

[2003-05-05]

# **The Situation of Commercial Farm Workers after Land Reform in Zimbabwe**

A report prepared for the  
Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe

by

Lloyd M Sachikonye

March 2003

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank many individuals and organisations who assisted during this study. They are too numerous to mention, but I am profoundly grateful to all of them. Godfrey Magaramombe and Grace Buhera of the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ) were extremely supportive at every stage of the research. The staff at the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), the National Employment Council for the Agricultural Industry and the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), and officials from government departments and local authorities were also helpful. The research assistants, team leaders and drivers were tireless in their efforts during the difficult phase of gathering field data.

Many thanks, too, to the respondents — more than 1,000 of them — who patiently answered the questions put to them. I hope that their voices will be heard through this report. A number of people provided comments on the first draft: for this I am grateful to Steve Kibble, Robin Palmer, Blair Rutherford and, for their kind assistance, to Kaori Izumi, Brian Raftopoulos and Lynn Walker. Finally, I am indebted to the staff who did the data analysis, and to Tawanda for helping with the tables.

I remain, however, solely responsible for the limitations of this study.

LMS

March 2003

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## Acronyms

CBA	Collective Bargaining Agreement
CFU	Commercial Farmers' Union
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
ECEC	Early Child Education Centre
FADCOs	farm development committees
FCTZ	Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FHW	farm health worker
FOST	Farm Orphans' Support Trust
GAPWUZ	General Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV-AIDS	Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAG	Justice for Agriculture
LRRP	Land Reform and Resettlement Programme
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NAC	National AIDS Council
NEC	National Employment Council
NECF	National Economic Consultative Forum
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NSSA	National Social Security Authority
ODA	Overseas Development Administration
PASS	Poverty Assessment Study Survey
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC FEWSNET	SADC Famine Early Warning System Network
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WFP	World Food Programme
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZCDT	Zimbabwe Community Development Trust
ZFTU	Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions
ZHDR	Zimbabwe Human Development Report
ZJRI	Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association

## Executive Summary

### 1. Introduction

Land reform has brought about the most far-reaching redistribution of resources in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. After a slow but orderly process of redistribution between 1980 and 1999, a fast-track programme was implemented between 2000 and 2002. Various terms have been used to describe this process: 'an agrarian revolution', 'Third Chimurenga' (liberation struggle) or '*jambanja*' (direct action), this latter phase of land reform involved the acquisition of 11 million hectares from white commercial farmers for redistribution in a process marked by considerable coercion and violence. An estimated 300,000 small farmers were resettled and about 30,000 black commercial farmers had received land by the end of 2002.

Prior to land reform, an estimated 320,000 to 350,000 farm workers were employed on commercial farms owned by about 4,500 white farmers. Their dependants numbered between 1.8 and 2 million (nearly 20 per cent of the country's population). How did farm workers fare in the massive redistribution of land? What was the broad impact on them? And what are their future prospects?

By the beginning of 2003, only about 100,000 farm workers, a third of the original workforce, were still employed on the farms and plantations. What was the fate of the other 200,000 or so, who together with their families amount to a population of more than 1 million? What sort of livelihoods do they have in the aftermath of land reform? Do they have enough to eat, given the big decline in crop output in the large-scale commercial farming sector? These issues are the subject of this report.

### 2. The purpose of the report

This report aims to assess the situation of farm workers, in particular the profound effects of the fast-track land reform. Most farm workers face a very difficult situation. Up to two-thirds of them are jobless and landless. In many cases this means they have lost their entitlement to housing on the farms, to basic social services (health and education), and to subsidised food. Displaced workers are stranded on farms, while others seek to find shelter in fast-growing 'informal settlements' where social conditions are desperate. The study investigates these conditions and the coping strategies of farm workers. It also analyses the following:

- the impact of the decline in food security on farm workers
- the effects of the HIV-AIDS epidemic on their livelihoods and family structure
- the evolving relationships between farm workers, small farmers and commercial farmers
- the gender dimension in employment and access to land

- the immediate and long-term needs of farm workers.

The focus of this report derives from the mission and programme priorities of the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ), which commissioned it. The FCTZ is a local non-governmental organisation committed to the empowerment of farm workers to achieve a better and secure life, and the creation of an environment conducive to the holistic growth of commercial farming communities. It has pursued this objective through a coordinated programme of community development, advocacy and communication targeted at those who can facilitate change in the sector. The significant reduction (by about 90 per cent) in the numbers of white commercial farms and of farm workers (about 70 per cent), and a concern for the welfare of displaced workers have inspired FCTZ to review its programme focus. Based on material from an extensive national survey completed in November 2002, this report is a contribution to that process of review. The survey was based on a sample of 160 farms and 977 farm worker households in eight provinces, and interviews with stakeholders in the commercial agricultural sector.

### **3. The context and broad impact of reform**

The report situates its assessment of the conditions of farm workers in the broader framework of the land question and the historical development of farm worker communities. The land question centred on the inequitable distribution of land between black and white populations. The compelling case for land reform was that of historical redress. In particular, land redistribution was desirable as an outlet for small farmers in the congested communal areas, and for the increasing numbers of landless.

The report provides a historical overview of the development of farm workers. Initially migrant labour drawn from neighbouring countries, their wages, working and living conditions were often poor. By the 1970s, however, the majority of farm workers were indigenous black people, who at the start of the fast-track reform constituted about 75 per cent of the farm workforce. Although conditions on some farms improved in the 1990s, they did not have security of tenure or adequate social safety nets on retirement. A marginalised and vulnerable group, their political and social rights were restricted for many years.

In assessing the fast-track programme, the report shows how political and electoral calculations shaped the pace and direction of reform and explores the dynamics behind the various phases of the programme. The last phase of reform witnessed controversy over the allocation and ownership of model farms, leading to calls for a comprehensive audit of the programme.

The immediate consequences of the programme for crop production in the large-scale commercial sector include significant declines in output of maize (from 800,000 tonnes in 2000 to about 80,000 tonnes in 2003), wheat (from 225,000 tonnes in 2000 to less than 100,000 tonnes in 2003), soya beans (from 145,000 tonnes in 2000 to 30,000 in 2003) and tobacco (from 230

million kg in 2000 to about 70 million kg in 2003) (CFU, 2003). The declines will have profoundly negative consequences for the sector, gross domestic product (GDP) and foreign exchange earnings.

#### **4. Effects on workers' livelihoods**

Drawing on field material gathered in October and November 2002 in eight provinces, the report explores the effects of land reform on employment and workers' livelihoods. About 90 per cent of the 160 farms surveyed had experienced a halt or drastic decline in production, and hence in employment, following the receipt of eviction orders from the government. Exceptions to the evictions and decline were large estates and plantations engaged in tea, coffee, sugar and livestock production, and those operating in export processing zones.

The overall picture is one of massive job losses — affecting about 70 per cent of the original farm workforce. More precise estimates are not possible. The loss of permanent worker status on farms is widespread. There is a pronounced trend towards contract or piece-work arrangements. Both the newly resettled small farmers and 'new' large commercial farmers lack the financial resources and production capacity to absorb the former permanent workers.

However, despite the large job losses, a considerable proportion of farm workers remain living on the farms. There is evidence to suggest that up to 50 per cent of farm workers stayed on even if they no longer held jobs. In general, female workers suffered greater loss of employment. The survey data suggests that more than 50 per cent of permanent female workers and nearly 60 per cent of seasonal female workers lost their jobs. This compares with 30 and 33 per cent respectively for permanent and seasonal male workers. The data also indicate a decline in permanent and seasonal female workers (by 63 per cent and 42 per cent respectively) living on farms. That substantial proportion of female and male workers no longer living on farms must be experiencing considerable hardship, wherever they are now.

