

# **NePAD :**

## **A NEW PARTNERSHIP?**

“Shall I abide by the rules or speed up  
change by breaking them?”

Auteur: Bram Posthumus  
Datum: 7 april 2003  
Versie:



**Nederlands instituut voor Zuidelijk Afrika**

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## Table of Contents

<b>1. NePAD: A NEW PARTNERSHIP?.....</b>	<b>4</b>
Introduction.....	4
Background.....	4
Guest Speakers.....	5
<b>2. Conference Programme: .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>3. A conference report (by Bram Posthumus) .....</b>	<b>8</b>
Face value: what is NePAD? .....	8
NePAD in (future) action .....	8
NePAD and the EU perspective.....	10
Market access, a sticking point .....	12
Beyond market access: is NePAD a neo-liberal enterprise? .....	13
NePAD and civil (society) participation .....	15
Civil society engagement with NePAD.....	17
Peace and good governance – which comes first?.....	19
Messages all around: to civil society organisations in the African Union .....	20
Messages all around: to the NGOs of the North .....	20
Conclusions, of sorts .....	21
<b>4. Opening Speech (by Bob van der Winden) .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>5. How can/are the SADC NGO's influencing regional developments in terms of NePAD? (by Venetia Govender).....</b>	<b>25</b>
Introduction.....	25
African civil society's reactions and responses to NePAD .....	25
Commonalties in Civil Society .....	27
Criticisms of the fundamental basis of NePAD .....	27
Scepticism about NePAD's main strategies:.....	28
Public Protests against NePAD.....	30
<b>6. What is NePAD? How does it relate to civil society and to Europe? (by H.E. Ms. P. Jana) .....</b>	<b>31</b>
“NePAD – A new partnership?” .....	31
How does NePAD relate to Civil Society?.....	32
How does NePAD relate to Europe?.....	34
<b>7. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (by Claire Mandouze, presented by Vincent Dowd) .....</b>	<b>36</b>
Summary.....	36
What is NePAD ?.....	36
The implementation of NePAD .....	37
The relation between NePAD and the African Union.....	38
The African Peer Review Mechanism.....	38
Related events and support for NePAD.....	39
The position of the Commission .....	39
EU Africa Dialogue.....	39
Bibliography .....	40
<b>8. NePAD and African unity (by Viriato Tamele) .....</b>	<b>41</b>
A critical Analysis.....	41

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

Introduction.....	41
Other programmes prior to NePAD .....	41
Unravelling and understanding NePAD .....	42
Civil society's reaction to NePAD.....	43
NePAD and women.....	44
Strategic objectives and aspiration of African unity .....	45
African unity and integration.....	46
Some questions .....	47
Crucial questions for civil society.....	48
Bibliography .....	48
<b>9. A view of the Zambian Civil Society on NePAD</b>	
<i>(by Grayson Koyi)</i> .....	<b>50</b>
Organisational Positions on NePAD .....	50
Ownership Of NePAD.....	51
Problems with NePAD .....	52
Positive Features of NePAD .....	55
Civil Society initiatives on NePAD in Zambia.....	55
Possible collaboration areas For North-South Partnership On NePAD.....	56
<b>10. NePAD and the problem of ownership</b>	
<i>(by Mallet Pumelele Giyose)</i> .....	<b>58</b>
The importance of ownership .....	58
The Genesis of NePAD .....	58
Public consultations.....	59
Why South African Business .....	60
Once more, which ownership .....	60
<b>11. The Peer Review Mechanism and the role of civil society in Angola</b>	
<i>(by Manuel Jose Paulo)</i> .....	<b>62</b>
Background.....	62
NePAD.....	<b>Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.</b>
Angolan civil society.....	63
Angola civil society and NePAD .....	64
Conclusions.....	64
Bibliography .....	65
<b>12. Closing speech</b> <i>(by Bob van der Winden)</i> .....	<b>67</b>
<b>13. Participants list</b> .....	<b>69</b>

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## **1. NePAD: A NEW PARTNERSHIP?**

**Conference, February 21, 2003**

### **Introduction**

Held at the Netherlands Conference Centre in The Hague on February 21, 2003, the conference "NePAD: a new partnership?" was organised by the Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa (NiZA) for an intended audience of development workers, policy makers and interested third parties. This one day conference focused on where the niche for the Dutch and European civil societies in NePAD is, especially in solidarity activities to its counterparts in the South. As NiZA Programme Director Bob van der Winden noted, the meeting was indeed remarkably free of the development jargon that usually obfuscates debate.

NePAD is proclaimed as an initiative by African leaders to take ownership of sustainable growth and development for Africa. Through democratic governance, sound economic policies, and peace building. And by having coherent, consistent, and politically legitimate new partnerships with the industrialised countries and multilateral organisations.

That being so the NePAD initiative notes that 'Africans must not be wards of benevolent guardians; rather they must be the architects of their own sustained upliftment'.

### **Outline:**

This one day conference focuses on where the niche for the Dutch and European civil societies in NePAD is, especially in solidarity activities to its counterparts in the South.

### **Background**

The conference primarily aims at development workers and policy makers. It will bring together a North and South audience to share knowledge, experience and advance thinking in partnerships between southern and northern NGO's and policy makers.

The choice of focus in the conference discussion is due to the fact that:

1. Europe is the most important trading partner, investor and aid donor for Southern Africa. Thus Southern Africa's social economic development is heavily dependent on the policies of the EU and the EU member states. To lobby and influence positive and fair relations between these two regions, strategic choices need to be made from a sustainable clear understanding of the EU stand or stance on NePAD, and likewise of the NePAD secretariat/initiator's stand.
2. Enhanced involvement and participation of SADC's civil societies to the NePAD development process is of the utmost importance. This conference focuses on how to develop the lobbying capacity in the south, whilst creating space for their dialogue with the European Union.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

The Chair of the day was Jacquelin Woodman; Co-ordinator of the Economic Policy Empowerment Programme – EPEP at the European Network on debt and Development – EURODAD.

### Guest Speakers

- **Mr Bob van der Winden**; Programme Director and the Media Programme Manager at the Netherlands institute for Southern Africa.
- **Ms Jacqueline Woodman** is the Coordinator of the Economic Policy Empowerment Programme – EPEP at the European Network on Debt and Development – EURODAD
- **Ms Venetia Govender**; a consultant for the Human Right Programme at NiZA.
- **Ms H.E. Priscilla Jana**; South African Ambassador to The Netherlands. The ambassador is the direct South African representative of NePAD in the Netherlands. She has written several articles and speeches on NePAD. Mrs Jana has been involved as a Human Rights Lawyer in most of the celebrated political cases throughout South Africa. She was a member of the National Assembly from 1999 to 2001 and also a member of several Parliamentary Committees on specific Bills.
- **Mr Vincent Dowd**; European commission, Development Directorate General on SADC desk.
- **Mr Viriato Tamele**; Executive Director of the Economic Justice Coalition (EJC) in Mozambique. EJC works on lobbying and advocacy of development policies including WTO agreements, Cotonou Agreements, AGOA and NePAD. His work on economic justice started in 1997 by helping the foundation of Economic Justice Coalition in Mozambique and networking in the region and internationally.
- **Mr Grayson Koyi**; Director of Research and Information at the Civil Servants Union of Zambia. He has served eight years in the Civil Servants Union, specialising in policy analysis and research. He is also the economist for the Zambia Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU). He is also currently National Coordinator of a project entitled “A new approach to Social and Economic Policy and Poverty Alleviation in Africa”, commissioned by the Netherlands Trade and Confederation, FNV and the Trade Union Solidarity Centre of Finland, SASK in conjunction with the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Mr Koyi has been actively involved in social and economic policy issues. He is also a task force member of the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR), which is a network of Civil Society Organisations actively working in areas of poverty reduction as well as inputting into the PRSP process in Zambia. He is also an associate of the African Labour Researchers Network as well as the Economics Association of Zambia.
- **Mr Manuel J. Paulo**; Angolan and currently an Assistant Researcher at the British-Angola Forum in the United Kingdom within the Africa Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). He conducts research for the head of the programme on NePAD, Western foreign policy towards Africa, and oil and gas on the Gulf of Guinea. He also oversees the development of the British-Angola Forum by organising a series of seminars, and conferences on Angola.
- **Mr MP Giyose**; the Chairman of Jubilee South Africa. He is particularly committed as the National Chairperson of Jubilee South Africa to the struggle against NePAD which he thinks will be the testing ground of the liberation movement of workers, peasants, rural poor, women and youth in Africa throughout the twenty first century.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## 2. Conference Programme:

Morning Programme:

- 08.30-09.30: Registration, Coffee/Tea
- 09.30-09.40: Welcome Speech: **Bob van der Winden**
- 09.40-09.50: Introductions of the day by Chairperson: **Jacqueline Woodman**
- 09.50-10.00: Introduction: **Venetia Govender**  
\*How can/are SADC NGOs' influencing regional dynamics (NePAD)
- 10.00-10.20: NePAD advocate: **Her Excellency Priscilla Jana** the South African Ambassador to The Netherlands.  
\**What is it and how does it relate to civil society and Europe*
- 10.20-10.30: Co-Reference: **Prof. Henk de Haan and Mrs Erica Terpstra**
- 10.30-10.45: Discussion
- 10.45-11.00: Coffee Break:*
- 11.00-11.20: European Union Desk, Directorate-General for Development; **Vincent Dowd**, a desk officer for SADC at the European Commission.
- 11.20-11.30: Co-Reference: **Basker Vashee**
- 11.30-11.40: Discussion
- 11.40-11.55: Mozambique NGO: **Viriato Tamele**  
\*A view of the Mozambiquean civil society.
- 11.55-12.10: **Grayson Koyi**  
\*A view of the Zambian civil society.
- 12.10-12.25: Co-Reference: **Caroline Veldhuizen**
- 12.25-12.50: Discussion
- 12.50-13.00: Morning Wrap-up – **Jacqueline Woodman**
- 13.00-14.00: Lunch*

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

14.00-15.30: Working groups: (*Tea and Coffee during Workshops*)

**Group One:** NGO's strategies on NePAD; North –South partnership  
*-Demands from the South; what the south expects from NePAD*  
*-NePAD in development Policy; e.g NePAD and MDG*

Chairperson: **Awil Mohamoud**

Resource Person: **Grayson Koyi** (Zambia)

**Group Two:** Who owns NePAD: - The question of Ownership.  
*-The importance of ownership*

Chairperson: **Ives Bonzi**

Resource Person: **MP Giyose** (South Africa)

**Group Three:** Is NePAD a guarantee for Good Government  
*-The Peer Review Mechanism and the role of civil society*

Chairperson: **Judith Sargentini**

Resource Person: **Manuel Paulo** (Angola)

Round Up:

15.30-16.00: Conclusion from the workshops (**Workshop Chairs**)

16.00-17.15: Panel of all speakers with Floor Discussion

17.15-17.30: Conclusion by **Jacqueline Woodman** and thank you note by **Bob van der Winden**: Programme Director at NiZA.

17.30-19.00: Borrel/ Informal networking

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

### **3. A conference report**

*(by Bram Posthumus)*

#### **Face value: what is NePAD?**

The first discussion revolved around the question what NePAD actually is. There is a substantial amount of official documentation available on NePAD, not least from its secretariat in South Africa and from its website ([www.NePAD.org](http://www.NePAD.org)). NePAD dates back to July 3, 2001, when the South African Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery (MAP) and the Senegalese Omega Plan were officially merged.

Three and a half months later, NePAD's policy framework was realised by the premier executive body of the plan, the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC). In the wake of the official endorsement of the plan, an elaborate structure has been put in place, including the HSIC, the Steering Committee, the Secretariat, Task Teams and Subcommittees. Extensive information on these organs and their respective functions can be gleaned from the NePAD web site and from the article by Benedict Tembo "The NePAD Machine" in the NiZA publication that accompanied this conference, "Trade Traps, Debt Throes and Escape Routes" (NiZA Amsterdam, 2003).

Poverty alleviation and sound democratic governance are some of the pillars that NePAD is built on, as day chairperson Jacqueline Woodman noted. A further exploration of what the plan is all about was offered to the conference by South Africa's Ambassador to the Netherlands, Her Excellency Pricilla Jana. She began her address by saying that although she had been billed as a NePAD advocate she would certainly not qualify as such. The Ambassador first outlined the differences between NePAD and the various plans that have gone before it. 'Many fine initiatives have been developed in the past for the Development of Africa – such as the Lagos Plan of Action. But many of them failed due to three main reasons and these are:

- Timing under the Cold War paradigm
- Lack of capacity for implementation
- A lack of genuine political will'

The Cold War is now almost a decade and a half behind us, one may assume that things have changed. Ms Jana certainly holds that view: NePAD provides three keys, new elements and the first is that it is African designed, managed and owned; second, it brings a concept of new partnership with mutual commitments, obligations, interests, contributions, benefits and respects. And finally, Africa is undertaking certain commitments and obligations in her own interest without externally imposed conditionalities.' Human rights, good governance and conflict resolution are among them, hence also the voluntary accession to the African Peer Review Mechanism or APRM.

#### **NePAD in (future) action**

The nuts and bolts of NePAD are contained in the Action Plan, endorsed at the African Union Summit in Durban in July 2002. In the Action Plan, the following matters are

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

incorporated – among others: conflict prevention management and resolution, intra-African market access and access to African products in the international market place – a point that was emphasised by the South African Ambassador - infrastructure, debt relief and mainstreaming gender.

Ms. Jana was keen to stress that NePAD is not an island. 'It will be linked to existing initiatives and programmes for Africa. NePAD does not seek to replace or compete with these initiatives and programmes but rather to consciously establish linkages and synergies between them. Further on the nuts and bolts, she stated' NePAD is not an implementation agency and will not be directly involved in implementation. Implementation will be at the level of nation states, regional economic communities and continental institutions. NePAD will act as a catalyst, facilitator and negotiator.' In other words, existing structures will be used to mobilise the resources that are needed to make the execution of the plan a success. She ended her presentation with a quote from her President, Thabo Mbeki, who recently stated: 'The people's contract for a better tomorrow is taking shape. I trust that all of us will identify with this historic process...we dare not falter.'

***Two Dutch members of the Second Chamber,***

*The Dutch equivalent to the Lower House or the House of Commons were at hand as co-references, to ask a few pertinent questions.*

*Henk de Haan (of the Christian Democratic party), speaking in his personal capacity, wondered whether NePAD was not too big and about too much. 'It is engaged in almost all aspects of human development, he observed. And his other point was: 'What could NePAD do to improve the engine of internal growth? Almost all LDCs (Least Developed Countries, bp) have a savings deficit...if you want to invest you are dependent on external capital. It is essential that countries improve their savings ratios, in order to become less dependent on loans and official development aid. How will NePAD help to mobilise private equity to generate growth?' And Ms Erica Terpstra (of the Liberal party) made a statement which emphasised the need for good governance. 'I underlined your statement "No peace without development and no development without peace. Would you not add good governance?" Terpstra wondered how important good governance actually is for NePAD. Secondly, she wholeheartedly endorsed the Ambassador's plea for market access. 'I can hardly be more supportive in this. You are absolutely right [when you say] there is no free trade.' Terpstra said that this was a European issue.*

*The response of the South African Ambassador was brief and to the point. 'Is NePAD too big? Of course it is too big. But as I said, it is not an implementation program. It sets out guidelines.' The word is "synthesis". As for good governance, she said: 'I use peace as a synonym for good governance. That is why we have the APRM. An inclusive peace sets the tone for development.' The Ambassador to Brussels of Algeria added: 'Is NePAD too big? What is meant by "too big"? Because there are others who say that NePAD is not big enough. It had to be comprehensive, because following independence we have been left with virtually every problem imaginable. Isn't the concept of the European Union too big?' (At which point Terpstra could not resist the temptation of an open goal and interjected 'Yes!'). So I think we should see it as a promising plan and ask how it can be implemented.'*

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## **NePAD and the EU perspective**

As NePAD is to be primarily funded by donors, it was appropriate for the South African Ambassador to also have included some passages to how NePAD will actually relate to the European Union (EU). This is what she said: 'NePAD's action plan confirms a central role that Europe has to play at the level of individual countries, at the level of the European Union, and at the level of broader international organisations including the UN, the World Trade Organisation and international financial institutions. However, the important[ point] here is that the days of paternalism and prescription are over, the new partnership envisaged through NePAD is now based on equality, with mutual respect and interests.'

Vincent Dowd, working in the EU Desk, Directorate General for Development (DG Development), gave a presentation of the European Commission's position vis a vis NePAD, most of which can also be gleaned from the Background Note prepared by DG Development on NePAD. The European Commission regards itself as an external partner to both the African Union and NePAD. It supports the political values that are at the heart of NePAD and the AU, because they correspond to the what it terms the "essential elements" of the EU's own external Co-operation policy: governance, strengthening democratic practices, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Until recently, the link between NePAD and the African Union appeared not to be very clear. There were different philosophies and agendas. This has now been clarified with NePAD having been officially declared to be the execution programme of the African Union. There may still be differing

Interpretations of the relation between NePAD and the AU but the Commission has clearly indicated that they see the AU as the political and institutional process that needs long-term support. The Commission is committed to offer concrete support to the process of the establishment of the AU, particularly with respect to its peace and security mechanism and to strengthen institutional capacity. In addition, the peer review (APRM) system can be used to hold governments accountable to their own people and indeed ensure more effective conflict resolution. Dowd had the impression that the AU's institutions actually mirrored those of the European Union and as such suggested the setting up of the kind of tripartite consultation body one sees in many parts of Europe, the fora where business, trade union and government talk together, known as Social Council or their equivalents.

Relations between the EU and Africa, sitting largely within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement (i.e. the successor to the 1975 Lomé Convention), now hinge on three areas: trade, aid and political dialogue. Dowd stressed that this was indeed a partnership, 'nothing is imposed here.' Trade has been in terms of unilaterally granted market access to unprocessed products from the 49 or 50 Least Developed Countries, most of whom are part of the Cotonou Agreement. Trade agreements under this arrangement need to be re-negotiated in regional settings, largely under unilateral EU pressure (see also the latest NiZA publication "Trade Traps, Debt Throes and Escape Routes", Amsterdam 2003.) Aid is run through the European Commission's DG Development, with money lodged in various budget lines and in the European Development Fund. As for political dialogue, it is the view of the Commission that the new pan-African context and the creation of the AU offer a new opportunity to establish

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

a more structured political dialogue with the African institutions and give a new raison d'être to the so-called "Cairo process". NePAD and the AU are likely to become the general framework for the EU-Africa dialogue and its implementation. Unfortunately, political dialogue is stalled at the moment. The next EU/Africa Heads of State Summit in Lisbon scheduled for April 2003, billed as an "occasion to give a new political momentum to the Europe-Africa dialogue and to strengthen and develop the European Africa partnership in order to help Africa meet the challenge of integration and sustainable development", has been postponed until an as yet unspecified date. Dowd regrets the move: 'The European Commission would have liked the dialogue to have continued.'

In monetary terms, the European Commission does not regard NePAD as another channel through which funds can be directed. The existing channels (Cotonou, and the various bilateral agreements) serve this purpose. What can be said, though, is that the Commission has supplied support for programmes that are relevant to the NePAD objectives. € 10 million has gone towards the AU's peace and security mechanism and another € 2 million in international support for capacity building. Other budget lines in function of Human Rights, among other, were available or being studied.

