1 and A2 farmers.

Some A1 farmers ventured into commercial crops such as tobacco, paprika and soya beans.

Groundnuts, cotton, small grains (sorghum, millet and rapoko) were produced mainly in Chikomba, Mudzi, Mutoko and UMP.

Some farmers who planted late benefited from cyclone Japhet while others were adversely affected.

Some areas, especially in the drier parts of the province (Wedza, Mudzi, Mutoko and UMP) were drought stricken and would need food assistance.

*Table 6: Area Planted By Sector (In Hectares) 2002/2003.*

*(Statistical table omitted)*

Source: AREX

*Table 7: Expected Production by sector 2002/2004.*

*(Statistical table omitted)*

Source: AREX

### *Production Constraints*

(a) There were shortages of fuel, transport, inputs and draught power. Tillage of land, sourcing and transportation of inputs were adversely affected.

(b) The provision of inputs and support services were not synchronised.

(c) Some A1 farmers especially in Goromonzi and Wedza were allocated land late.

(d) A2 farmers could not access finance for inputs due to lack of security of tenure.

### *3.5 Governance*

In A1 farms the committees of seven had been constituted but were not fully composed. Officials and settlers conceded that some of these committees tended to be dominated by a few individuals. This led to conflicts in some cases over who has control on the day-to-day operations of the A1 areas. The committees of seven were a

temporary structure put in place as the traditional leadership was not institutionalised.

The Rural District Councils in both A1 and A2 had generally been ineffective due to under funding and the increase in the population and area to be covered.

Concerns were expressed over the security of Government assets, as a result of lack of governance structures. There were instances of vandalism of communication networks, machinery, equipment, farmhouses and buildings.

Poaching was said to be rife in the farms, so were thefts of both crops and livestock. Some members of committees of seven were alleged to be involved in acts of poaching and vandalism.

### *3.6 Environmental Impact*

A lot of land was said to have been cleared to open up new arable land. However, on unofficially settled farms, officials reported the indiscriminate cutting down of trees. The shortage of coal led to the cutting down of trees for tobacco curing.

The ownership of woodlots and dams in A1 farms had not been clarified. Officials suggested that Rural District Councils take over the management of such resources to ensure that they were not destroyed.

Some A2 farmers were overstocking resulting in overgrazing.

There were reports of gold panning in Mudzi and UMP around the Mazowe and Nyadire Rivers respectively. It was reported that some of the farmers who got land under A1 in Goromonzi turned to gold panning because it is more lucrative. There are also reports of gold panning activities in the Nyagui river area.

### *3.7 Dairy Farms*

There were 78 dairy farms in the province of which 71 were operational. All dairy farms were recommended for de-listing on the understanding that they would continue with dairy production. However, officials noted that production in the dairy farms was declining, while some had stopped production. Farmers cited stock feeds and grazing for their herd as constraints. Recurrence of animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth was also said to have affected the beef and dairy industry.

It was reported that some indigenous farmers had taken over some of the formerly white owned dairy farms.

### *3.8 Infrastructure And Support Services.*

Some homesteads in A1 farms are occupied by some members of the committee of seven, while a few have been allocated to extension workers. Others have been designated as schools, while others have not been determined. In the A2 farms most of the assets are reported to be in good repair as they are under the management of one beneficiary. The teams observed that generally, there is no proper inventory of all the buildings and current use of those buildings.

There is evidence on the ground that the Fast Track was not matched by the provision of schools, clinics, boreholes and other infrastructure in the new farms. DDF and AREX faced resource constraints, which hampered service delivery.

### *3.9 Impact on Former Farm Workers.*

Some former farm workers were allocated land under A1, others were employed by the new A2 farmers and some were still in the compounds. There had been conflicts between the A1 farmers and the former farm workers over the payment of utility bills. New A1 farmers complained that the former farm workers were contributing to criminal activities like cattle rustling, vandalism and theft of farm machinery and equipment. Some of the former farm workers were reported to be buying vacated land in communal areas.

#### iv) MASHONALAND WEST

##### 1.0 Background

1.1 Mashonaland West Province has six districts namely, Chegutu, Hurungwe, Kadoma, Kariba, Makonde and Zvimba. It has a total population of 1 222 583 and covers an area of 57 441 sq km (2002 census). Most of the province lies in natural regions II and III which are suitable for intensive and semi-intensive cropping and livestock production. However, small portions of the province, especially in Kariba district lie in regions IV and V. regions IV and V are suitable for semi-extensive and extensive farming. In the province, Kariba had only two commercial farms.

##### 2.0 Statistical Data

2.1 The province had a total of 2 028 farms, 1 792 of which were acquired for resettlement (figures as at 31 July 2003). As at the 31st of July, 2003 28 643 household had been settled under the A1 model while 3 490 had benefited under the A2 model. The full statistical data is given below.

##### 2.2 Number of Farms in the Province

DISTRICT	DEPT OF LANDS	LAND REVIEW COMMITTEE	GAZETTED FARMS	WHITE OWNED FARMS NOT GAZETTED	DE-LISTED FARMS
Chegutu	363	335	340	41	68
Hurungwe	383	325	318	68	27
Kadoma	297	269	179	103	43
Kariba	2	2	1	1	1
Makonde	465	424	376	92	15
Zvimba	718	673	578	155	31
Total	2 228	2 028	1 792	460	185

The main reasons for the variations between the number of farms in official records and those recorded by the Land Review Committee data collections teams are that some of the subdivided farms were counted as one while some amalgamations were counted as separate farms.

In some cases some of the farms on the Department of Land list had already been allocated to urban areas, a case in point is Zvimba where some farms which appeared on its list had already been absorbed by Harare. Some of the farms listed under Chegutu belonged to Kadoma.

Reasons for de-listing farms were that some of the farms were indigenous owned, agro-industries or single owned properties.

##### 2.3 Hectarage and take up Rates (Statistical table omitted)

The take up rate for the A1 model in Hurungwe was 102,6% indicating that the plots pegged were oversubscribed. Chegutu and Zvimba had significantly low take up rate for the A2 scheme.

##### 2.4 Allocation Patterns (Statistical table omitted)

##### 2.5 Farms Officially and Unofficially Settled

DISTRICT	A1 FARMS OFFICIALLY SELECTED	A2 FARMS OFFICIALLY SELECTED	TOTAL FARMS OFFICIALLY SELECTED	TOTAL HECTARAGE	FARMS UNOFFICIALLY SETTLED
Chegutu	105	53	158	112 757.41	9
Hurungwe	111	98	209	120 140.00	14
Kadoma	83	17	100	137 442.05	3
Kariba	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL
Makonde	163	176	339	258 753.71	6

Zvimba	208	263	471	163 420.00	94
Total	670	607	1 2779	792 513.17	126

The Gwebi/Hunyani area is worthy of note in terms of the high instances of unofficially settled farms.

### 2.6 Land Ownership Patterns After Fast Track.

Category	No. of Farms	No. of Owners	Hectarage
White Owned	265	265	322 302.2864
Indigenous Owned	141	141	164 977.2992
Company Owned	22		14 516.9117
Parastatal Owned	4		5 351.6000
Church Owned	2	2	1 293.0026
State Institutions & Municipalities	27		29 759.3351
Grand Total	461		538 200.4300

### 3.0 Emerging Issues

#### 3.1 Reaction of the People to the Land Reform Programme

3.1.1 the Programme was received very positively in the Province. Most beneficiaries were also satisfied with the sizes of the plots allocated to them and many found the soils fertile and suitable for growing crops and rearing livestock. However, officials in the Province stated that the land acquired to date was not adequate as the communal lands remained congested and the waiting lists of people in need of land were still very long.

3.1.2 Almost all the officials interviewed agreed that some farms that were acquired should not have been acquired, particularly those with agro-industries, such as coffee, citrus, banana plantations and cattle ranching. Some felt that some farms that had well-developed irrigation infrastructure should not have been allocated to A1 but to A2 beneficiaries who could make full use of the infrastructure.

3.1.3 Interviewees reported a high prevalence of theft and vandalism to farm property, stock theft and poaching which they attributed to lack of proper governance structure in the resettlement areas.

#### 3.2 Institutional Arrangements

3.2.1 The laid down procedures for land identification and allocation were followed at the initial stages but were later interfered with by prominent politicians and others who became involved in land allocations, leading to a number of administrative problems and unofficial settlements, especially in the Districts of Hurungwe and Kadoma.

3.2.2 The multiplicity of "allocating authorities" gave rise to double allocations, multiple allocations, and favouritism in land allocations.

3.2.3 The processing of offer letters in the Province was considered too slow. This was compounded by other factors such as officials interfering with the allocation process as in the case of Hurungwe where the former DA did not post 341 offer letters to the beneficiaries, but instead, issued his own offer letters to favoured people. The DA has since been dismissed. In Gwebi/Hunyani, the DLIC and PLIC failed to resolve the problems there, resulting in a lot of people being allocated land unofficially.

#### 3.3 Land Allocation

3.3.1 Planning seems to have been largely a desk exercise as it failed to take cognisance of the infrastructure existing on some farms. On such farms as Stirling Vale and Dichwe in Makonde District, coffee and citrus plantations were cut up into small units and allocated to separate individuals rendering them unviable. Concern was expressed at the uprooting of coffee plants at Dichwe farm.

3.3.2 At Hunyani and Yomba (Zvimba), Two Tree and Manyamba (Makonde) as well as Blackmovale and Impalavale (Kadoma), the demarcation of plots failed to consider the irrigation infrastructure already on the farms to the extent that it is difficult to operate the system unless re-planning is done.

3.3.3 The production of specialised crops such as flowers has also been severely affected particularly in Zvimba, since most of the farms where such activities were taking place were demarcated for A1. Most farmers in A1 lack the knowledge and wherewithal to undertake such activities. The following farms in Zvimba are a case in point: Mimosa (A1), Mpandaguta (A1), Muhacha (A1) and Nicortina (A1).

#### *3.4 Decongestion*

3.4.1 Statistics from the data collection teams and comments from interviewees suggest that decongestion had not significantly taken place in the communal lands. This situation had been worsened by some land reform beneficiaries who maintained dual homes i.e. both in the communal areas and in the new resettlement schemes owing to the uncertainty of tenure referred to earlier.

#### *3.5 Productivity*

3.5.1 While some people especially in Makonde realised good harvests, production was generally constrained by a number of factors which included: lack of adequate financial resources, lack of farming implements for tillage, lack of adequate inputs and drought.

#### *3.6 Provision of Agricultural Inputs*

3.6.1 A sizeable number of settlers benefited from the Government input support programme. However, many expressed concern with the way the inputs scheme was being administered by the GMB. They complained that inputs such as fertiliser and seed often came late or were inadequate. Some pointed out that some of the agricultural inputs were often given to undeserving persons who sometimes ended up selling them. There was therefore need for the GMB to institute follow up mechanisms to ensure the inputs are used properly.

3.6.2 The DDF was failing to cope with the demand for tillage and was being accused of favouring influential people at the expense of the ordinary people.

3.6.3 Most farmers in both A1 and A2 models had very little resources for farming activities and largely depended on Government support. The lack of resources such as draught power and adequate farming inputs was a major constraint on crop production.

#### *3.7 Role Played by Agro-business*

3.7.1 Many settlers were of the view that some agro-businesses operating in the province were playing an important role in providing input support services. However, some expressed concern at the operations of certain companies which they alleged were charging exorbitant prices for the inputs they supplied.

#### *3.8 Tenure*

3.8.1 The uncertainty in the security of tenure resulted in beneficiaries being unable to secure loans for investment and also being hesitant to invest their own money on the plots they would have been allocated resulting in reduced production.

#### *3.9 The Environment*

3.9.1 Gold panning was becoming a major issue, especially in Kadoma district as it competes for land with agricultural production. The precedence of the Mines and Minerals Act over other land use legislation was questioned. There was thus need to make it compatible with legislation governing land use practices.

#### *3.10 Infrastructure on the Farms*

3.10.1 Instances of conflicts regarding the use of tobacco barns and other infrastructure such as irrigation facilities were observed e.g. at Maine farm (Chegututu), Chinomwa (Zvimba), Two Tree farms (Makonde) and others.

3.10.2 Infrastructure on most farms, such as the farmhouses, barns, sheds etc. were in a state of neglect or had been vandalised. Many settled farms had irrigation infrastructure but very few were functional. The infrastructure needed to be rehabilitated.

3.10.3 There was shortage of social infrastructure i.e. schools, clinics, roads, water supply points etc.

#### *3.11 Governance*

3.11.1 The issue of governance in resettled areas was of major concern. Many farmers expressed dissatisfaction with the role of the committee of 7 that was responsible for local administration in A1 farms as these, especially

the chairmen often abused their powers. There was thus need to clarify the terms of reference for these committees. In A2 farms it was mostly the Rural District Councils, which were responsible for local governance, however, settlers still had difficulties in the areas of dispute settlement, and security.

### *3.12 Former Farm Workers*

3.12.1 Generally, former farm workers did not benefit from the land reform programme in the province, for various reasons. However, at Katawa (Zvimba), some former farm workers have been allocated 2 hectare plots.

### *3.13 Issues Peculiar to the Gwebi/Hunyani Area.*

3.13.1 Virtually all the officials, in both Zvimba district and at Provincial level highlighted the need to have the problem of illegal settlements in the Gwebi/Hunyani area resolved.

## v) MASVINGO

### 1. Background

Masvingo province which has a surface area of 56 566 square kilometres has a population of 1 318 705 (2002 Census) and is made up of the following administrative districts: Bikita, Chiredzi, Chivi, Masvingo, Mwenezi and Zaka. Of the seven districts, farms in Bikita are part of the Save Valley Conservancy and the Chiredzi River Conservancy and were thus delisted, whilst Chivi and Zaka did not have any commercial farms.

The Province falls within Natural Regions III, IV and V.

### 2. Statistical Data

3. 2.1 A total of 649 farms measuring 2 622 147 hectares were gazetted for compulsory acquisition in Masvingo Province. One hundred and ninety-six (196) of these were delisted for various reasons including indigenous ownership, church ownership, protection under the BUPA, designation as conservancies, plantation farms (sugar estates), and state land. A total of 23 772 households were resettled under the various resettlement models during the Fast Track on 1 439 912 hectares.

The following tables give a statistical overview of the land acquisition profile and settler emplacement in Masvingo province as at the end of July 2003.

*Table 1. Number of farms in the Province*

DISTRICT	NO. OF FARMS EST BY DISTRICT TEAMS	NO. OF FARMS ON OFFICIAL LISTS	NO. OF FARMS GAZETTED	NO. OF FARMS DELISTED
Bikita	16	16	16	16
Chiredzi	128	137*	128	36
Chivi				
Gutu	123	123	123	18
Masvingo	255*	250	255	116
Mwenezi	127	131*	127	10
Zaka				
Total	649	657	649	196

\* The following reasons were given by the District Teams for the variations in the statistics:

- (1) Chiredzi District: Variance of 9 farms because 9 farms belonging to Masvingo district were captured in Chiredzi district records.
- (2) Masvingo district: Variances of 5 farms because farms were recorded under Chiredzi district.
- (3) Mwenezi District: Variances of 4 farms because 2 were recorded twice whilst 1 farm was listed under three different names.