In the survey sample, only about a quarter of the farm workers who lost jobs had received severance packages by the end of 2002. The packages would have cushioned them against loss of income, at least for a few months. Those who did not receive packages expect to seek piece-work and other income-earning opportunities. In sum, the loss of a regular job-based income has undermined the livelihoods of most farm worker households.

An unfortunate development is farm workers' diminishing access to crucial resources and services. Change in farm ownership has restricted access to housing, schools, clinics and safe water. Where a farm owner has been evicted, the running and maintenance of the school and payment of the teaching staff often cease, leading to the school's closure. Most early child education centres (ECECs) have also been closed down, as have farm clinics.

## **6. Food security, vulnerable groups, HIV-AIDS and coping strategies**

Land reform has had a direct impact on food security at national level as well as on farm workers' requirements. The decline in maize and wheat production since 2000 was compounded in 2001-02 and 2002-03 by a major drought affecting the entire southern Africa region. In Zimbabwe, however, the disruptions associated with 'land invasions' further undermined crop production. For jobless farm workers, access to food has been difficult and irregular. Food aid has been made available to some of those without a livelihood, and to children under five and those of school age. The role of the FCTZ in the three Mashonaland provinces and in Manicaland has been pivotal in this. There have been deaths from starvation in several provinces. Moreover, despite efforts to provide food aid, the incidence of malnutrition is increasing among farm workers' children on farms and in informal settlements.

Like other social groups, farm workers have been vulnerable to the HIV-AIDS epidemic. The prevalence rate among them in the 20-49 year age group is estimated at higher than 25 per cent. The consequences include a rise in the number of orphans and child-headed households. Extended family and nuclear family structures are under severe stress as household assets are drawn upon to treat people with AIDS-related sicknesses. Resources and home-based care institutions for the sick are very limited. Constant food shortages mean poor nutrition for AIDS patients, among others.

Other vulnerable groups in the farm worker community include migrant workers and their descendants, women, the elderly, youth and children. Most migrant workers or their descendants have no communal homes, land or jobs to fall back on. There is no social safety net for the elderly and retired workers, or for women concentrated in insecure, seasonal jobs.

In response to the loss of permanent jobs and access to shelter and social services, farm workers have pursued a number of coping strategies. These include the itinerant search for piece-work jobs at different farms at different times, informal trade, gold panning, fishing and hunting. Income from these activities is irregular and limited, but the workers appear to have no other options. The working conditions and wages on the farms of small and new commercial farmers are unattractive. A few farm worker households receive remittances from relatives working elsewhere. Some farm workers have created or joined 'informal settlements' on which they have access to a small piece of land, and to basic, often-rudimentary social services.

## **7. Towards the future**

The report concludes with an examination of the emerging relationship between the new farmers, both small and large, and farm workers. While the former have been, by and large, beneficiaries of land reform, the latter have not, despite appeals for land through their union, the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union (GAPWUZ). A somewhat uneasy relationship exists between the beneficiaries and the farm workers. There have been



conflicts over continued access to farm housing for farm workers, and over resources such as land, water and food. However, there are also instances of peaceful co-existence on some farms.

Although there has been a substantial decline in union membership, owing to job losses, about 75 per cent of the union members interviewed still belonged to GAPWUZ. However, the newly-created and state-sponsored Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) also appears to have members, at least in a few provinces such as Masvingo. The challenges that GAPWUZ faces are new and manifold. It will need to re-assess its mission, focus and strategies, now that the farm worker community is substantially reduced in size.

In assessing the immediate and medium-term needs of farm workers, the report draws on priorities suggested by those interviewed for the survey. Not surprisingly, they identified the more immediate needs of farm workers as food and land. When the field research was conducted, in October and November 2002, food scarcity was a major problem and a livelihood crisis was mounting. This explains the priority attached to the resources of food and land. Other priority needs were income generating projects (requested in particular by women respondents), crop inputs, social infrastructure and services.

The report also presents recommendations for interventions by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), governments and donors to avert an evolving crisis.

## **Recommendations**

This report identifies many issues, challenges and needs pertaining to farm workers in the post-land reform era. The relevant stakeholders need to address these systematically. In this context, the stakeholders include the Zimbabwe government, the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), GAPWUZ, Parliament, local and international NGOs, and donor countries and agencies. The issues and needs have been distilled into recommendations which should lay the basis for further discussion and refinement, and for planning and action. They are not exhaustive. However, the urgency of the recommendations cannot be over-emphasised in view of the evolving humanitarian emergency that farm workers confront.

### **I. Food security and provision of inputs**

The immediate needs of farm workers on and off the farms are for food supplies. This report gives evidence of increased malnutrition among farm workers' children and hunger among displaced farm workers, including deaths from starvation. The combination of disrupted production, drought and erratic food supplies through the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) has undermined the food security of farm workers. The report mentions important efforts by the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe to meet the food needs of jobless farm workers and their children through feeding programmes. But these programmes cannot cater for all who are short of food. The programmes should be enlarged and extended into other provinces, namely the two Matabeleland provinces, Midlands and Masvingo. Political considerations and partisanship should be completely excluded from matters of food distribution. Only humanitarian considerations should apply.

However, food handouts are not a sustainable way to ensure long-term food security. Farm workers should be provided with the means to produce food for themselves and for local markets. While they may already have production skills, they lack access to land and inputs. There is therefore a need for an extensive programme to provide inputs, particularly seed, fertiliser, draught-power and an extension service to those workers with land on which to grow food. For sustainable food security, displaced farm workers should be granted land rights. The modest FCTZ input assistance programme should be studied for wider lessons for a more extensive programme for farm workers.

Those who should act on this recommendation are: government, local and international NGOs, private sector and donor agencies.

### **II. Infrastructure and social services**

The report shows that in the aftermath of reform, infrastructure and social services on most farms that were acquired for resettlement have collapsed. Also, there is little or no infrastructure or services in most newly settled areas:

no roads, electricity, protected water supplies, schools or clinics. While previous resettlement schemes included systematic planning for and investment in such infrastructure and services, this was absent in the current schemes. There is a danger of the spread of disease and prolonged disruption of children's schooling, unless infrastructure and services are put in place. But this will require holistic planning and very substantial resources. These facilities would serve the needs not only of farm workers, but also of newly settled small farmers. Several parliamentary portfolio committees have testified to the difficulties the new settlers are experiencing owing to the collapse or absence of infrastructure and services. The infrastructure and services that previously existed on the farms must be repaired or revived. This is a daunting task but an essential one.

Those who should act on this recommendation include government, donor countries and agencies, local and international NGOs, new commercial farmers, GAPWUZ and Parliament.

### **III. The coping strategies and livelihoods of farm workers**

Of necessity, farm workers who are jobless, landless and without homes in communal areas have tried various coping strategies. Piece-work on the farms where they live and on adjacent farms is often temporary, insecure and badly paid. They also earn some income from informal trading in agricultural produce and second-hand clothes, and in craft materials in local markets. These activities should be supported by setting up market stalls and small depots for buying and resale in nearby towns and communal areas.

Assistance to set up a distribution network and service would boost the growth of small crafts industries using local raw materials. Provision of equipment, credit and a regulatory framework would enable gold panners to ensure basic occupational health and safety, and encourage preservation of the environment.