Dowd was then asked by co-referent Basker Vashee of the Transnational Institute to respond to a few remarks. 'Europe has been involved in Africa for a long time, from the slave trade onwards. How will the European Commission now want to relate to NePAD? The inclusion of good governance is a very political project. How much interference will that bring for the continent because Europe is involved? What actually is Europe's view of good governance? Most of Africa is afflicted by this disease called corruption, at enormous costs to the development of peoples and societies. If we deal with corruption, we can develop Africa within 20 years, I am sure of it. And there was one final thing: 'Amnesty International and other organisations make pronouncements on Africa at the time. The European Commission takes these pronouncements seriously, since it responds to them. But how do they view human rights and human rights institutions in Africa?' Dowd made a few general comments in reply. He said that the European Commission did not want to get involved in Africa's internal affairs and issues and it was going to leave the fleshing out of the Peer Review Mechanism (the APRM) to the appropriate institutions within the African Union. The same basically applied to corruption and the rule of law. There is also language pertaining to these issues in the Cotonou Agreement, indeed: political dialogue that would deal with issues of human rights and corruption has been strengthened in the text of the Cotonou Agreement. At the European level, the issue of corruption is being taken up in the sense that European firms have now been taken to court if they were caught in corrupt practices and the tax deductibility options of bribe paying have been greatly limited. Some European countries still allow facilitation fees. (ed note: one could, for instance take a good hard look at the signature bonuses that are currently handed out to the Angolan government by French, British and American – and probably soon to follow Dutch – oil companies). Finally, Anne Graumans of the Dutch Labour Party-linked Evert Vermeer Stichting, a think tank on development issues, wondered if the AU and EU would actually ever find each other on the issue of good governance. And Amboka Wameyo of the London-based NGO Action Aid wondered whether there was not yet another layer of conditionality added onto the ones already existing. The World Bank

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

has its PRSPs, the US sticks to the UN Millennium Goals, now the EU has political dialogue and the insistence of enhanced partnership. The list apparently never ends. Next stop: the G8 summit in Evian, in France, another resort town that shares its remote tranquillity with the Canadian resort where the previous one took place. The EU is now a part of the G8, which has put the NePAD Action Plan on the agenda. One of the more promising initiatives could be the EU initiative to fund infrastructural projects. If this is done along the lines that characterise its own internal Structural Funds, which boosted Spain's and Portugal's economies at the time they joined the EU almost 30 years ago, then something positive may be expected from this partnership.

### **Market access, a sticking point**

The idea of increased market access for African products has been born out of the notion that trade leads economic growth, which in its turn alleviates poverty and diminishes inequality.

The South African Ambassador Ms Jana made it quite clear in the course of her address that market access presupposes a level playing field, which clearly is not in evidence. On the African side, improvements in trade policy, supply side support, institutional development and trade negotiating skills are among the areas that the NePAD initiative is focusing on in order to remove some of the constraints that have so far hindered Africa's share of the global trade market to increase.

The developed nations have as big a role to play here – if not a bigger one. And Ms Jana argued that the main obstacle here was the continued existence of trade policies in the rich parts of the world. 'The huge layers of protection in the EU, the US and other developed countries, in agriculture, textiles and steel for example, continue to stifle the development and growth, precisely in those sectors where developing countries enjoy competitive advantage. A change in these protectionist policies by the developed world would unleash the development potential of large numbers of developing countries. Thus providing new sources of growth for the global economy and contributing to development...in Africa. This should be taken into account as the EU is expanding.'

Indeed, the playing field is not level, the rules are unevenly bent, the odds are stacked in favour of the rich. And there was a warning towards the end of the Ambassador's speech: 'None of us can feel safe or secure if the benefits of globalisation are shared only by a few and the rules of the multilateral trading system are perceived to be in the interest of only the rich and the powerful.' She was certainly not referring to the kind of imagery that was conjured up 9 years ago in the essay by the American writer Robert Kaplan (*The Coming Anarchy*) but simply stating an age old political fact: inequality on a massive scale only gets tolerated for so long.

Her Excellency Mathato Adel Matuanyane, the Ambassador of Lesotho to Brussels also emphasised the importance of market access. She highlighted the problem of non-tariff barriers that would still impede full market access for Africa.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

**Beyond market access: is NePAD a neo-liberal enterprise?**

NePAD sometimes appears to be more of a fundraising project than an actual attempt to get Africa out of its predicaments using its own engines. '[It has been] designed to reassure and encourage foreign investment and increased donor aid.' The second, obviously related point, is that NePAD allegedly follows a neo-liberal approach that is based on a economic model that can be named free market fundamentalism. It became the received gospel (the word "paradigm" is often used here) among donor agencies in the early 1980s and has proved a virtually unmitigated disaster for the majority of African economies.

As Viriato Tamele, Executive Director of the Economic Justice Network in Mozambique pointed out that his country is often taken as a shining example of wonderful behaviour within the free market parameters now offered by the Bretton Woods Institutions, World Bank and IMF, the leading donor agencies and guardians of that current ideology. But the Structural Adjustment Programs that his country has carried out have led to job losses for 120,000 people.

The very same can be repeated about Zambia, as Grayson Koyi, the Director of Research and Information of the Civil Servants Union of Zambia confirmed. 'We have absolute poverty levels of 70%,' meaning that 7 out of 10 Zambians live on an unsustainable daily income of € 1 or less. 'We face a debt burden of some 6.5 billion US Dollars, which is impossible to repay and a history of Structural Adjustment Policies that has not been an inspiring experience.' Since 1991, when the Chiluba government ushered in the harshest variety of structural adjustment, an estimated 70,000 salaried Zambians have lost their jobs. What these policies mean in practice, says Koyi, can be seen if one goes out into the villages and onto the streets. 'It is seen in the increasing number and rates at which [men and women] are being informalised in the economy, the feminisation of poverty, the increase in street children, in school drop out rates, disease and social exclusion...'

Tamele sees the same happening with the follow up conditionality, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (or PRSP) and the NePAD exercise. Both continue to follow current dominant donor dogma. At a deeper level, what many African civil society organisations have in common – apart from their very obvious diversity – is their desire to 'counter and end the continent's long subordination to powerful external forces and negative factors in the world system, to re-vindicate Africa's rights...aims and claims and to "rescue", revive and reinvigorate the continent,' as Venetia Govender, the National Director for the Human Rights Commission in South Africa put it in her address. Is NePAD going to do this? This is where doubt sets in. Govender: 'A major criticism of the ideological positioning of NePAD is that [it has been located] within the Washington Consensus (ed. note: the name given to the neo-liberal free market paradigm that is behind donor policy)... NePAD is likely to perpetuate and reinforce the subjugation of Africa in the international global system.'

In her view, the close associations between NePAD's founding South African, Nigerian, Senegalese, Algerian and Egyptian fathers and the leaders of the richest countries in the world only bear this out. Markets, runs the argument here, have driven globalisation, of which the Washington Consensus is an integral part. Globalised

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

markets have driven Africa to the margins of the world and its peoples into more poverty and despair. More insertion into world markets in its present form will simply mean: more of the same. It is even argued that NePAD represents nothing more than a programme driven by international business, through corporate South Africa, to bring the entire continent into the orbit of multinational corporations and their nefarious ways. This is probably why the investment climate has been termed "inhospitable" and its political dispensations "hostile" to foreign investment.

However, Viriato Tamele, in his presentation, questioned this popular notion of Africa's marginalisation. 'Africa's fundamental problem is not its exclusion, but its long-standing inclusion, subordination and exploitation by a profoundly asymmetric international economy that has forcibly "integrated" it into international trade and financial systems. 'It is not the lack of integration that is the problem it is the manner in which the continent has been integrated into the global economy, in an increasingly worrying way. One could take Tamele's point even one step further, as has been done in the writings of the likes of Patrick Chabal and others (see, for instance, *The Criminalisation of the African State*). It is not just the exploitative relations between Africa and the exterior, it is also the way in which increasingly criminal systems insinuate themselves into Africa's economies with the acquiescence or active connivance of its main political movers and shakers. Resource exploitation, human and drugs trafficking, arms smuggling and even complete resource depletion have become the preferred manner of connecting the Liberia's, Congo's, Angola's and CAR's to the rest of the world, accountable to nobody, to the detriment of many and the benefit of a few.

'NePAD tries to straddle two paradigms: African self-reliance and potential dependence on the Western corporate world.' Govender concluded. Her question was almost rhetorical: 'Will Western business invest to provide health and education to every family in Africa or will it look after itself to make money in Africa?...There is nothing wrong in the ambition of NePAD to bring about self-reliance. The issue is how, with what agency and for whom.' For Koyi there is no doubt that the paradigm needs to be questioned. He cited the Dakar declaration on the role of African workers and trade unions in NePAD, when it said: 'There are very strong moral and compelling economic reasons of common interest for Africa's development partners to buy into [a] new paradigm, since the continued economic non-performance of Africa has enormous impact on global progress.' The new paradigm was not further defined but that it is a step away from the neo-liberal market fundamentalism appears clear enough.

The Washington Consensus argument was later picked up by the South African Embassy's Chris Botha. 'It's more than that. Debt cancellation and fair trade are all part of NePAD and this is not in the Washington Consensus. 'It is, after all, a question of degree and extent. To which extent NePAD is inside the Washington Consensus is a matter for debate. The degree to which NePAD should be inside the Washington Consensus was probably most succinctly encapsulated in the question put forward by MP Giyose, the National Chairperson of Jubilee South Africa: 'Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?' African leaders and even the G8 are now saying that development aid has not worked – so that trade should. The assumption is trade and investment will succeed where aid and grants have failed. It is the view of many civil society actors that aid has not worked because of its nature. If aid

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

does not promote social justice, if aid runs counter to how Africans perceive their development, if aid is tied to conditions that expel social policies like land reform and if aid is not given on the basis of solidarity – then aid will not work. As Govender put it: 'it is not aid, trade, investments or loans that do not necessarily work. It is the particular social relation that they express and reflect that has been the problem. In Africa, donor aid has failed because it was given to prop up allies, neutralise opponents, to pay for military bases and support counter-insurgency movements...the Western bureaucracies for aid management took a considerable amount of the aid budget.' Her conclusion: 'It is the political economy of aid that was negative, not aid itself. But the political economy of aid has never been put into question.' As NePAD will to a very large extent depend on foreign funding, as the Ambassador of Lesotho already pointed out, this issue is obviously crucial.

### **NePAD and civil (society) participation**

As is well known, a large number of civil society organisations have made public both their support for and their misgivings about NePAD. The latter, taken together, amount to a comprehensive criticism of NePAD and especially the way it has been conceived.

Venetia Govender outlined some of the issues. 'We meet at a time,' she had set out her address, 'when the continent is going through an incredibly testing period.' The indicators are indeed grim when we consider higher than average figures for child mortality, unemployment, HIV/Aids, armed conflict and other scourges, which, lest we forget, are all human-made and can therefore be human-unmade. What is required is political will and as far as NePAD is concerned there has been no shortage of it. 'The amount of activity on NePAD has been quite phenomenal,' says Govender, and civil society has been involved in debate throughout. 'NePAD received mixed but generally critical responses from African NGOs and broader social movements.' One of the main points: 'NePAD has no direct process for engagement with civil society. While there is general recognition of the impossibility of engaging with all civil society, the design of the programme does not include...mechanisms for consultation.' This is an issue that has dogged NePAD right from the beginning: its very genesis should have been an inclusive, consultative process, which in the view of most civil society organisations in Africa it was not.

The absence of any meaningful consultation with the intended beneficiaries of NePAD has rendered the entire exercise a top-down enterprise. Reality on the ground says it all: throughout Africa, NePAD is virtually unknown among the general populace. As Koyi questioned: 'Where does NePAD draw its legitimacy from? Does it reflect the ambition of the people?' Not really, appeared the consensus on the part of civil society.

'Voicelessness,' was how Govender characterised the situation. In countries like Angola and Mozambique there is the added "handicap" of the language barrier as Tamele pointed out. 'We (mostly) speak Portuguese in Mozambique and most of the agreements we hear about are in English.' And at a more profound level: 'What do ordinary people think about development policies? What do they know about them?'

Manuel Paulo of the British Angola Forum and assistant researcher of the Africa Programme at the Royal Institute for International Relations in London made it very clear in his presentation at the workshop on Good Government held in the afternoon

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

that in Angola, NePAD does not come anywhere near the top of the list of priorities for both government and citizenry, be this for entirely different reasons. The people of Angola have simply never heard of NePAD as it is never talked about in the media. And emerging from war they have different preoccupations – survival being one of them. The governments, as Paulo notes, rather avoids talking about NePAD, ‘as its emphasis on good governance and peer review could become uncomfortable for Luanda in the future.’ This state of affairs is not unique to Angola.

Ms Jana had already pre-empted some of the criticisms regarding consultation by including a long passage in her address about civil society. ‘The core concept of the NePAD initiative is the element of partnerships between African States and international community and between governments and the private sector.’ Government and its agencies are responsible for mobilising civil society (and indeed the private sector) and Ms Jana went on to list the events at which engagement with civil society has been initiated:

- the Africa Development Forum in Addis Ababa in March 2002,
- The African Scholars Forum in Nairobi in April 2002,
- The African Development Bank meeting in Addis Ababa in May 2002 and
- the Durban and Johannesburg summits in 2002.

Govender had indeed mentioned that this engagement, in South Africa, had been going on, one of the intentions being to improve the NePAD document to hand – as was the case at the Continental Experts’ Meeting organised in Pretoria in June 2002 by the Africa Institute of South Africa, with the stated aim to have African intellectuals add value to NePAD.

The South African Ambassador continued: ‘Opportunities have been provided wherever possible, for instance the Organisation of African Trade Unions was invited was invited to provide an input during the March 2002 NePAD Heads of State Implementation Committee (HSIC) meeting in Abuja. ‘Especially in South Africa itself, there have been many consultation rounds from which Ms Jana could conclude, at least for South Africa, that ‘as participative a process as possible has been followed. Of course there are the criticisms that civil society was not involved at the initial stages.’ But now that NePAD is there, the process should, in her view, become more inclusive. ‘In every country, civil society and the private sector is to be closely involved in addressing the priorities identified in the Plan of Action. As the detailed action plans in these areas are implemented, partnership with civil society, at individual country level, at the level of the Regional Economic Communities and at continental level, will be a vital element to the success of the process.’ The recipe was already carried through: more communication and consultation, both with civil society and the private sector which also plays a key role in the eventual success of NePAD, both as economic players and as partners of the various governments in a number of public-private initiatives that could be instrumental in getting major infrastructural projects off the ground, such as the fibre optic cable that is currently being spun around the continent, tourism projects and, of course, the power grid that one day should reach all corners of the continent.

Then, the Ambassador made a telling remark. ‘In order to ensure the sustainability of the program NePAD must be brought to all levels of African society. The people must be given the opportunity to engage in the process and take ownership of the initiative.’

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

To the attentive listener, that ties in with her previous remark about criticisms that had been levelled at NePAD for not being inclusive from its conception. So the question that now remains is: how is NePAD going to be given the broad public support it needs in order to succeed? Is it going to be “sold” to the people or are the people going to be “engaged”? If the remarks of some of the Ambassadors were anything to go by, the visions differ somewhat. From the point of view of the Senegalese Ambassador, results will count, rather than the process: ‘The Marshall Plan worked in Europe and I am not so sure whether the people were consulted there,’ he observed. The Ambassador from Lesotho declared that civil society participation was accorded the highest priority but that a word of caution was needed, since there are instances where behind a civil society outfit is looming the figure of a politician who could use such an organisation to further his or her political agenda. Her final conclusion: work out a compromise at the level of society at large. Chris Botha of the South African Embassy had a more pronounced view: ‘The supposition apparently is that governments do not represent their people. But I have to take it as my starting point that by and large we consider ourselves to be representative governments. It is the governments’ job to work for the people. Civil society must of course be engaged and this process of taking it down to the grassroots is actually happening but it is the government’s job to lead.’ Indeed, but Virato Tamele’s riposte would be that once a government has been elected this does not mean it has the green light to do everything it jolly well pleases. The jury is out.

### **Civil society engagement with NePAD**

So how are civil society actors on the continent shaping their engagement with NePAD, for engage they must: it is there and is unlikely to disappear any time soon. As Koyi noted, civil society has, to begin with, not been without praise for some aspects of the plan. The centrality of the idea of a new partnership was welcomed, as was the focus on African ownership and management, the importance of national and regional priorities and the idea that these plans must be prepared through participatory processes. All these have been recognised. Over and above, Govender noted that civil society actors have been and are engaged in study, rigorous analysis, offering comprehensive alternatives and continuing to participate in public consultation processes – including those that have been opened up by the NePAD secretariat itself, ‘in response to...many process criticisms,’ as she put it. Civil society has also been engaged in resisting some of the excesses of this neo-liberal approach, e.g. the privatisation of public utilities such as water, electricity and transport. As Govender said in her address: ‘Most infrastructure is of a “natural monopoly” type, for which competition is unsuitable.’ Anyone who doubts this is invited to take a look at the privatisation calamities that have befallen the once-proud British railway system, the once-reliable electricity supply in California, the recent downfall of the European telecoms – with plenty more on the way. ‘There is, in contrast’, as Govender continued, an extremely strong case, based on the “public good” features of infrastructure, for state control and non-profit operation. ‘This is not just for reasons of good corporate governance. ‘Privatisation...usually prevents the cross subsidisation required to serve poor consumers, especially women-headed households.’ Related to this is of course the issue of access to medication, in an age where HIV/Aids continued to wreak havoc within entire communities. Court action in South Africa, where the argument that anti-retroviral drugs are a human right has been put forward, may point the way. In addition,

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

civil society organisations have been meeting in their own ever broadening circles, such as the Forum des Peuples in Bamako, Mali (a meeting that coincided with the G8 in Canada in 2002), which came up with a comprehensive critique that hinged – once again – on participation and formulated a number of straightforward demands: debt cancellation, return of stolen funds, fair prices for agricultural products and protection of nascent industries (all this and more can be read in the excellent paper “A chacun son NePAD” by Frédéric Morteau of the French NGO AITEC, written in February 2003 at the occasion of the anti-Françafrique summit in Paris that same month). Finally, civil society organisations have been

protesting at gatherings such as the Durban Summit of the African Union and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. There is, in other words, the emergence of a social movement that is bottom-up, vocal and gaining momentum.