All the farms in Bikita were delisted, as they are part of the Save Valley Conservancy and the Chiredzi River Conservancy. According to policy conservancies were not supposed to be acquired for resettlement.

*Table 2. Land Allocation Patterns and Take up Rates  
(Statistical table omitted)*

Statistics could not be established by the District Teams and in the case of Mwenezi District Model A2 settler emplacement, the gender breakdown of beneficiaries could not be obtained. Please note that Bikita is not included on the table because all its farms were delisted whilst Chivi and Zaka are excluded because they do not have any commercial farms. People from these districts were accommodated in other districts during the Fast Track resettlement exercise.

*Table 3. Land Distribution by Gender  
(Statistical table omitted)*

The Mwenezi district team could not establish the gender breakdown for the Model A2 beneficiaries. However, available statistics from other districts depict that a very low percentage of females were allocated land under the Fast Track land reform programme. The table does not capture the war veterans who were resettled under the programme.

*Table 4. Unofficially Settled Farms by District*  
(Statistical table omitted)

Does not capture households informally settled on Chidza and Chevden farms which could not be established

#### *Nuanetsi Ranch*

Discussion with the Provincial Administrator and Chief Lands Officer at the time of report writing indicated that there has been no official settlement yet on Nuanetsi Ranch. They noted that the following plans have been made to address the issue.

150 000 ha had been made available by DTZ for official resettlement of people.

54 000 ha of the offered land have been planned for A1 plots and A2 subdivisions as follows:

A2 20 beneficiaries for livestock farming

100 beneficiaries for irrigation

A1 = 6 500 households for irrigation on plots between 0,5 and 10 ha in extent

\*10 000 — 14 000 ha for maize irrigation scheme by ARDA

Ministry of Lands Agriculture and Rural Resettlement were currently conducting head count to facilitate allocations once pegging had been concluded.

*Table 5. Land Ownership Profile after Fast Track*  
(Statistical table omitted)

Excludes areas of Chiredzi Research Station, Mbizi Quarantine Station and Nandi (ARDA) farm in Chiredzi district whose exact sizes could not be obtained.

Does not include areas of Makoholi Research Station in Masvingo district

Does not incorporate areas of Gokomere, Muzero and Morgenster Missions in Masvingo district as well as areas of Mbungo and Mukaro farms in Gutu district whose sizes could not be ascertained.

### *3. Emerging Issues.*

#### *3.1 Reactions to the Fast Track.*

Stakeholders who included the Governor, Government Officials, traditional leaders, war veterans and new settlers were generally satisfied with the overall land redistribution exercise. They acknowledged that Government had managed to empower the majority of the people in Zimbabwe through land allocation. There was however consensus among those interviewed that more land was required for resettlement especially from districts like Bikita, Chivi and Zaka which did not have any commercial farms.

Although quite a substantial number of people had been resettled from the communal areas, interviewed chiefs indicated that potential settlers on their lists had not been exhausted. Officials explained this development indicating that there was competition for resettlement between the communal people and people from the urban areas.

#### *3.2 Institutional Arrangements*

3.2.1 Implementation of the programme was spearheaded by the PLIC chaired by the Governor and the District Land Identification Committees (DLICs) chaired by District Administrators (DAs). However, officials noted that departures were later observed in Chiredzi where there was interference from war veterans and politicians; Masvingo district where war veterans politicians and traditional leaders had an overriding influence over the operations of the Committees; and Mwenezi, where war veterans and politicians interfered with Committee business.

This phenomenon led to unprocedural land allocations.

Gutu district is an exception in the Province in this regards as the composition of the DLIC followed the laid down policy. Land identification and allocation were therefore done procedurally.

3.2.2 Laid down procedures for land identification were generally followed at the inception of the programme. Departures were however noted where instructions to acquire conservancy farms such as Angus, Chigwete, Mkwazi and Mukazi in Bikita district were issued by the Provincial authorities. After these farms were settled, outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease were reported as settlers' cattle came into contact with Save Valley

Conservancy buffalo. Agro-industrial properties and farms protected by country to country agreements were also observed to have been gazetted for compulsory acquisition.

3.2.3. The District Teams also discovered that the institutional arrangements were affected across the Province when all districts were directed by the Chairman of the National Task Force of Ministers to meet settler emplacement targets within a period of “40 days and 40 nights” during March/April 2001.

### *3.3 Impact of Fast Track on Decongestion in Communal Areas*

Stakeholders who were interviewed stated that the impact of the resettlement programme on decongestion in the communal areas was minimal. This was attributed to the following reasons among others:

Land shortage in the Province because two of Masvingo's districts do not have any commercial farms.  
Failure by the new settlers to surrender their communal homes and land holdings.  
The accommodation of people from the urban areas at the expense of communal people.

Gutu district was however an exception as all the stakeholders had come together in the A1 settler selection process. Settlers had therefore been selected according to the ward system thereby achieving a measure of decongestion. It was still necessary though to undertake a communal land re-organisation exercise for the full impact of the resettlement exercise to be felt.

### *3.4 Plot Take up Rate*

The average plot take up rates for Model A1 and A2 were 95% and 79% respectively. Take up constraints were evident in Chiredzi district where A2 beneficiaries experienced difficulties with former cane growers who had provisional orders from the courts barring the new farmers from taking up their land. The same difficulties were encountered over land under wildlife management.

### *3.5. Production*

#### *3.5.1. Crop Production*

Generally, the Fast Track had a great impact on cropping in the Province. Resettled farmers responded positively to the need to grow a whole range of crops including high value cash crops such as cotton, paprika and wheat over and above the staple crop maize. Reasonable yields were realised despite the drought conditions. Settlers indicated that the advent of Cyclone Japhet benefited the late planted crops such as cotton and sorghum.

Significant yields were realised by resettled farmers who averaged 0,6 to 0,7 tonnes/hectare for sorghum and 0,8 to 1 tonne/hectare for cotton in Chiredzi district. According to the Chief Agricultural Extension Officer, yields can be increased through timely distribution of inputs in adequate quantities.

#### *3.5.2. Sugar Cane Production*

The Fast Track saw 401 indigenous farmers being allocated land under the Model A2 on 54 farms.

#### *3.5.3 Livestock Production*

While many parts of the Province are suitable for cattle ranching, it was noted that many properties which had been assigned to such ranching had now been demarcated into plots for cropping. This called for replanning and reorganisation of the properties in question such that they would revert to the original land use patterns.

### *3.6 Agricultural Inputs and Support Services*

Most beneficiaries acknowledged receiving inputs through the Grain Marketing Board scheme but expressed concern at the late delivery of these inputs in inadequate quantities. Some settlers therefore wanted to participate in loan financing schemes for the procurement of inputs (seed, fertiliser and agro-chemicals) if these were made available. These settlers also wanted to use such schemes to procure tractors and other agricultural equipment.

The new farmers particularly A2 farmers also bemoaned the lack of security of tenure under the Fast Track programme as this limited their capacity to borrow. They implored Government to urgently address this issue.

Most settlers were not satisfied with the delivery of services by AREX extension staff and called for the introduction of skills development programmes for interested resettled farmers.

### *3.7 Infrastructural Support*

Most of the stakeholders who were interviewed were of the opinion that infrastructural requirements such as schools, clinics, boreholes and access roads were hardly adequate. However, satellite schools and clinics had

been established in all the districts using homesteads in the former commercial farms. The shortage of this infrastructure was cited as one of the reasons for the dual ownership of land in the communal areas and resettlement farms. Schools and clinics were available in communal areas and this therefore encouraged settled farmers to maintain their communal homes.

The irrigation rehabilitation programme was popular among beneficiaries who had irrigation infrastructure on their allocations. Concerns were however raised over the apparent delays in the processing of applications and hence there was a call for the decentralisation of the disbursement of funds under the programme.

### *3.8 Governance*

3.8.1. Committees of Seven were observed to be evident on resettled farms even though they were mostly ineffective. It was noted that their authority had been undermined by influential individuals calling themselves 'Base Commanders'. This was particularly evident in Gutu and Masvingo districts. This feature had the negative effect of unprocedural land allocations particularly in Masvingo district, and the occupation of homesteads on A1 farms by individuals instead of these being used for community purposes such as satellite schools and clinics. Poaching, stock-theft, indiscriminate tree cutting and vandalism had also been observed because of the absence of a governing authority on resettled farms.

3.8.2. There were boundary disputes in the districts of Chiredzi, Bikita and Gutu involving some chiefs in these districts.

3.8.3. The institutional presence of Rural District Councils (RDCs) was not very evident in resettled areas.

### *3.9 Environmental Issues*

#### *3.9.1 Illegal Gold Panning*

Illegal Gold panning was observed along Runde River on the Development Trust of Zimbabwe (DTZ) Nuanetsi Ranch. It was believed that approximately 1 400 people who were part of the 4 193 families that are settled unofficially on this property are responsible for this activity.

#### *3.10 Former Farm Workers*

Some 128 former farm workers were resettled. Others are assumed to have taken up employment under the newly resettled A2 farmers particularly in the Chiredzi can growing area. It was also believed that the rest may have gone back to their original homes or taken up alternative employment elsewhere.

## *4. Issues Peculiar to The Province*

### *4.1 Conservancies*

Masvingo province had large tracts of land under wildlife management on designated conservancies such as Save Valley Conservancy, Chiredzi River Ranch Conservancy and parts of Bubiya Conservancy covering Bikita, Chiredzi and Mwenzi districts. These conservancies were the preserve of the whites. Many in the province bemoaned the policy vacuum in this sector.

### *4.2 Gonarezhou National Park/Ndali Boundary Dispute*

National Parks and Wildlife Management Authority and the Ndali people in Chiredzi district are engaged in a long-standing boundary dispute. An area of about 16 000 hectares was occupied by the Ndali people. The land in question formed part of the above cited National Park. The matter required early resolution (see Chapter 7 above).

## (vi) MATABELELAND NORTH

### 1.0 Background

1.1 Matabeleland North Province, with a population of 701 359 (2002 census) comprises 7 districts: namely; Binga, Bubi, Hwange, Lupane, Nkayi, Tsholotsho and Umguza, spanning a total area of 75 025 square kilometres. The Province is very dry and arid and falls in ecological-regions IV and V, which are suitable for livestock and wildlife ranching.

### 2.0 Statistical Data

There are 670 farms in the province with the largest concentration in Umguza and Bubi districts. There are no commercial farms in the districts of Binga and Nkayi. Out of the total number of farms, 323 farms measuring 686 311.5963 hectares were allocated 59 A1 and A2 schemes benefiting 10 092 settlers. The statistical picture of the farms and land allocation patterns are as given below.

#### 2.1 Number of Farms in the Province

DISTRICT	DEPT OF LANDS	LAND REVIEW COMMITTEE	Gazetted Farms	Gazetted but not settled Farms	White owned farms not gazetted	De-listed Farms
Binga	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bubi	278	278	187	3	27	23
Hwange	55	55	42	2	3	5
Lupane	35	35	31	0	1	6
Nkayi	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tsholotsho	12	12	12	0	0	1
Umguza	290	290	209	3	23	67
TOTAL	670	670	481	8	54	102

The table shows the number of farms as in official records (Department of Lands Office) and verified and rationalised by Data Collection teams. The figures include those farms that were originally gazetted but were de-listed. The farms were de-listed mainly because the owner was a single owner, or were subject to country to country agreements or were owned by indigenous people or were dairies. Gazetted farms not settled were either set aside for CAMPFIRE projects or were not allocated. 23 farms belong to either ARDA, Forestry Commission, churches or Government.

Data gathered by Data Collection tallied with that found in official records at the Lands office, particularly in Hwange, Lupane and Tsholotsho districts. This is because the districts have fewer farms. However, in Bubi and Umguza districts, it was found that some farms were recorded under Matabeleland South. The same was the case with some farms which fall into Matabeleland North.

#### 2.2 Allocation Patterns (Statistical table omitted)

#### 2.3 Farms officially and unofficially settled

District	No. of A1 Farms officially settled	No. of A2 Farms officially settled	Total Farms officially settled	No. of Farms unofficially settled
Binga	0	0	0	0
Bubi	124	7	131	8
Hwange	12	12	24	0
Lupane	7	19	26	0
Nkayi	0	0	0	0
Tsholotsho	12	0	12	0
Umguza	103	27	130	4
TOTAL	258	65	323	12

The table shows that 323 farms were allocated to A1 Villagised, A1 Self-Contained and A2 farmers in Matabeleland North Province.

*2.4 Beneficiaries by gender*  
(Statistical table omitted)

*3.0 Emerging issues*

*3.1 Reactions of the people to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme*

3.1.1 The people in Matabeleland North Province were generally happy with the government's decision to embark on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. They were of the view that the land allocated to them was generally adequate and suitable for the intended purposes, particularly those in the A1 Villagised schemes. However, those allocated land in safari areas required urgent assistance to render operations in these areas viable.

*3.2 Institutional arrangements*

3.2.1 Problems of conflicting policy positions and directives from the Ministry of Land, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement down to district levels were observed. These manifested in double allocation of farms, uncoordinated de-listing of farms and instances where some persons defied authority when asked to vacate certain sites on which they had settled. The dissolution of Land Identification Committees further created problems as settlers could not have immediate recourse to the government machinery when disputes arose.

*3.3 Decongestion*

3.3.1 Chiefs and Officials in the province were of the view that the land acquired for resettlement was inadequate as they had long waiting lists. The impact on decongestion had therefore been negligible according to them.

*3.4 Land Allocation*

3.4.1 Verification by Data Collection teams revealed that there were many instances of people being settled over and above the official carrying capacities of the farms, thereby reducing the sizes of individual land allocations particularly in A1 schemes. There were also many instances of plots that had been allocated without official sanction.

3.4.2 A few cases of double ownership were noted. Although the verification that was done on this matter was not exhaustive, what emerged could be a tip of the ice-berg.

*3.5 Impact on Former Farm Workers*

3.5.1 As indicated above, only 2.23% of the former farm workers benefited from the Land Reform Programme. The whereabouts of the majority of them was unknown. According to some of their former colleagues still remaining on some farms, they had left with their former white employers.

*3.6 Productivity*

3.6.1 Yields were very low due to a number of factors attributable to the drought and shortages of inputs.

3.6.2 Most beneficiaries expected the government to provide them with start-up capital by way of equipment, draught power and inputs in order to farm productively.

3.6.3 There were very few irrigation schemes in the province. Both beneficiaries and officials were of the view that this would adversely affect crop production in this low rainfall province.