Women expressed particular interest in income-generating projects, including poultry-raising, sewing clothes and uniforms, baking and jam-making. Some have skills in horticulture, vegetable and fruit processing, and packing. Programmes to support such projects would provide sources of income to female former farm workers.

As the report shows, some groups among farm workers are much more vulnerable following land reform. They include migrant workers, elderly and retired workers, women, youth and children. Special schemes should be devised to meet their specific needs, to mitigate a very stressful environment. Most of them have no homes or land of their own; the elderly and retired workers have little or no pension. They need some kind of safety net. Young people and children have difficulty in obtaining education and skills training. Programmes to provide such opportunities should be resuscitated and expanded.

Actors who should enhance support for coping strategies are local and international NGOs, government, local authorities, donors, the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) and the National Employment Council (NEC) for Agriculture.

#### **IV. Addressing HIV-AIDS in farm worker communities**

Farm workers have been caught in the web of the HIV-AIDS epidemic, and widespread poverty and food insecurity have exacerbated its effects. A systematic response is needed to the increase in numbers of people with AIDS-related illnesses and the growing number of AIDS orphans. Programmes such as the Farm Orphans Support Trust (FOST) have developed some experience in promoting community-based care of orphans over the years. This experience should be closely studied for wider lessons, and expanded to cater for the greater number of orphans on farms and in informal settlements. The food, health and education needs of orphans should be treated as a high priority.

The National AIDS Council (NAC) receives considerable sums of taxpayers' money every month but little of it appears to reach farm worker communities. There should be a special effort to alert the NAC to the situation of these communities, and to ensure that they receive a share of the revenues through credible AIDS support organisations such as FOST and community-based organisations. Efforts should be made to establish community-based home-care organisations to look after AIDS patients. At the same time, AIDS awareness campaigns and messages to promote condom use and other forms of safe sex should be stepped up.

Main players who should be active in this sector are: the NAC, government, local and international NGOs, the CFU, GAPWUZ, the NEC for Agriculture and the media.

#### **V. Informal settlements**

The report observes that informal settlements or 'squatter camps' have mushroomed to provide shelter and sometimes land to farm workers who have lost jobs and entitlement to shelter on the farms. Such settlements exist in different provinces: in Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central and Mashonaland East, Manicaland and Matabeleland North. Some of them are on the fringes of commercial farms; others are near small farming towns and several are close to the capital. Conditions in these settlements leave a great deal to be desired. Housing, schooling, health facilities, sanitation and water supplies are rudimentary. Food security is poor. The number of poor households is considerable.

Yet these settlements are now a sanctuary to hundreds, in some cases thousands, of farm worker households. One advantage is that they and their occupants are easily accessible. With their concentrated population, provision

of services and infrastructure should be cost-effective. But it will require basic planning by local authorities and consultation with the inhabitants. More immediately, there is a need to ensure food supplies to the settlements, and provide schooling and health facilities. Where there is a reasonable amount of land near the settlement, government should consider allocating it to former farm workers who want to turn it to productive use. In the longer term, informal settlements can be turned into growth points and service centres offering opportunities for light and informal industry, and markets for local goods and services. They will need to be upgraded and provided with basic services, such as shops, banks and post offices. Issues of tenure security (land and housing rights) will need to be negotiated with both central government and local authorities.

Major players in the provision of resources, services and planning would be: government, local authorities, local and international NGOs, churches and donors, and settlement community-based associations.

## **VI. Skills and organisational base of farm workers**

Over many years, farm workers acquired a range of skills in crop production, use of agricultural machinery, repair and maintenance of equipment and use of agri-chemicals. Some workers were drivers, technicians, clerks and forepersons. These skills will be wasted if they are not used. The model farms appear to be employing few of them. There is therefore a compelling reason to allocate land to former farm workers on which they can deploy these skills. It would be worthwhile to invest effort in encouraging the creation of producer groups, or production and marketing cooperatives, among former farm workers. Workers' groups could negotiate fair arrangements with companies that lend inputs. The companies could recoup the costs when they purchase the commodities produced.

In the aftermath of land reform, the union base among farm workers has been considerably weakened. The main union, GAPWUZ, now operates on a smaller membership and resource base. There is a case for material and solidarity support for the union. More specifically, efforts should be directed at capacity building in the union and strengthening its advocacy. Its focus will be wider now, extending to workers on the new commercial farms, and to those in informal settlements.

Main players who should help to preserve and strengthen the skills and organisational base of unions are: GAPWUZ, the international labour movement, FCTZ, local and international NGOs, agribusiness companies and commodity associations.

## **VII. Compensation and reintegration of white farmers**

Although this report is not explicitly about the conditions of white farmers after reform, compensation for them remains a major issue. It is addressed in the

Abuja Agreement of 2001, and in discussions between the government and the farmers' body, the CFU. By February 2003, compensation had been paid for only 134 farms and the government's current budget for compensation is about Z\$4.5 billion (about £3.46 million at the official exchange rate — in May 2003 the official exchange rate was Z\$1,300 to £1, while the rate on the parallel market was Z\$2,000 to £1). This could scarcely compensate for 40 farm properties.

Hence the need to create conditions of normality so that dialogue with bilateral and multilateral donors can resume in earnest after nearly four years. This will centre principally on discussions with the British government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The British government had pledged £50 million for land reform in 2001, but on condition of a return to the rule of law. The UNDP has promised to mobilise international support for an independent Trust Fund, of which one component would provide direct compensation to farmers for land acquired. A second component would support displaced farm workers. A third component would provide resources for the resettlement process, including basic infrastructure on acquired land, equipment and tools, extension services, and training and support for capacity building and technical assistance to the government.

Resolving the compensation issue would pave the way for re-integration of the white farmers who remain in the country and would be willing to resume farming. The contacts between the CFU and government would have to reach a more serious level for this to become a reality. In particular, a major diplomatic and political shift to 'give and take' is needed on the part of government and the other parties.

Major actors in this process will be: the Zimbabwe government, the British government, UNDP, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), CFU, GAPWUZ, donor countries and agencies.

### **VIII. Transparent, equitable and gender-sensitive agrarian reform**

The main focus of this report is the repercussions of land reform for farm workers. However, field findings show the imperative for a transparent, equitable and gender-sensitive process. Indeed, in early 2003 there were growing calls for a comprehensive land audit to ascertain irregularities and corruption in the allocation of model farms. There is certainly a need for transparency in agrarian reform. In comparison with organised interest groups such as war veterans, women have not been allocated a fair share of land. They appear to have received less than 20 per cent of the land. It seems that fewer than 5 per cent of farm workers received land under the programme.

It would be advisable to revisit the criteria of land allocation and ensure that the landless, women and farm workers receive preference. Land allocated for prospective black commercial farmers remains unoccupied: of the projected 51,000, about 30,000 have taken up land. The remaining land should be allocated equitably to the priority groups. So should land that was allegedly

taken up as second or third farms by some members of the elite. There is a compelling case for an independent land commission to ensure transparent and equitable land distribution. The agrarian reform needs both national and international credibility: its funding will depend partly on this. It would be useful to organise an international land conference that would consider these issues, and especially support for farm workers, the resettled small farmers, and long-term food security. An evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the fast-track programme would help in planning the next phase of reform.

Major players in this process should include: government, UNDP, the European Union, the Commonwealth, bilateral and multilateral donors, GAPWUZ, the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF), local and international NGOs, the Independent Land Commission.