***About participation and perception:***

*Perhaps there is a point that needs to be made here about perception. It is often observed by any variety of players that somehow governments and civil society are enemies. Unfortunately, on all sides there are those who think this is – or even ought to be – the case. Some governments, civil society organisations and/or their supporter's abroad have taken this view. Tamele made it quite clear that as far as he was concerned, civil society is not the enemy of the government. 'Even the opposition parties in Mozambique do not talk about NePAD. We must go to them and to the government.'* In principle one can say that if NePAD is indeed predicated upon a partnership between governments and civil society, as it claims to be, then significantly more tangible steps towards dialogue, co-operation and partnership are indeed needed in an uncomfortably large number of countries. Caroline Veldhuizen of the Dutch National Commission for Sustainable Development (NCDO) asked in her intervention as a co-referent for Tamele and Koyi, whether there is constructive dialogue possible between governments and civil society, as it is very clear that NePAD is discussed at a very high level indeed and must be brought into all levels of society. The question is of course, how the engagement of society, and especially the poorest within those societies, can be brought about. One aspect of the matter is of course that it all depends on where one is. As we have seen, Zambia and South Africa are examples of countries where comprehensive civil society efforts have resulted in dialogue, both in terms of governments' real or perceived willingness to listen and based on the quality of civil society input. In Zambia, for instance, there was the much-debated paper entitled “Civil Society perspectives on PRSPs” in which the very serious concerns of Zambian civil society as regards this exercise were outlined. But there are a large number of countries that have a long standing tradition of extreme political intolerance, such as Angola, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Chad and many others where civil society is first and foremost “the enemy”. Some have seen improvements over time, like Senegal, Ghana, and very recently Kenya and Madagascar while others have been on a steady slide backwards – Côte d'Ivoire and again Zimbabwe stand out as obvious examples. Where there are states that are still functioning (which excludes countries like Somalia and Liberia and possibly a few more) and there is some sort of independent civil society movement (not one single country is entirely without one) NePAD may be the builder of the momentum of dialogue between these two actors. In fact, nothing less will do if its ambitions are to be realised.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

### **Peace and good governance – which comes first?**

NePAD is based on the existence of good governance. And, indeed, efficient economic management. As the South African Ambassador had pointed out in her address, Africa is undertaking certain commitments and obligations in her own interest without externally imposed conditionalities.' Human rights, good governance – hence the voluntary accession to the African Peer Review Mechanism or APRM - and conflict resolution are among them. The APRM is clearly designed to diminish donor conditionality, as it would be lodged within the AU's own structures. The idea, as Chris Botha explained during the workshop on NePAD and Good Government, is that once the APRM had been established and proved to be successful, some positive spillover could be expected. Terpstra, the Dutch MP, had inquired after the preponderance of peace above good governance of the other way around, to which Her Excellency Ms Jana had replied that peace was a synonym for good governance. Perhaps one might even speak of a metaphor. Her Excellency the Ambassador to Brussels of Lesotho saw it slightly differently when she said that as far as she was concerned the issue of peace and good governance starts with the former. 'The starting point must be peace.'

When one looks at the countries that have so far signed up to the APRM mechanism, at least two (Cameroon and Gabon) are very firmly entrenched in the system known as La Françafrique, an obscure set of relationships among diplomats, heads of state, politicians, civil servants, movers and fixers and dealers that has been run for well over 40 years to the detriment of the people in Francophone Africa. It can and has been argued by organisations like Survie in France that the very existence of La Françafrique mitigates so heavily against NePAD and its goals that the partnership does not stand a chance to succeed. Four other countries (Egypt, Algeria, Rwanda and Uganda) face increasingly harsh criticism over the way they run their political systems, one (the DRC) is a barely functioning state whose authority does not extend beyond perhaps one-third of the national territory. In all probability, of this list only South Africa can be held up to the standards the APRM is seeking to voluntarily foster.

However, this rather depressing information from the ground should not be construed to mean that the APRM has no future. Scepticism on the part of civil society could actually help as a catalyst to make the mechanism perform. It might take a long time before the APRM can be implemented and here the input of NGO reports can make an important difference. This was one of the more important conclusions to come out of the workshop on Good Government. NGOs could actually use NePAD as an opportunity to review governments' behaviour. Obviously, the way the case of the increasingly authoritarian primus inter pares Robert Mugabe and his colleagues in Togo, Guinea, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Liberia (to name some of the worst offenders) are going to be subjected to peer review will provide an equal number of interesting test cases that will be closely watched by all concerned. From the outside world, not a great deal of help is to be expected in this respect. Manuel Paulo cited the case of his own country Angola, a land with an appalling track record of human rights abuses and corruption, and said: 'Good governance is not a prerequisite for a government to get aid or funding. Angola has always got aid, funding and investment. If the Portuguese will not give money, then someone else will.' In the Angolan case, these are most likely to be France and the United States, bent on getting their hands on more Angolan oil. Paulo concluded: 'The West does not always take

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

good governance as a criterion. 'In fact, it is an exception if it ever does. Barring a few exceptions here and there, African governments, as was observed during the Good Government workshop, do not need their people to survive. In Angola, as Paulo quoted the former UN Human Rights observer in that country, Nicholas Howen, it has often been the priests and pastors who have stayed with the people and died with the people in the towns under siege [during the war] and in remote communities. This has given the churches legitimacy and authority, buttressed by whatever food and social services they have been able to distribute.' Internationally, some hope may be expected from efforts like the Kimberley Process that is trying to outlaw the so-called "conflict diamonds" and the Publish What You Pay campaign designed to make oil companies, particularly in Angola, reveal how much they actually pay to the government of that country for the right to explore for oil. Messages all around: to the governments in the African Union The message from the workshop entitled "Who owns NePAD" was simple and clear: stimulate a bottom-up approach and promote pro-active civil society involvement. Democratisation of the NePAD exercise may be modelled along the lines of the now abandoned South African Reconstruction and Development Plan, a document which the ANC wrote before national independence in 1994 as a blueprint for both reviving the economy and introducing social justice into South African society at large. The main message could be summarised thus: build solidarity with the citizenry in-country, rather than with those far away in the aid bureaucracies of the rich world.

### **Messages all around: to civil society organisations in the African Union**

From the workshop "Who owns NePAD?" the message was very clear: study NePAD, formulate alternative strategies based on the interests of the rural poor – who of course need to be asked about their opinions! – and inform/mobilise people on issues of social justice. Another, slightly ambiguous point, to come out of the Good Government workshop was to "take the political situations as it is and use the tools already existing, such as NePAD and the APRM and build strategies around those.' On the one hand, one is reminded of the old adage by Ernesto "Che" Guevara: 'Let's be realistic, demand the impossible.' On the other hand, one has to take into account the circumstances in which some civil society organisations have to work. Finally, fundraising within the region could well be an alternative to continued dependence on largesse from the North. Messages all around: to the donor community Not so much mentioned in the recommendations department but criticised for their accumulating conditionalities and their perceived lack of commitment to Africa's development in spite of the rhetoric, donors were also criticised for the way in which they are seen as trying to "harmonise" Africa's smooth integration into a corporate-dominated economic global system. It did not amount to a set of real recommendations but it would be fair to say that a firm "Cease and Desist" emerged from the conference where these particular issues just mentioned are concerned.

### **Messages all around: to the NGOs of the North**

Since this was the thrust of the conference, most messages ended up here. The main one from the "Who owns NePAD" workshop was once again: study NePAD and know what it is about. Then develop common campaigns and alternative programmes that answer the needs of poor people. In practical terms, the engagement of the African diaspora may or may not be a task for Northern NGOs, but could well come as a function of the way in which the African diaspora organises itself.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

As it was agreed that there could be no debate on content without input from the Southern counterparts, it was left to – among others – Grayson Koyi to mention a few pressure points for Northern NGOs. ‘There’s an external component to Africa’s problems, among others the need for market access. In addition, mostly debt-driven economic reform has been largely unsuccessful and therefore debt cancellation is one basis for the way forward.’ That is the first point. The second one refers to the need for good governance to be broad and inclusive and the last point refers to NePAD as a whole: ‘Is it the appropriate framework?’ he asked. There is a case to be made for building consensus around the formulation of alternatives. Northern NGOs could do a lot in terms of awareness building in the North and presenting alternative cases effectively. Amboka Wameyo of Action Aid mentioned the importance of Northern NGOs to lobby their governments on the proliferation of small arms – a fourth pressure point – and reiterated the importance of the continued lobby for extra debt relief.

Some remarks were made about capacity building, a term that was taken exception to by a number of participants from Africa, since this implies that there was no capacity to start with. “Capacity enhancement” might be a better alternative, although the question did arise whether this would actually mean anything in substance, beyond mere semantics. Areas where Northern NGOs might have added value was in areas such as: how does development aid actually work, how do both governments and the commercial sector in their countries work, and how can you lobby governments and international institutions. This useful information could then be relayed to their partners in Africa and elsewhere.

Some of this is already happening and a lot of it could be done effectively. One of the things that Northern NGOs are not particularly good at is listening. As was said during one of the workshops: the focus should be on partnership and participation, not on education. Or as Morteau put it in his paper “A chacun son NePAD”: it does not behove the northern solidarity organisations to put themselves in the place of the analyses and demands of African civil societies.’ Autrement dit: base your judgement on what you hear, not on what you think you know. This institutional exhortation really is nothing new. Whether they like to hear this or not, like their counterparts in ministerial and UN agency circles in the North and the South the itinerant cadres of Northern NGOs are increasingly members of a rather cosy brother and sisterhood of like-minded individuals, whose views and lifestyles are increasingly removed from those they claim to represent. So the call to listen is really meant as a call to reconnect with the constituency, base strategies on what the constituent members of that constituency have to say – and then engage and address their own governments in the North on the issues that have been brought forward. And one final message: consider the possibility that one might disagree with a partner: do Northern NGOs then have an exit strategy?

### **Conclusions, of sorts**

So in the end, it could be said, and this is what chairperson Woodman indeed did, that there may well be some general consensus about what, broadly speaking the objectives should be but uncertainly disagreement about the manner in which these objectives should then be realised.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

Van der Winden had noted a few promises in the course of the day: the peer review mechanism would be in place soon, there would be pilot projects with civil society involvement, Dutch MP's would once again take up the tariff walls issue and help put an end to European agricultural subsidies. Still, he did note the lack of grassroots involvement. Ownership at that level certainly should be increased dramatically and it is here that all involved – African governments, civil society organisations in Africa, donor agencies and countries and Northern NGOs each have their specific role to play. Not the most satisfactory of conclusions, perhaps, but it is only a start.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## 4. Opening Speech

*(by Bob van der Winden)*

We are very glad that over a hundred participants have invested a full day in NEPAD. An initial investment we could say – at least that's what we hope; we hope that we have such an interesting programme that you will be prepared to visit one of our future 'gigs' as my HIPHOP friends would say on this and similar topics as well.

But let me first introduce myself: my name is Bob van der Winden, and I am the programme director of NiZA. That immediately leaves two things to explain. Yes, this seminar is organised by the Netherlands Institute of Southern Africa, with a specific interest in that region, but with heartfelt interest in the rest of the continent as well. And yes, NiZA has several programmes, mainly the media programme, supporting independent and public media in the SADC region, the Human Rights programme supporting Human Rights and Peace building groups and the economy programme, which is directly responsible for this seminar, and other campaigns such as FATAL TRANSACTIONS.

For us the three programmes are all directed towards democracy and good governance – not just on a national, but also on an international level, as we will certainly experience today.

It's really good to see you here together – again for some I may say, because many of us already know each other from previous occasions: Not strange, because NiZA is over 40 years old now, at least the organisations that merged into NiZA, 3 formerly anti-apartheid organisations.

Just a few facts that I would like to bring to your attention: the first committee of the range that merged into NiZA was the Angola committee – founded 1961. We went as an organisation, but also as individuals through the independence wars of many countries, through the banning of the ANC and the Mandela trials (our chairman Coen Stork was there as an observer). Through the Angolan and Mozambican independence in 1975, through Zimbabwean independence in 1980, which I personally witnessed like the Namibian independence in 1989, as well as the peace process in Angola, then war and now peace again, like in Mozambique. We saw the fall of the dictator of Malawi, ....and we will see the fall of more dictators, wherever they are governing ..... I'm sure of that.

Finally we lived through the liberation of Nelson Mandela and the South African people. We saw it happen from within I can say, from within the movements of those days, and from within something that we nowadays could describe as concerned Civil Society. In fact groups of which many speakers and resource persons today assembled here are the protagonists.

Our history is not charity – our history is solidarity, and it is good to keep that in mind if you want to understand what is NiZA's driver to organise meetings such as this one. We think at the same time that solidarity does not come for free, that real support must be part of it. That is what we call solidarity new style: professional, innovative but

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

always with a heartfelt solidarity. We do feel the anguish and the anger our partners in Southern Africa feel – we are remote but we suffer from the things that happen in Zimbabwe for instance at the moment – and they are happening less visible in other places as well – as you are probably well aware of... We are very concerned that the war on Iraq will mean a setback for any development in Africa and not in Africa alone, so we do express our concerns about this unholy endeavour wherever we can...

We try to express our solidarity nowadays in supporting our partner organisations – all together around 80 at the moment – in what we use to call Capacity Enhancement: to enlarge their capacities to engage with their issues and with the world in confronting the world with their views. This seminar is part of that support.

Not because we don't have anything to learn here – capacity enhancement is more than anything else sharing knowledge, sharing views. And that is what we are here for today. So we will hopefully also enhance our capacities as we are here, coming from the Netherlands and other European countries. We, from NiZA, are not here to convey our points of view on NEPAD to you – we're here to share our views – that we certainly have – and exchange with the participants from SADC in this exercise, as well as with you.

In this sense we try to bring into practice views about Capacity building, or as we'd rather say enhancement – because there is a lot of capacity in the South as you will experience today! – of international agencies like UNDP etc. There is a shifting paradigm in development theories as a whole and capacity enhancement in special. But we ourselves should make these shifts in paradigms work in practice, every day, if we do not want to leave these so called shifting paradigms a dead letter.

We are embarking on a journey whereby more and more all over the world the basic assumptions of development, as something that comes from the North and many times is implemented by northern experts in the South will be completely abolished, and the South will steer it's own development. But that requires other ways of thinking, other ways of strategizing, other ways of planning and is such a long term process that we can only start it now, not knowing when and where it will end.

And I promise you this: not only this seminar and this programme but also the other programmes of NiZA will stand in the forefront of these changes.

NiZA with its history of solidarity is well equipped to dare to start and we need you as well to take the process to an end. But here and now we can start together on a journey that eventually will lead to another way of thinking about development and other practice in development as well.

We think that this is what NePAD is about as well, or at least should be about – but to hear more about it I would like to give the floor to our daychair, Jacqueline, because that's the topic of today.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## 5. How can/are the SADC NGO's influencing regional developments in terms of NePAD?

*(by Venetia Govender)*

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. My task this morning is to provide a broad overview of SADC civil society engagement and interaction with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NePAD).

### **Introduction**

The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NePAD) aims to establish a "new framework of interaction with the rest of the world, including the industrialised countries and multilateral organisations" as a means of putting Africa on a high-growth path. As a project of the African Union, it tries to articulate a regional development strategy. The NePAD outlines a reciprocal set of commitments between Africa states, donor governments, and the private sector as a framework for managing Africa's integration into the world economy.

NePAD has been through various adjustments over some years to become the version eventually presented officially to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Abuja, Nigeria in October 2001, and was formally adopted in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, as the economic programme of the newly launched African Union (AU).

### **African civil society's reactions and responses to NePAD**

NePAD received mixed but generally critical responses from African NGOs and broader social movements, trade unions, church-based and academic researchers, and even many media analysts across the continent. On the other hand, some African civil society organisations and analysts welcome NePAD and support it both in its aims and its content.

NePAD has no process for direct engagement with civil society. While there is a general recognition of the impossibility of engaging with all civil society organisations, the design of the programme does not include processes or mechanisms for consultation. If one views NePAD as a poverty reduction strategy programme on a continental scale it lacks the participatory element that is regarded as essential to the success of these programmes and an important reason for the failure of earlier poverty reduction initiatives.

As regards the critical engagements, I will attempt to summarise the key issue areas **Many** focus on the process of NePAD's formulation, and the absence of appropriate and wide-ranging prior public consultation on its very conceptualisation, and in the various phases of its subsequent elaboration and global promotion;

**Others** focus more on the overriding external orientation, and the basic motivation of the document as a 'fund-raising project' designed to reassure and encourage foreign

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

investment and increased Northern government ODA (overseas development aid) to Africa;

**Others** analyse in some detail the overall paradigmatic framework within which the programme is situated, or the theoretical concepts that are employed within its proposals, and the substance and implications of its specific projects;

**Some** analyses combine various or all of these dimensions.

However, cutting across these different approaches or emphases, there is a lively debate within African civil society as to how or whether African non-governmental or civil society organisations (CSOs) should now 'engage' with the inter-governmental NePAD.

For some CSOs, 'engagement' means a continuation of their rigorous analysis of NePAD as one part of the longstanding independent research and analyses on African political economy that had been underway well before - and not only in response to - NePAD; towards the articulation of viable sectoral programmes and comprehensive alternatives for individual countries, regions and the continent, to quote the Accra declaration of April 2002 by African academics of the highly reputable, continent-wide Council for Development and Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), together with activist intellectuals working in civil society organisations and policy institutions throughout Africa:

*"In support of our broader commitment to contribute to addressing Africa's development challenges ... we shall deploy our research, training and advocacy skills and capacities to contribute to the generation and dissemination of knowledge on the issues at stake; engage with and participate in the mobilisation of social groups around their interests and appropriate strategies of development; and engage with governments and policy institutions at local, national and continental levels [and] we shall continue our collaboration with our colleagues in the global movement" .*

For other CSOs, 'being engaged' means participating in the public consultation processes, and even some official avenues that have belatedly been opened up by the NePAD secretariat in response to the many process criticisms; and working therein to contribute to more detailed content for the existing proposals. For some of these, in recognition of current gaps and inadequacies, the declared aim of such 'engagement' is to 'improve' the document as a whole. Thus, the 'Continental Experts Meeting', organised in Pretoria in June 2002 by the Africa Institute of South Africa with financial support from the South African government, recommended that

*an 'All-African Academy of Arts and Sciences' or an 'African Academy of Scholars' be established to institutionalise the intra-African academic partnership as a civil society component of NePAD to optimise the opportunities for African intellectuals to add value and participate in the NePAD process by means of dedicated research and scientifically-based recommendations [and for which] NePAD funding should be made available to support the identification and guidance of such Centres of Excellence"*

Thus, underlying and informing such very different civil society responses to NePAD are contrasting positions not only on their response to this document per se, but on the role and relationship of African civil society to African governments about the key

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

features and the main internal and external sources or causes of the problems within African societies, politics and economies;

### **Commonalties in Civil Society**

However, despite these significant differences of perception and approach, there are also apparent commonalties in motivation and inspiration that are evident in otherwise diverse Africa civil society organisations. There is a wide and deep, intellectual and emotional commitment in most African organisations to the philosophical ideals and political aims of African co-operation and unity, in order for Africans to collectively counter and end the continent's long subordination to powerful external forces and negative factors in the world system; to re-vindicate Africa's rights, its just aims and claims, and to 'rescue', revive and reinvigorate the continent.

### **Criticisms of the fundamental basis of NePAD**

A major criticism of the ideological positioning of NePAD is that the drivers had located it within the "Washington consensus" which, according to Eddy Maloka, SA's representative at the experts' meeting, refers to the view that the state must be less involved in the economy, privatise and leave everything to the "invisible" hand of the market. Within that consensus NePAD is "likely to perpetuate and reinforce the subjugation of Africa in the international global system, the enclivity of African economies and the marginalisation of Africa's people". Whilst maintaining the status quo.

NePAD can only be seen to achieve its goals if African communities believed that it was delivering effectively at the community level. From this perspective the major concern has been the lack of opportunity for the participation of African communities and civil society in the rapidly developing debate around NePAD's developmental framework.

NePAD evolved under conditions of smoke-filled-room secrecy, in close contact with Bill Clinton and Tony Blair (several times during 2000), the G8 (in Okinawa in 2000 and Genoa in 2001), the Bretton Woods Institutions (in repeated meetings) and international capital (at Davos in 2001). As a result, the plan denies the rich contributions of African social struggles in its very genesis. Instead, it empowers transnational corporations, Northern donor agency technocrats, Washington financial agencies and Geneva trade bureaucrats.

African leaders and even the G8 are now saying development aid has not worked. That is true- aid, loans have not worked. The alternative panacea is said to be- not aid but trade, not loans but investment. The assumption is trade and investment will succeed where grants and loans have failed.

From aid has not worked in Africa (an empirical fact), there has been an impermissible logical deduction that aid will not work in Africa. An even stronger claim is that trade and investment will work better in Africa. This has been the US's African Growth and Opportunity Act's message and now NePAD's driving reductive and linear logic.