*3.7 Provision of Agricultural Inputs*

3.7.1 Seed packs and fertilizers either came too late in the planting season or were inadequate. Although a sizable number of beneficiaries received tillage services, at times these services also came too late.

3.7.2 Although this was a bad agricultural season, the Government's Limited Input Support Scheme went a long way in averting starvation, as some beneficiaries harvested enough for their own sustenance, albeit for a short period.

*3.8 Tenure*

3.8.1 Security of tenure on the farms for the new settlers was still to be resolved. This had affected the complete re-location of the beneficiaries to their new settlements, such that many continued to maintain two homes, thus negatively affecting productivity on the new farms.

### *3.9 The Environment*

3.9.1 The destruction of the environment was cause for concern for both officials and some of the beneficiaries. There was considerable cutting down of trees and illegal gold panning especially in Bubi district. Poaching of wildlife is prevalent.

### *3.11 Infrastructure on the farms.*

3.11.1 Verification by Data Collection teams revealed that amenities such as schools, roads, dams, clinics and service centres were grossly inadequate. There was also considerable vandalism of farm homesteads, fences and water facilities. Instances of conflict over usage of these facilities were brought to the attention of the teams.

### *3.11 Governance*

3.11.1 Governance structures existed on the ground in the form of the Committee of Seven. However, the committees of Seven had tended to usurp the powers of the DLICs particularly in the allocation of land. The institutional presence of the Rural District Councils was virtually non-existent in the new settlements, according to the new settlers. This also partly explains some of the problems of poaching and illegal gold panning mentioned above.

### *3.12 Conservancies*

3.12.1 In some conservancies, the Data Collection Teams established that some former owners obtained High Court Orders to remain on gazetted properties, thus frustrating the new owners who had been given hunting quotas on the same properties. This led to conflict especially in the Gwaai River Conservancy. The reluctance by foreign clients to deal with Zimbabwean operators in the preference for South Africans was observed. This might mean that substantial foreign currency was being lost to South Africa.

3.12.2 The new beneficiaries did not have adequate equipment, facilities and skills to run quality and viable operations.

### *3.13 Issues peculiar to Matabeleland North Province*

3.13.1 Although there are no farms in Binga district, the predominant Tonga inhabitants were not interested in taking up land outside the district. Their view was that they should be resettled in nearby National Parks which to them were deliberately created for wildlife at their expense, and that government should develop irrigation and assist local fishing activities in the area. Fishing permits needed to be reviewed in order to remove what was perceived as a bias against locals in this regard.

## (vii) MATABELELAND SOUTH

### 1.0 Background

1.1 Matabeleland South Province has six administrative districts, namely Beitbridge, Bulilimamangwe, Gwanda, Insiza, Matopo and Umzingwane. It covers an area of 54 172 square kilometres and had a population of 654 879 (2002 census). The Province lies wholly in agro-ecological region 5, which is suitable for cattle and game ranching. Cropping can also be undertaken under irrigation.

### 2.0 Statistical Data

2.1 The Province has a total of 922 farms, of which 435 farms were acquired for resettlement (as at 31 July 2003). As at 31 July 2003, 8 923 households had been settled under the A1 Model, while 271 had benefited under the A2 Model.

### 2.2 Number of farms in the Province

District	No. of farms as per Dept. of Lands	No. of farms as per Land Review Committee
Beitbridge	35	35
Bulilimamangwe	233	347
Gwanda	127	127
Insiza	224	245
Matobo	88	101
Umzingwane	43	67
Total	750	922

The variance arises from sub-divisions which were done prior to the Land Reform Programme but whose details were not yet recorded at the Deeds Office.

### 2.3 Number of farms gazetted

District	No. of Gazetted farms as per Dept. of Lands	No. of Gazetted farms as per District Teams
Beitbridge	31	34
Bulilimamangwe	102	114
Gwanda	71	71
Insiza	93	94
Matobo	61	61
Umzingwane	39	61
Total	397	435

Variance: The records at the District Administrator's Office were more up to date than those of the Department of Lands.

### 2.4 Farms allocated and Take up rates (Statistical table omitted)

2.4.1 65 farms were allocated to 271 beneficiaries under the A2 model, while 226 farms were allocated for the resettlement of 8 923 beneficiaries under the A1 model. The take up rates are as follows:-

A1 Males 87.63%, Females 12.37%

A2 Males 79.6%, Females 20.5%

### 2.5 Number of ungazetted farms

District	No. of Ungazetted farms as per Dept. of Lands	No. of Ungazetted farms as per District Teams
Beitbridge	4	1

Bulilimamamangwe	131	232
Gwanda	56	56
Insiza	95	106
Matobo	13	43
Umzingwane	4	6
Total	303	444

2.5.1 Bulilimamamangwe, Gwanda and Insiza Districts had ungazetted farms, which included some settled prior to the Fast Track.

#### 2.6 Number of de-listed farms

District	No. of Ungazetted farms as per Dept. of Lands	No. of Ungazetted farms as per District Teams
Beitbridge	10	13
Bulilimamamangwe	6	10
Gwanda	1	1
Insiza	35	35
Matobo	3	3
Umzingwane	6	13
Total	61	75

The 75 farms were de-listed on account of country to country agreements, or were owned by indigenous people, or were single owned properties.

#### 2.7 Number of gazetted but unsettled farms

District	No. of Gazetted but Unsettled farms as per Dept. of Lands	No. of Gazetted but Unsettled farms as per District Teams
Beitbridge	3	3
Bulilimamamangwe	0	0
Gwanda	0	1
Insiza	0	0
Matobo	18	18
Umzingwane	0	12
Total	21	34

2.7.1 Only two districts, Beitbridge and Matobo had indicated that they had farms which were gazetted but unsettled. However, the District Team found out that Umzingwane also had 12 farms in this category. The reason for failure to settle was that these were being contested by white farmers.

#### 2.8 Number of gazetted but unofficially settled farms

District	No. of Gazetted unofficially settled farms as per Dept. of Lands	No. of Gazetted unofficially settled farms as per District Teams
Beitbridge	0	0
Bulilimamamangwe	0	0
Gwanda	2	0
Insiza	11	8
Matobo	0	0
Umzingwane	0	0
Total	13	8

2.8.1 Gwanda and Insiza had some farms which had been unofficially settled on land already allocated. These unofficial settlers were mainly from Bulawayo.

## 2.9 Number of Farms owned by various institutions

District	Owned by Government	Owned by Indigenous Farmers	Owned by Churches	Country to Country
Beitbridge	0	0	0	1
Bulilimamangwe	1	112	1	2
Gwanda	2	12	0	0
Insiza	2	59	2	0
Matobo	0	2	0	0
Umzingwane	1	9	0	3
Total	6	194	3	6

## 3.0 Emerging Issues

### 3.1 Reactions of People To the Land Reform Programme

3.1.1 The majority of respondents in the Province applauded the Land Reform Programme for empowering the landless. Whilst the land allocations complied with the stipulated farm sizes in both A1 and A2 models, most beneficiaries expressed the view that land offered was inadequate for cattle ranching.

3.1.2 The carrying capacity of land allocated to the majority of A2 beneficiaries could not sustain the large numbers of cattle they owned, which ranged between 100 to 1000 herds. There already was evidence of overgrazing in the newly resettled farms.

3.1.3 Interviewees expressed concern over some unsavoury instances of greed that tarnished the land allocation exercise. Instances were cited of favouritism and the use of positions to influence allocations.

3.1.4 Government officials interviewed expressed concern over delays in the resolution of court cases arising from contests by white farmers. This had hampered new farmers in confidently investing on their allocated farms. A number of conflicting statements had been issued by government departments on the status of these farms, thereby causing new farmers to be cautious on developing their land.

### 4.0 Decongestion

4.1 Decongestion of rural areas had not been effected because most families decided to split, with some family members and their cattle moving to the new farm. Other members of the family remained at the rural homestead with school-going children.

### 5.0 Productive Capacity and Supportive Services

5.1 The majority of the beneficiaries interviewed indicated that they did not carry out farming activities due to problems of scarcity of inputs. Only a few beneficiaries in Gwanda acknowledged having received maize seed late and could therefore not do any cropping.

5.2 There was very little networking between the new beneficiaries and the existing private sector/farmers' association for inputs or other support programmes because of lack of information dissemination. Most beneficiaries were of the view that cropping was a non-starter without adequate irrigation infrastructure by way of dams with perennial water supply.

5.3 A1 beneficiaries were better supported by AREX than was the case with those in A2 schemes. In certain cases, it was difficult to assess this aspect due to the absence of the beneficiaries, the majority being civil servants who tend to miss out on support schemes, which was available during the working days of the week.

### 6.0 Infrastructure

6.1 Infrastructure on the newly resettled farms had been vandalised during the changeover between the former farmers and the new beneficiaries. Allegations of abuse of such infrastructure ranged from blame on the departing farmer to incompetence of using the infrastructure by the new beneficiaries.

6.2 Such farm structures as homesteads had been converted into schools. Very few had been turned into clinics.

### *7.0 Impact On Former Commercial White Farmers and Farm Workers*

7.1 A number of white commercial farmers still remained in the Province engaged in activities ranging from cropping, citrus fruits, cattle ranching and game ranching. A few cases of acrimonious relationships between the new beneficiaries and white commercial farmers were noted in Matobo and Umzingwane. It was difficult to establish the number of the remaining white commercial farmers who are settled on sub-divided farms because some farmers are still contesting the gazetting of their farms.

7.2 Many former farm workers were alleged to be involved in gold panning especially in Umzingwane district. A few were employed by the new beneficiaries. All the districts recorded some farm workers who benefited from the land reform programme. Insiza had the highest number of former farm workers who benefited from the scheme (238) with Matobo district being the least with 6 beneficiaries only.

### *8.0 Role by Agro-Business*

8.1 The Cold Storage Company farms were mainly being used for contract grazing. ARDA supported new farmers with irrigation facilities and loans. The GMB provided inputs whilst AGRIBANK provided credit financing.

### *9.0 Governance*

9.1 The newly resettled areas were mainly administered by the District Administrator's office in conjunction with the committees of seven. These new leaders were still being integrated into the local governance structures of chiefs and headmen.

9.2 The PLIC had very little control over the DLICs such that the co-ordination of allocations of farms was done at district level. In some districts conflicts arose when self-imposed leaders took to allocating land to persons who were not on original registers.

### *10.0 Security of Tenure*

10.1 The majority of beneficiaries had expressed concern on matters of security of tenure. Without a clear indicator as to their ownership of the allocated land and frequent relations at some farms, some beneficiaries were unwilling to commit their resources to the land.

10.2 Delays in court cases arising from contests by white farmers against displacement from their farms remained unresolved. Cattle rustling and poaching of wildlife on most farms adjacent to urban areas was rampant.

### *11.0 Impact On The Environment*

11.1 Gold panning was rife in the Province especially in Umzingwane district. This had created conflict between newly settled farmers and panners, as the latter had encroached on some of the farms. Gold panning had led to degradation of catchment areas and siltation of dams. The Umzingwane River had become heavily silted due to gold panning.

## (viii) MIDLANDS

### *Background*

The province with an area of 49 166km and a population of 1 366 331 (2002 census) comprises eight administrative districts namely Gokwe North, Gokwe South, Gweru, Kwekwe Mberengwa Mvuma, Shurugwi and Zvishavane.

The Province lies mainly in Natural Region III, IV, and V. It has an annual rainfall ranging from 450 - 880mm, which is generally characterised by uneven distribution, mild season droughts and early cessation. This makes most areas of the Province suitable for extensive livestock production whilst the higher rainfall areas with corresponding fertile soils are more suitable for mixed agricultural production.

### *1. Statistical Data*

The total number of farms in the Province as established by the data collection teams is 1 347. A total of 791 farms measuring 997 213 hectares were gazetted whilst 95 farms were de-listed for various reasons including engagement in agro-industrial production, dairy farming, conservancies, protection by country to country agreements, indigenous ownership, church ownership and state land. A total of 18 489 households were resettled under the various resettlement models during the Fast Track programme on a total of 640 458 hectares.

The following tables give a statistical overview of land acquisition and settler emplacement in the Midlands Province as at the end of July 2003.

*Table 1: Total number of Farms in the Province.*

District	Number Obtained from Authorities	Number Established by the District Teams
Gokwe North	0	0
Gokwe South	0	0
Gweru	538	585
Kwekwe	210	397
Mberengwa	27	27
Mvuma	135	187
Shurugwi	151	101
Zvishavane	31	25
Total	1 092	1 347

The number of farms supplied by the authorities of Kwekwe, Gweru, Shurugwi and Mvuma districts show a marked variation from what was established by the data collection teams. A total of 255 farms were not on the official records from MOLARR and the explanation given was that the records had not been updated.

*Table 2: Gazetted, Ungazetted and Delisted*

District	Gazetted	Ungazetted	Delisted
Gokwe North	0	0	0
Gokwe South	0	0	0
Gweru	438	100	65
Kwekwe	114	96	9
Mberengwa	19	8	5
Mvuma	70	65	6
Shurugwi	127	24	9
Zvishavane	23	8	1
Total	791	301	95

The largest number of delisted farms is in Gweru followed by Kwekwe and Shurugwi Districts because it was discovered that they were indigenous owned, agro-industries or seed producing farms.

*Table 3: Number of Farmer Allocated and Take Up Rates*

(Statistical table omitted)

Table 4: Land Allocation by Gender

(Statistical table omitted)

There are no A2 farms in Mberengwa district. The allocation patterns by gender could not be ascertained for Mvuma and Shurugwi districts.

Table 5: Unofficially settled farmers

District	No. of Illegally Settled farms	No. of unofficial settlers
Gokwe North	0	0
Gokwe South	0*	164
Gweru	2	30
Kewkwe	1	5
Mberengwa	7	822
Mvuma	1	209
Shurugwi	5	160
Zvishavane	0	0
Total	16	1 390

A total of 16 farms are unofficially settled in the whole province. \* Although Gokwe South does not have farms, there are 164 unofficially settled people on Mapfungautsi Forest area. Authorities are in the process of looking for land on which to resettle them.

Table 6: Land Distribution Profile after the Fast Track

(Statistical table omitted)

There are two Railway properties whose hectareage was not established in Mvuma district.

The hectareage of one indigenous owned farm could not be established in Zvishavane. The area of the one government farm could not be established in Shurugwi. Ownership and the area of three farms could not be established in Shurugwi. The hectareage of one black owned farm could not be established in Shurugwi.

## 2. Emerging Issues From the Review

### 2.1 Reactions to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme

2.1.1 All stakeholders who were interviewed including the Governor, traditional leaders, Government officials, war veterans and the new farmers expressed satisfaction at the way the Programme had been implemented. They all acknowledged the fact that the land redistribution exercise had economically empowered the majority of the indigenous people. However, there was consensus that more land was required for resettlement as the communal lands particularly in Gokwe North, Gokwe South, Mberengwa and Zvishavane districts remained congested.