### **IX. Forum for conflict management and resolution**

The report refers to uneasy relations between farm workers and the new settlers and farmers. There have been conflicts over resources: access to housing, land and food. Farm workers have been evicted from farms and compounds. Tension has sometimes broken out between commercial farmers and the newly settled small farmers. A structure is needed to facilitate the resolution of misunderstandings and disputes between these parties. This structure should include local authorities and representatives from the parties themselves. It should adjudicate conflicts and serve as a non-partisan forum for regular consultation on matters of mutual interest. Such matters would include access to water and other natural resources, social services and livelihoods opportunities. As far as possible, local communities should work out the format and scope of this forum. Local authorities should facilitate such initiatives.

Main actors in such a forum would be: local communities, settlers and new farmers, local authorities, NGOs, the NEC for Agriculture, GAPWUZ and the CFU.

### **X. Citizenship rights and civic life**

Until recently, the citizenship rights of so-called migrant farm workers were ignored. There was even a xenophobic attitude towards them in some circles. However, it appears legislation is to be introduced to grant citizenship to people, including migrant farm workers, from countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Unfortunately, this belated citizenship will not give them a right to land. This report argues that workers should have land rights to cushion them from the loss of jobs and livelihoods. There should be a special effort to ensure that farm workers do indeed secure full citizenship rights. Their access to birth certificates, national identity documents and passports should be facilitated. In the past, it has been difficult for them to obtain these vital documents.

In addition, special efforts should be made to integrate farm workers into civic life. They should receive basic education about their rights, as well as voter education. They should be encouraged to participate in local community activities such as those of farm development committees (FADCOs), local council programmes and union activities. Voluntary associations and civic groups have a special role to play in this.

Major players in this process should be: NGOs, local community organisations, local authorities, GAPWUZ, women's and youth groups, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network.

## **XI. The search for sustainable models for agrarian reform in southern Africa**

Following the controversial land reform in Zimbabwe, debate is intensifying over what form and pace reform should take in countries such as Namibia and South Africa. The 'willing seller, willing buyer' approach appears to be inadequate. It will not be effective or feasible on a significant scale in these countries. At the same time, huge problems attend reform based on orchestrated land invasions. Governments and civil society need to work out feasible and sustainable approaches to land reform. Consultation and policy based on consensus between the stakeholders are indispensable in crafting such approaches.

From the beginning, farm workers should be integrated into reform strategies. Systematic planning of resettlement schemes will need to integrate infrastructure support, services, input supplies and extension from the start. A strong and visible poverty reduction strategy should be built into the reform process. This search for reform models should build on successful smaller schemes where they have been implemented in the region.

Major actors in this process should be: governments, the SADC, the UNDP, farmers' associations, agricultural workers' unions, research institutions, NGOs and donors.



## CHAPTER 1

### The Land Question, Reform and Farm Workers

#### 1.1 Introduction

For many years, commercial farm workers were the largest segment of the workforce in Zimbabwe's formal sector. In the 1980s and 1990s, their numbers fluctuated between 300,000 and 350,000, or between 20 and 25 per cent of the national workforce. The farm workforce supported an even larger population of about 2 million. The employment opportunities in commercial agriculture testified to the pivotal role that the sector played, and continues to play, in the national economy. Historically, the sector was not only a major employer, but also a leading contributor to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as well as to foreign exchange earnings.

Until 2000, the average annual contribution of agriculture to GDP was between 16 and 18 per cent. Its contribution to foreign exchange earnings was boosted in particular by tobacco and horticulture exports. About 40 per cent of foreign exchange earnings came from the sector. Because of its large contribution to employment, GDP and foreign exchange, agriculture was termed the 'engine' or 'backbone' of the economy. Moreover, the manufacturing sector derived about 60 per cent of its inputs from agriculture. The deepening linkages between agriculture and manufacturing were a major factor behind the growth, sophistication and diversification of the Zimbabwean economy from the 1950s to the 1990s.

However, the prosperity of commercial agriculture was based on a shaky foundation. It rested on skewed land distribution. Through historical dispossession, the majority African population was assigned inferior, overcrowded land while the white settler minority amassed most of the prime arable land. At independence, this minority owned 15.5 million hectares.

There was an attempt at land reform soon after independence but the new constitution arising from the Lancaster House negotiations did not allow a comprehensive reform programme. The impetus for such a comprehensive programme was generated in 2000. The 'fast-track' land reform was the result.

The most far-reaching effect of the fast-track programme or *jambanja* (direct action), as politicians called it, was the acquisition of about 90 per cent of commercial farms. The government claimed to have completed this by August 2002, although new acquisitions were still continuing in March 2003. In a land reform marked by considerable coercion, violence and disorder, the government acquired for distribution about 11 million hectares owned by white commercial farmers. The immediate consequence was an exodus of white farmers from their properties, and the loss of jobs and livelihoods for thousands of farm workers. Many lost regular incomes and access to basic

social services such as health and education. They became particularly vulnerable to a widespread food shortage that affected between 6 and 7 million Zimbabweans in 2002.

## **1.2 The purpose of this report**

The purpose of this report is to assess the situation of commercial farm workers, in particular, how it has been shaped by the fast-track land reform programme since 2000. Some estimates suggest that 180,000 to 200,000 farm workers, if not more, lost their jobs. In most instances, this resulted in loss of their entitlement to housing on the farms, and often to subsidised food and basic social services. Others were forced to move off the farms to make way for new settlers under the A1 and A2 models. (Under the A1 model, small farmers have been settled on pieces of land of about 5 hectares with additional grazing land. Under the A2 model, aspiring black commercial farmers have been allocated land of several hundred, sometimes several thousand, hectares). Those displaced by the reform are often stranded on the outskirts of the farms, or else they have trekked to fast-growing 'informal settlements' where social conditions are desperate. The report investigates the conditions in which farm workers subsist, and their coping strategies. In particular, it analyses the impact of the decline in food security and the effects of the HIV-AIDS epidemic on their livelihoods and family structures.

The report begins by setting out the social and historical context surrounding the debate and process of land reform. This background is needed to explain the dynamics and trajectory of the fast-track programme. It presents the contending perspectives on how the reform should have been undertaken, and then examines the wider economic and social consequences of what actually occurred. The report draws on field findings to describe and assess the changes on commercial farms since 2000, and focuses on the impact of those changes on farm workers. Aspects of government policy or measures and the positions and experiences of commercial farmers are touched on where they had effects for farm workers.

There is a compelling reason to maintain this focus on farm workers. Historically, they have been sidelined in discussion of policies or programmes that determine their interests. So it was under the fast-track programme. This focus also derives from the mission and programme focus of the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ), the sponsor of this report. The FCTZ is a local non-governmental organisation (NGO) committed to empowering farm workers to achieve a better life, and creating an environment conducive to the holistic growth of commercial farming communities. Founded in 1999, the FCTZ has pursued its objective through a coordinated programme of community development and advocacy, lobbying and communication, targeted at those who can facilitate change within the commercial farming community. In a number of ways, the fast-track programme has had a direct impact on the scope of FCTZ's work and on its target group, the farm workers themselves. The significant reduction in the number of white commercial farms and the workers who provided labour on them, and a need to attend to

the welfare of displaced workers, have inspired FCTZ to review its programme focus. This report is a contribution to that process. It is based on the findings of an extensive national survey undertaken in October-November 2002.

The report intends to contribute to a broader regional debate on land reform. Namibia and South Africa are currently experiencing increasingly strident calls for speedy and comprehensive redistribution of land. As in Zimbabwe, historical injustice underlay the colonial dispossession of the majority African peoples. Are there any implicit lessons that can be drawn from Zimbabwe for future land reforms in those countries? What aspects of Zimbabwe's fast-track programme should be adopted or avoided? How can the interests and welfare of farm workers be kept at the centre, and not the margins, of a land reform programme? These issues are addressed in the concluding section of the report.