For aid to work, it must satisfy the following conditions:

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

- It is disbursed in a way that builds, promotes and assists social justice in Africa
- Complements and not contradicts a clear, comprehensive African national development conceptual framework
- It is untied to conditions that expel social policy like land reform, that undermine social justice and an African national policy framework
- It is given on the basis of solidarity and not expectation of direct benefit to the donors.

Thus it is not aid, trade, investment or loans that are problems per se. It is the particular social relation that they express and reflect that has been the problem. In Africa donor aid failed because it was given to prop up allies, neutralise opponents, to pay for military bases and support counter-insurgency movements. Self-reliant and nationalist Governments such as those of Nkrumah and Lumumba were undermined. The western bureaucracies for aid management took a considerable amount of the aid budget. It is the political economy of post-war aid that was negative, not aid in itself.

Another concern is NePAD's promotion of the failed neoliberalism of free market economic policies. NePAD's premise is that poverty in Africa can be cured, if only the world elite gives the continent a chance: 'The continued marginalisation of Africa from the globalisation process and the social exclusion of the vast majority of its peoples constitute a serious threat to global stability. We readily admit that globalisation is a product of scientific and technological advances, many of which have been market-driven. The locomotive for these major advances is the highly industrialised nations.' All of these arguments are better put by reversing the logic. Africa's continued poverty ('marginalisation') is a direct outcome of excess globalisation, not of insufficient globalisation, because of the drain from ever declining prices of raw materials (Africa's main exports), crippling debt repayments and profit repatriation to transnational corporations.

As for 'mobilising,' NePAD does not mention the mass civil-society protests that threw off the yokes of slavery, colonialism, apartheid and dictatorships.

### **Scepticism about NePAD's main strategies:**

- Privatisation, especially of infrastructure such as water, electricity, telecoms and transport, will fail because of the insufficient buying power of most African consumers;
- More insertion of Africa into the world economy will simply worsen fast-declining terms of trade, given that African countries produce so many cash-crop and minerals whose global markets are glutted;
- Multi-party elections are held, typically, between variants of neoliberal parties, and cannot substitute for the genuine democracy required to restore legitimacy to so many failing African states;

Grand visions of information and communications technology are hopelessly unrealistic considering the lack of simple reliable electricity across the continent; and

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

South Africa's self-mandate for peace-keeping provides no peace of mind, in the wake of Pretoria's ongoing purchase of US\$5 billion worth of offensive weaponry and its unhappy record of regional military interventions.

As for economic aspirations, such as lower foreign debt, more stable capital financial flows and increased foreign investment, NePAD offers only the status quo. Instead of promoting full and immediate debt cancellation, as do virtually all serious reformers, the NePAD strategy is to 'support existing poverty reduction initiatives at the multilateral level, such as the Comprehensive Development Framework of the World Bank and the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach linked to the Highly Indebted Poor Country debt relief initiative.' Jubilee South labels these a 'cruel hoax' and even the World Bank now concedes its HIPC plan has failed to make Africa's foreign debt 'sustainable.'

NePAD's solution to foreign investment drought includes 'Public-Private Partnerships' in privatised infrastructure: 'Establish and nurture PPPs as well as grant concessions towards the construction, development and maintenance of ports, roads, railways and maritime transportation. With the assistance of sector-specialised agencies, put in place policy and legislative frameworks to encourage competition.'

But most infrastructure is of a 'natural monopoly' type, for which competition is unsuitable: roads and railroads, telephone land lines, water and sewage reticulation systems, electricity transmission, ports and the like. NePAD cannot make a case for competition in these areas. There is, in contrast, an extremely strong case, based on 'public-good' features of infrastructure, for state control and non-profit operation. Most noticeably, privatisation of infrastructure usually prevents the cross-subsidisation required to serve poor consumers, especially women-headed households.

There are also concerns about geopolitical realignments in Africa related to NePAD. While NePAD has been adopted as a continent wide strategy by the AU, in its relations with donors NePAD will create "winners and losers", with the main benefits likely to go to the economically stronger countries. This is likely to increase polarisation on the continent around support for NePAD which is already feeding divisions in the SADC region between Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia (which share a military pact) and South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique, which have growing trade links. These shifting geopolitical alignments on the continent provide a new African geopolitical context for assessing NePAD.

The debate on market access within NePAD focuses on tariffs and quotas. While this is important for established exporters and foreign investors, the issue of subsidies is more important from a trade justice perspective. For example every European cow gets around US\$2.3 a day in subsidies while half of Africa's people live on less. Support for small-scale farmers in Africa means reducing or eliminating the subsidies in developed countries that impact on the price of commodities. This would prevent a situation where, for example, sugar produced in the EU sells at less than its production price, making it uneconomic for small-scale farmers in Africa to harvest their sugar crops for market.

Finally, NePAD is at its most self-contradictory when appealing 'to all the peoples of Africa, in all their diversity, to become aware of the seriousness of the situation and the

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

need to mobilise themselves in order to put an end to further marginalisation of the continent and ensure its development by bridging the gap with the developed countries.'

### **Public Protests against NePAD**

The first public protest against NePAD occurred in early June, at the World Economic Forum's Southern African regional meeting in Durban, where anti-apartheid poet Dennis Brutus--now acting secretary of Jubilee South Africa--led more than a hundred non-violent demonstrators against horse-charging policemen. Brutus held up a sign for national television viewers: 'No Kneepad!', culminating in a massive march at the World Summit on Sustainable Development.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## **6. What is NEPAD? How does it relate to civil society and to Europe?**

*(by H.E. Ms P Jana, Ambassador of South Africa)*

### **"NEPAD – A new partnership?"**

What is the New Partnership for Africa's Development? NEPAD is a holistic, integrated, sustainable development initiative for the economic and social revival of Africa.

The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, at the Millennium Summit called for a higher priority to achieve "the twin goals of freedom from want and freedom from fear". The New Partnership for Africa's Development NEPAD represents Africa's response to both these challenges.

It addresses the issues of security and stability and of socio-economic development. It is premised on the idea "no peace without development, no development without peace".

Many fine initiatives have been developed in the past for the Development of Africa – such as the Lagos Plan of Action, but failed due to three major reasons:

- Timing under the cold war paradigm
- Lack of capacity for implementation
- A lack of genuine political will

We are at a critical juncture in history, a core leadership has developed both in Africa and abroad that are genuinely committed to the regeneration of our continent. Africa's advances in recent years and the convergence of the agreement on international development goals and a common agenda for Africa illustrate this. NEPAD provides three key, new elements namely:

- It is African designed, managed and owned
- It brings a concept of a new partnership with mutual commitments, obligations, interests, contributions, benefits and respect
- Africa is undertaking certain commitments and obligations in her own interest without externally imposed conditionalities.

NEPAD is a commitment by African states to good governance, democracy and human rights while endeavouring to prevent and resolve situations of conflict and instability on the continent. Coupled to these efforts, to create conditions conducive for investment, growth and development are initiatives to raise the necessary resources to address Africa's development needs in critical sectors that have been highlighted in the Program of Action.

The NEPAD initial Action Plan was endorsed at the African Union Summit in Durban in July 2002. Certain priorities were identified such as:

- Address Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanisms;

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

- Strengthen institutions of political, economic and corporate governance;
- Address market access issues, including intra-African trade and diversification of production and exports;
- Infrastructure, including ICT, transport, water, and sanitation;
- Debt relief; and
- Mainstreaming gender.

With regard to gender, the African Women's Forum whose aim is to promote a collective interest of women in Africa, stating that women's involvement in all stages of NEPAD is an investment for social transformation and necessary for sustainable growth and development, they recommended that women's steering committees should be established at national and regional levels.

NEPAD has not been constructed nor does it exist in a vacuum. It will be linked to existing initiatives and programmes for Africa. NEPAD does not seek to replace or compete with these initiatives and programmes but rather to consciously establish linkages and synergies between them.

In this way, all activities focused on Africa can be pursued in an integrated and coordinated fashion within the framework of priorities and needs identified by Africans for themselves.

NEPAD is not an implementing agency and will not be directly involved in implementation. Implementation will be at the level of nation states, regional economic communities and continental institutions. NEPAD will act as a catalyst, facilitator and negotiator.

African States will commit to good governance, democracy and human rights through the ratification of the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance of the African Union and by voluntarily acceding to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

The APRM is a mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring by the participating member governments. The mandate of the APRM is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate values, codes and standards contained in the declaration.

In the state of the nation address on the 14<sup>th</sup> February 2003, President Thabo Mbeki stated that "within weeks, the NEPAD implementation committee will finalize criteria, standards, institutions and legal instruments for the APRM, pending the setting up of relevant institutions within the African Union."

### **How does NePAD relate to Civil Society?**

The core concept in the NePAD initiative is the element of partnership between African States and African organizations, between Africans states and the international community, and between governments and the private sector and governments and civil society.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

Individual countries constitute the nuclei of all programmes and implementation actions. Central actors at this level are governments acting through their relevant departments or designated agencies.

They are responsible for mobilising civil society and the private sector to participate and to see NEPAD as relevant in their efforts towards development and the alleviation of poverty. Therefore, government, civil society and private sector are expected to internalise the NEPAD development strategies and investment plans.

NEPAD has attempted to utilize major events on the continent to engage with civil society representatives for example the African Development Forum in Addis Ababa in March 2002, the African Scholar's Forum in Nairobi in April 2002, the ADB AGM in Addis Ababa in May 2002 and the AU Summit in Durban in 2002 and the WSSD in September 2002.

Opportunities have been provided wherever possible, for instance the Organization of African Trade Unions was invited to provide an input during the March 2002 NePAD Heads of State Implementation Committee meeting in Abuja.

In South Africa over the course of the last year, NePAD and the Constitutive Act have been debated in Parliament, there has been engagement with the provincial governments, and meetings have been held with various sectors of civil society on these topics, including church groups, labour organizations, academia, business and the youth. For example, at the AU Summit, events were held with labour, civil society, gender, youth and business groups to discuss these issues. It can be clearly seen that as participative a process as possible has been followed.

Now that NePAD is ready for implementation the role of communication and marketing becomes even more important. It is essential to set up "In-Country" NePAD communications structures which will keep the NePAD initiative and all its projects and programs in focus in each and every country. Pilot projects in 10 countries are presently being initiated in this regard.

In every country, civil society and the private sector is to be closely involved in addressing the priorities identified in the Plan of Action.

As the detailed action plans in these areas are implemented, the partnership with civil society, at individual country level, at the level of Regional Economic Communities and at continental level, will be a vital element to the success of the process. For this reason, the process of communication and consultation is being intensified.

Structures and opportunities are being developed for engagement with civil society at the level of the African Union. There can be no doubt that it is essential that African private sectors and civil society structures are mobilized in support of NePAD and are provided with opportunities in a meaningful manner for it to be a success.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

In order to ensure the sustainability of the program NePAD must be brought to all levels of African society. The people must be given the opportunity to engage in the process and to take ownership of the initiative.

Clearly the private sector has a key role to play in the future development of the continent and public private partnerships are essential in the NePAD process.

Many of the priorities of NePAD including peace and security, democracy and political governance, economic and corporate governance, infrastructure development, banking and financial standards, agriculture and market access, are about reducing the risk profile of doing business on the continent and creating conditions conducive for investment, reducing business costs, and increasing Africa's competitiveness in the world economy. Vast opportunities exist under NePAD for domestic and foreign investment.

A NePAD business group has been formed comprising continental and international business to provide a point of entry and engagement for business with the NePAD process at the substantive level led by the African Business Roundtable and includes other organisations such as the international chamber of commerce, the US corporate council on Africa and the Commonwealth Business Council. This partnership is already beginning to deliver tangible results, for example continental fibre optic cable project, launched in Dakar and at the WEF meeting in Durban, the Okavango-Upper Zambezi International Tourism SDI and the Africa Energy Fund that is currently being established to provide a continental power grid.

### **How does NePAD relate to Europe?**

NePAD's action plan confirms a central role that Europe has to play at the level of individual countries, at the level of European Union, and at the level of broader international organizations including the UN, the World Trade Organization and international financial institutions. However, the days of paternalism and prescription are over, the new partnership envisaged through NePAD is now based on: equality, with mutual respect and interest.

Let me elaborate on the market access initiative, as an example of what we are seeking with European countries. This initiative postulates the promotion of trade as an engine for economic growth and development for African countries and thus contributing to alleviating poverty and inequality. Market access alone is neither sufficient nor sustainable in generating growth in trade. Therefore importance is also placed on the competitiveness of production along with the expansion and diversification of supply of commodities, goods and services in order to exploit trading opportunities.

The five key elements for our market access strategy:

1. Trade Policy Development
2. Supply Side Support
3. Institutional Development
4. A three-level approach: firstly a bilateral strategy with key trading partners, secondly a regional strategy and thirdly, a multilateral strategy.
5. Trade negotiation skills.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

It is the trade policies of the developed world that continue to stifle the growth and development of many developing countries.

The huge layers of protection in the EU, the US and other developed countries, in agriculture, textiles and steel for example, continue to stifle the development and growth of many developing countries, precisely in those sectors where developing countries enjoy comparative advantage.

A change in these protectionist policies by the developed world would unleash the development potential of large numbers of developing countries. Thus providing new sources of growth for the global economy and contributing to development especially of the least developed countries, most of which are in Africa. This should be taken into account as the EU is expanding.

We believe that the rules of the WTO are imbalanced. The balance of interests, rights and obligations of the TRIPS agreement clearly favours the developed world.

We also are increasingly aware that while trade liberalization and globalization have benefited countries of the North, most developing countries, particularly those in Africa, continue to be marginalized. None of us can feel safe or secure if the benefits of globalisation are shared only by a few and the roles of the multilateral trading system are perceived to be in the interest of only the rich and powerful.

In terms of NePAD we intend to address these concerns, to challenge the rest of the world, not to narrowly seek our own self-interest, but for the long term, sustainable benefit of the entire planet.

From what I have outlined to you today, it is clear that much has to be done. In the words of President Thabo Mbeki, "The tide has turned. The people's contract for a better tomorrow is taking shape. I trust that all of us will identify with this historic process. Given the great possibility we have to move forward we dare not falter."

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## **7. The New Partnership for Africa's Development**

*(by Ms. Claire Mandouze (European Commission),*

*presented by Vincent Dowd ( Directorate-General for Development at the European Union Desk).*

### **Summary**

- The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NePAD) is an African initiative born in 2001 from two previous plans, the Millennium Africa Plan (MAP) of South African President Thabo Mbeki and the OMEGA plan of Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade. At the OAU Summit in Lusaka (July 2001), the two plans were merged into NePAD.
- NePAD has since been promoted by a group of five African leaders: Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Egypt who constitute the NePAD Steering Committee, mandated and set up by the OAU. Since Lusaka, progress has been made in defining NePAD objectives in the area of governance and its priorities in the different sectors. An Initial Action Plan was endorsed by the OAU Summit in July.
- In July 2002, NePAD was adopted by the new African Union (AU) as its operational programme.
- NePAD has received the support of the G8, the UN and the EU. In October 2001, NePAD was presented to the EU in Brussels. The EU (Presidency and Commission) pledged to support the initiative, particularly in the areas of capacity building and infrastructure, and Council agreed to make it a regular feature of the EU-Africa dialogue.

### **What is NePAD ?**

NePAD is based on two main principles:

- African ownership, with a focus on Africa's own efforts to solve its difficulties and organise its "renaissance"
- Selectivity, regarding the high standards of governance that it sets for participating countries, and a peer-review mechanism to ensure they are observed.

The NePAD Action Programme is organised around seven main initiatives: peace, security and political governance (support to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution adopted by the AU and under the Commission of the AU as focal point), economic and corporate governance, human resources development, infrastructure (ICT, transport, energy, water), environment, capital flows and debt, as well as market access.

NePAD was conceived as a process and not as implementation agency. Its role is that of a catalyst/initiator/facilitator to:

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

- accelerate the mobilisation of all resources and actors/partners for the development of Africa and promote better convergence and synergies in the priorities for actions;
- build confidence among Africans and with the international community;
- create “a framework for collaboration and co-ordination under the AU. It is also a mechanism to create the space to engage stakeholders beyond government in moving forward” (African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in their Ministerial Statement at the UNECA Conference in Johannesburg 19 – 21 October 2002).

### **The implementation of NePAD**

- The NePAD governance structure as mandated by the AU consists of the Heads of State Implementation Committee comprising fifteen Heads of State - the five who had been promoting the Initiative (Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Egypt), plus ten others (in total three Heads of State per region<sup>1</sup>) as well as the Chairman and the Secretary General of the AU. The Implementation Committee meets on a quarterly basis. Their work is supported by the NePAD Steering Committee, comprised of the “Sherpas” of the five Heads of State promoters of the initiative, and an interim NePAD Secretariat based in South Africa.
- At its Inaugural Summit in Durban (9-11 July 2002), the AU endorsed the NePAD Progress Report, its Initial Action Plan, a Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and the principles of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), thus setting the working programme for the implementation of NePAD.
- As NePAD is a mandated initiative of the AU, the NePAD Implementation Committee has to report annually to the AU Summit on its task to further elaborate the NePAD Framework and ensure its implementation. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Assembly of Heads and Government of the AU will be held in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2003.
- The African Ministers of Finance (October 2002) recommended four immediate actions to be taken in order to show concrete results:
  1. Build NePAD’s objectives into national programmes;
  2. Engage parliaments and private and civil stakeholders in country owned development strategies;
  3. Move forward on subregional projects, especially for infrastructure; and
  4. Implement quickly the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

---

<sup>1</sup> The AU Durban Summit endorsed the increase in the number of members of the Implementation Committee from 15 to 20. So far, for Northern Africa, there have been Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia on the Committee, for Western Africa Mali, Nigeria and Senegal, for Eastern Africa Ethiopia, Mauritius and Rwanda, for Central Africa Cameroon, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe, and for Southern Africa Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa. Angola and Ghana have been appointed by their respective Regional Economic Communities as additional members for Southern and Western Africa.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

### **The relation between NePAD and the African Union**

The Durban Summit of the AU (9-11 July 2002) adopted NePAD as the operational programme of the AU. NePAD shares the same basic principles and common vision (governance, promotion of human rights and democracy) as enshrined in the constitutive Act of the AU, and adds a powerful economic and partnership dimension.

Thus the relationship between NePAD and the AU has been gradually clarified: conceived originally as two separate initiatives (although both under the guidance of the OAU) NePAD and the AU are now seen as mutually reinforcing (i) NePAD is seen as the operational programme of Action giving credibility and effectiveness to the AU in the short term and (ii) the AU providing the institutional framework and its political legitimacy to NePAD. This convergence is being further increased as South Africa, main promoter of NePAD, is holding the presidency of the first year of the AU.

Although it has been confirmed that the two initiatives should not constitute two parallel processes and that the AU will, after the election of the AU Commission at the next AU summit, integrate NePAD, there is still some confusion and contradicting interpretation. The present discussion about the APRM, where there are still areas of duplication and overlap, reflects the need to further clarify the relation between the NePAD APRM and the peer review system of the AU, notably the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA).

### **The African Peer Review Mechanism**

The APRM has initially been conceived as a "comprehensive instrument" covering both political and economic (corporate and financial) governance. Its aim is to promote fulfilment of the commitments contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance that was endorsed by the Durban Summit. All AU Member States were encouraged to ratify the Declaration and accede to the APRM.