### 2.2 Institutional Arrangements

2.2.1 The PLIC was chaired by the Governor and DLICs were chaired by the District Administrators (DAs). Land identification and allocation procedures were adhered to with agro-industrial properties and conservancies not gazetted for compulsory acquisition.

2.2.2 Most of the land acquisition in the province was carried out in consultation with the owners which meant that most of it was acquired by consent. White commercial farmers filled in LA3 forms which the Governor indicated had to date not been processed by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. This had created a situation of uncertainty as both the former commercial farmers and the new settlers awaited confirmation of the resultant subdivisions.

2.2.3 A1 allocations were supposed to be carried out under the auspices of DLICs. However, incidents of unprocedural allocations outside formal structures were reported in Gweru, Mvuma and Shurugwi districts where some councillors, war veterans and errant government officials allocated land.

2.2.4 It was noted that Provincial Institutional arrangements were upset during a period of "40 days and 40 nights" in March/April 2001 when all districts were directed by the Chairman of the National Task Force of Ministers to meet arbitrarily set settler emplacement targets. This resulted in DLICs allocating land to settlers on

ungazetted farms, farms owned by indigenous people, de-listed farms and in some cases church owned farms. Some of these people remain settled on these farms as they wait to be relocated to properly acquired farms.

### *3.3 Take Up Rates.*

3.3.1 The average plot take up rates for Model A1 and A2 are 90% and 48% respectively.

3.3.2 Take up constraints were experienced in Shurugwi district where farms left for A2 settlements were either mountainous or on a chrome bed. Interviewed officials noted that these physical features affect both livestock and crop production since the soils in these areas are inherently infertile.

3.3.3 The low take up rate of 44% for the Model A2 beneficiaries in Mvuma was attributed to the small size of subdivisions (100-350ha) allocated to the new farmers in areas suitable for cattle ranching. The subdivisions were deemed unviable for commercial livestock production.

3.3.4 Some A2 beneficiaries who were interviewed also cited the lack of security of tenure as a problem.

### *3.4 Impact of Fast Track on Decongestion in Communal Areas.*

3.4.1 Lists of potential settlers from communal areas which were submitted by traditional leaders were to a large extent used in the land redistribution and allocation exercise. Land hunger however, still remains as demonstrated by the long waiting lists. The largest areas of demand are Gokwe North and Gokwe South whose people have gone as far as Mashonaland West looking for land for resettlement. Mberengwa and Zvishavane districts which had few commercial farms, were also to a large extent still in need of land for resettlement.

### *3.5 Former Farm Workers.*

3.5.1 It was established that 377 former commercial farm workers were accommodated in the resettlement exercise in the province. It is believed that those who were not resettled went back to their original homes whilst others were now employed by the new A2 farmers.

### *3.6 Production*

#### *3.6.1 Crop Production*

It was observed that rainfed agricultural production formed the bulk of cropping activities in the Midlands. Resettled farmers under the Fast Track planted such crops as maize, sugar beans, soya beans, sorghum, groundnuts and sunflower. Wheat yields, particularly in the A2 settlements of Sherwood Block area in Kwekwe district and Edwards farm in Shurugwi district were also impressive.

#### *3.6.2 Cattle Production*

Most A2 beneficiaries lamented the low carrying capacity of their allocated subdivisions in the cattle ranching areas of the province as stated above. Beneficiaries called for the authorities to review the situation.

There had also been an outbreak of the foot-and-mouth disease in some parts of the province in the period of the Fast Track, thus negatively impacting on livestock production.

#### *3.6.3 Dairy Production.*

Dairy farms in the Midlands were deliberately left intact during the Fast Track. The provincial monthly milk production on 28 farms was on average 2 650 000 litres.

### *3.7 Agricultural Inputs and Support Services.*

3.7.1 Most new farmers acknowledged receiving Government inputs. Tillage was provided by the DDF. Interviews revealed that the seed and fertiliser received by beneficiaries was not adequate and that these were not distributed timeously. Since DDF tillage services could not meet the demand, settlers wanted assistance to acquire cattle for draught power.

3.7.2 A2 beneficiaries in cattle producing areas also requested for the promotion of the livestock development support programme in their areas. They also called on the Government to give them some form of security of tenure.

3.7.3 Those settlers in areas which require the rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure were happy with the Government's irrigation rehabilitation scheme under ARDA. Concerns were however, raised at the long time taken to process applications. Decentralisation of the programme could possibly quicken the disbursement of

funds under this scheme.

3.7.4 Most of the beneficiaries indicated that they were not happy with the service provided by AREX extension staff. It was however indicated that a recruitment drive was underway.

#### *4. Environmental Issues.*

##### *4.1 Illegal gold panning*

4.1.1 Illegal gold panning activities were observed to be prevalent in the districts of Gweru, Kwekwe, Mberengwa, Shurugwi and Zvishavane.

4.1.2 In Shurugwi, the illegal gold panners were observed to be digging through the fields and pastures of new settlers on farms like Shangrilla East. Some of the settlers' livestock had been lost as a result of accidents related to this gold panning. A lot of environmental degradation was also observed in this area including siltation of water bodies.

4.1.3 A2 beneficiaries at Edwards farm pointed out that they had problems in accessing water for irrigation purposes from nearby Mutebekwi river which was now silted. The Cyanide which was discharged into the river during the gold purification process was reported to be endangering the lives of both people and livestock.

4.1.4 Most of the farms in Kwekwe district were classified as conservancies and were therefore not gazetted for compulsory acquisition. The Governor wrote to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement seeking guidance on recommended area for these farms but no response had been received during the time of this exercise. The Governor bemoaned the policy vacuum in the wildlife management sector as he was of the view that a policy on conservancies would help to clarify many outstanding issues.

4.1.5 Other farms that exceed the maximum farm size in the Midlands were noted to be either agro-industrial, dairy properties or commercial livestock ranches.

#### *5. Governance.*

5.1.1 The district teams noted that Committees of Seven had been established and were functional in most of the A1 resettlement farms. The Chairmen of these committees were reported to have been chosen by the Chiefs responsible for the resettled areas and were ratified by the DA's. The Committees were observed to be largely operating in harmony with the traditional leadership and other stakeholders.

5.1.2 The presence of Committees of Seven had effectively prevented such practices as indiscriminate tree cutting and vandalism on acquired farms.

#### *6. Peculiar Issues to The Province.*

##### *6.1 Farm Sizes.*

6.1.1 Approximately 90% of the white commercial farmers were either left with whole farms or subdivisions of their original farms after the Fast Track land acquisition exercise. This is equivalent to approximately 30% of the commercial farming land in the Province. The District Teams noted that whilst most of these farms now complied with the maximum farm size regulations in their respective agro ecological regions, there were others who were left with farms that exceeded the stipulated maximum farm sizes. Most of these properties were located across the Province with Kwekwe district having the largest hectares.

6.1.2 The data collection teams were told by Government officials and the Governor that most of the farms in Kwekwe exceeded the maximum farm size because they were classified as conservancies.

## 9. GENERAL AND OVERARCHING ISSUES:

- (i) **Planning for the Transformation of Zimbabwe's Agriculture**
- (ii) **Reform of Key Institutions of Government involved in Agriculture and Water Resource Development and Management**
- (iii) **The Gender Dimension of Agrarian Change and Reform**
- (iv) **Farm Sizes and Review of the Resettlement Models**
- (v) **Cost Recovery Issues**
- (vi) **Legal Issues that arise from the Fast Track**
- (vii) **Information and Communication Needs for Agrarian Reforms in Zimbabwe**

### *i) Planning for the Transformation of Zimbabwe's Agriculture*

#### *Introduction*

The process of transforming Zimbabwe's agriculture, following the completion of the Fast Track land reform programme, will involve a greater reliance on efficient input and output delivery systems and a smooth integration of agriculture with other sectors of the domestic, regional and international economy. Agricultural transformation will not occur in the absence of sustainable productivity growth in agriculture. Such growth will depend on the successful development of key partnerships and alliances between government and private stakeholder groups, strong institutional arrangements, research and developments, market linkages and human capacity. Planning for the transformation of Zimbabwe's agriculture should address the following issues: What are the basic elements and pillars for moving agriculture forward? What policy lessons have been learnt from previous experience with reforms and the Fast Track that have brought about a broad-based agricultural system, and what must be done differently from the past?

#### *Strategic Goals for the Agricultural Sector*

The strategic goals for the agricultural sector can be collapsed into three namely:

The need to ensure food self-sufficiency and food security at all times through adequate production of staple food crops in particular maize, wheat, sorghum, millets, oil seeds, livestock, fruit and vegetables;

The need to profitably generate adequate foreign exchange earnings through the production of exportable commodities in which Zimbabwe has demonstrated its comparative advantage, mainly sugar, cotton, citrus, horticulture, beef, tobacco, paprika, soya beans and groundnuts; and

The need to stimulate the manufacturing sector through effective demand for factors of production (seed, fertiliser, machinery chemicals, irrigation equipment), and providing raw materials for the industrial sector (milling, processing, packaging, retailing)

#### *Pillars For Agricultural Transformation*

The rapid transformation of the agricultural sector will hinge upon the following five pillars:-

**Institutional Framework for Agricultural Service Province;  
Human Capacity and Skills Development;  
Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer;  
Agricultural Inputs and Financial Services; and  
Domestic and International Markets for Agricultural Product.**

Under each pillar there are various instruments and policy strategies and key result areas as explained in the next sections, and as summarised in Figure 1.

#### *1. Institutional Framework For Transforming Agriculture*

For agricultural transformation to work, the starting point is to clearly re-define the structures, strengths and capacities of key public institutions responsible for agriculture, particularly in areas of skills development, land, water, research and extension, policy analysis and information management, strategic planning and monitoring and evaluation. Good policies and programmes can become totally ineffective if the public institutions that implement them do not function properly or are disconnected. Existing public institutions: Ministries, Parastatals and other Government agencies need to be restructured (GMB and ARDA) and new institutions

created (Agricultural Development Bank, Agriculture Marketing council, Irrigation, Engineering and Agricultural Mechanisation Department) in order to effectively execute a comprehensive plan for the agricultural sector. The small-holder green revolution that occurred in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1986 due to heavy Government involvement in infrastructure development and input support services is a clear demonstration that sustained public investment in the supply-side of agriculture through institutional capacity development is a critical ingredient for agricultural transformation.

#### *Private and Producer-Based Organisations*

In cases where the development and transformation of the agricultural sector results in the expansion of markets and increased demand for service delivery functions beyond what the Government can provide on its own, producer and community-based organisations, together with the private sector, have an important role to play in providing basic linkages between farmers, business (food processors, manufacturers, traders) and research organisations. Properly functioning producer-based organisations can help to increase farmer's access to extension, inputs and financial services, and facilitate greater participation of the rural community in decision making. Current farming organisations in Zimbabwe need to move away from their old structures which were based on racial and sectional lines, and which have been discredited because of their poor performance (African Farmers Unions) and their appetite for misrepresenting national policy issues (CFU) to ones that are more professional and commodity-oriented, and which are economically viable, self-sustaining, transparent and responsive to the needs of all farmers combined. Government will still need to assist them in developing business and management skills, establishing information systems and creating good governance practices and an appropriate legal and financing framework for such organisations. In the interim Government must insist on dealing only with one unified structure for the agricultural industry.

A national framework for promoting private-public sector partnership in all areas of activity (research, extension, land, irrigation, marketing, and trade) will be a key essential element in the implementation of Zimbabwe's agricultural sector. This point is further highlighted below.

In summary, the institutional framework for transforming Zimbabwe's agriculture should include revamping the structures and operations of present public institutions, creating new ones where feasible, and fostering public-private partnership in the delivery of essential services. What must be done differently is that in facilitating the role of the private sector, which stands to benefit tremendously from the opportunities created by the Programme, government must be unequivocal in demanding that certain conditions be met by private companies in return for their privilege of doing business in the country. Such conditions for example, should include expanding depots and distribution centres for seed and fertiliser to rural areas and providing training and skills development for new farmers in return for the import/export permits and registration licences which they get to undertake lucrative businesses in the agricultural sector. The kind of demand-driven and participatory development needed for the transformation process may require effective devolution of many planning and implementation activities to the local level. This requires stronger local Government and community organisations so as to allow central Government to empower them and transfer resources to these organisations (especially for the upkeep of rural infrastructure and management of natural resources).

#### *2. Human Capacity and Skills Development*

The development of human capital is critical for achieving agricultural growth. Zimbabwe is endowed with human skills at all levels that are the envy of many, and yet these skills are either not fully utilised or sufficiently motivated. Staff members involved in development sectors will need to show a greater sense of commitment and a willingness and ability to adequately communicate and correctly articulate the common vision and strategy of the agricultural sector. Effective public institutions require an adequate supply of trained people, including agricultural policy advisors, agricultural research and extension workers, business managers and financial and computer experts. Such training programmes should take into account the effects of HIV/Aids, ageing and low salaries and morale within public institutions that may continue to contribute to chronic staff shortages.

Human capacity training should also be biased in favour of women who play a key role in agriculture as farmers, entrepreneurs and nutritionists. They should have greater opportunities in terms of access to inputs and labour-saving technologies, land ownership information and extension services and education.

An accelerated skills development and farmer training programme will be an essential part of the plan. Training centre should be spread out country-wide and allow various public, private, NGO and individual experts to bid for running courses for farmers and farm labour, with AREX and the National Farmer Training Board of the Ministry of Agriculture designing and supervising the training modules.

In order to close the skills gap created by the movement of professional staff from public to private companies in search of higher salaries, there is need for a partnership agreement for subcontracting services, which must be pursued urgently. While efforts are being made to narrow the gap and retain the remaining staff, development services must continue to be made available without compromising quality through well supervised sharing of responsibilities with the private sector.

### *3. Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer*

Perhaps the single most important driving force for Zimbabwe's agricultural transformation will be the generation of new crop and livestock varieties through research and the transfer and adaptation of those technological packages through technical service provision, extension, training and on farm demonstrations. The steps taken by the Ministry of Agriculture to combine research and extension under one roof has significant advantages of economies of scale through de-compartmentalisation and closer linkages for speedy delivery, provided the combination does not compromise one in favour of the other. The generation of new varieties and regulatory aspects of crop production must be properly balanced with delivery of extension services. The starting point for AREX is to agree on production targets for individual crops that should be decentralised and used as a basis for assessing the performance of the transformation process on a seasonal basis. Commodity specialists at both the nation and district levels will play a critical role in gathering information and compiling appropriate research and extension packages. These must be held accountable for national yields and annual productivity gains. For example the average yield per hectare of maize in this country has hardly shifted since the early 1980's and particularly since 1985 when yields in communal areas peaked. Communal area yields of sorghum, cotton, and groundnuts also remain essentially unchanged.