### **1.3 The structure of the report**

This report has four chapters, in addition to this introductory chapter, which outlines the scope of the report and gives some historical background. The second chapter provides an overview of the scope and process of land reform on the national level. This sets out the broad context in which the reform was implemented, and the impact on farm workers, commercial farmers and the wider economy. It assesses the role of political, electoral and legal factors in shaping the direction of reform. The chapter identifies several distinct phases of reform: a phase of 'spontaneous occupations' preceded the 'land invasions', which were in turn followed by the 'fast-track' programme itself. The overview concludes by assessing the last phase of reform in 2002, including the controversy surrounding ownership of A2 model farms that led to calls for a comprehensive audit of the programme.

Chapter 3 considers the impact of the land reform on the employment conditions and livelihoods of farm workers. Drawing extensively on field data from the provinces, it assesses how the decline in numbers of operating commercial farms, especially in 2001-2002, led to a large drop in employment. (An estimated 50 per cent of farm workers had lost jobs by the beginning of 2002, and 65 per cent by February 2003.) This had a direct effect on their livelihoods because of the loss of regular incomes. The chapter also considers the effects of the acquisition of farms on social infrastructure and services such as schools and health centres that had been set up on the farms. Some closed down, causing great hardship to farm worker communities. The chapter goes on to examine the extent to which farm workers have had access to severance packages under Statutory Instrument 6.

Food security and the coping strategies of farm workers are addressed in Chapter 4. Food shortage appeared to be intensifying in most rural and farming areas in all the provinces covered. Farm workers still in employment, as well as those who had lost their jobs, had difficulty in obtaining regular supplies of food. But the new settlers had the same problem. The chapter discusses the situation of the more vulnerable groups: migrant workers,

women, elderly and orphans. It describes how HIV-AIDS has become a major epidemic in farm worker communities, which lack resources and local care institutions to look after those who are ill. With the growing stress on the extended family network, these communities have less and less capacity to look after AIDS orphans. The chapter also provides an account of coping strategies that farm workers have adopted to help them survive in an economically stressful environment.

Chapter 5 examines the emerging pattern of social relations: primarily those between the new settlers, new farmers and farm workers. It shows how farm workers have been marginalised in the land reform process. Examples are provided of conflict, but also of co-existence, between farm workers and the settlers and new farmers. The farm workers have not been completely passive and powerless in this process. The chapter outlines the collective response of workers through the main union in the sector, GAPWUZ. Finally, the chapter spells out the immediate needs of farm workers and identifies ways to address them.

#### **1.4 The land question in historical perspective**

To understand fully the complex character and contested process of the fast-track reform, the land question should be viewed from a historical perspective (Palmer, 1977; 1990). Land was a major economic resource expropriated from the indigenous peoples at the start of colonialism in the 1890s, and expropriation continued intermittently until the 1950s and even into the 1960s. Land dispossession symbolised colonial subjugation. Perhaps no other issue was more emblematic of national liberation. Nationalist politicians did not tire of reminding their supporters that the primary purpose of the independence struggle was the restoration of the land expropriated by colonial settlers. In the 1950s and 1960s, a nationalist position on land was taking shape. In 1963, the newly founded Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party demanded the abrogation of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 (ZANU, 1963, quoted in Nyandoro and Nyangoni, 1979). It further stated that 'absentee ownership of land shall be forbidden' and that 'unused land shall be declared communal'. ZANU eventually created a National Land Board to administer an equitable distribution of land.

Nowhere else on the African continent (with the exception of Kenya, Namibia and South Africa) had there been such a massive expropriation of land. Independence in 1980 was therefore expected to lead to the recovery of this important material and symbolic resource. The structure of land-ownership and use was clearly inequitable at independence (Sachikonye, 2002). About 6,000 white commercial farmers owned 15.5 million hectares, while 8,500 small-scale farmers possessed 1.4 million hectares. The remaining indigenous communal farmers — about 700,000 households — subsisted on 16.4 million hectares. This was less than half of the country's agricultural land. Of particular significance was that 75 per cent of the land owned by communal farmers was in agro-ecological regions 4 and 5, which are drier and less fertile. There was therefore a keenly felt sense of historical injustice and

deprivation, focused on land. Not surprisingly, it was one of the most contentious issues negotiated at the Lancaster House talks on Zimbabwe's independence in 1979. Nationalist negotiators subsequently said that at that conference, the UK and US promised to contribute significantly to land purchase to redress imbalances in land ownership. However, the UK and US disputed this.

Whether it was made or not, that promise was not enshrined in the independence constitution. The constitution contained onerous clauses protecting private property, including land. As one leading nationalist recalled:

we said that the new constitution should permit government to expropriate land if it was not being properly used. The British said 'fine', so long as we paid the full market price. But we knew that vast acreage were lying idle and therefore without a market price in areas formerly reserved for white ownership. To buy areas adequate for resettling the many land-hungry African farmers, who had been confined to the former tribal trust land, would be beyond the financial ability of the new state (Nkomo, 1984: 195-6).

After independence, land reform focused on settling people on land acquired from white commercial farmers on a 'willing seller, willing buyer' basis. But this was relatively expensive. The independence constitution had tied the government's hands by entrenching property rights, so that only under-used land could be compulsorily purchased (Cliffe, 1988). Even so, purchase involved immediate payment of full value in foreign exchange. The cost constraint significantly restricted government's room for manoeuvre on the land question in the 1980s.

This was the structural context in which the post-independence government embarked on a land reform programme whose centrepiece was resettlement of the landless and poor on newly acquired land. The programme's overall objective was to resettle 162,000 households on 9 million hectares. That would have represented a transfer of about 23 per cent of families from the congested communal lands on to new land. It was not to be. Owing to the resource constraints and limited political will, only about 48,000 households had been resettled by 1989.

In general, what distinguishes this phase of gradual land redistribution from the later 'fast track' phase was its peaceful and orderly character. The process of selecting settlers for resettlement was, by and large, transparent. Resettlement itself was accompanied by provision of essential inputs such as seed and fertiliser, and infrastructure such as roads, clinics and schools. As one aid mission concluded, the resettlement programme in the 1980s made 'impressive strides towards its principal objectives' (ODA, 1996). The majority of settled families had benefited considerably from the increased opportunities for income generation, and the availability of services such as health and education.

**Table 1.1 Land tenure in Zimbabwe 1980-2002**

Land category	1980 ha(m)	1997 ha(m)	2002 ha(m)
LSCF <sup>a</sup> (white-owned)	15.5	12.1	1 <sup>b</sup>
LSCF (A2 model)	--	--	2.0
<sup>c</sup> CA	16.4	16.4	16.4
<sup>d</sup> SSCFA	1.4	1.4	1.4
Resettlement	--	3.6	11
State farms	0.3	0.8	0.6
National parks	6.0	6.0	6.0

<sup>a</sup>Large-scale commercial farming area

<sup>b</sup>Approximation

<sup>c</sup>Communal area

<sup>d</sup>Small-scale commercial farming area

**Source:** Zimbabwe government, 1998, various press reports, 2002

In the 1990s, on the whole, less urgency was attached to resolving the land question. This was perplexing in view of the earlier impetus and the expiry of the restrictive clauses of the Lancaster House constitution in 1990 (Palmer, 1990; Adams, 2003). Less than 20,000 new settlers received land between 1990 and 1997, a significant slow-down in land reform. By 1997 a total of 71,000 households had been resettled on 3.6 million hectares, a far cry from the original target of 162,000 households. By the mid-1990s, about 500 indigenous commercial farmers had graduated into fully-fledged commercial farmers. About 80 per cent of them had bought farms with their own resources while the remainder rented government leasehold farms (Zimbabwe government, 1998). The official explanation for the slow-down in reform in the 1990s was that land acquisitions through the 'willing seller, willing buyer' approach had become more expensive. The approach also significantly limited the scope of matching land supply with the demand for resettlement.