The last Meeting of the NePAD Implementation Committee in Abuja (3 November 2002) took some decisions to further clarify the implementation of the APRM:

- The APRM is comprehensive, i.e. it will cover political, economic and corporate governance. Accession to it will remain voluntary.
- Eventually, the AU will be responsible for the APRM. Until the AU, currently in transition from OAU to AU, is ready for the task, the NePAD Secretariat will co-ordinate and administer the implementation process under the supervision of a Panel of Eminent Persons.
- After this transitional phase, the AU will integrate the APRM through its specialised commissions, institutions or organs responsible for democracy, political and human rights.
- The NePAD Secretariat will further develop detailed criteria and indicators for measuring performance on political and economic governance and design the accession.
- Twelve members of the Implementation Committee signed a Declaration of Intent to participate in the APRM.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

The clarifications show the evolutionary and transitional character of the process. It is expected that the AU should take definitive decisions at the next Summit in July 2003.

### **Related events and support for NePAD**

- **G8:** NePAD received official support from the G8 Summit in Kananaskis (June 2002) where the G8 adopted their "Action Plan for Africa".
- **UN:** Last October, the UN General Assembly adopted NePAD as the successor framework to the UN New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF). The UN- system was urged to organise its support for Africa in accordance with the principles, objectives and priorities of NePAD.

### **The position of the Commission**

- The Commission supports the political values that are at the heart of NePAD and the AU, because they correspond to the "essential elements" of the EU's own external Co-operation policy: governance, strengthening democratic practices, respect for human rights and the rule of law.
- Commission does not see NePAD as a channel for financial resources or a new co-operation instrument. Thus co-operation with Africa can best take place through the existing contractual instruments of Barcelona/MEDA, Cotonou and the EU/South Africa agreement.
- As a follow-up to the meeting with NePAD Heads of States in October 2001, the Commission has pledged to design a pilot project of capacity-building for priority actions in the implementation of NePAD, and to take part in a joint Task Force on infrastructure development in Africa.
- Commission financially supported a first Forum of African Parliamentarians on NePAD , that took place in Cotonou (7-9 October 2002) with a view to increase ownership of NePAD among Africa's elected representatives and to identify their role in its implementation. It was recommended to all national and regional African parliaments to set up NePAD parliamentary groups supported by an electronic network within one year.
- Whereas there are still differing interpretations of the relation between NePAD and the AU, the Commission clearly indicated that they see the AU as the political and institutional process, which need to be supported in the long term. In an official message of support to Thabo Mbeki as the first President of the AU, President Prodi confirmed the EC's commitment to offer concrete support to the process of the establishment of the AU particularly with respect to its peace and security mechanism and to strengthen institutional capacity in the transition period.

### **EU Africa Dialogue**

The new pan African context and the creation of the AU offer a new opportunity to establish a more structured political dialogue with the African institutions and give a

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

new *raison d'être* to the "Cairo process". NePAD and the AU are likely to become the general framework for the EU-Africa dialogue and its implementation. The next EU/Africa Heads of State Summit in Lisbon scheduled for April 2003 represents the occasion to give a new political momentum to the Europe-Africa dialogue and to strengthen and develop the Europe Africa partnership in order to help Africa meet the challenge of integration and sustainable development.

### **Bibliography**

The original NePAD documents can be found on the NePAD website:  
[www.NePAD.org](http://www.NePAD.org):

*NePAD Priority Projects and Programmes*

[http://www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news\\_upload/NePAD\\_2dPROJECTS\\_2edb.AA0050201.pdf](http://www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news_upload/NePAD_2dPROJECTS_2edb.AA0050201.pdf)

*Declaration on Democracy on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance*

[http://www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news\\_upload/NePAD\\_2dCORE\\_2dDOCUMENTS\\_2edb.DeclarationPolGovNePAD250902.doc](http://www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news_upload/NePAD_2dCORE_2dDOCUMENTS_2edb.DeclarationPolGovNePAD250902.doc)

*The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)*

[http://www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news\\_upload/NePAD\\_2dCORE\\_2dDOCUMENTS\\_2edb.Assembly.AU.DeclonImplNePAD090902.1\(I\).doc](http://www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news_upload/NePAD_2dCORE_2dDOCUMENTS_2edb.Assembly.AU.DeclonImplNePAD090902.1(I).doc)

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## 8. NePAD and African unity

*(by Viriatoto Tamele)*

### A critical Analysis

Initiatives like NePAD, which are inspired by World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programme strategies, and based on the liberalisation of trade and unequal exchange, will continue to keep Africa under control. These programmes are based on western government models and are not rooted in the culture and history of African peoples.

The Bamako Forum noted that the neoliberal model of globalisation has had a ruinous effect on human rights in Africa. The people's access to basic needs – food, housing, clothing and energy – is directly threatened by compulsory privatisation and the opening up of Africa to the multinational corporations (endorsed by NePAD), making democracy and human rights impossible. The conditions laid down by the West, the World Bank and the IMF in relation to democracy, good governance and corruption are both hollow and hypocritical.) [ I African Social Forum, 5 – 9 January 2002, Bamako, Mali]

### Introduction

The New Partnership for African Development (NePAD) went through many changes in the years before it was officially presented to the Organisation of African Unity summit meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001, and formally adopted in Durban, South Africa, at the launch of the African Union (AU) in July 2002, as the AU's economic programme.

### Other programmes prior to NePAD

Since the 1970s, African leaders have drawn on their own convictions and perceptions to try and formulate development paradigms for the continent. But history shows that each African attempt to create a better future for the continent, using its own development strategies and policies, has been ridiculed by the international financial institutions (IFIs), with the support, or at least, the connivance of the rest of the donor community. Five of these initiatives were especially important:

- The Lagos Action Plan for African Economic Development, (1980 – 2000) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980) (LPA);
- The African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery and Development (APPER), 1986-1990, which became the United Nations Programme for African Action, Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) (1989);
- African Alternative to the Economic Readjustment Programmes for Recovery and Socio-Economic Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1990)
- The United Nations New Agenda for African Development in the 1990s (UN-NADAF 1991);

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

Unfortunately, all these programmes were opposed, harmed and rejected by the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and IMF) and so Africans were prevented from exercising their basic and fundamental right to decide on their own future. But the fact that African leaders depend excessively on the west, have a narrow political base and continually suffer from not being able to channel financial resources into the appropriate places, meant that the implementation of these plans was neglected. The lack of resources, as well as a lack of self-confidence, led them to abandon their own strategies.

If we want to analyse NePAD, we cannot disregard these programmes, despite their failure. It is only by understanding the past and facing up to the present that we can move firmly towards a promising future.

### **Unravelling and understanding NePAD**

NePAD ignores healthy and well-established experiences, African research and debates, and places no value on the accumulated body of African analysis and proposals. NePAD is an embarrassing, superficial and unthinkable programme that does not serve Africa well and could even be said to betray Africa. If our response to NePAD is correct, civil society must alert people to this fact and explain the distinctions between the following:

- Illusory political rhetoric and appeals, suggestions, references to beliefs and aspirations, that are completely unsupported by the programme;
- Useful general proposals that, in other contexts, could merit support, but that raise many questions about the programme and that are contradicted by the document itself;
- Recognisably important ideas and objectives that make sense to NePAD's creators and leaders, but which are contradicted by the substance of the proposals and in the detail of its general orientation, objectives and methods;
- NePAD should not be judged by its language and general declarations, nor by the good intentions expressed by its supporters. NePAD should be evaluated in the light of an analysis of its substantive proposals and their implications.

#### NePAD's absurd and badly targeted approach

There are a series of profoundly absurd and badly targeted approaches in NePAD. Here is an example:

The so-called marginalisation of Africa is one of the absurdities put forward by NePAD. The exact opposite is the case as can be seen by the position occupied by the continent in the international capitalist economy. NePAD accepts the views of those agents of globalisation, such as the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), who claim that Africa's internal problems and "inhospitable political environment" marginalise the continent from the beneficial effects of investment and trade flows. However, Africa's fundamental problem is not its exclusion, but its long-standing inclusion, subordination and exploitation by a profoundly asymmetric international economy that has forcibly "integrated" it into the international trade and financial system.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

### **Civil society's reaction to NePAD**

NePAD was launched internationally in 2000 and 2001 as though it was a piece of cake for sale. It was criticised by African NGOs and social movements, trade unions, faith organisations, academics and even by media analysts in Africa. On the other hand, some civil society organisations (CSOs) and analysts welcomed NePAD and supported its objectives and content. Critics focused on the following points:

- Many focused on the absence of appropriate levels of *consultation* at all stages of the preparation of NePAD, including its final promotion and global preparation stage;
- Others criticised it for its external focus and basic motives, seeing it as a fund-raising exercise, designed to attract and encourage external investment and increase official development aid (ODA).
- Others conducted a detailed analysis of the whole global context in which the programme is situated, the theoretical concepts on which its proposals are based and the substance and implications of its specific proposals.
- Some combined these different approaches.

However, the varied approaches or emphases of the analyses shows there is a heated debate in civil society, in NGOs and mass organisations, about how to engage this inter-governmental programme.

For some CSOs, "engagement" means continuing with a rigorous analysis of NePAD as part of an existing and independent programme of research and analysis of African economic policy.

For others, "engagement" means participating in public *consultation* processes. This could even mean participating in the officially sponsored processes instigated by the NePAD secretariat rather late in the day, in response to the criticisms levelled at the programme, and in search of contributions to improve its analysis of the context. Some organisations recognise the gaps and weaknesses in NePAD and the declared objective of their "engagement" is to improve the whole document.

Analysis of the different CSO responses to NePAD shows there are antagonistic positions about the role and relations of African researchers and analysts with regard to African governments and social movements.

However, despite this diversity and their significantly different perceptions and approaches, these organisations clearly have a lot in common in relation to what motivates and inspires them. There is a strong intellectual and emotional commitment in most African organisations to collectively facing the problem with a view to ending Africa's long subordination to the powerful external forces and negative factors of the global system; to demanding African rights, to achieving Africa's objectives, and "saving", reactivating and reinvigorating the continent.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

### **NePAD and women**

NePAD's has little idea about the relations between gender and poverty, something that is common among international development institutions and donor agencies: the fusion of gender and poverty issues. The "feminisation" of poverty has been translated into strategies that identify poverty with gender and tend "to blame all the forms of disadvantage on poverty", including the subordination of women, which should be treated as a gender issue different to poverty.

Nevertheless, NePAD provides an opportunity for women to question whether they benefited from previous partnership programmes or not. It is an opportunity to analyse and discuss ways that NePAD can offer mechanisms that could promote a new relationship and partnership between African women. A partnership not aimed solely at ensuring survival, but one that sees them as fundamentally important elements of development in their countries, economically, politically and culturally capable of ensuring they can influence the partnership.

African women have made great sacrifices in their long battle to free themselves from colonialism, racism, fanaticism, "civilising missions" and various capitalist attempts to modernise Africa. African women in general and women's rights activists in particular have criticised development models for being responsible for the situation of African women, especially when discussing the impact of structural adjustment programmes on women.

Global economic (dis)order is expressed in the form of high economic growth and economic expansion to all parts of the world in the so-called "globalisation" process, facilitated and promoted by liberalisation. Women find they are in a quagmire of declining social expenditure in such key sectors as education, health, energy, water, food security and environmental sustainability.

More significantly, the controversy about the impact of socio-economic policies on Africa's social and political fabric has led governments to favour the private sector and multinational corporations interested in profits. African women have paid a high price due to the negative effect of these policies, which have increased the gap between the rich and the poor.

In this scenario, it is clear that African women should already have opted for another vision, another economic and development alternative. The challenge they have faced is how to oppose the idea that the market can adequately respond to women's needs. It has been necessary for African women to face the challenge of reconstructing the state so that it is more responsible in its actions.

All this means that NePAD poses a dilemma for African women. They are the poorest people on the planet, sacrificed on the altar of neoliberalism and crucified on the cross of global capitalism as manifested in NePAD.

NePAD does not take gender into consideration. It ignores the analyses of African women and their experiences of structural adjustment programmes. NePAD views globalisation as a "fact", as something that is a "reality", without, however, analysing the collective memory and experiences of recent centuries. Women need to clarify and

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

define globalisation as the new word for imperialism, because it consolidates economic and political domination by the west.

NePAD fails to analyse the relationship between the expansion of the market and the major increase in poverty. NePAD ignores the fact that poverty in Africa is affected by gender, class, ethnicity, religion and the unequal relations of the international economy.

By wanting to implement the poverty reduction strategy programmes (PRSP) of the Bretton Woods institutions, NePAD is accepting the same strategies and the same conditions of the Structural Adjustment Programmes, which severely harmed African women. This is clear for anyone interested in looking.

African women cannot afford to make this mistake. Africa's problems are external as well as internal. Africa cannot carry out reforms until the west reforms its insidious and cynical global policies, which are actively hostile to the African continent.

African women will need political and economic support to challenge and defeat NePAD's vision of key issues, such as global governance, globalisation, agriculture, technology, international aid, direct foreign investment, education, economic management, regional integration, political will and other ideas set out in that document.

### **Strategic objectives and aspiration of African unity**

There are voluminous studies, well-documented practical initiatives and very detailed political debates about the motivations and significance of African (re)unification and development. Many African organisations are, to a certain extent, aware of the various arguments. But it will be useful to consider the following points when reflecting on the general strategic objectives of African unity:

- Regional groups should take collectively formulated joint programmes into account in order to change the unbalanced relations between the weak and the poor, and between the small and large African economies, and their unequal access to resources;
- The large number of arbitrarily created, economically inviable African countries, including many that are small in size or have landlocked populations should be rationalised. They should be given the opportunity to merge into ecologically sustainable geographical units;
- There is a need to remove the barriers resulting from the borders imposed by colonialism, which separate societies, families, ethnic groups, common cultural and linguistic groups, pre-existing political and economic systems and basic relations in Africa. Africans need to create appropriate institutional relations to deal with the effects of imposed divisive and destabilising models;
- There is greater economic potential and political advantage in developing joint trade strategies and employing a more collective approach to multilateral trade negotiations. This would also reduce the opportunities that outsiders have for pitting African countries against each other;
- The mobilisation of development potential using a combination of natural, human, financial and technical resources by the bigger groups of countries, also using joint

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

trans-border infrastructures and production programmes to facilitate intra-regional trade; and

- The general potential strategy resides in the possibility of using larger political and economic regional entities as an effective basis for strategic engagement/involvement with the international/global economy.

### **African unity and integration**

NePAD was designed, and apparently accepted as a programme for all Africa. Of its four strategic objectives, the last one – the “increase of African integration” is the foundation stone. There are various questions that must be asked about this objective:

What is understood by “increase”? What is NePAD’s timeframe for integration? What is NePAD’s evaluation of “integration” as a long-term objective of African unity and development based on? The replies to these questions are not simple. There are complex explanations behind plans for African Unity and major objectives, within and outside the continent.

And another factor; we must be certain that it will be very difficult for any African country on its own, including South Africa, to achieve qualitative changes in international economic policy relations. The necessary African Unity will not be enough, and will not happen, without political changes, especially with regard to the role of African leaders; who will have to depend on the mobilisation and involvement of African peoples. That is why it is important, For there to be effective popular involvement and leadership, internal political change in Africa, African co-operation and unity, it is important that the organisations of the African people are properly informed about crucial issues, the ones that are really important. This will allow them to evaluate how AU and NePAD might achieve certain objectives.

The inconsistencies and contradictions in NePAD derive, in part, from its eclecticism. It combines ideas from different paradigms and is influenced by NePAD’s creditors and forerunners. It is shaped by pressures from the World Bank and the IMF, who want to make sure their own programmes survive. Then there is a continuous attempt to incorporate development concepts taken from other programmes and paradigms.

The inconsistencies of NePAD also result from a pragmatic combination of contributions from different models, different government interests, multinational/regional programmes in different parts of Africa (particularly SADC) and the different and divergent policies of national, regional, continental and international institutions,.

NePAD’s lack of a coherent structure also results from the fact that it has taken and adapted extracts from various other documents, in an attempt to accommodate a variety of interests and approaches from both within and outside Africa. At the same time, it tries to simultaneously address itself to a variety of international agencies and potential partners, the complete panoply of African leaders and technocrats and, to a lesser degree, the African peoples.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

How many times have we heard them refer to Africa as a region and the regions as sub-regions? This obsession reflects the insidious influence of the World Bank and the IMF who label the whole African continent as a region. The hidden supposition contained in this vision is that Africa is, or should be treated, simply as a region in the global(ised) economy and world system.

### **Some questions**

The fact that NePAD is led by South Africa, which uses more of its own resources (more than all of the other African countries combined) raises a series of questions, including questions on the nature of the proposed partnership. Why is NePAD not a balanced partnership of all the African countries? This unilateral attitude raises certain suspicions that those who are promoting NePAD, including South African investors, may have a hidden agenda. NePAD does not only establish a healthy platform for foreign (non-African) investors, it also provides for an expansion of South African capitalism into the rest of Africa. South Africa could take advantage of this situation to further its position in the WTO, contrary to the African position;

A considerable number of African countries are vulnerable to the constraints and subtle pressures put on them by western agencies. The internationalisation of the policies, ideologies and intentions of the international institutions leads African leaders to make decisions that are against the interests of their own countries. NePAD is one more illustration of how they comply with the current global balance of forces;

NePAD's direction and results will depend on whom it chooses as its partners. As has already been shown by the decision taken at the last meeting of the G8 at Kananaskis, where the G8 club decided it would choose its partners with reference to measurable results, and with reference to the promotion of peace and security in Africa. It also decided to increase and encourage trade and direct investment, and provide more Official Development Aid. Reading between the lines, we can see that it will not be the Africans who are holding the reins of NePAD and that the G8 is interested in harmonising African legislation, including laws against terrorism and promoting greater liberalisation of investment as conditions for aid;

More fundamentally, NePAD mentions "African integration" without specifying how, when and what steps will be taken to achieve it. It confuses African integration with the rapid African integration into the world economy. The doubt remains as to whether NePAD's inconsistencies are due to a lack of knowledge, or reflect a deliberate intention of obscuring or hiding true intentions. This has many different implications, including ones that are negative for African development. If we take into consideration the dividends offered by globalisation, we have to conclude that NePAD endorses globalisation without understanding the collateral effects it may have on NePAD itself or the contradictions it has with NePAD.

Finally, and directly related to the previous point, there is the basic question as to how the two contrasting and opposing strategic viewpoints in NePAD can both subscribe to the nature and objectives of African integration. Will regional integration and African development be led by the state in a politically negotiated process or by investors in a market-led process? Will African integration give the continent a platform for more

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

effective political and economic involvement in the global system? Will it create a geographical-political "space" in which participating countries can co-operate and co-ordinate their policies and programmes? Or is regional integration a way to develop the market and attract international investment and technology to improve growth? These and other questions are left open by NePAD.

### **Crucial questions for civil society**

The subtle weaknesses and inadequacies of this document reflect the fact that NePAD is based on contradictory, mistaken aspirations and inappropriate paradigms. For it to have been an ideal African development plan, it should have been completely different and based on completely different ideas.

And, as mentioned above, Africans need to know more about their own history, about their efforts and achievements, as well as about the mistakes, failures and treachery of the past, recent past and present, so as to learn and build from such experiences, and move forward, creating alternatives for themselves, their communities, their countries and the rest of the continent.

Africans should take steps to ensure that the AU has firm, solid and sustainable foundations. To achieve that, it will be necessary to mould economic policies, democratise development and organise a new economic order at the national and regional levels. The African states should be working for development. Excessive dependence on external aid does not lead to development.

The origin of NePAD lies in the idea that the continent is ready to control its endemic conflicts and instability and become a valid partner. However, its complex and unnecessary robustness and institutional form could become a major constraint. The extrovert nature of its campaign could harm the logic of African property, which is NePAD's *raison d'être*. Unless this partnership between African leaders is based on the aspirations of the people and has their support, NePAD will not be put into practice.