#### *Private Sector Contracts and Competitive Grants*

It is recommended that the public sector and all private sector players involved in seed and fertiliser should proceed on a contract-based strategy in order to increase production by a given percentage each year as a joint effort and in exchange of the various areas of support for research and extension being provided by Government (e.g. provision of rural roads, depots, electricity).

A competitive grant system for research and extension funding managed by a technical advisory committee made up of public and private sector participants should be introduced.

The awarding of such a grant would then be biased in favour of those proposals promising a most positive impact on development and transformation.

At the district level, specialist production committees are needed. In addition, extension services should focus on lead farmers in both A1 and A2 areas, and use them as models for encouraging other farmers in the districts.

#### *Agricultural Marketing Council*

This calls for the creation of the Agricultural Marketing council where the various actors, commodity councils, Government and traders can converge and where an agricultural information and market regulatory function can be housed.

The increasing role of contract farming in Zimbabwe, where processors and agro-business provide inputs and guaranteed markets at fixed or negotiated prices with producers of various products, but with no arbitration mechanism to monitor the impact of contract farming on the achievement of production and marketing goals, further supports the need for such a regulatory marketing agency.

Its structure can draw lessons from the former Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) which was dissolved at the peak of the economic structural adjustment programme when it had become superfluous following the granting of autonomy to the marketing boards which used to fall under its umbrella such as the GMB, CMB, CSC and DMB. The current partially liberalised marketing system also lends support for the recreation of an independent commodity exchange e.g. ZIMACE which can act as a price indicator by bringing together buyers and sellers of agricultural products.

A major function of the AMC will therefore be to co-ordinate all public and private agricultural marketing activities in consultation with the Ministry and producer based commodity councils.

To sum up, it is important to highlight that technological change in agriculture is essential for improving food

security and agricultural growth, lowering food costs and increasing competitiveness in domestic and foreign markets and for the overall transformation of the economy.

#### *Comprehensive Plan For Agricultural Research*

While improved technologies for food staples are needed, sustained increases in farm incomes will hinge principally on diversification into higher value agricultural products and non-farm activities. Additional research is required on livestock, agro forestry, horticultural crops, post-harvest losses and agro-processing.

A revised comprehensive agricultural research and development plan is urgently needed that focuses on the development of agricultural science and technology policy frameworks and which defines the goals, objectives, targets, incentives and financial commitments from Government and private sector for each commodity, strategies for strengthening linkages between researchers and users of research on a priority basis, conducting on farm research and establishing partnerships with farming associations; plans for decentralising research activities and introducing revenue retention schemes to increase institutional autonomy and flexibility and measures for providing management training and rewarding leadership for commitment to enhancing success as well as performance monitoring.

This should build upon the work already started through the Agricultural Research Council (ARC). ARC should expand its structures to new farming areas and create research and extension information centres in every district where farmers, researchers, traders, extension agents and private sector input suppliers can interact with farming associations. Joint funding from constructing such centres and equipping them with electronic communication can be explored between Government and those private companies who regularly service the farming community.

#### *4. Agricultural Inputs and Financial Services*

Input provision, used in a broad sense, refers to the availability production, procurement, distribution, delivery and utilisation of all factors of production, i.e. the basic ingredients that a farmer mixes to produce output. For the purposes of comprehensively addressing Zimbabwe's transformation, the plan should include an in-depth analysis of the following factors of production: land, water, seeds, fertilisers, chemicals, tillage, transport, machinery, veterinary drugs, stock feeds, irrigation infrastructure, credit, finance, fuel, electricity, building materials, labour and management skills.

#### *Input Procurement and Distribution Policy*

The Ministry of Agriculture, Lands and Rural Resettlement should revive its input procurement and distribution stakeholders committee which once played a major role in forecasting and monitoring the availability of various inputs and recommending pricing and import/procurement measures.

This exercise should then link up with the production targets as they are reviewed each year by Arex, such that the two functions become jointly accountable for the performance of the productive sector.

In addition, the Ministry should have a unit within its policy and planning department, which is devoted to the analysis and facilitation of the whole array of agricultural inputs. (Land related issues assuming they will be dealt with under a separate institution will not be expected to feature prominently as an aspect of the agricultural Ministry, hence the logic of treating land is given, and as one of the factors of production).

It is at this point that strong linkage with agri-business's responsible for inputs provision and rural agri-dealers should be nurtured.

There is a general consensus that greater competition should be encouraged in the input supply sector, especially for tillage, seed and fertiliser distribution as opposed to the current dominant roles of DDF, ARDA and GMB.

Presently most of the input supply companies have the tendency to sit back and wait for larger sales off their Harare depots.

These companies should be encouraged to offer small packs for seed and fertiliser into outlying areas and enter into contract with rural agri-dealers, for business development as well as providing specialised extension and promotion programmes.

Arex should make it a point that when they register seed and fertiliser companies or issues them with import/export permits and phytosanitary certificates, a contract must be signed which ensures that these

companies will distribute appropriate pack sizes and follow them up with technical support, especially for small-holder farmers as a condition for doing business in the lucrative agricultural sector.

#### *Agricultural Mechanisation*

A major requirement for the agricultural sector is the adequate provision of machinery, ranging from vehicles, motor cycles, tractors combines, graders, irrigation pumps and pipes and other farm and processing equipment.

The envisaged growth in Zimbabwe's agricultural production create significant demand for tractors and combine harvesters.

Another factor is that with the anticipated increase in labour costs and declining availability of skilled and semi-skilled labour on many new farms also due to the effects of HIV/Aids, farmers will have to gear themselves to substituting labour with mechanisation and to importing new labour-saving technologies on the market.

This therefore requires that the input procurement Unit of the Ministry mentioned above will need to develop a capacity to assess the machinery requirements of the farming industry, working in conjunction with tractor dealers and the Agricultural Engineering and Mechanisation Department of the same Ministry.

It is also recommended that the Ministry works closely with DDF and Arda to co-ordinate tillage units and promote the participation of commercial farmers and private sector tractor units in the tillage programme.

This can be done by creating satellite centres and workshops at strategic places where farmers can hire or procure equipment.

Registered dealers and providers of tillage services should be given incentives in the form of duty exemption for imports of machinery and spare parts, so as to encourage them to provide services.

The Arda estates outgrower schemes can also play a few role in this regard.

DDF tillage services for A2 commercial farmers should be privatised and allow DDF to concentrate on providing services to A1 and communal farmers who have limited capacity to provide their own tillage services.

The policy and institutional framework for input production and distribution must be strengthened, and closely linked with the determination of agricultural production targets, and public-private sector partnerships in the implementation of input issues.

#### *4. Domestic And International Markets For Agricultural Products*

Market access remains a major constraint for Zimbabwe's agriculture both at the domestic and international levels.

For effective transformation to take place, farmers must have access to well functioning and well-integrated markets.

These depend to a large degree on the existence of infrastructure such as roads and storage facilities and supportive public and private institutions.

For example, the peak year of small-holder cereal production in Zimbabwe was 1985, when rains were good but also when the GMB established some 135-collection depots.

Investment in collection points increased competition and educed transaction costs.

High transportation costs that prevent the transportation of food from surplus to deficit areas, coupled with statutory movement controls, can cause food shortages even in year to above normal production.

#### *Market Liberalisation*

Market liberalisation must be gradual and cautious if experience across Africa over the past ten years is anything to go by. Market liberalisation might have removed major distortions created by previous controls and the high subsidies associated with marketing boards, but the results of liberalisation have proved disappointing for agricultural growth, export performance and poverty reduction. This is because the reforms did little to transfer benefits to farmers.

Liberalisation through the gradual reduction and rationalisation, not total elimination, of the role of parastatal agencies, and the development of a regulatory framework for agricultural commodity marketing is therefore a vital and essential factor in the present era in Zimbabwe's agricultural transformation.

Marketing boards should operate in an environment where they facilitate and complement but not constrain private marketing activities under a level playing field. But for such an environment with a level playing field to function properly, it must be supported by a regulatory framework for quality grades and standards, enforcement of contracts and co-ordinating domestic and international markets to improve timing, availability and identity/traceability of Zimbabwe products. Market liberalisation without improved access to market information for producers and traders will do little to improve production, availability and trade in agricultural products. Market information centres should be created in every district where timely, accurate market data can be relayed using e-mail, radio and solar powered systems, where feasible.

#### *Grain Reserves/Buffer Stocks and Pricing Policy*

The establishment or augmentation of grain reserves and their sound management not only provides an important safeguard against the threat of famine, but buffer stocks can also be used to stabilise prices and offset fluctuations in domestic production or in import prices, and thereby reduce vulnerability to famine and further destabilisation of production in the new season. Staple grain reserves should as much as possible be located strategically including in remote areas to enhance accessibility to food in the event of shortages. There should be cost sharing arrangements between the national grain marketing agency and grain producers, traders, consumers and processors, using seasonal contracts for leasing storage capacity for local and imported grain. This ensures that information on grain availability is centralised but without necessarily having to centralise all grain handling functions under one authority. Implementation of targeted food distribution schemes for the poor and vulnerable groups also becomes possible under such an arrangement.

Price stabilisation should therefore focus more on ensuring a floor price and incentive price for producers or a ceiling price for consumers. This is a price that lies somewhere between a cost of production-related price, an import/export parity price and a market determined price. Such a price can only be known in an environment where other traders are allowed to operate in competition with the GMB. However, as markets are gradually liberalised and free trade is used to stabilise prices, buffer stocks and price intervention becomes less relevant as a marketing instrument.

The main recommendation here is that the way forward for agricultural marketing in the post-reform era in Zimbabwe should best be handled through an Agricultural Marketing Council, made up of existing commodity councils like Cotton, Horticulture, Tobacco, Grain, Oil-seeds and Livestock, which are in turn comprised of producers, traders, financiers, freight forwarders, processors, input suppliers and other public and private agencies. As a prelude to the creation of an AMC, an interim Agricultural Marketing Review committee may need to be put in place to start reviewing the marketing structures for each commodity. Such a review will constitute an input into the drafting of a comprehensive agricultural marketing policy for Zimbabwe to compliment the production-driven agrarian reform. Periodic and seasonal policy statements should be issued by the Ministry to guide the key players in the market.

Other functions of the AMC will be to co-ordinate contract farming activities, trade finance, providing marketing information and policy advice on domestic and international trade, and in conjunction with ministry, deal with market regulations and other legislative matters. The point of departure from the previous AMA is that the AMC will be more industry wide focussing on co-ordinating all agricultural marketing issues beyond the former marketing boards, rather than be a controller of prices and markets for controlled products.

The example of the cotton sector should be emulated by other commodities if at all Zimbabwe is to experience rapid growth and transformation in the agricultural sector. Private companies must be encouraged to change their way of doing business, and not just wait to be pushed by Government but be proactive.

#### *International and Regional Trade in Agricultural Products*

Perhaps the greatest push for the recovery and transformation of Zimbabwe's agriculture will come from increased regional and international trade, in addition to the demand created on the domestic market for direct consumption and value addition. The advent of globalisation, trade liberalisation and fast changes in lifestyles and demographic trends present new market opportunities for agricultural products. At the regional level, income growth, urbanisation, the return of peace and a shift away from consumption of basic staple foods to high value processed products and livestock products, present new opportunities as well.

### *Regional Co-operation*

Regional co-operation and harmonisation of trade systems will therefore play a vital role in trade and when dealing with multi-country markets. Harmonisation of regional markets can also help speed up the efficiency with which food crises and shortages can be addressed (including GMO and biosafety issues) and can also help accelerate the integration of developing countries into global trading systems through adapting common negotiating positions in WTO and other trade protocols. The member states of Southern Africa which are highly dependent on agriculture for food, national revenue and export earnings must work hard to build national and regional capacity to make use of these global and regional agricultural trade protocols. The creation of SADC free trade area is a promising start in this direction.

The proposed Agricultural Marketing Council could also be the right institution through which agricultural trade promotion can be done. Out there Zimbabwean products are treated as one source and one big farm and it pays for the sector to adopt a common approach involving all key stakeholders when dealing with foreign markets for agricultural products.

### *Conclusion*

The lessons learned from previous experience with structural reforms have taught African countries including Zimbabwe that agricultural growth and transformation requires an enabling economic environment and that simply getting prices right is not enough. There is a great complementary need for sustained public investment in the supply-side of agriculture, without which there is little aggregate supply response. The previous abrupt withdrawal of state parastatals and of subsidised inputs did leave a vacuum in agricultural marketing and support services which the private sector was not able to quickly fill.

The private sector can only play a bigger role if it were not also constrained by weak legal, financial and human resource issues and the same economic problems that beset Government. More promising results for growth and employment creation can be obtained by engaging the private sector, NGOs and producer-based organisations in more participatory and demand-driven interventions in partnership with Government. Building local human and institutional capacity is also essential for stimulating agricultural growth.

### *Specific Recommendations on Appropriate Institutional Framework for Agricultural Transformation and Land Management*

The following is a summary of recommendations for immediate consideration on appropriate institutional framework for transforming the agricultural sector and for land management.

#### *Institutional Framework for Agricultural Transformation*

1. There is need to have a clearly defined Ministry responsible for Agriculture and Water Development away from the land portfolio in order to give full attention to agricultural production and marketing.
2. The technical departments of Agricultural Research and Extension, Agricultural Engineering, Irrigation and Mechanisation and Livestock and Veterinary Services must be redefined and adequately capacitated to carry out the agrarian reform. These should be supported by the new Agricultural Development Bank, a restructured Grain Marketing Board, and a new Agricultural Marketing council to spearhead agricultural marketing and trade.

#### *Agricultural Marketing Council*

3. Agricultural marketing both at the domestic, regional and international level is a complex matter, but critical for the success of agrarian reform. The former Agricultural Marketing Authority dealt mainly with the control of marketing boards. What is needed now is an Agricultural Marketing council, constituted from the various commodity councils which will have a broader public/private sector driven mandate of market promotion and development, product traceability, advice on pricing and market systems, contract farming, trade issues etc, supported by a Chief Executive Officer and team of marketing experts. It will be funded through commodity marketing and export levies. Market information and effecting marketing regulations on behalf of the Ministry, will be some of its major functions.

4. Because of the complex and dynamic nature of marketing, there is need for the Ministry of Agriculture to appoint a sector-wide marketing review committee, as a prelude to the creation of the AMC, in order to immediately review commodity marketing, establish production targets, and as part of the drafting of a comprehensive agricultural policy framework for Zimbabwe.

In addition to that the Ministry should issue periodic policy statements to guide farmers and other stakeholders on production and marketing expectations.