### 1.5 Farm workers in historical perspective

The facts commonly rehearsed about farm workers are that they formed the largest but lowest-paid stratum of the working-class. Historically, they were poorly organised because of the spatial dispersion of farms. They lived in

appalling housing conditions, and had little access to health services and schools. Farm workers were also largely seen as illiterate and bound to farm owners in a quasi-feudal relationship. These images represent the broad picture of conditions before independence. It is necessary, however, to review briefly the academic literature on farm workers in Zimbabwe.

The most wide-ranging study of farm workers did not appear until the 1970s (Clarke, 1977). It noted an apparent paradox. Although farm workers appeared to be 'a forgotten people', they and their families constituted about 20 per cent of the country's population in the mid-1970s. The study further observed that:

they are seldom interviewed in the media or by other branches of the media. Their high rate of illiteracy imposes a severe disability upon them in a word ... These workers have no collective voice at a national level ... It is not surprising then that the debate and decisions on farm labour policy proceed in a way which excludes the subjects of the discussion, as if by some stroke of magic the very people most concerned were not even there, except as objects of manipulation in varying degrees of benevolence. (*ibid*)

These conditions of marginal existence, 'voicelessness' and 'invisibility' were integral to the growth of the agricultural working class since the advent of colonialism. The poor working conditions initially deterred indigenous Africans from farm work. Until the 1960s, most farm workers were imported from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. The reluctance of local Africans to engage in farm labour was due to difficult working conditions. As one contemporary analyst observed, on tobacco farms foreign labour constituted about 70 per cent of the workforce in the 1940s and 1950s (Wadsworth, 1950). An explanation for this state of affairs was that:

the local peasants who did become workers discovered that housing, rations and other services, termed 'payments in kind' were inadequate even for a single migrant. Employers expected these low wages to be subsidised by peasant earnings ... Many women were forced to seek an income in beer brewing, prostitution and to work on farms at even lower wages than men. This availability of cheap labour buffered employers from the effects of international economic slump ... (Loewenson, 1992)

Although the proportion of indigenous farm workers rose in the 1970s, conditions did not improve a great deal. Government intervention in setting a minimum wage in the sector after independence alleviated the situation, but not to a significant extent.

The literature on farm workers post-independence picked up the themes explored during the colonial era. Much of it focused on low wages, poor housing and amenities, and surviving vestiges of quasi-feudal and paternalistic relationships between landowners and farm workers. There was a strong element of advocacy in this literature (Amanor-Wilks, 1995; Balleis

and Mugwetsi, 1994; FCTZ, 2001; Tandon, 2001). It urged an improvement of the social and wage conditions of this 'forgotten' and 'invisible' stratum of the working class. Farm workers were seen as lagging behind other social sectors, and as being denied participation in full political and economic life. There was, however, an acknowledgement that there had been some changes in their living conditions, although these were, on the whole, inadequate (Amanor-Wilks, 1995). There was strong advocacy for the empowerment of farm workers through better working conditions, income and food security, and access to health, education and security of tenure (Gavi and Banda, 2001). Recommendations were made for more positive government policy on housing and sanitation, and land rights for farm workers (Magaramombe, 2001). This literature reflected the growing role of NGOs in programmes to assist and empower the farm worker community in the 1990s.

It was also in the 1990s that a segment of commercial farmers became more receptive to calls for systematic improvements in the material conditions of their workforce. In 1996, the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) launched a 10-year plan to improve farm workers' housing. The centrepiece of the plan was the construction of suitable housing for all permanent workers: a three-roomed structure with a durable roof, adequate ventilation and a separate kitchen (CFU, 1996). Commercial farmers pressed for tax incentives as a reward for improving housing conditions. A series of workshops in the late 1990s pursued these issues to strengthen advocacy for 'a better deal' for farm workers (FES, 1998). Continuous consultations were urged between commercial farmers, farm workers and government on housing and tenure security (Sachikonye and Zishiri, 1999). There was, at least for a while during this period, an atmosphere that appeared to nurture dialogue on the rights and welfare of farm workers.

However, from the beginning of 2000, the discourse on farm workers took a sharply different tone. The discourse became polarised between those who approved the fast-track *jambanja* reform, and those who argued for a more orderly and transparent approach. Nevertheless, some thoughtful analysis of farm workers' conditions and their responses continued to be presented (Tandon, 2001; Rutherford, 2001). Farm invasions sought to discourage political participation by farm workers. They were subjected to intimidation and violence, and were deliberately marginalised as a group in land resettlement (Rutherford, 2001). The powerlessness and underdog role of farm workers which had been a feature of their existence historically was re-played as the Zimbabwe government launched its *jambanja* in early 2000.

## **1.6 Assessing the impact of reform on farm workers**

The scale of the fast-track land reform was unparalleled in the country's history. It easily dwarfed the land redistribution undertaken between 1980 and 1997. Between 2000 and 2002, some 11 million hectares changed hands, in a massive property transfer from white commercial farmers. An estimated 90 per cent of the farmers had their land acquired by the government. According to proponents of the reform, this amounted to 'an agrarian revolution' or 'Third



Chimurenga'. (Chimurenga is a Shona word meaning struggle. The 'First Chimurenga' was the 19th century resistance to British colonialism, the 'Second Chimurenga' was the national liberation war of the 1970s.) The specific challenge of this report is to assess the impact of this land reform on farm workers.

On the face of it, it would not be difficult to identify the 'beneficiaries' and 'non-beneficiaries' of the fast-track programme. The beneficiaries largely consist of the estimated 300,000 small-holder settlers who received land under the A1 model. They also include the 30,000 black commercial farmers who had taken up land under the A2 model by February 2003. The original provision had been for 51,000 A2 farmers, but the uptake was below expectation. Those who lost out in the reform include the white commercial farmers whose land was acquired, and farm workers who lost jobs and were not allocated land. Less than 5 per cent of farm workers were given land under the fast-track programme. Because the fortunes of the workers were intimately tied up with those of their 'white bosses', they bore the brunt of the consequences of the acquisition of the white-owned farms.

An assessment of the impact of land reform on farm workers should consider the original objective of reform, and the material outcomes in terms of loss of jobs, assets and access to services and entitlements. It should also consider the benefits, if any, that accrued to farm workers as a result of the reform. This is not as simple an exercise as it would appear at first sight. First, it is not clear whether the government had a policy for addressing the situation of farm workers under land reform. In its document on the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP) Phase 2, the government stated that the reform would, among other things, reduce the 'extent and intensity of poverty among rural families and farm workers by providing them with adequate land for agricultural and pastoral use' (Zimbabwe government, 1998). In the event, however, while the land needs of some communal families were catered for under the A1 model, those of the farm workers were largely ignored. This raises the question of whether the government was seriously committed to land reform that would benefit farm workers. We will return to this theme in Chapter 2.