(Translated from Portuguese to English by Chris Whitehouse)

### **Bibliography**

**P. Bond**, Fanon's Warning: A Civil Society Reader On The New Partnership For Africa's Development, Africa World Press, AIDC, 2002

**Africa Agenda**, From Liberation into NePAD, Vol. 5 No. 2 & 3, TWN Africa, Ghana 2002.

**D.Keet**, The New Partnership for Africa's Development ( NePAD) and the Africa Union, Unity and Integration within Africa? or Integration into global Economy? AIDC Mowbray 7705, Cape Town October 2002

**New Agenda**, NePAD and Africa Under-Development, issue 7, IAA Mill St.8010 Cape Town, 2002

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

**TAE/CUSO**, Mozambique Civil Society Workshop on NePAD, CCM –

taeccm@isl.co.mz, www.africafiles.org/article, April 2002

Tamele V, Sobre as Ilusões contidas na NePAD, in Jornal Noticias 02-10-2002, Maputo  
NePAD, 2002

**Civil society statements:**

**African Social Forum**, Bamako, Mali - January 2002

**Trade Union Conference**, Dakar, Senegal – February 2002

**Codresia/TWN**, Acraa, Ghana – April 2002

**Kwazulu Natal** Towards A New Partnership Between African Peoples Africa's  
Development, Portshepstone, South Africa - July, 2002

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## 9. A view of the Zambian Civil Society on NePAD

*(by Grayson Koyi)*

### Organisational Positions on NePAD

The Zambian civil society has not remained quiet on the New Partnership for Africa's Development – NePAD. Stronger voices so far, have come from the more radical section of civil society. One of these is the Women for Change that has critically interrogated NePAD and categorically said 'no to NePAD'.<sup>1</sup> The relevant paragraphs from the statement made by the Executive Director of Women For Change, Emily Sikazwe read as follows:

“ NePAD has been hailed as a plan developed by Africans FOR Africans - a kind of Marshal Plan to lift Africa out of Poverty. But in reality, NePAD was developed without consulting the people of Africa. So while it may be an African plan, it's an African plan without African society... Furthermore, NePAD is based on the same development and economic model crafted by the G8, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that has been in place for the last 20 years, with catastrophic effects...”

Many Zambians would find Sikazwe's observation real and justified, especially that neo-liberal policies inspired by the IMF and World Bank have destroyed the national economy, ruined the social safety net and devastated the environment. PANOS Zambia adds that,

“...Matters seem to have gone too far, the crisis too deep for further proposals based on the neo-liberal economic model to carry any conviction by themselves...”

On the other hand, the Trade Union Movement in Zambia has not totally rejected NePAD , but have put across some recommendations which they believe can go some way in trying to re-craft and re-cast NePAD. Thus, in line with the Dakar declaration on the role of African workers and trade unions in NePAD, the trade union movement has recommended to the decision- makers that:

“NePAD should be regarded as a working platform that needs re-crafting and re-casting in order to avoid the pitfalls that earlier programmes had encountered. More importantly, the need for a mutually beneficial symmetry in the partnership concept cannot be ignored”.

Further that:

“NePAD should represent a paradigm shift in Africa's relationship with her international development partners. There are very strong moral and compelling economic reasons of common interest for Africa's development partners to buy into the

---

<sup>1</sup> Sikazwe E., (2002): No to NePAD: Reflections by Emily Sikazwe , Kairos, Toronto, June 27.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

new paradigm, since the continued economic non-performance of Africa has enormous impact on global progress. In this vein the need for commitment is paramount”

By contrast, International organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF as well as representatives of global capital appear to see in NePAD a possible way out of Africa’s stubborn poverty and underdevelopment. NePAD has also been welcomed by the African Union at its Lusaka meeting in October 2001.

### **Ownership Of NePAD**

Civil Society is united in the conviction that, although NePAD talks about “ownership” of the process by the African people, and indeed exhorts the people to mobilise themselves behind NePAD, they have not been consulted in the process. Interestingly, once NePAD was discussed among leading African heads of Government, it would appear their first priority was to go to the Western capitals and the representatives of international private capital before consulting with their own people<sup>2</sup>. Presumably, the people will follow. But, as Tandon (2002) observes, the mood in Africa is changing; and putting the representatives of the donor countries and international private capital ahead of the people of Africa in the consultation process may not, to say the least, have been a very wise strategy. This action may well be in fulfilling Franz Fanon’s Warning that,

“In the beginning, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial country identifies itself with the decadence of the bourgeoisie of the west. We need not think that it is jumping ahead; it is in fact beginning at the end. It is already senile before it has come to know the petulance, the fearlessness, or the will to succeed of youth”<sup>3</sup>

Therefore, the big challenge that NePAD has to stand is that of legitimacy and ownership. NePAD’s claim of it being African-owned seems difficult to accept, since the socio-economic partners for its realisation have been ignored in its preparation. This is more evident not only from the top-down approach employed in its formulation, but also in the fact that in section three of the document, vivid guidelines have been drawn for African leaders to follow, while a partial reference is made to the “peoples of Africa”. Incidentally, no mention is made of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (ACPPD), adopted in Arusha, Tanzania, February 1990 and by the OAU Summit in July 1990.

Isn’t it surprising that a plan that is supposed to fundamentally change the lives of African peoples has curiously not been a part of the discourse and the subject of debate within African societies from its conception. How then does it become implemented? Who is it being implemented for? Where does it draw its legitimacy?

---

<sup>2</sup> Tandon, Y. (2002): NePAD =sap + Gats + DSB, Seatini Bulletin, 5.4, 28 February.

<sup>3</sup> Fanon, F.(1963)[1961], The Wretched of the Earth, New York, Grove Press, pp. 152-153

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

### **Problems with NePAD**

The new African initiative, in the words of African governments, "is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development." They see the programme anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment, in particular the exclusion of Africa in a globalising world.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NePAD) gives African people the opportunity to examine whether previous partnerships around development have benefited them. It is an opportunity to analyse whether NePAD offers a framework for a new relationship and partnership. But the word partnership is one of the most popular concepts in international development today. Partnerships vary. There is one where individuals freely and deliberately create partnership for the purposes of promoting or achieving their common objectives or interests. This emerges after a long process of consultation and arriving at the same place with same vision.

There is another type of partnership. A partnership that promotes the interests of a certain class, gender, race, or interest group. This is an imposed or engineered partnership by a few individuals over the collective. The question one may wish to pose is, which partnership does NePAD offer?

The African continent has a sacred memory drawn from the long battle to free itself from colonisation, racism, bigotry, and so-called "civilising agendas" attempting to modernise Africa through capitalism. In this regard, The Zambian civil society has been linking NePAD to going concerns as part of their critique of development models, especially the manner in which structural adjustment programmes have impacted upon them.

It is seen in the growing impoverishment of Zambia; the increasing number and rate in which workers and women, in particular, are being informalised in the economy; the feminisation of poverty; the increase in street children; increase in school drop out rates, soaring unemployment, disease and social exclusion and in the shrinking political space to debate the structural conditionality in adjustment programmes which have made it difficult for Zambian civil society to welcome NePAD.

Coupled with this is the emerging global order that is driven and characterised by the enormous economic growth and worldwide expansion and penetration named globalisation, facilitated and promoted by liberalisation. Indeed, Zambians are caught in a quagmire of declining social expenditure in key sectors like education, health, electricity, water, food security and environmental sustainability.

More significantly, this contestation between economic and social policy has impacted on the social and political fabric. It has changed relations with governments in favour of the private sector and multinational corporations producing for profit. Workers, women and children are paying a high price for the negative impact of these policies that are increasing the gap between the rich and poor.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

In this scenario, it is clear that civil society in Zambia has long opted for the need for an alternative vision of the economy and development. The challenge has been to counter the notion that markets are adequate in meeting society's needs. It has been necessary for civil society to pose this challenge with their demand for the reconstruction of the state to make it more responsive and accountable for its actions.

Having said that, NePAD poses a dilemma for Zambia's development, especially because of its apparent underpinning of neoliberalism and global capitalism. NePAD at the outset states that African leaders are implementing it on behalf of their people and not with the African people. This is a significant nuance that will be a deciding factor in terms of how Africans participate within NePAD.

Civil Society in Zambia is united in the conviction that, besides being gender blind, NePAD has experienced a very low profile among the rank and file at the national and even continental level. This brings into question the nature of this "partnership." A plan that is supposed to fundamentally change our lives has curiously not been a part of the discourse and the subject of debate within African communities from its conception.

How then does it become implemented? Who is it being implemented for? For civil society these are old questions. In the long struggle fighting for space in political decision-making it has posed the same questions around the development discourse: what kind of partnership, what type of consultation, what kind of participation and collaboration? These questions are the ones that have led to a consensus of the need for a restructuring of relationships at the national, regional and global levels.

An in-depth analysis of the NePAD document underscores its dependency on World Bank and IMF policies in African. It refers for example to the Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategies as a key way of routing poverty out of Africa. Zambian civil Society has consistently offered a sharp critique to the failed policies of the IMF and World Bank. That NePAD is premised on the same economic model makes it amount, in essence, to a re-subscription by governments to these policies of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). As Mohau Pheko posits,

"Given the trajectory of Africa's limited engagement in global and political partnerships and the failure of development that these unequal relations have brought to Africa, their reintroduction and reintegration through NePAD show a paucity of innovation and thinking around development, and nullifies the negative impact that these policies have had on the livelihoods of women".<sup>4</sup>

Research and experience by many scholars show how these policies have displaced the development vision of many African countries and destroyed the industrialisation process necessary to make Africa a formidable force in world affairs. One of the objectives of NePAD is "to promote the role of women in social and economic development by reinforcing their capacity in the domains of education and training; by the development of revenue-generating activities; by facilitating access to credit; and assuring their participation in the political and economic life of African countries."

---

<sup>4</sup> Mohau, P. (2002): New or Old Partnership for African Women, African trade Network, 4 May.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

What is new about this? Civil Society contends there is nothing profound or life altering about this.

Civil Society observes that NePAD is far behind, when it keeps women in areas of the economy that perpetuate exclusion from the macro economy. NePAD's lack of reference, in terms of analysis and experience of the African women and people regarding these policies, is a glaring omission resulting in a rather peculiar conclusion about how Africa has experienced SAPs. . Lusaka gender researcher Sara Longwe argues that,

"...NePAD is deeply and comprehensively gender blind. It fails almost completely to recognise or address the major issues of gender inequality and discrimination, and the oppression of women that lie hidden and unacknowledged within NePAD goals and objectives, and which must be revealed and addressed if the participating governments are to meet its commitments under various international agreements and conventions."<sup>5</sup>

Civil Society also observes that NePAD fails to build on many documents developed around African development. The Lagos Plan of Action, the African People's Consensus document and a score of other documents developed or facilitated by the OAU. The failure to select the positive aspects of these documents constructs a NePAD in a vacuum.

Indeed, in NePAD, globalisation is treated as a "fact" and "reality" without a deeper probing of our memory and experience of globalisation, which has existed for centuries in various forms in Africa. Civil Society sees need to clearly define globalisation as a new word for imperialism for the manner in which it serves to consolidate the West's economic and political domination. The relationship between the spread of markets and the changing nature of poverty is not examined in NePAD. It ignores the fact that poverty in Africa is shaped by gender, class, ethnicity and religion and by unequal relations in the international economy.

It has also been observed that NePAD fails to give a clear history of domination in Africa and the impact it has had on African people economically, socially and politically. It describes globalisation as neutral, yet the proof is there to show that Africa's processed goods are closed to western markets because of the growing wall of protectionism in the industrialised countries.

NePAD seem a complex, compromised document produced in a different reality that argues that in order for Africa to "recover" it must take responsibility for itself. But according to civil society this is a dangerous notion because it ignores the absolute reality of wars, corruption, debt that the West has and continues to contribute to in order to support its strategic economic interests.

The argument of civil Society is that problems of Africa are not only internal; they are also external to it. Africa cannot reform without the West reforming its policies'

---

<sup>5</sup> Longwe, S.H.(2002): Assessment of gender orientation of NePAD, paper presented at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa, Nairobi, Kenya, 26-29 April 2002.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

contempt and cynicism in a global environment that is actively hostile towards Africa. In the midst of this hostility, Africa is told there is no alternative.

Thus, the response and solidarity of the Northern NGOs needs to join African NGOs by stating clearly to their government that there must a reconstruction of the entire global economic system in favour of everyone and indeed for vital plenary interests.

### **Positive Features of NePAD**

NePAD is not without positive features, however. For instance, following along the lines of Yash Tendon (2002), some of these include:

- the need for Africa to negotiate a new relationship with her development partners, which is the central idea behind NePAD;
- Also central to the spirit of NePAD is the idea that the “African Renaissance” project, the African continent has been “plundered for centuries” will “take its rightful place in the world”;
- the focus on “African ownership and management”;
- the importance of national and regional priorities in the formulation of development plans
- the notion that these plans must be prepared through participatory processes involving the people;
- some of the goals are the same as those set by the United Nations in several of its global conferences, e.g. reducing extreme poverty by half by 2015, a sustained average gross domestic product(GDP) growth rate of above 7 percent per annum for the next 15 years, etc.

The above principles and objectives are noble and can conceivably be said to summarise at least some of Africa’s aspirations. If there should be any basis for engagement it needs to build on some of these features to provide a framework for a civilised discourse. As it is said in Arabic, “comprehension precedes understanding”, and it is through dialogue concerning our commonalities and differences - that we may first achieve the mutual comprehension that can precede a global ethos of understanding. It is perhaps in recognition of this fact which can give us one possible starting point with NePAD. And this can represent a high investment in our common future.

### **Civil Society initiatives on NePAD in Zambia**

Civil Society in Zambia has created an institutional arrangement in a network called the Civil Society for Poverty reduction(CSPR) to allow for effective participation of diverse Civil Society Organisations (CSO's) in different locations in the poverty reduction and development process of Zambia and allow for a unified front in articulating issues of governance, gender, HIV/AIDS, trade, debt, economy and development, etc. A functional Secretariat has been in place since 2001. The network comprises a steering committee of about 22 key CSO's working in different fields as well as a larger network of CSO's. The first preoccupation of CSPR was to ensure that participation of the people of Zambia in the preparation of Zambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was real.

Since then, the network has equally taken on board the challenge of NePAD and is currently in the process of collating the views and trying to tease out a common theme. Workshops have already being planned around the subject of NePAD. Key CSO ’s

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

dealing with the issues of NePAD [for instance, Panos, Women for Change, Non-governmental Co-ordinating Committee (an umbrella organisation for women non-governmental organisation), Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and the Economics Association of Zambia] have been identified and efforts are underway to see how best to tease out common themes and condition collective actions.

### **Possible collaboration areas For North-South Partnership On NePAD.**

While many areas do exist for possible north-south partnership on NePAD, there would seem to be priority in at least six thematic cluster areas:

Cluster I: On facilitating consensus-building and effective partnership for Africa's development, for instance, creating the Southern Africa NePAD forum, strengthening development policy analysis and decision making through research partnerships, strengthening communication and outreach for Africa's development

Cluster II: On promoting good governance and effective civil society participation , for instance, setting goals and monitoring progress towards good governance and strengthening civil society participation in governance and development in Africa.

Cluster III: On enhancing international competitiveness and regional integration, for instance, strengthening Africa's participation in the global economy and strengthening south-south Cooperation for development

Cluster IV: On integrating gender, HIV/AIDs and environmental considerations in development.

Cluster V: On promoting information services for Africa's development, for instance, developing the capacity of African societies and economies to tap into the global system of information and knowledge and strengthening capacity in statistical services.

Cluster VI: On strengthening advocacy and lobbying, for instance, on transformation of aid relationship between Africa and development partners, debt cancellation and development paradigm shifts.

### **Conclusion**

The sentiment behind NePAD is noble. It is to put Africa on a "self-reliant" path to development where the processes are owned by the African themselves. The intentions notwithstanding, the practical effect of NePAD would be to surrender the human rights of the people of Africa ( their right to food, water, energy, etc) to the whims of a volatile and untrustworthy global capital. What may be the best trend of the story? Yash Tandon (2002) succinctly summarises the way forward:

"NePAD's noble intentions may be embraced, yes, but the strategy for self-reliance is... self reliance. African government's must pledge to provide the basic services to the people - drinking water, basic food, essential housing and transport, and access to energy- as necessary element of their basic human rights. They must then work upwards from there and see how production and distribution (including savings

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

and investment) are organised in order to meet these basic needs. Leave matters to the whim of international capital, and Africa would find itself in a worse mess than it is now. "<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Tandon, Y. (2002): NePAD =sap + Gats + DSB, Seatini Bulletin, 5.4, 28 February

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## **10. NePAD and the problem of ownership**

*(by Mallet Pumele Giyose)*

### **The importance of ownership**

The 1994 democratic elections in South Africa, which brought the African National Congress to power, were conducted by that party on the basis of a political programme known as The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). There was absolutely no doubt about the appropriation of that programme by the various social classes in the country. That document, which was originally prepared by Cosatu, actually went through five draft editions before the endorsement by the ANC of the final one, which then formed its election platform. The reason for the five editions was that, while the first four were eminently acceptable to the vast majority of the masses of the poor in the country, business demurred and found them too restrictive of its own interests. The fifth edition became a generally acceptable compromise. That explains why the victory of the ANC was so decisive even in difficult conditions where significant portions of Afrikanerdom and an important section of traditional leaders among the Blacks too still remained resistant to the very idea of the changes posed in the RDP. Here the question of ownership of that programme was both democratic and unequivocal.

### **The Genesis of NePAD**

The plan of action pronounced by the Kananaskis G8 conference on June 27 2002 handed over to President Mbeki and his colleagues from the OAU a sum of 6 billion US\$ towards the financing of NePAD. A portion of this money was budgeted for a process of conducting public consultations on NePAD throughout Africa. The African leaders had been forced to admit that the public at large had not been consulted on NePAD and that therefore the document could not be justly appropriated by the people of the continent as their own. The question was raised by the social movements in Canada at that time already as to what consultation was being financed on June 27 when the AU inaugural conference going with NePAD, as its economic programme was due in Durban on July 8? Clearly the "consultation" budget was a component of implementation. We can therefore raise the fundamental issue now quite forthrightly, who has owned NePAD then and now?

In the session of the ASF held in Bamako Mali on 5-9 January 2002, the Minister for Economic Planning and Development in the Senegalese government of President Ouadei offered an inkling to African people there assembled on the genesis of this programme. He affirmed that at the Okinawa conference of the G8 of the year 2000, African presidents had called upon President Clinton to deliver on the promises for money going by the intention of poverty relief for third world countries. In Germany in the year 1999 President Clinton had rolled out a poverty relief programme connected with the external debt. This is what is today known as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme managed by the IMF. But Clinton had promised to put actual money on the table in debt relief and indicated that he would be ready to deliver on the same at Okinawa 2000. Needless to say he failed dismally to perform save roll

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

out yet a second debt relief programme, the so-called PRSP. It is on this occasion that he was reported to have sent the African leaders back with a request that they should put together their own programme for both poverty alleviation as well as the enhancement of development on the continent. According to the Senegalese Minister, this is what led to the production of the Omega plan by Ouadei with the help of French technocrats. It will be recalled that that plan laid its emphasis on the development of mega projects in the area of technical infrastructure. At the same time this allowed President Mbeki to link up his ideology about an African Renaissance to a concrete economic plan at that time known as MARP. The rest is by now well known, namely that it is the merging of the two plans that concretised in the NePAD plan by September 2001.