#### *Pricing Policy, Buffer Stocks and Role of the Grain Marketing Board.*

5. Food availability, in particular maize can be enhanced if partial decontrol of maize and wheat is re-introduced to allow other players to market the products (except imports and exports) in competition with GMB. The recommended pricing strategy is one where the GMB defends a floor price for producers and ceiling price for consumers using buffer stocks. Such a price should be calculated to lie somewhere between a cost of production based price, an import/export parity price and an open marketing price. The role of GMB should revert to that of managing strategic reserves and trading in competition with other players and providing targeted services to remote areas.

#### *Farming Union and Private Sector Partnership*

6. A framework for establishing private sector partnerships with government in the area of research, contract farming, input supply and marketing must be established so that the two parties will complement each other in the various agricultural programmes. It is also recommended that the issuing of licences, registration certificates, import/export permits, phytosanitary certificates and facilitation of legal framework and contracts for private business by government should as much as possible be tied to the provision of support services for agricultural development by agro-businesses.

Government should also insist and facilitate the creation of a single union for the farming sector, supported by specialist commodity associations and councils as a way of fostering uniformity and efficiency in the agricultural sector.

#### *Institutional Framework for Land Administration*

7. There are several post-Fast Track land reform activities that will take time to be finalised such as land registry, boundary disputes, appropriate tenure, compensation, maximum farm sizes, multiple ownership, farm swaps, inheritance systems, land tax, sub-divisions, new settler allocations etc, which warrants the creation of a separate Ministry of Lands and Rural Development underpinned by a Department of Lands, Surveyor General, and support by DDF and ARDA, which will need to be refocused to deal with rural development using agricultural outgrower schemes, and a new National Land Board.

#### *National Land Board*

8. The advantages of a National Land Board as a quasi-Government institution is that it allows major players on land matters (farmers, Government, civil society groups, agri-business, traditional authorities, war vets) to come together and resolve the administrative issues on land and advise Government, while allowing time for the line Ministry to concentrate on policy and legislative matters and actual implementation of land policies. The Board would be supported by DLICs (and sub-district Committees) made up of agencies, which deal with land issues at the local level. There may be no need for provincial level committees to minimise duplication.

#### *Land Technical Unit and Land Support Fund*

9. There is need to have a technical unit to service the National Land Board and administer a Land Fund, land registry and approve or recommend land settlement projects for funding by Government, donors or private companies, many of whom may prefer not to deal directly with Government departments. There is also a need to re-draft the National Land Policy, taking into account all the new changes.

#### *Skills Development and Farmer Training*

10. A major function of the Ministry of Agriculture, through AREX and the National Farmer Training board will be to implement a crash programme for training various categories of farmers and farm labour using existing public and private training institutions. The Board should tender for submissions of training proposals to speed up the process, while they supervise the programme.

#### *Stakeholder Workshops and Conference*

11. To engender a common vision of the agrarian reform programme there will be need for local and national stakeholder workshops where the programme can be explained and discussed.

## ***ii) Reform of Key Institutions of Government Involved in Agriculture and Water Resource Development and Management***

### ***1.0 Introduction***

1.1 Problems related to the administration and governance of Parastatals have been extensively examined and reported by the Committee of Inquiry on Parastatals of 1988, the Irish Consultancy on Parastatals and the Kariba Workshop on the Administration and Governance of Parastatals of 2000.

1.2 Parastatals are set up in terms of enabling legislation, which defines the structures as well as the relationship with the parent Ministry. Matters related to budgets, capital expenditure, borrowing and investment, where prior Government approval is a requirement, are provided for in Part VI of the Audit and Exchanger Act. Problems common to the sector include the role of Boards of Directors. The performance and management issues, under-capitalisation, poor communication and co-ordination with the parent Ministry including supervisory deficiencies; poor financial performance and inter-Parastatal indebtedness

### ***2.0 Recommendations***

It is recommended that:

The boards of Parastatals be abolished in the light of their failure to add value to the effectiveness of the entities they run. Boards are a financial burden, manipulated in the name of politics, and conversely, have used this situation as an excuse for inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

Parastatals be converted into private companies with Government retaining all or the majority of the shareholding. The companies could be floated on the Stock Exchange to raise equity and broaden ownership, thus empowering people and generating the capital needed.

Vacancies for heads of Parastatals should be filled within three months of the post becoming vacant. In all instances, employment contracts should spell out clear performance targets and procedures pertaining to dismissals or suspensions. Once the General Manager or Chief Executive has been suspended, the cause of such suspension should be disposed of within three months.

### ***3.0 Agricultural Development Bank (Land Bank)***

The establishment of the Agricultural Development Bank (Land Bank) will require that it be adequately resourced to ensure its effectiveness. It is recommended that the Bank operate on the principle of cost recovery, except where a subsidy is provided.

### ***4.0 Cold Storage Company.***

It is recommended that Government liquidates the company's debt but in circumstances in which the entity is fully commercialised, its management revamped and the appointment of senior staff has been effected.

### ***5.0 Grain Marketing Board (GMB)***

GMB should be streamlined to focus on strategic grain reserves and the export of grain. The trading and milling of grain locally should not be the responsibility of the GMB, nor the distribution of inputs. The cost of maintaining the strategic grain reserves should be borne by Government and not the GMB itself.

### ***6.0 Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA).***

ARDA, whose main objective should be rural development in all aspects but particularly agriculture, is now overburdened and saddled with the provision of tillage, irrigation finance, contracting, etc. It should be refocused on spearheading the efficient development of growth centres around its estates as was the case with Sanyati, Jotjolo, Katiyo and Kezi. The pull effect of the use of irrigation development, with the attendant outgrower schemes, led to the development of tarred roads, electricity, post offices, ginneries, fertiliser and chemical depots in these areas, thus benefiting the surrounding communal areas. The development of growth centres would also result in employment creation for people not directly involved in agricultural production and thereby stemming the rural urban drift.

### ***7.0 Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA).***

7.1 The case of the Osborne Dam whose water is not being utilised and yet siltation is already occurring, points to the imperative need for the rationalisation of the functions of ZINWA and other Departments with mandates over water and irrigation management and development. Other water bodies in the country such as Mtshabezi,

Mazvikadei and Zhovhe are also in the same situation as the Osborne Dam.

Currently, ZINWA's mandate is to build and maintain dams and sell water to users. ZINWA's mandate should go beyond this. It should be restructured to assume responsibility for irrigation development and potable water quality testing. When it assumes the irrigation function, other Departments with a similar mandate should be subsumed into a restructured ZINWA.

7.2 ZINWA should take over the maintenance of dams in the new areas and continue to build more dams for irrigation. Responsibility for irrigation development would ensure that water use plans are taken account of at the time of dam construction.

7.3 The proposed Research and Irrigation Equipment Testing Centre (as was proposed in relationship with the University of FRESNO Testing Centre) should be developed and housed in the engineering section of the Ministry of Lands Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.

7.4 Water charges should encompass a 5% surcharge (such as levied on electricity bills) for small-scale rural irrigation development in the drier regions and for research. However, the levying of charges on water use from private boreholes, small dams and weirs should be stopped because it discourages investment in water resource development and the enhancement of production on farms through irrigation.

### ***iii) The Gender Dimension of Agrarian Change and Reform***

#### *Short term*

- 1 Land leases should be registered in the names of the husband and wife.
2. A quota of at least 40% of the land allocations should be made to women especially in A1 areas where elderly women take care of sick, orphaned and indigent people, often without adequate resources. Women's significant participation in all farming systems should be consolidated through a quota of 40% of funding reserved for women and other new farmers, for credit and other purposes.
3. In cases of widowhood, the surviving spouses should have first option to take over the lease provided they can work the land productively. The lease should also take account of the situation of multiple wives where applicable.
4. Upon the dissolution of a marital union, the spouse who leaves the farm should be fairly compensated. This measure will encourage commitment to the land.
5. Public infrastructure investment and development in new farming areas should be rationalised so that women, men and children can live together, share work loads and concentrate investment in one household.
6. The development of farm technology that can be used by elderly women, men and children should be prioritised in view of the high mortality of young and middle aged men and women in rural households.
7. Farmer training should be community-based in order to endow new farmers, particularly women with children, with farming skills without prejudicing farm operations at their inception. This helps to mitigate farmer absenteeism from the land.
8. The certification of farm worker skills is critical to allow new farmers access to a skills data base.
9. Tillage services should be provided especially to the child and women farmers and the elderly, to facilitate productive land use in A1 areas.
10. There is need for the re-orientation of existing and new extension workers to make them appreciative of and sensitive to gender, age and other needs of the new farmers.
11. Zimbabwe should implement the ILO convention that forbids child labour.

### *Medium and Long Term*

1. Marital legislation such as the Marriage Act 5:07 and 5:11 should be reviewed with respect to the needs of women in rural Zimbabwe. Where there are multiple wives, legislation should stipulate formulae for appropriate compensation in the event of a marital dissolution while safeguarding productivity and continued operation of the farm.
2. The custodians of customary law must develop formulae to enable women to access land through inheritance and other means. A quota of 40% is a starting point to ensure that women's participation in agriculture is sustained.
3. New courses on small ruminants and registration of livestock in individual household members' names are necessary to safeguard the property rights of men, women and children in specific households.
4. Extension courses should be developed to suit the needs of different management regimes on farms e.g. male dominated, female managed or employee managed. It is essential to devise training that recognises the lead person in any farm enterprise and equips them to meet the challenges of farming in newly settled areas.
5. Rural centres need to be developed to provide housing, water, electricity and other services in order to stabilise rural labour in general. Labour itinerancy prevents its efficient utilisation by new and old farmers. This would benefit women and children who are usually in contract or seasonal workers on the farms.
6. Existing family and marriage legislation such as Marriages Acts 5:11 5:07, the Deceased Estates Act, needs to be reviewed in view of the influx of large numbers of black farmers into commercial farming. This legislation should examine the issues of succession and inheritance where farm lessees die testate or intestate, having many children, multiple wives and dependents.
7. Monitoring of land use has to be efficient and effective so that under-utilised land is put back into circulation. Thus the proposed National Land Board should be fully representative incorporating the interests of all stakeholders, particularly women.
8. New farm practices that accommodate traditional gender requirements should be harnessed to encourage women and men's participation in agriculture. Specialised crop and animal husbandry training focusing on men and women's preferences in all farming systems, should be mounted both on and off farms to stimulate productivity.
9. Irrigation schemes should be designed and run in such a way that at least 40% of women hold land benefiting from such a facility, especially where they have responsibility for children and other older or indigent people.
10. The issue of child-headed households arises in communal areas. It is likely to become an issue on A1 and A2 farms. Current family legislation provides that minors are placed under the guardianship of related adults. Given that the capacity of minors to farm productively in A1 and A2 farms is limited, farmers should be encouraged to write wills and organise their operations in ways that protect their progeny and dependents. In this regard the interest of children should be safeguarded.
11. A special programme should be organised in tertiary institutions to encourage young women studying agriculture, wild life and other related subjects, to choose farming as their preferred occupation. Supportive financing, marketing and other infrastructure must accompany this programme to make it attractive to young women.

### *iv) Farm Sizes and Review of Resettlement Models*

1. Variability in sizes of plots demarcated for resettlement is a common feature within and across the A1 and A2 models countrywide. This phenomenon renders categories of A1 and A2 meaningless in as far as plot sizes are concerned.
2. These variations also manifest within the same Province and in most cases where topographical or viability considerations are not an issue. Also notable was the phenomenon of demarcations undertaken without due cognizance of the topography of the land in question, i.e. a hill or a vlei constituting the bulk of the plot, or a demarcation which splits complimentary structures between different plots thereby rendering both plots nonviable. It is imperative that farm sizes take account of viability considerations both in terms of land use and

the existing infrastructure. Some reorganisation of plot demarcations has to be undertaken as soon as possible and even more so, before the leases for the affected plots are drawn up.

3. In Matabeleland North and South Provinces, land ownership patterns as well as the modalities for land use need to be reviewed as soon as possible. This imperative is particularly reinforced in Matabeleland South Province where ranching is the mainstay of agricultural activity. Settler emplacement was undertaken on the basis of the A1 self-contained variant and yet the only viable A1 variant is the old three-tier system.

Apart from viability considerations, the model presents real problems for the beneficiaries on accessibility of social amenities given the vast distances from their homes to where such facilities can be found. Similarly, this creates real challenges for Government in terms of the planning and provision of the necessary facilities and institutions. There is therefore a compelling need to redesign this model expeditiously.

4. Related to the issue above, is the policy on maximum farm size. Where subdivision of former white commercial owned farms has been undertaken under the LA3 facility, the policy on farm sizes has not been adhere to (Midlands Province for example). Given that land is a finite resource and that decongestion still remains as issue in some parts of the country, there should be compliance with the maximum farm size regulations to release more land for resettlement.

5. In Manicaland, the Committee witnessed the situation of vast tracts of land allocated to the A2 model but not taken up, in a Province where the political leadership is apparently hamstrung by the shortage of land for A1 settlement. Consideration should therefore be given to the conversion of the unoccupied A2 plots to the A1 model.

6. Related to the shortage of land for A1 model, is the situation where A1 plots are 14 to 40 hectares in extent, and therefore are larger than some A2 model plots. In Masvingo Province, the Governor indicated that he was considering the further subdivision list under the A1 model. Clearly this admission apart from betraying for a countrywide review of plots sizes for the A1 model to release land such as quoted above, for further distribution.

7. On Maximum Farm Size Regulations there is need for flexible application of the Statutory Instrument taking to account land use patterns and subject to the oversight of the National Land Board.

#### **v) Cost Recover Issues**

##### *Cost Recovery From Beneficiaries*

It is understood that in respect of farms under the A1 model, Government bears the full cost of acquisition inclusive of improvements on the land. Beneficiaries under the A2 model, will however presumably pay Government on a full cost recovery basis the costs incurred in acquiring the property as regards any improvements and a lease rental in addition.

##### *Recommendations*

It is recommended that A2 farmers pay for all the improvements made by the former owner, such as housing, irrigation facilities, tobacco barns and other infrastructure on the farm on a cost recovery basis.

In cases where there is a standing crop at the time of allocation of land, it is also recommended that the principle of cost recovery should also apply.

With perennial crops, an assessment should be made as to the value of that crop, including a costing projecting the potential value in the determinate future. This should be the case with crops such as fruit, coffee, tea and sugar cane. Likewise where timber is involved.

In the case of annual crops such as soya beans, maize, wheat, etc, it is recommended that compensation be based on the actual value of the crop.

Regarding green houses, the associated infrastructure and any crop therein have to be taken into account in the assessment of the compensation. The benefiting farmer should be required to pay full cost recovery.

It is also recommended that the A2 recipient pays an initial down payment with the outstanding balance payable over 5 years with interests, or any longer period as may be determined.