The impact of land reform on farm workers can be measured in terms of the number of jobs and incomes lost. Although it is not possible to give exact figures for these, some reasonable estimates can be made, on the basis of the number of farms that have ceased operations, the number of white commercial farmers who have vacated their properties, and the number of schools and clinics that have been shut down. However, allowances should be made for those instances where new farmers who acquired the properties re-engaged some of the farm workers. Not all farm workers once employed by white commercial farmers have lost jobs and livelihoods. The same consideration applies to their access to housing on the farm. There is also a varied picture regarding access to basic services such as health, education, water supplies and subsidised food. In most cases, land reform has significantly reduced farm workers' access to these.

An analysis of this sort must also take into account the widespread drought of the 2001-2002 cropping season. This drought, which affected large parts of southern Africa, caused a dramatic drop in harvests, leading to massive food shortages. The food security of farm workers was severely affected. It is not simple to separate the relative contributions of drought and land reform to the sharp drop in food production in 2002-2003. However, the decline in agricultural output began in 2000 when the reform began, and before the drought. Moreover, in previous droughts, for instance in 1992-93, food reserves and agricultural production did not fall to the alarming levels reached in 2002. To that extent, the manner and scale of land reform contributed to a dramatic fall in agricultural output.

An assessment of the impact of land reform at this stage can be, at best, provisional. The full impact of the reform on farm workers and the wider economy will take several years to work itself through. The recovery in agriculture will take even longer. Thus this report focuses largely on the immediate consequences of the programme. This is partly explained by the priority to address the humanitarian and other emergency needs of social groups that have been adversely affected by the reform. This report highlights clear practical problems, namely the threat to livelihoods and the fate of vulnerable groups. Where opportunities exist to ameliorate the plight of farm workers in the context of the reform or by enhancing coping mechanisms, these will be identified. This has a bearing on the methodology of the study.

### **1.7 The methodology of the study**

The primary method of research for this report was field research, complemented by a detailed review of existing literature. An extensive corpus of written materials exists in the form of unpublished and published reports, articles and books on both farm workers and the land question. These materials include documents and reports from central government and NGO sources, as well as from international aid organisations (Zimbabwe government, 1990, 1998, 2001; ODA, 1996; Buckle, 2001; Hunter, Farren and Farren, 2001; FCTZ, 2000, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; UNDP, 2002; ). In addition, there is a burgeoning scholarly literature which raises pertinent issues regarding farm workers' conditions. There has also been extensive newspaper reportage of the fast-track programme and its wider social and economic impact in the country and beyond. This journalistic material is not impartial, but it contains a wealth of first-hand accounts of the roles and responses of the main protagonists in the *jambanja* drama: government, commercial farmers and farm workers (see various issues of *Daily News*, *Herald*, *Sunday Mail*, *Standard*, *Financial Gazette* and *Zimbabwe Independent*). The national and international press carried constant if uneven reports on the evolving situation. A number of specialist publications such the *Farmer* (which ceased publication in early 2002), and the *New Farmer* (which commenced publication in 2002) carried relevant empirical material and topical discussions.

Nevertheless, systematic assessment of how farm workers' conditions and livelihoods have been shaped by land reform required extensive field research. The conditions of farm workers needed investigation through observation and interviews, as well as focus group discussions. A sample was drawn of 1,250 farm worker households living on 125 commercial farms (out of an estimated total of 5,000 farms). The number of farms eventually covered was 160: of these, 110 were owned by white farmers and 60 had already been settled by small farmers under the A1 model. In the event, 977 farm worker households were interviewed. The farm sample represented more than 2.5 per cent of the total number of farms. The farms were selected from the eight rural provinces: Mashonaland Central, East and West; Matabeleland North and South; Manicaland, Masvingo and Midlands.

The number of farms selected in each province was determined by the intensity of commercial farming. In other words, the greater the number of farms in a particular province, the higher the number of farms and farm workers covered in the survey. This meant that the survey covered a greater number of commercial farms in the more densely-farmed Mashonaland provinces. For instance, 27 farms were covered in Mashonaland West, 24 in Mashonaland East and 33 in Mashonaland Central (field notes, 2002). The survey covered some 11 farms in Manicaland, 20 in Matabeleland South and 10 in Matabeleland North, together with 15 in Midlands and 20 in Masvingo (see Table 1.2 for number of respondents in each province). To date (March 2003) this is perhaps the most extensive coverage of research (in terms of scope of issues investigated) on commercial farms and farm workers since the onset and 'official' conclusion of the fast-track land reform.

At each farm visited, a stratified sample of 10 farm worker households was interviewed (see Tables 1.3 and 1.4 for details of the types of household). The interviews were conducted with the head of household or a well-informed member of it. The questionnaire-based interviews sought information on family demographics, education, income, food production and security, child growth, family planning and awareness of HIV-AIDS. The interviews with commercial farmers sought information on patterns of crop production, on-farm employment, the state of social infrastructure such as housing, farm schools and clinics, and food security. Although most commercial farmers interviewed were old-established (and evicted) farmers, some newly settled (mostly black) A2 commercial farmers were also interviewed. In addition, interviews were conducted with settlers placed under the A1 model in a number of provinces. These settlers created a committee at each of the acquired farms, and collaborated closely with structures of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Popular Front (ZANU-PF) party.

Interviews with individual 'old' and 'new' farmers and with worker households were supplemented by focus group discussions and interviews with key informants. Separate male and female focus group discussions were held at most farms covered. This was intended to encourage greater participation from female workers. Information and perspectives from the group discussions were checked against those gleaned from individual interviews. The other key informants interviewed ranged from local authorities to

representatives of organisations such as the CFU, Justice for Agriculture (JAG), the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union (GAPWUZ), the Farm Orphans Support Trust (FOST), the Zimbabwe Community Development Trust (ZCDT) and other NGOs.

It was no small challenge to interpret the data and views from these different sources. The material provided a reasonably accurate composite picture of the fast-track reform on farm workers, and on the broader economy and society.

**Table 1.2 Respondents by province**

Province	No. of respondents	Percentage
Mashonaland West	177	18.5
Mashonaland East	109	11.4
Mashonaland Central	71	7.4
Manicaland	90	9.4
Masvingo	169	17.7
Midlands	107	19.2
Matebeleland North	91	9.5
Matebeleland South	142	14.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>956</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November 2002

**Table 1.3 Profile of respondents' households**

Category	Number	Percentage
Male-headed	673	70.5
Female-headed	181	19.0
Child-headed	12	1.3

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November 2002

**Table 1.4 Household type by province**

Province	Male-headed	Female-headed	Child-headed	Total
Mash West	159	18	--	177
Mash East	93	15	1	109
Mash Central	66	5	--	71
Manicaland	69	21	--	90
Masvingo	123	42	4	169
Midlands	80	27	--	107
Mat North	59	30	2	91
Mat South	83	53	6	142
Total	732	211	13	966
Total as %	76.6	22	1.4	

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November 2002

Several problems were encountered during field research. Compared to previous years, the present atmosphere for research on farms has become more difficult. Several teams of research assistants met with hostility and non-cooperation. The political volatility that has gripped the country since 2000 has also engulfed rural Zimbabwe. One unfortunate result of that is suspicion of outsiders, particularly towards researchers affiliated to NGOs. Typical of observations by research assistants were these in Mashonaland East:

access to farms was a problem especially on farms that were affected with war vets that have moved in ... We found that locals were not free to speak to us ... It was very sensitive to do interviews especially if war vets were around ... (field notes, 2002)

Similarly, in Mashonaland West, there was a problem of access to farms because the authorities appeared to view NGOs with suspicion (*ibid*). Researchers also recorded suspicion from the authorities in Manicaland and Midlands. There was less suspicion and hostility in Matabeleland and Masvingo. Even in the Mashonaland provinces, however, the suspicion was not universal. In most provinces, the reception and cooperation from farmers and farm workers was often good.