### **Public consultations**

The matter is also historically notorious that the two plans, as well as their sum in NePAD were well canvassed in foreign capitals in the course of the year 2001. Consultations were performed during the annual conferences of the IMF and the World Bank. Others were carried out with the WTO. Individual heads of state in Europe were targeted now by four African presidents, namely those of South Africa, Senegal, Nigeria and Algeria. Improvements to various drafts of these plans were proposed in that sector of world leadership until President Thabo Mbeki was ready to take the penultimate draft of NePAD to the Genoa conference of the G8. It is here that he was advised by Bush and Blair to append a politico historical forward to the document for it to become what we know it to be today.

It is also interesting that by the end of 2001 Tony Blair on a systematic tour of West African states actually offered them NePAD as a programme they should sell to their own citizens in exchange for financial support by the British government. And all this time not a word about NePAD was mentioned to the broad masses of the African people by any of these presidents. That also accounts for the initial reserve and jealousy with which some of the African leaders, such as President Gaddafi of Libya greeted the proposals. On his part this gentleman only came to reconcile himself to NePAD when President Mbeki offered to marry the economic programme to Gaddafi's own past dream of updating the OAU in the form of a new EU type African Union. And typologically both Gaddafi and Mbeki understood the new African Union proposal to be entirely in sink with the emergence of the European Union with all the neo liberal underpinnings and impulses as offering the reply of a European market to the hegemonic designs of USA cushioning itself with both NAFTA and the new FTAA. In a word both Gaddafi and Mbeki sort to realise in Africa today through the AU a dream once enunciated by Kwame Nkrumah on the specific weight of combined all African planning in reply to the machinations the transnational corporations which already in Nkrumah's time had begun to be a bane to the development prospects of smaller and weaker African economies.

Right up to the year 2002 NePAD was now being canvassed only at the level of government and state bureaucracies on the African continent. The first African president to initiate a process of public consultations on NePAD was President Mbeki. During the conference of the European Economic Forum sub-committee for the SADC countries held in Durban in June 2002, he carried out a virtuoso performance similar to what he had done before the business people of the world at Davos earlier in the year,

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

presenting NePAD to a congress full of all the captains of business from South Africa. By the end of the three-day process all the major corporations in this country had signed up enthusiastically their support for NePAD and passed a resolution urging the government to seek a general acceptance of the programme throughout Africa and especially via the auspices of the projected African Union.

### **Why South African Business**

It will be remembered that South African business concerns had already consolidated their strangle hold over the South African economy and that of Southern Africa through an application of both the Gear Strategy (since 1996) and the Southern African Free Trade Protocol of 1997. A renewed push by these companies into Africa had been the direct upshot. By 2002 the economy of a country such as Mozambique was now a virtually South African owned company incorporated. Other big South African companies such as Eskom, Telkom, South African Breweries and De Beers had an impregnable presence in most African countries and their specific weight was growing together with a truly rhodian outlook of tying up the continent with mega projects that would displace and marginalized African communities.

It is important to remember that the South African Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel in his mid-term budget delivered to the South African parliament in November 2002, he raised the exchange control allowances for foreign investment conducted by South African corporations with African countries from R250 million per company per annum to a staggering amount of R2 billion per company per annum. This is set to facilitate the spewing of the greatest volume yet of finance capital out of South Africa onto the continent.

And it cannot be doubted that these companies have tied up their aspirations with the possibilities for market access offered to them by the South African European Union Free Trade Agreement. Nor should we discount further possibilities opened up for them in the same direction by both Agoa and the putative Free Trade Agreement now being put together for SACU countries with the USA. Clearly the NePAD impulse, which already within its own internal tenets encapsulates a systemic bond coming out of the IMF, World Bank programmes of the last twenty years, is bent properly to articulate itself and project linkages into a new global world economy entirely dominated by the USA and the EU. South African companies, which are part of the current world investment and trade regime, are geared to pick up resources in Africa and trade them in lucrative markets in both Europe and the USA.

### **Once more, which ownership**

Indeed now that both Gear and NePAD have been imposed on the people of both South Africa and the continent as none negotiable government policy, there has in the last few months arisen a process of publicising NePAD to the South African populace in the same way that imparts the impression of "NePAD *as food*" that the impoverished populations of Africa should understand. No one is allowed to believe that the political doctrine contained in the Peer Review process is expected to blunt the urge of African despotism. The ruins of the Commonwealth initiative on Zimbabwe, for which Obasanjo and Mbeki are equally responsible, are proof of this situation. The so-called PRM is nothing short of an IMF, WTO, and World Bank type of economic-political

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

conditionality that establishes the inalienable rights of business and profits over people. The pretences put up by AU spokespersons such as Arma Essi in linking the AU up with African civil society at large are nothing short of a fraud. That regime of NePAD conditionalities is being fashioned right now into an albatross to place round the necks of African economies so that they submit themselves to the power of the USA and EU to dominate and crush the future of the whole African people. That is why every intelligent person in Africa understands so well the servile role of the governments of South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria in this matter because indeed it is the ruling cast in these countries, which has the strongest ties with business houses in Europe and the USA. That is why again people in Africa regard this impulse as sub-imperialist. That finally, is why African governments have never cared to make even the slightest effort for NePAD to be appropriated by the majority of the impoverished masses on the continent. This is the kind of challenge that faces both civil society and the poor of the continent so that they study NePAD and set out on that basis to conceive a development path that redefines their own future and destiny.

The future of ordinary people in Africa is not identical with that of the big corporations, including those from South Africa or any other African country. The people have a developmental future, which begins with their basic needs and ends up with their broad cultural aspirations as humans. The path followed by the corporations is tied up exclusively with profit, exploitation, exclusion and oppression. NePAD links its economic possibilities with the latter, and therefore thus cannot be owned by ordinary people. These have the obligation to study NePAD closely and on that basis redefine the kind of economic, political and cultural programme that can lead to their own emancipation. This is what they will inevitably claim ownership over.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## **11. The Peer Review Mechanism and the role of civil society in Angola**

*By Manuel Jose Paulo*

### **Background**

Angola is emerging from twenty-seven years of civil war. It is blessed with reserves of oil, diamonds, and other minerals resources but remains one of the poorest nations in Africa in terms of economic, social and human development. Underdevelopment is blamed on the war, but poor economic management, worsened by endemic corruption are also to blame.

The civil war is over but deep social divisions, endemic corruption and a wrecked economic infrastructure remain. Reconstruction will be a huge challenge: resettlement of 4.2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and over 500.000 refugees is needed. This is in addition to the need to reintegrate ex-combatants into society as well as addressing the appalling level of poverty.

Angola's current social indicators speak for themselves. In 2000 the country ranked at 160 out of 174 countries in the Human Development Report (UNDP) and 50 percent of the population is preliterate. Only 15% of the population have access to health care and one third of the population has access to clean water. 42 % of the children are malnourished (see IMF 2002:5).

It is with this background that this paper looks at the strength and weakness of the Angolan civil society and whether it can play a role in the New Partnership for Africa Development's (NePAD) African Peer Review mechanism.

### **NePAD**

At the core of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NePAD) is good governance, and efficient economic management. The African Peer Review is an initiative under NePAD, which should encourage good governance as well as economic development. The African Peer Review mechanism aims for African countries to become less dependent on donor conditionalities and NePAD implies that African governments will have to be open to participatory politics where the fight for ideas, and alternative views will take central stage. The aim is to have input from the people with an ambitious goal of reducing absolute poverty by 2015 and achieving a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 7% annum in the next 15 years.

In the past many economic programmes for Africa have failed because they paid little attention to the day-to-day needs of the local people. In Angola social exclusion, injustice, and intolerance have been a root cause for economic and social stagnation. As argued: *"At the heart of NePAD lies a recognition that African governments must establish effective and democratic governance. Without institutional capacity and popular participation, additional resources flows to the continent will be futile"* (de

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

Waal, 2002:471). In Angola NePAD faces an additional challenge that Angolan civil society remains weak, divided and poorly informed about NePAD.

### **Angolan civil society**

Political transition in Angola commenced in the earlier 1990's in the run-up to the 1992 first-ever-multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections. The lifting of the ban on freedom of association (law 14/91) opened the way for the creation of NGOs. Further laws such as on political freedom (15/91), freedom of the media (25/91), and the right to strike (23/91) also helped this evolution. However, the resumption of the civil war in 1992, stagnated this process until the mid-1990s when the Lusaka Protocol provided space once more for growth.

With the return to war in 1998 the government once more tried to impede the growth of NGOs but were increasingly unable to stop the growth of a peace coalition vanguarded by the churches. Nicholas Howen noted that: " It has often been the priests and pastors who have stayed with the people and died with the people in towns under siege and in remote communities. This has given the churches legitimacy and authority, buttressed by whatever food and social services they have been able to distribute" (Howen, 2001:29). The Inter-Ecclesiastic Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA) and other efforts by the Catholic Church encouraged civil society to participate in a national debate about the prospect for a lasting peace in Angola. The churches called for an end to human rights abuses and an abandonment of the culture of violence. They also demanded the introduction of good governance, and economic reform. By late 2001 both the government and UNITA were playing lip service to the call of the churches for dialogue. The killing of UNITA leader Savimbi in February 2002 ended this prominent role by the Angolan churches that had focused on peace through dialogue.

In Angola there are more local NGOs than political parties. At the same time there is a number of local groups carrying out government duties in the field of education, and agriculture. Most of the civic associations are faced with a number of challenges; lack of human capacity worsened by donor's conditionalities on what to fund. As argued: Furthermore, Angolan civil society groups rely heavily on external funding, which force employers to commit only 50% of their time so the other half is engages in other businesses to ensure their survival. Also these local groups mandates are conditioned to donors requirements. As suggested: " The type of work NGOs do is sometimes dictated by the donor market rather than their assessment of the needs of the community. (ADRA, 2000 & PACT, 2000). As a result some of the civic groups are used to ensure individuals day-to-day subsistence is guarantee rather than fight for society causes. Also most of the prominent members of Angolan civil society have either political ambitions or are attached to the current political leadership for their subsistence. Therefore, their attempt to press the government for change is compromised.

The government is more flexible with civic organisations headed by former ruling party officials; credible to the government; a loyal enemy, which pursue a number of changes in a very moderate way. "It is common in Africa for civil society not to be as differentiated from the state as in the west, but this does not mean that none will struggle for change" (Howen 2001:33). Another factor is that most civil society groups in Angola lack a certain degree of internal democratic culture let alone accountability.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

As a result, external funders do not have confidence in them worsened by a lack of skills to implement acceptable programmes because of lack of management skills.

Nevertheless, a number of local civic groups have shown competence in their scope of activities, which have earned them trust from the donor community. Angolan civil society must support destroyed communities to facilitate the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction; a better model for wealth distribution. In order to change the current social indicators. Angola civil society will also need to further engage with the government about its policies to address demobilization and reintegration and the process of resettlement. National reconciliation can only be achieved within the spirit of civic coexistence if the ethnic diversity of Angola is to be equitably embraced.

### **Angola civil society and NePAD**

NEPAD has not been a priority issue for Angolan civil society except (Jubilee 2000 Angola)<sup>i</sup>. This is partly because Angolans are poorly informed about what NePAD is. A survey of the state media finds few references to NePAD and the independent media has also not featured it or been encouraged to by international donors. The Angolan government seems to prefer not to talk about NePAD as its emphasis on good governance and peer review both could become uncomfortable for Luanda in the future. NePAD is also regarded with suspicion seen as yet one more South African led initiative. Surprisingly the political opposition has also remained silent about NePAD, possibly out of ignorance or also because there is no domestic resonance.

NePAD should be a publicly driven initiative and the Angolan Minister of Planning in a speech argued: "NePAD represents a noble vision to address Africa's social, and economic problems. It suggests way for the development of the continent as well as its assertion in the global economy. But different countries in Africa have a different reality. Therefore, each country should establish within the NePAD framework a public, private, autonomous strategy based on the countries inefficiency and lack of capacity"<sup>ii</sup>. It is striking that in all recent keynote speeches by the President and his senior officials there has been no reference to NePAD.

The contrast could not be more dramatic with a number of Western countries vocal about their desire to see Angola embrace NePAD. The United Kingdom, Canada and Sweden have encouraged Angola's active participation in NePAD during bilateral meetings. International NGOs have also tried to raise NePAD's profile in Angola. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation jointly the Jubilee 2000 Angola held a workshop on NePAD<sup>iii</sup>. The conclusion was that, there was lack of knowledge about NePAD government, the private sector, and civil society.

### **Conclusions**

Clearly more needs to be done to sell the NePAD concept and educate people about it in Angola. This will need donor support of NGOS and civic associations to push this issue onto the domestic agenda. There also needs to be more regular engagement of the Angolan government about NePAD not only from the West but also from African States such as Cote D'Ivoire, Algeria and Nigeria the non-South African pillars of this initiative.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

Angola is currently the chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and sits on the United Nations Security Council for the next two years. It has regional ambitions and is seeking an improvement of its international image. If Luanda embraced and implemented the principles that NePAD stands for, the chances of sustainable peace would be greatly enhanced.

Civil society can help in this process by pressing the government to tackle poverty, and push for accountability, transparency, and dealing with the institutional culture of corruption. As argued: *"[In Angola] the poor have been excluded from economic and social development as a consequence of war, corruption and a centralising bureaucracy. A peace process in Angola that does not contribute to the building of a genuine stake in society for ordinary Angolans will be fragile, as it will lead to the alienation of people from both that process and the state"* (Howen: 2001: 44).

The African Peer Review mechanism in Angola can only succeed if a partnership between the Angolan government and civil society is forged and NePAD becomes a recognizable term not only in Luanda.

### **Bibliography**

**Burton, J.W.** (1987), *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook*, Washington DC University Press, USA.

**Birmingham, D.** (2002), "Angola" in P. Chabal (ed) *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*, Hurst & Company, Uk.

**Hodges, Tony**, (2001), *Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*, The Fridjtof Nansen Institute & The International African Institute in Association with James Currey Oxford, Indiana University Press, Bloomington.

**Howen, Nicholas**, (2001), *Peace-Building & Civil Society in Angola: A Role for the International Community*, Copyprint Ltd, UK.

**Tvedten, I.** (1997), *Angola: Struggle for Peace & Reconstruction*, Westview Press. UK.

**World Bank** (2000), *Angola*, Washington DC: World Bank

**IMF** (2002) *Angola: Staff Country Report*, Washington DC.

**UNDP**, (2000), *Human Development Report*, New York.

**Chabal, P.** (2002), *The quest for Good Government & Development in Africa: Is NePAD the Answer*, *International Affairs Journal*, Vol. 78, (3).

**Moura Roque, F.** (1994) "Economic Transformation in Angola", *The South African Journal of Economics*, Vol.62 (2).

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

**Waal, A**, (2002), What's new in the 'New Partnership for Africa's Development, International Affairs Journal, Vol. 78, (3).

**The official website for NePAD**, accessed at, <http://www.NePAD.org>

**The South African government's** website on NePAD, accessed at, <http://www.gov.za/issues/NePAD>

**The Inter-Church Coalition on Africa (ICCAF)'s** website at, [http://www.sarpn.org.za/NEPAD/april2002/dev\\_bank/index.php](http://www.sarpn.org.za/NEPAD/april2002/dev_bank/index.php)

<sup>1</sup> Jubilee 2000 Angola intends to run a number of workshops to ensure governments officials, public institutions, and civil society is aware of it.

<sup>1</sup> A speech by Ana Dias Lourenco at the SADC meeting in Angola 'Prospects and Challenges for NEPAD where she made no reference of the good governance issues and role civil society could play in this. <http://www.mirex.ebonet.net/sadc/economia.htm>

<sup>1</sup> The workshop was organised during the Southern African Development Community (SADC) heads of state meeting in Luanda – Angola on the 24-25 September 2002.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

## 12. Closing speech

*By Bob van der Winden*

It is of course impossible to comment on all the different speeches, political statements and expressions of meaning that have been discussed today. It was not the aim of the meeting to draw direct conclusions about NePAD anyway. That would also pretty much contradict my opening speech.... Not even it was meant to make one single "NiZA statement" on NePAD today. We will also learn to live with different opinions even inside NiZA...

Fortunately I heard a promise in Ambassador's Priscilla Jana's speech when she referred to the Peer Review Mechanism (on African Union Level) and even more important for Civil Society the 10 pilot projects in African countries that will start on short notice. That could very well be used by the civil society!

I also heard the European Union's representative, Mr. Vincent Dowd say that European Union would be inclined to support this kind of initiatives. Particular interesting was his fingerpointing – when on his turn probed by Basker Vashee- on the corrupters- who most of the time at least live in the Northern Hemisphere, instead of the corrupted. You can imagine that the Fatal Transactions campaign for instance- a campaign in Europe of several NGO's and in Holland by Novib and NiZA together will engage the European Union on that...

Generally speaking though, the representatives of our Civil Society partners in SADC concluded again, apart from many other things, that especially the lack of involvement of the African Civil Society and the African people as such in the shaping, but also in the upcoming implementation of the plan is the Achilles'heel of NePAD. As MP Giyose stated in the ownership workshop: study NePAD.

Allow me one quote that comes from Glenda Daniels from South Africa in this book, with various contributions, that NiZA commissioned journalist Bram Posthumus and our own NiZA-researcher Sihle Dube to edit :

The North must listen

“In the end it doesn't matter which voice is more important – the left social movement, the moderate civil society groups or the trade unions.

Bar the tactics, it all boils down to the same thing:

The northern countries have to begin to listen if they genuinely are concerned about contributing to a fairer world.

While the Thabo Mbeki government appeals to the rich countries for more aid, and espouses the good of NePAD, the two voices of civil society will be equally important and necessary in ensuring the pressure continues. The end everyone wants is the same – the eradication of poverty, suffering and starvation, cancellation of debt and an end to enforced trade liberalisation.”

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

Let me unquote the book here: you can read many more contributions by yourself and from your own opinions it's available here today.