## *vi) Legal Issues that Arise from the Fast Track*

### *1. Leases (A2 Model)*

The provision of leases with the appropriate tenure system, has become supremely urgent especially in view of the coming cropping season. Absence of some form of title for land allocated under the A2 model was partly the reason for the low take up rates as, given from financial institutions who invariably require collateral security of one form or another. Therefore the issue of cession of "title" becomes critical. There is need for the leased to have provision for cession or alternatively for a Government guarantee that would provide the requisite comfort to a financial institution wanting to take the risk of lending to an A2 farmer.

An appropriate tenure system should provide for a lease period sufficiently long to encourage investment on the land in question, and for a succession in title by the heirs of the leaseholder. Attendant to the importance of ensuring optimum utilisation of land, is the need for a tenure regime permissive of State policing of land usage.

The policing should not be confined to the A2 leaseholder, but should also extend to environmental protection of common areas in the villagised A1 schemes. Given the breakdown of traditional authority, there no longer is a sense of ownership over communal property. The proposed National Land Board should be the appropriate institution to assume this task.

Land reform necessarily results in the re-organisation or redistribution of property rights. Apart from educating the A2 beneficiaries of their rights and obligations on the issue of servitude's — i.e. the right of way or way of necessity, the right to lead or draw water-there I also need to make provision in the lease for such obligations on the owner of the encumbered property. The regime for land transfers and compensation for improvements should also be addressed.

### *2. Mines and Minerals Act*

The above Act gives precedence to mineral rights (right to prospect for, to extract and remove minerals) over any other rights. This seemingly disregard of the rights of a land owner has given rise to conflict especially where the exercise of the mineral rights renders some part of farm land unusable. It is also possible that the precedence is encouraging all manner of mining activities, gold panning included, given the tendency of District Mining Boards towards the wholesale issuance of mining permits.

It is therefore recommended that the precedence be removed altogether. The prerequisite for consultations between the affected parties to reach an accommodation of each other's interests should be incorporated into the respective provision of the Act.

### *3. Zinwa Act*

The overall import of some provisions of the Act is to discourage irrigation development as well as penalise for water usage through the applicable punitive water charges on water drawn from boreholes, small dams and weirs privately developed on a property. The levying of these charges should be stopped because it discourages investment in water resource development and the enhancement of production on farms through irrigation. A distinction is made with water drawn from major rivers and similar water courses.

Also requiring review, are the operations of Catchment Councils. It has emerged that in some instances there is a deliberate attempt to frustrate new farmers' bid to secure water rights. Some policing mechanism or an oversight body should be put in place to oversee the activities of the Catchment Councils.

### *4 Corporate Entities*

Viability concerns have been raised over the prudence of demarcating plots within existing Plantations, Safaris and Conservancies. Operational and capacity considerations point to the need for maintaining the current farm sizes in these areas. To ensure a broad ownership of the resources, which in many respects are God given, Government should enact legislation creating corporate entitles to run these enterprises. A2 beneficiaries would be allocated shares in and participate in managing the entitles running the Safari farms, Plantations of conservancies.

### *5. Administrative Court*

Under the current Constitution, the compulsory acquisition of land by the State must be confirmed in the Administrative Court. The expropriation of land in the public interest is an accepted norm internationally. The

Administrative court should only adjudicate over disputed compensation levels.

There is therefore a contradiction, which inheres in Zimbabwe statutes on compulsory land acquisition-there is in effect no provision for compulsory land acquisition.

Government may wish to address this anomaly.

#### *6. Juristic Persons*

There is need for refining the policy on one man one farm in as far as it applies to juristic persons where multiple ownership of farms is a common feature and where changes in the shareholding structure are frequently encountered.

#### *vii) Information and Communication Needs for Agrarian Reforms in Zimbabwe*

Zimbabwe's Land and Agrarian Reform Programme should not narrowly focus only on issues of agricultural productivity, but should take on the whole question of rural development and empowerment in an integrated fashion. The thrust should thus include infrastructure development; water development; food security; sustainability rural education; rural healthcare; sanitation and security.

On agricultural productivity and agrarian reforms in general, an effective communication model must look at the whole continuum of information and knowledge needs of the farmer. In designing an agricultural knowledge and information system, the new farmer must be equipped with the requisite skills and knowledge to make a success of their farming activities.

#### *Recommendations*

1. An Agricultural Multimedia Information Production Unit is recommended to consolidate and expand current efforts, to feed into the national media and rural information systems. Content generated should be many media including print, audio, video, slide, pictorial and folk media, and should encompass all facets of agricultural extension.
2. It is also recommended that Agricultural Portals of Information and Delivery Platforms be launched and decentralised enough to be accessible to the new farmer. Investment around distribution essentially should focus on delivery platforms, whether singly or in combinations, including radio, television, newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and mobile vans. It is recommended that Government implements the notion of what is called Farmer Radio in the West and Rural Radio in the Developing World whose primary focus is in serving the farmer with vital news and information.  
  
Such a radio platform should be considered the master medium for communicating agricultural information, with the rest of the media as reinforces. Radio is the medium of rural communication and allows interactivity at minimum cost to the farmer. Government is already working on licencing Community Radios in each of the country's 57 districts and the should be the basis for such a facility. In the meantime, more time and slots should be devoted to radio extension on all the four national channels in local languages. If the promotion of radio as the master medium is to be effective, efforts at making radio receivers fairly affordable should be intensified.
3. Existing televised programmes should be expanded to reach more rural audiences where possible. Live programmes that allow for real time interaction should be encouraged, with a deliberate bias on farmers on the land.
4. The magazine New Farmer has proved quite a decisive intervention and institutions like New Ziana and Zimpapers itself should be encouraged to move beyond general agricultural news to specialised publications which focus on specific commodity areas of agricultural efforts. The tenor of such publications should be instructional and inspirational.
5. The Daily Press should be encouraged to devote specific pages to agricultural news and market statistics so that farmers are served the same way the ZSE is served by those publications. This, complemented by regular radio bulletins on agriculture should be able to make available usable information to the farmer.

6. The Rural Mobile Video Service currently supported by 10 fully kitted Mobile Vans should be expanded to accommodate a special Agricultural Mobile Video Service that carries a specialised service targeting farmers in

their habitats. This service should draw from content generation investment efforts.

7. The InfoHuts Programme currently being implemented by Government in every district should be resources so Zimbabwe has its own equivalent of Telecentres that have served farmers well in other environments. For easy, faster and cheap distribution, it is suggested that these InfoHuts have Internet connectivity so that information radiated from production centres is quickly transmitted to these huts for reproduction in forms and language deemed appropriate.

## *10. Production and Marketing*

### *Introduction*

The importance of production of all crops, food and non-food, including livestock has been highlighted throughout this Report. AT the centre of the agrarian reform must be the urgent task to produce for purposes of achieving national food security; enhancing the growth of the industrial sector via the supply of raw materials and the utilisation of the products of local industry as well as the supplying export markets. Such productive activity on the land should however proceed on a planned basis as indicated above.

In essence what is sought is that productivity should take place on a systematic, scientific and well-targeted basis both in terms of crop varieties and the markets for the same.

As already outlined in preceding sections, there is need for the strengthening of the institutional framework that should facilitate the needed forward movement. A commitment of the requisite resources-skills, finance, technology-is also an urgent requirement.

To complement the overarching perspectives spelt out under the preceding chapter, the following recommendations are advanced:

### *Recommendations*

(a) The policy on pre-planting prices should be strictly observed. A policy of targeted production should be adopted, with targets communicated by September at the latest.

(b) Direct contracting arrangements between farmers and buyers should be permitted, and in this regard an Agricultural Marketing Council should be established to co-ordinate this interface.

(c) There is need to invest in research of major agricultural commodities to keep ahead of variety types. Zimbabwe has been a leader in research, competing with the developed countries. Zimbabwean researchers produced the first maize Single Hybrid, SR52. Small-scale farmers have largely used hybrid varieties and therefore would not wish to revert to inferior yield varieties. Given the existing skills capacity in biotechnology, it should be possible to come up with disease and pest resistant cultivars. The Biosafety Board has the mandate to promote and regulate gene manipulation and the release of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). In line with international trends, research should also be undertaken locally, into GMOs, utilising facilities at University, the TRB and the SIRDC.

(d) Government should put in place measures sufficiently stringent to deter crop or stock theft. It should also introduce punitive measures against unauthorised livestock movement.

(e) Government must stop the merging pattern of agro-business or private sector bodies subleasing land from the A2 beneficiaries whilst paying a percentage of the produce as the lease fee. Further the utilisation of funds realised through the Agribonds by these corporate bodies should not be permitted.

The above should however not be confused with proper contract farming.

Corporate farming entities have played a very significant role in agricultural development. Taking into account the advantages of economies of scale, they probably are the best vehicle for the development of sugar and timber plantations including the processing of the relevant products. For the further development of corporate sector farming, which will include indigenous operators, the National Land Board referred to above could be tasked with developing the relevant operational guidelines and policies.

(f) Mixed farming facilities cattle, sheep, goat, pig and poultry production. Livestock production is often successful when accompanied by grain production, a necessary ingredient in stockfeed.

Foot and mouth disease has negatively affected the beef and dairy industry. It is therefore imperative that regulations on cattle movement and control fences be strictly enforced. For the viability of the livestock sector, it is critical that land use and viability considerations be the determinant of maximum farm sizes. There should also be flexibility in the control of grain to allow the retention by a farmer of part of their produce for livestock feed.

Modern technology can bolster research into disease and pest control. In this regard, the provision of resources to the Department of Veterinary Services must be given priority.

### *11. Water Development and Irrigation*

1. Under colonialism, successive governments then recognised the role of irrigation in agricultural development and embarked on deliberate policies to target specific stakeholders for involvement in irrigation development so as to achieve particular objectives. In the 1950s the Rhodesian Government placed high priority on water development, in particular dam construction and provision of concessionary loans for irrigation development in the Large Scale commercial Sector.

2. This initiative made large-scale commercial farmers key beneficiary stakeholders of this policy. In the 1960s government became a major player in the smallholder irrigation sector as it developed government-managed smallholder irrigation schemes based on a policy of stemming urban migration by rural communities. Although the target beneficiaries of this policy were rural communities, the nature of the policy mitigated against any meaningful farmer participation.

3. During the liberation war and in particular the decade 1970-1980, many smallholder irrigation schemes suffered serious setbacks and a number were abandoned.

4. It was not until 1983, and with a new government, that deliberate steps were taken by the new government to recover from the effects of 20 years of relative inactivity. Efforts were initially directed towards rehabilitation of existing schemes through donor funding.

5. In 1998 Zimbabwe adopted a policy and strategy framework captured in the document "Towards Integrated Water Resources Management". The aim was to promote sustainable water resources management so as to balance water utilisation and its replenishment. Efforts were then directed at managing water as an indivisible complex system comprising water, ecosystems, catchments and human water use.

6. Legislation was promulgated to support this policy thrust. The Water Act was promulgated in 1998. This provided fair access to water by all, improved administration and management of water resources and increased protection of the environment. Along with this piece of legislation was created the Zimbabwe National Water Authority to manage the country's water resources.

7. Since Independence Government has constructed a number of large and small dams for irrigation. Some of these are however yet to have their irrigation potential exploited. These include the Osborne, Mtshabezi and Zhovhe.

8. Small holder irrigation systems situated in the rural areas are a vital basis for rural development and transformation. These and any new ones need to be structured in a way that opens the door to full participation by the beneficiary farmers themselves. There is much evidence from observation and literature to demonstrate that farmer-managed schemes operate at a lower cost, utilise local institutions, grow a greater variety of crops. Farmer involvement must start right from the planning and design of the relevant projects.

### *Recommendations*

#### *Policies and Strategies*

i. In view of the endemic droughts in the country and the imperatives of agrarian reform, irrigation must be viewed as a national priority on the development agenda of Zimbabwe.

ii. All existing major dams with no irrigation infrastructure should be fully equipped for irrigation as per original plans or any new such plans.

iii. As any dam is planned and built the ministry responsible should ensure that land has been made available, indeed prepared for irrigation, to commence.

iv. Government should create an enabling environment for investment by the private sector and institute credit policies that encourage borrowing for irrigation development by farmers.

v. Irrigation water pricing policy should be formulated through a participatory approach and water-pricing formulae should be worked out in consultation with the users. However the levying of charges on water use from private boreholes, small dams and weirs should be stopped because it discourages investment in water resource development and the enhancement of production on farms through irrigation.

vi. In line with a recommendation already made in this report, irrigation planning, design, construction, maintenance of infrastructure, management, and allied activities comprising on-farm water management, should be the responsibility of the ministry responsible for Agriculture.

vii. Smallholder irrigation is a specialised undertaking which, to realise its full potential, must be supported by specialist services in agronomy, crop husbandry, business management, marketing, post harvest handling, water management and irrigation engineering.

viii. Farmer participation should be encouraged in all development phases, from the very beginning of planning and designing, through to implementation, management and evaluation of the irrigation systems.

ix. Training of farmers in water management, irrigated crop production, marketing as well as general management and operation and maintenance are pre-requisites for scheme viability under farmer management.

#### *General Issues Relating to Water and Water Quality*

i. Environmental Quality Information System (EQUIS), a new system of determining the chemistry, geology and limnology of water could be adopted as a means of assessing potable water quality at house-hold, village, town and city levels. The system assesses water quality in wells, boreholes, rivers (recording the state of running water in canals, rivers and streams using telemetric technology or even satellites via geographical information systems (GIS).

ii. Each house in rural homes, villages, towns and cities should where possible have gutters installed, and water tanks constructed for water harvesting and storage.

iii. Efforts could also be made to capture water from the rock croppings, hills and into reservoirs to generate hydroelectric power or for domestic use and irrigation.

iv. Small dams should be constructed on tributaries of medium to large-scale rivers into which to pump floodwater, which would normally be lost to the sea.

v. As each dam is built, efforts should be made to add a hydro-electric installation to generate power for the local community.

vi. Water polluters should be penalised as a matter of policy and principle.

## *12. Plantations, Forests, Safaris and Conservancies*

### *Safaris/Conservancies*

With the promulgation of the 1975 Wildlife Act, farmers and ranchers on private land became increasingly aware of the financial value of their wildlife resources. This has taken the form of sport hunting and non-consumptive tourism, with the latter being more significant on certain private properties.

Wildlife ranching and tourism in Zimbabwe has grown steadily over the years. The comparative advantage of wildlife lies primarily with its aesthetic value rather than in the production of meat. Since the late 1980s, Zimbabwe has become a major destination for sport hunters and wildlife tourists.

Tourism and sport hunting on state land is managed by National Parks and forms the core of the land allocated to wildlife-based tourism in Zimbabwe. In 1991 it was estimated that 30% of total sport hunting revenue was

earned from state land. In 1998 and 1999 this sector grossed US\$21 million.

On communal land, the main formal use of wildlife is through sport hunting in districts with appropriate hunting authority. The revenue earned in 1998 by rural District Councils was US\$1.8 million.