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

### 13. Participants list

<b>Buni M. Matlanyane Sexwale</b> <b>Consultant</b> Haagweide 10 070-389 43 77	<b>A time to act chona</b>  2515 RT Den Haag bunie@xs4all.nl
<b>Amboka Wameyo</b> <b>Africa Policy Officer</b> Hamlyn House, Macdonald Road	<b>Action Aid</b>  N19 5PG E London Groot Britannië awameyo@actionaid.org.uk
<b>André Leliveld</b> <b>Researcher</b> Postbus 9555 071 527 33 96	<b>African Study Centre</b>  2300 RB Leiden leliveld@fws.leidenuniv.nl
<b>Victor Igreja</b> <b>Researcher</b> Postbus 9555 071 527 33 69	<b>African Study Centre</b>  2300 RB Leiden vigreja@yahoo.com
<b>Ahmed Yusuf</b>	<b>Afrika Netwerk</b>
<b>Hassan Jalloh</b> Donker Curtiusstraat 7 (322) 020 751 25 91	<b>AfroNeth</b> 1051 JL Amsterdam
<b>Frank Hendriks</b> Donker Curtiusstraat 7 unit 322 020-684 87 41	<b>Alternative View</b> 1051 JL Amsterdam frank.hendriks@alternativeview.nl
<b>Hassan Jalloh</b> Donker Curtiusstraat 7/unit 322 020 684 87 41	<b>Alternative View</b> 1015 JL Amsterdam afroneth@alternativeview.nl
<b>H.E. O. Dosumu</b> <b>Ambassador Extraordinary</b> Wagenaarweg 5 070 350 17 03	<b>Ambassador Extraordinary of Nigeria</b>  2597 LL Den Haag nigembassy@nigerianambassy.nl

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>H.E. Grace Amponsah- Ababio</b> <b>Ambassador</b> Laan Copes van Cattenburch 70 070 338 43 84	<b>Ambassador Ghana</b>  2585 GD Den Haag
<b>H.E. N.Djoudi</b> <b>Ambassador</b> Van Stolklaan 1/3 070 352 29 54	<b>Ambassador of Algeria</b>  2585 JS Den Haag ambalg@wanadoo.nl
<b>H.E Mohammed S. Ahmed</b> <b>Ambassador</b> Sweelinckplein 9 070- 427 68 12	<b>Ambassador of Eritrea</b>  2517 GK Den Haag eeritrea@yahoo.com
<b>H.E. L.N. Ngaithe</b> <b>Ambassador</b> Nieuwe Parklaan 21 070-350 42 15	<b>Ambassador of Kenya</b>  2597 LA Den Haag kenya@dataweb.nl
<b>H.E. Mathato Adel Matuanyane</b> <b>Ambassador</b> Blv General Wahis 45 00 32 2 705 39 76	<b>Ambassador of Lesotho</b>  1030 Brussel België lesothobrussels@hotmail.com
<b>H.E. Cisse Saliou</b> <b>Ambassador</b> 196, Av. Franklin Roosvelt 00 32 2 673 00 97	<b>Ambassador of Senegal</b>  1050 Brussels België senegal.ambassade@coditel.net
<b>H.E. Priscilla Jana</b> <b>Ambassador</b> Wassenaarseweg 40	<b>Ambassador of South Africa</b>  2596 CJ Den Haag
<b>H.E. A. Thembaten Dlamini</b> <b>Ambassador</b> Av. Winston Churchillaan 188 00 32 2 347 47 21	<b>Ambassador of Swaziland</b>  1180 Brussel België
<b>Johan van Kesteren</b> <b>Country coördinator Angola</b> Millingenhof 298 020 696 05 96	<b>Amnesty International</b>  1106 KT Amsterdam

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>Ayesha de Sousa</b> <b>Project Assistent</b> Prins Hendrikkade 48 G 020 524 56 78	<b>AWEPA</b>  1012 AC Amsterdam awepaads@antenna.nl
<b>Marc Holtkamp</b> <b>Project Officer</b> Prins Hendrikkade 48 G 020 524 56 78	<b>AWEPA</b>  1012 AC Amsterdam awepamh@antenna.nl
<b>Luc Timmermans</b> <b>Head of Unit</b> Brederodestraat 6 0032 2 519 0686	<b>Belgian Development Cooperation</b>  1000 Brussel België luc.timmermans@diplobel.fed.be
<b>Manuel Paulo</b> <b>Assistent Reseacher</b> 10st James's Square	<b>British Angola Forum</b>  SW1 Y 4LE London Groot Brittanië
<b>W.M. de Lange</b>  <b>Director</b> Heidelberglaan 8 030-253 91 98	<b>Centre Southern Africa Utrecht University</b>  3584 CS Utrecht margreet.delange@let.uu.nl
<b>Grayson Koyi</b> <b>Director of research and information</b> PO Box 50160 00260 1 323 606	<b>Civil Servants Union of Zambia</b>  Lusaka Zambia gkoyi@zamnet.zm
<b>Jan Ridder</b> <b>Project Officer Africa</b> Postbus 2475 030-291 36 81	<b>CNV International</b>  3500 GL Utrecht j.ridder@cnv.nl
<b>Habtom Abraha</b> <b>Consul General</b> Dr. Kuiperstraat 11	<b>Consulat General Ethiopia</b>  2514 BA Den Haag cons01@xs4all.nl
<b>Tsegaye Demeke</b> <b>Consul</b> Dr. Kuiperstraat 11	<b>Consulat General Ethiopia</b>  2514 BA Den Haag cons01@xs4all.nl

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>Genet Abebe Sesse</b> <b>Vice Consul</b> Dr. Kuiperstraat 11 070-358 69 44	<b>Consulat General Ethiopia/Vice-General</b>  2514 BA Den Haag cons01@xs4all.nl
<b>Edith Boekraad</b> <b>Programme Officer East and South Africa</b>	<b>Cordaid</b>  edith.boekraad@cordaid.nl
<b>Peter Vermaas</b> <b>Journalist</b> Sumatrakade 915 020-419 40 49	<b>De Groene Amsterdammer</b>  1019 RB Amsterdam vermaas@groen.nl
<b>Viriato Tamele</b> <b>Executive Director</b> Av. Amilcar Cabral No. 571-1 00258 1 314 129	<b>Economic Justice Coalition (Mozambique)</b>  Andar Esq. Maputo 2309 Mozambique viriatot@zamnet.zm
<b>Yvon Saint Hilaire</b> <b>Counsellor</b> Sophialaan 7 070-311 16 51	<b>Embassy of Canada</b>  2514 JP Den Haag yvon.saint-hilaire@dfait.gov.ca
<b>Jens Vahldiek</b> <b>First Secretary</b> Groot Hertoginnelaan 18-20 070-342 06 59	<b>Embassy of Germany</b>  2517 EG Den Haag cw3@auswertiges-amt.de
<b>Limpho H.Masolo-Motsamai</b> <b>First Secretary</b> Blvd. General Wahis 45 0032 2 705 39 76	<b>Embassy of Lesotho</b>  1030-Brussel lesothobrussels@hotmailcom
<b>Salaheddin el Mesallati</b> <b>Diplomat</b> Parkweg 15 070-355 88 86	<b>Embassy of Libia</b>  2585 PC Den Haag
<b>Sophia Nangombe</b> <b>Counsellor, deputy head of mission</b> 454 Ave de Tervuren 00 32 2 771 14 10	<b>Embassy of Namibia</b>  1150 Brussels België nam.emb@brutele.be

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>Mishek Mwanze</b> <b>Counsellor</b> 469 Av. Moliere 00 32 2 343 56 49	<b>Embassy of Zambia</b>  1050 Brussels België nkondel@hotmail.com
<b>Vincent Dowd</b> <b>Dev. Directorate General on SADC desk</b> Wetstraat 200 0032 2 29 577 37	<b>EU-DG Development</b>  B-1049 Brussels vincent.dowd@cec.eu.int
<b>Jacqueline Woodman</b> <b>Co-ordinator of EPEP</b> Rue Dejoncker 46	<b>Eurodad</b>  B-1060 Brussels jwoodman@eurodad.org
<b>R. van Ermen</b>  <b>Executive Director</b> 67 Aveneu Toison d'Or 00 32 2 771 15 34	<b>European Partners for the Environment</b>  1060 Brussel België
<b>Anne Graumans</b> <b>Programme Officer</b> Postbus 1310 020 551 21 36	<b>Evert Vermeer Stichting</b>  1000 BH Amsterdam agraumans@pvda.nl
<b>Mariëtte van de Loo</b> <b>Executive Director</b> Kapelpad 9 070 320 05 11	<b>Foundation: Hand in Hand</b>  Leidschendam
<b>Anne Sedee</b> <b>Manager</b> Kwakersplein 3-3 020 550 74 24	<b>Friends of the Earth Netherlands</b>  1053 TZ Amsterdam anne@miliedefensie.nl
<b>Chris Collier</b> Raamweg 16 070 376 55 00	<b>Hivos</b> 2596 HL Den Haag africa@hivos.nl
<b>Edit Tuboly</b> Raamweg 16 070 376 55 00	<b>Hivos</b> 2596 HL Den Haag africa@hivos.nl

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>Karel Chambille</b> Raamweg 16 070 376 55 00	<b>Hivos</b> 2596 HL Den Haag africa@hivos.nl
<b>Mirjam Elderhorst</b> Raamweg 16 070 376 55 00	<b>Hivos</b> 2596 HL Den Haag africa@hivos.nl
<b>Venetia Govender</b> <b>Consultant to NiZA</b> PO Box 42769 Fordsburg SA 0027 11 837 66 83	<b>Human Rights Committee South Africa</b>  2033 Johannesburg South Africa
<b>N. Balakrishnaraj</b> <b>Student</b> PO Box 29776 070 426 05 66	<b>Institute of Social Studies</b>  2502 LT Den Haag mrr0308@iss.nl
<b>Camilo Diaz</b> <b>Student</b> Kortenaerkade 12 06 41 22 64 58	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 AX Den Haag
<b>Christine Esi Dorgbedo</b> <b>Student</b> Dorus Rijkersplein 58 06 48 41 91 32	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 DB Den Haag pad025@iss.nl
<b>David Gvenetadze</b> <b>Student</b> Kortenaerkade 54	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 DB Den Haag dgvenetadze@yahoo.com
<b>Edith Lugonvu-Nvule</b> <b>Student</b> PO Box 29776 06 41 79 12 10	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2502 LT Den Haag
<b>Gabriel Botchwey</b> <b>Student</b> Kortenaerkade 54	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 DB Den Haag gabbotch@yahoo.com
<b>Jaff N. Bamenjo</b> <b>Student</b> Kortenaerkade 54	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 DB Den Haag jaffnapoleon@yahoo.com

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>Joe Kapembwa</b> <b>Student</b> Kortenaerkade 54	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 DB Den Haag pnd0206@iss.nl
<b>Kathleen A. Boohene</b> <b>Student</b> Kortenaerkade 54	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 DB Den Haag
<b>Paschal Mihyo</b> <b>Student</b> Kortenaerkade 54	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 DB Den Haag mihyo@iss.nl
<b>Patrick M. Mucheleka</b> <b>Student</b> Kortenaerkade 12 06 11 06 83 58	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 AX Den Haag ard0209@iss.nl
<b>Tidiani Ouedraogo</b> <b>Student (Burkino Faso)</b> Kortenaerkade 54	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 DB Den Haag otidani@hotmail.com
<b>Yonas Mulat Ketsela</b> <b>Student</b> Kortenaerkade 12 070 426 04 60	<b>Institute of Social Studies (ISS)</b>  2518 AX Den Haag pado226@iss.nl
<b>Peter Ballantyne</b>  <b>Team Leader, knowledge Sharing and Thematic networks</b>  070-311 73 11	<b>International Institute for Communication and Devel.</b>    pbalantyne@iccd.org
<b>MP Giyose</b> <b>National Chairperson</b> PO Box 3 00 27 11 47 03 76 24	<b>Jubilee South Africa</b>  1082 Braamfontein South Africa j2000sec@sn.apc.org
<b>Bert Kling</b> <b>Programme Officer</b>	<b>Kerkinactie</b>   e.kling@kerkinactie.nl

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>Vicky Ngindu</b> <b>President</b> Eligiusweg 31 0478 511 673	<b>Lomaf</b>  5801 JM Venray v.ngindu@home.nl
<b>Prof. Dr. Henk de Haan</b> <b>Member of Parliament</b>  070-318 25 52	<b>Member of Parliament, CDA</b>  h.dehaan@tk.parlement.nl
<b>Erica Terpstra</b> <b>Member of Parliament</b> Binnenhof 1a	<b>Member of Parliament, VVD</b>  2500 EA Den Haag
<b>Arend Huitzing</b> <b>Director Ghana, Netherlands</b> <b>Tercentary</b> Belgische plein 2 070-348 52 01	<b>Ministry of Economic Affairs</b>  2587 AN Den Haag
<b>drs.C.S.M. Beemsterboer</b> <b>Interim Director</b> Bezuidenhoutseweg 30 070-379 78 38	<b>Ministry of Economic Affairs</b>  2594 AV Den Haag s.ijsselstein@minez.nl
<b>mr. M.V. ven der Steenhoven</b> <b>Programme Officer</b> Bezuidenhoutseweg 30 070-379 78 38	<b>Ministry of Economic Affairs</b>  2594 AV Den Haag
<b>Fons Gribling</b> <b>Senior Policy Advisor Central and Eastern Africa Division</b> Postbus 20061 070-348 51 96	<b>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</b>  2500 EB Den Haag fons.gribling@minbuza.nl
<b>Frieda Nicolai</b> <b>Programme Officer Senior</b> Postbus 20061 070-348 66 07	<b>Ministry of Foreign Affairs DAF/WA</b>  2500 EB Den Haag frieda.nicolai@minbuza.nl
<b>Caroline Veldhuizen</b> <b>Programme Officer</b> Postbus 94020 020-568 87 69	<b>NCDO</b>  1090 GA Amsterdam c.veldhuizen@ncdo.nl

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>Bob van den Winden</b> <b>Programme Director</b> Postbus 10707 020 520 62 10	<b>NiZA</b>  1001 ES Amsterdam niza@niza.nl
<b>Elizabeth Wiebrens</b> <b>Programme Officer Economy</b> Postbus 10707 020 520 62 10	<b>NiZA</b>  1001 ES Amsterdam niza@niza.nl
<b>Elma Doeleman</b> <b>Programme Officer Human Rights</b> Postbus 10707 020-5206210	<b>NiZA</b>  1001 ES Amsterdam
<b>Hille Linders</b> <b>Press Officer</b> Postbus 10707 020-5206210	<b>NiZA</b>  1001 ES Amsterdam hille@niza.nl
<b>Joke Hartmans</b> <b>Human Rights Programme manager</b> Postbus 10707 020-5206210	<b>NiZA</b>  1001 ES Amsterdam
<b>Meike de Goede</b> <b>Assistent to the management</b> Postbus 10707 020 520 62 10	<b>NiZA</b>  1001 ES Amsterdam niza@niza.nl
<b>Nathalie Ankersmit</b> <b>PR Officer</b> Postbus 10707 020 520 62 10	<b>NiZA</b>  1001 ES Amsterdam nathalie@niza.nl
<b>Sihle Dube</b> <b>Programme Officer Economy</b> Postbus 10707 020 520 62 10	<b>NiZA</b>  1001 ES Amsterdam niza@niza.nl
<b>Monica Maassen</b> <b>Manager Southern Africa</b> Postbus 30919	<b>NOVIB</b>  2500 GX Den Haag monicamaassen@novib.nl

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>Patricia Aeilkema-Schor</b> <b>Programme Officer Lusophone Africa</b> Mauritskade 9 070 642 16 55	<b>NOVIB</b> 2500 GX Den Haag patricia.schor@novib.nl
<b>Russel Pickard</b> <b>Deputy to the Director</b> Rue des Minimes 26 0032 2 505 46 46	<b>Open Society Institute- Brussels</b> 1000 Brussel België russel.pickard@osi-eu.org
<b>Stephen John Deul</b> <b>Managing Director</b> Postbus 36238 020-636 14 63	<b>Pari Passu consultancy</b> 1020 ME Amsterdam info@paripassuconsultancy.nl
<b>Jean Ives Bonzi</b> <b>Programme Officer/Africa</b> Van Boshuizenstraat 12 020-549 53 71	<b>Plan Nederland</b> 1070 AL Amsterdam ives.bonzi@plannederland.nl
<b>Henry Parham</b> <b>Co-ordinator</b> (2nd Floor) Tower Building, 11 York Road 0044 20 7981 0315	<b>Publish What You Pay</b> SE 7NX London Groot Brittanië coordinator@publishwhatyoupay.org
<b>Jeff Handmaker</b> <b>Freelance Consultant</b> Dunne Bierkade 14-b 070 363 07 85	<b>Rea Hamba Advice</b> 2512 BC Den Haag handmaker@reahamba.nl
<b>Bram Posthumus</b> Postbus 10707 020 520 62 10	<b>Reporter</b> 1001 ES Amsterdam niza@niza.nl
<b>Abdullah Mohammoud</b> <b>Consultant</b> Imogrituin 35 020-627 80 94	<b>Sahan Consultancy</b> 1019 RL Amsterdam sahan-consultancy@planet.nl
<b>George Duncan</b> <b>Chairman</b> Acaciastraat 112 070-346 33 34	<b>Sankofa Foundation</b> 2565 KE Den Haag info@sankofa.nl

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>Eelco de Groot</b> <b>Project Advisor</b> Theemsstraat 68 023 54 08 88	<b>Senter International</b>  2014 RZ Haarlem eelco.de.groot@planet.nl
<b>Lianne Houben</b> <b>Project Advisor</b> Postbus 30732 070 361 04 87	<b>Senter International</b>  2500 GS Den Haag l.h.w.s.houben@senter.nl
<b>Paul Allerz</b> <b>Policy Officer, Planning and Monitoring Unit</b> Bezuidenhoutse weg 161	<b>SNV Netherlands Development</b>  2594 AG Den Haag pallertz@snv.nl
<b>Florence Aate Andrew</b>  <b>Chairperson</b> A.Douglaslaan 141 06 18 56 57 66	<b>South.Sudanese Women Ass. in the Neth.</b>  2279 GR Voorburg florencete66@hotmail.com
<b>Chief Thaddeus A. Osuji</b> <b>President</b> Dieverstraat 33 070-359 88 11	<b>St. Reach Africa</b>  2545 TK Den Haag help@reachafrica.nl
<b>Khamis S. Mwinyimbegu</b> <b>Project Coordinator</b> Dieverstraat 33 070-359 88 11	<b>St. Reach Africa</b>  2545 TK Den Haag interleis@hotmail.com
<b>Octavia Moneedi</b> <b>Voorzitter</b> Kasteleinstraat 4 06 19 05 45 95	<b>Stichting Mozambique, Afrika Netwerk</b>  5046 PR Tilburg octaviamoneedi@hotmail.com
<b>Rens van der Linden</b>  Gorontolastraat 27 hs	<b>Stoekrenners Productions</b>  1095 TM Amsterdam
<b>Vashee Basker</b> <b>Director of African Projects</b> Paulus Potterstraat 20 020-622 66 08	<b>Transnational Institute (TNI)</b>  1071 DA Amsterdam africa@tni.org

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

<b>Youssef Rahman</b> <b>Policy advisor dev. Cooperation and foreign affairs</b> Postbus 20018 070-318 26 66	<b>Tweede Kamerfractie, Groen Links</b>  2500 EA Den Haag y.rahman@tk.parlement.nl
<b>Jorris Eekhout</b> <b>Director</b> Oorsprongpark 7 030 232 06 00	<b>VSO Netherlands</b>  3581 ET Utrecht
<b>Karima Smit</b> <b>Programme Officer, Coordinator Youth Programme</b> Oorsprongpark 7 030-232 06 17	<b>VSO Netherlands</b>  3581 ET Utrecht k.smit@vso.nl
<b>Eric de Munck</b> <b>International Project Officer</b> P.O. Box 9101 0317 485 602	<b>Wageningen University</b>  6700 HB Wageningen eric.demunck@wur.nl
<b>Dominique Sindayinganza</b> <b>Project Manager</b> Keizersgracht 132 020 627 33 39	<b>www.baobabconnections.org</b>  1015 CW Amsterdam
<b>Yehudi van de Pol</b> <b>Project Manager</b> Keizersgracht 132 020 627 33 39	<b>www.baobabconnections.org</b>  1015 CW Amsterdam yehudi@baobabconnections.org
<b>Anjarwalla Kluifhout</b> <b>student (MSC Development Management)</b> Wielsekade 64 0348 554 914	  3411 AD Lopik tehzeen@zonnet.nl
<b>E.A. Esmeijer-Futado</b> Van Faukenberestraat 48 070 347 91 70	  2274 RZ Voorburg elia.furtado@zonnet.nl
<b>Lulessa Abadura</b>  Gillis van Ledenberchstraat 48-2	  1052 VJ Amsterdam dureti@hotmail.com

*"Shall I abide by the rules or speed up change by breaking them?"*

---