#### *Fast Track, Safaris and Conservancies*

Under Fast Track, emphasis has tended to be placed on the use of land for crops and livestock, with not much attention being paid to wildlife production as a legitimate land use option on newly settled farms. Yet in many regions of Zimbabwe poor rainfall and other agro-ecological conditions severely constrain crop production. In those regions and even in some higher rainfalls areas alternative land uses based on sustainable use of wildlife have proven to be successful and profitable in the past.

#### *Recommendations*

- a) Wildlife based land reform policy must be developed and used to guide settlements in those areas where wildlife is the most appropriate land use option.
- b) Government should consider devising a financial package to enable new settlers to buy machinery and other requirements critical for a successful wildlife operation.
- c) Allocation of a game ranch or part of a conservancy must be preceded by technical proposals to be evaluated by a competent authority.
- d) Technical support including the provision of animals must be extended to new settlers who are expected to observe land use stricture for the area.
- e) Some wildlife farms including those that constitute conservancies must be acquired and designated as core wildlife production zones to be offered on lease basis to approved Zimbabwean and foreign applicants.
- f) Resolute action needs to be taken to stem poaching, and illegal settlements in parks estates and stiffer penalties comparable to those now encompassed under the amended Stock Theft Act should be enforced.
- g) Government should seriously consider enacting a law requiring that conservancies of safaris be run on corporate basis.

#### *Indigenous And Plantation Forests*

##### *Indigenous Forests*

The Forestry Company owns and manages some 800 000 ha of gazetted or demarcated indigenous forests in western Zimbabwe on behalf of government. The forests are located on the ecologically fragile Kalahari sands which are characterised by low and erratic rainfall. The forests areas were gazetted for purposes of catchment conservation; protection of important commercial indigenous timber species only found on Kalahari sands; and the conservation and sustainable management of the resident wild flora and fauna.

According to the Forest Act , no people should reside in them without authority. Hence any persons and their livestock occupying such forest area as Gwaai/Bembesi, Umguza/Insiza, Chesa, Gwampa/ Lake Alice, Ngamo, Kavira and Mzola — as has been reported in the past — should be accommodated elsewhere or provision made to enable them to utilise some aspects of the forest resource under proper management.

##### *Plantation Forests*

Zimbabwe has a well-developed exotic plantation forest resource base on some 119 000 ha of land. Some 62% of the planted area belongs to private companies and individuals while the remainder is owned by the state through the Forest Company, the state forest authority.

The exotic plantation forestry industry is mostly vertically integrated into timber production, processing, packaging and marketing in order to increase returns from a high volume and low value product. The industry has invested considerable in plantation development, saw milling and value addition over the last decade.

However, the proposal to divide some of the plantation forests into small farms of about 250 hectares form to be allocated to individuals will almost certainly prove unviable.

Given the high level of vertical integration, the long gestation period and the contribution to the national economy of the exotic plantation forestry industry, it is recommended that land in this category should be maintained in the current state without any fragmentation.

It is further recommended that the shareholding structure of the existing timber production companies should be broadened to include indigenous people. Smallholder out-grower schemes should be promoted in order to increase the forest resource base.

### *13. The role of the Private Sector, Including Agro-Industrial Concerns, in Agriculture*

1. Private business concerns are deeply enmeshed in the agrarian sector in Zimbabwe's economy. From primary commodity production and processing to infrastructural development, equipment and machinery manufacturing, input provision and marketing and increasingly – contract farming activities, that role looms large.

2. The range of activities is thus diverse, covering food crops but also the production, processing and marketing of commercial commodities such as tobacco, paprika and cotton.

3. In addition to the above, private business organisations take on such other activities as transport, storage and distribution of agricultural commodities and related inputs.

4. However, crucial to the success of the Land Reform Programme in the medium to long term is the need for genuine partnership and collaboration between the private and public sectors in the areas indicated below:

#### *5 Research and Development*

Research into and production of agricultural inputs, machinery and equipment is expensive. This calls for private sector interaction with the public sector institutions such as the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC) and the Agricultural Research Council and Universities to develop local Research and Development (R & D)

#### *6 Transport and Storage*

Transport and storage are vital services to the farmer if his goods are to be competitive at the market. However, provision of the two is also dependent on good infrastructure of roads and communications.

#### *7 Irrigation Development*

It is recommended that Government provide incentives to encourage research into making irrigation technology cheaper and therefore accessible to the majority of farmers. Israel has developed advanced irrigation methods, which have boosted agricultural production.

#### *8 Processing of Produce and Value Addition*

Processing of produce and value addition is essential in that the country will be able to earn higher returns on exports, as well as creating job opportunities. Further, the establishment of rural growth points will entice agro-processors to provide processing facilities in situ.

#### *9. Contract Production*

Contract production of both domestic and export products should be encouraged. These tap into the resources of the private sector requiring produce. Some tobacco producing countries, like Brazil have developed this practice to good effect.

#### *10 Marketing and Distribution*

Marketing and Distribution underpin the production chain. Production is valueless if it has no market and ability to reach the market. Market intelligence, knowledge of the quality and packaging requirements of a market are key tools to successful production.

#### *Recommendations*

The private sector agro-business should be encouraged to participate fully in agricultural enterprises at all levels.

Consideration should be given to the granting of tax concessions to companies for research expenses or where commitment has been made to undertake such research.

Given the objective of creating skilled farmers among Zimbabweans, Government should put in place a

regulatory framework for contract farming. This should be structured in such a way that it proscribes the current practice of business entitled carrying out all farming activities on behalf of some beneficiaries of the Land Reform Programme.

Given that transport and communication services are vital for the farming sector, Government should encourage private investment in the development of these networks. In this regard, the proposed rail concessionaires could be one such method.

As part of measure to boost the livestock sector, Government should encourage investment in the production of affordable vaccines vital for disease control. The quality of livestock is dependent on the pedigree base of livestock, which is only possible through stringent disease control measures.

The establishment of farm equipment hire companies based at rural service centres should be encouraged to mitigate the lack of such equipment amongst some of the A1 and A2 farmers who do not own equipment.

The rural trader, who has capacity, should be assisted to provide dealer depots for agro-chemicals, machinery and equipment. Bigger business entities should work in partnership with the rural trader and not compete for business in these areas.

Agro-processing companies should be encouraged to promote out grower schemes in their areas of operation.

#### *14. Skills, Training and Extension Services*

##### *1.0 Introduction*

1.1 The Fast Track process has been successful in distributing land to the needy. The major challenge that confronts the nation is to make the resettled land productive. This, is at least in part achievable provided appropriate skills and knowledge are imparted to the new farmer. This calls for the revamping of the research and extension systems. It has been established that the new farmers possess varying levels of skills endowment. However, the need for further training has been established with a view of enabling the farmers to:

- i) Utilise the land, capital and labour effectively and efficiently;
- ii) Develop the ability, given the input resources available to them, to choose the enterprises that will profit most by using the technique of farm budgeting and record keeping,
- iii) Pass on acquired skills and information to fellow neighbouring farmers simply by demonstrating good crop and animal husbandry practices.
- iv) To be self-reliant by seeking information by themselves, for example, input requirements, producer prices and other technical information without depending entirely on extension agents.

##### *2.0 Research and Extension Capacity*

2.1 Research and extension institutions exist in Zimbabwe with various capacities. There are four public institutions that are currently responsible for research and extension. These are The Department of Agricultural Research and Extension; the Department of Agricultural Engineering; the Department of Veterinary Services and the Department of Livestock Production and Development. Complementing their activities are other public and private institutions such as, universities and farmer organisations. Given the increased number of new farmers requiring the services of these institutions, there is need for the Government to streamline their functions with a view to making them responsive to the needs of the expanded farmer base.

##### *3.0 Recommendations*

3.1 In order to enhance the productive capacity of the new farmers the Committee recommends that Government does the following:

##### *Short-term measures*

(a) Accelerate the process of deploying extension workers to the recently established farming communities arising from the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. Research and experience have demonstrated that extension agents are more effective when they live within farming communities.

(b) Identify specialised skills among former farm workers and initiate a programme of certification of the skills they possess, to build a database accessible to the new farmer.

(c) Establish mechanisms, which encourage farmer-to-farmer training at farm level, for example, through tours of farms that are doing well in the neighbourhood. This could be complemented by training activities such as, field days, trials and demonstrations, farmer groups and competitions.

(d) Build village libraries and ward information kiosks for purposes of information dissemination and equip them with appropriate and timely information collated for the local farmer (see Charter 9 (vii) above)

#### *Long-term measures*

(e) The old and tried approaches of imparting skills and knowledge which had proved successful could be resuscitated such as the master farmer training and certification and on-farm training for communities.

(f) The need to build more Kushinga-Phikelela-type institutions in the rest of the Provinces offering short and specialised courses for farmers is vital.

(g) A curriculum with agricultural skills training component should be designed for schools. Basic skills on crop and livestock production could be imparted to local communities through the same school facilities; i.e. schools could become sites for refresher courses or field days for farmers in the local community.

(h) It is also recommended that a system that regularly collects and collates accurate national, provincial and district data and information on farmer skills and training needs and requirements be instituted into strategic skills planning.

#### *15. The Agrarian Reform and the Protection Of the Environment*

1. While the Fast Track land resettlement brought long awaited land to the people of Zimbabwe, its long-term sustainability will depend on measures taken to protect the land and its natural resources. Without such measures, deforestation, soil erosion, land degradation and siltation would occur unhindered, rendering future economic development unsustainable.

2. Land use practices must be both ecologically sustainable and economically viable as determined by prior suitability assessments, having regard to the three main land use systems of cropping, forestry and wildlife ranching.

3. **Cropping** is the most dominant land use system in suitable agro-ecological zones and in irrigated areas. There is need to ensure long term sustainability through good land husbandry practices and other measures which protect the land from soil erosion, land degradation and siltation. Sustainability of some high potential agricultural land is under serious threat as a result of the rampant illegal and unregulated gold panning and related mining activities, which have led to land degradation and pollution of water bodies through the release of cyanide, mercury and other poisonous substances into rivers. Urgent practice steps should be taken to control these activities.

4. **Forests** are essential to control erosion, provide energy, building materials, fencing and fodder. They have also recently come to be recognised as vital "carbon sinks". Random removal of forests is a recipe for desertification. In addition, Zimbabwe requires timber plantations for local use and for foreign currency generation through exports. There is need to increase the area under timber plantation if the long term national needs and requirements are to be satisfied.

5. Some farmers in drought prone fragile areas have turned to **wildlife** as the best land use option which is ecologically sustainable and most suitable in semi-arid and arid areas of Natural Regions IV and V. It has been proved in these areas that the return from wildlife is often much higher than that from livestock or crop production.

6. Comprehensive policies and programmes are however required to ensure sustainability in the exploitation of these resources.

Such policy must minimally aim at achieving:

a) **Cropping** systems that reduce progressively, and eventually eliminate, soil erosion that results in siltation of rivers, dams and other water sources. Silted river systems, such as the Save, should be rehabilitated as a matter of deliberate policy and urgent action.

b) The protection and preservation of **indigenous forests** found in most parts of the country and especially in Matabeleland North and the Midlands Provinces, and the properly administered exploitation of the exotic timber plantations of Manicaland, are matters of great national importance. It should also be noted in regard to the latter that the timber industry is vertically integrated in terms of production, processing, packaging and marketing. It employs some 16 000 people. The industry accounts for 35 of the GDP.

The area earmarked for exotic timber is approximately 155 353 hectares with 110 000 hectares planted. Some 42% of the plantations belong to the State, 54% to private companies, mainly the Wattle Company of Zimbabwe and Board timbers, and the remainder to private growers including co-operatives. The Ministry of Environment and Tourism advises that if the plantation area is not expanded the available timber resources will in a few years not be able to satisfy the country's timber processing capacity. This would mean that Zimbabwe would need to import from other countries.

c) The formulation of policies on **game ranching and wildlife** conservancies or sanctuaries aiming to achieve equity and adequate financial benefits for both local communities and the country as a whole should be a priority.

7. What is required, essentially, is a Master Plan for environmental protection that is actionable and that engages all interested parties as regards its formulation, execution, oversight and review. Aspects of the Plan would obviously call for engagement of neighbouring countries as already demonstrated by the Gonarezhou-Kruger-Gaza Transfrontier Park.

## *15. Funding Mechanisms*

### *1.0 Background*

1.1 Agricultural finance — short, medium and long term, is an essential prerequisite for any farming venture. Formal financing of agriculture has occurred in Zimbabwe since the beginning of the colonial era. Land was held under freehold or leasehold security. Since Independence Government has often guaranteed loans for communal farmers directly or through the old Agricultural Finance Corporation.

1.2 The challenge facing the agricultural finance delivery sector in the aftermath of the Fast Track is the creation of financing schemes that cover a whole range of new players in the agricultural sector. Government is currently providing the bulk of agricultural sector. Government is currently providing the bulk of agricultural finance through various schemes. These include input support schemes, the irrigation support schemes tillage programme and the raising of finance through agro-bills. These schemes are currently responsible for the core of the agricultural production in the country. However, they have encountered such problems as lack of close liaison between institutions and inadequate resources.

1.3 The private sector has also been involved in agricultural finance through direct financing by banks, input support schemes, contract farming and agro-processor financing. Nonetheless, the need for agricultural finance is much greater than ever before. There is need for collaboration between Government and the private sector, to finance agricultural activities.

### *2.0 Recommendations*

In order to enhance agricultural production the committee recommends that:

(a) The setting up of the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) be effected as soon as practicable. The success of the land reform programme will, among other things, depend on the provision of adequate capital.

All existing Government credit schemes should be collapsed in the ADB;

(b) The ADB should give emphasis to financing A1 and communal farmers. The ADB will in addition be complemented by the other commercial banks in financing A2 and large-scale commercial farmers;

(c) Low interest finance be availed to farmers in the formative years particularly for infrastructure development.

As balance sheets strengthen through farmers redeeming their loans, they should be weaned off to access finance from the commercial sector.

(d) The Ministries of Finance and Lands should work out a co-ordinated mechanism to finance agriculture;

(e) Government continues to provide inputs to carefully targeted groups. A new mechanism needs to be put in place to handle the input support scheme;

(f) Agro-processors, marketers and other private sector organisations put up a revolving fund to assist farmers, given agriculture's contribution to the various manufacturing processes. This fund could be administered jointly by the Government and private sector;

(g) The private sector be encouraged to go into contract farming under arrangements that do not however render farmers into mere rent collectors;

(h) Government should consider the possibility of subsidising at farm level the production of targeted food and other crops in order to curb excessive price increases which may be unaffordable to the consumer;

(i) There be targeted production for the export markets;

(j) Government and the private sector should accelerate efforts to find new markets abroad; and

(k) As already indicated elsewhere in this Report, Government should spearhead the setting up of farm mechanisation hire services in newly resettled areas.

END OF REPORT