On the whole, however, the suspicion among some authorities and war veterans was short-lived once the purpose of the fieldwork had been explained. Only in a few instances did the research assistants have to change location. The atmosphere of intolerance, suspicion and fear in Zimbabwean politics has nevertheless left an unfortunate imprint on the research environment. It is earnestly hoped that this will be not be a permanent state of affairs.

This environment had a bearing on the overall study and accounts for its limitations. For instance, the reason why there were slightly fewer respondent households than originally planned was that some household members had resorted to itinerant activities for survival. In some households, members would be away from the farm performing piece-work jobs elsewhere or engaging in gold panning. In general, however, it was more difficult to get full details of original farm workers broken down by gender and type of contract from the new farmers. The latter would profess ignorance concerning the size of the original work force on the farm they had inherited. One way to obtain the information was to ask the clerk or foreman or a knowledgeable former farm worker.

Our estimate was that, at the time of our research, about 30-40 per cent of new farmers under the A2 model had taken up land allocated to them. Out of this group, about 10 per cent had absorbed some of the original workforce. The proportion was higher in the more intensively farmed districts and especially where horticulture was the main activity. Finally, there may have been an in-built bias in our findings because we tended to cover farms where some activity was still taking place, and where the farmer was still reachable for interview. At the end of 2002, this was no longer the case on most farms.

### **1.8 A demographic note on respondents**

Several notable features arise from the household data on farm workers. First, the gender distribution of the heads of the households surveyed is significant. Some 22 per cent — nearly a quarter — of the households are female-headed and given the concentration of women among seasonal workers, this implies that they and their households receive a lower and less regular income. Most job losses have been among seasonal workers. Similarly, the access of this group to housing and other services on the farms is much more precarious.

A new development is the phenomenon of child-headed households. They constitute 1.4 per cent (13) of the households surveyed. This shows the growing burden of HIV-AIDS on farm worker communities. While a farm orphan support programme exists under the auspices of FOST and extended family networks also look after orphaned children, these can no longer cope adequately. Hence the increasing number of child-headed households which, by their nature, are very vulnerable because they have neither a source of income nor food security. Their coping strategies require a special study in their own right.

**Table 1.5 Household members' marital status by gender**

	Male	Female	Total
Single	1012	831	1843
Married (monogamist)	537	560	1097
Married (polygamist)	20	27	47
Divorced/Separated	14	70	84
Widowed	14	73	87

**Source:** Field findings, October-November, 2002

**Table 1.6 Household members by sex and highest level of education**

	Male	Female	Total
No education	451	498	949
Grade 1-3 (Sub A-Std 1)	216	232	448
Grade 4-6 (Std 2-4)	242	296	538
Grade 7 (Std 6)	279	266	545
Form 1-2	163	130	293
Form 3-4	244	130	374
Form 5-6	5	3	8
Tertiary education	5	2	7

**Source:** Field interviews, November 2002

Another interesting aspect of the demographic data is the considerable number of single males and females on the farms surveyed (see Table 1.5). These people are mainly young and unemployed. They also constitute a vulnerable group (see as Chapter 4). The gender data on household members who are divorced, separated or widowed is revealing. Among the divorced or separated (84 people), over 80 per cent are women, and similarly among the widowed (87 people). It is difficult to explain this pattern of marital fluidity or instability; whether it has been accentuated by the land reform process or

prior changes in the sector, or some other factor, is not clear. But it is worthy of an extended investigation. The relatively high proportion of widows vis-à-vis widowers suggests the spreading effect of the HIV-AIDS pandemic, and that perhaps men tend to die from the virus earlier.

A significant proportion (about 30 per cent) of farm workers interviewed received no education at all, indicating low levels of literacy and education among farm workers (see Table 1.6). About half of the respondents had received varying amounts (mostly incomplete) of primary education. The circle of low education levels, low-income jobs and poverty is a defining characteristic of the trap in which farm workers find themselves.



## CHAPTER 2

### The Scope and Process of Fast-track Land Reform

#### 2.1 Introduction

The fast-track land reform or *jambanja*, which commenced in early 2000, went through several phases. The first phase ran between the onset of the 'land invasions' or occupations soon after the constitutional referendum in February and continued in the build-up to the June 2000 election. This appeared to be a phase in which there were no officially defined targets or clear direction for the 'invasions'. The elements of orchestration, coercion and violence were present in this first phase.

From July onwards, the government defined the parameters of the *jambanja* more clearly: It was to be implemented at an accelerated or 'fast-track' pace. The targets of the programme were specified, and the amount of land to be redistributed increased from 5 million hectares to 9 million, and then to 11 million. The number of beneficiaries was to rise to 160,000 (and later to about 300,000) under the A1 model, and a new set of indigenous commercial farmers numbering up to 51,000 would also benefit from the redistribution. This more expansive phase lasted between July 2000 and September 2001, when the Abuja Agreement was brokered between Zimbabwe and the UK with the assistance of key Commonwealth states.

The final phase of *jambanja* was from the last quarter of 2001 to August 2002, when it officially came to a close although land acquisition continued into early 2003.

This chapter of the report attempts to review developments in each phase, paying particular attention to their impact on farm workers and on the wider economy. However, we begin with antecedents to the 'land invasions'.

#### 2.2 Spontaneous land occupations

Before *jambanja*, spontaneous land occupations had been one method through which land-hungry peasants settled on new land. There were a number of such occupations soon after independence in 1980. Most of the land so occupied was eventually acquired by government and transferred to the *de facto* occupiers (Marongwe, 2000; Moyo, 2001). This route to land reform was taken in such provinces as Manicaland and Mashonaland Central, where a number of commercial farms had been abandoned by their owners during the liberation war. However, the government's land reform (the Phase 1 Programme) in the 1980s later defused and pre-empted such occupations to a large extent.

**Table 2.1 Land acquisition 1980-2002**

	<b>Total acquired</b>	<b>Average ha per year</b>
1980-85	2,147,855	429,571
1986-1990	447,791	74,632
1992-97	789,645	157,929
2000-02	11,000,000 <sup>a</sup>	3,660,000 <sup>a</sup>
Total	14,385,291	

<sup>a</sup>Approximation

**Source:** Zimbabwe government 1998; various press reports, 2002

Nevertheless, there was a resurgence of such occupations, mainly by land-hungry peasants, in the 1990s. This was partly due to the slow-down in land reform (see Chapter 1), and partly to the intensified pressure on land in communal areas. One instance of peasants occupying commercial farmland was in the Svosve area near Marondera in Mashonaland East in 1998. After persuasion from senior politicians in the ZANU-PF party, they returned to their original homes to await the resettlement that was promised to them. Earlier attempts at land occupation had also been made in the Chihwiti and Gambuli areas in the Makonde district of Mashonaland West. It was reported:

... in 1992, a group of families from Hurungwe communal under the leadership of a spirit medium called Nyamuswa settled on the Zumba state land. They were joined by retrenchees and pensioners from the commercial farms and from the mining sector. In 1995, Government declared these people illegal settlers and a total of 476 families had their shacks torched and they were moved to Chinhoyi bus terminus. However, during the same year, the spirit medium was persuaded by his followers to return to Chihwiti . In 2000, another attempt to remove these settlers was abandoned after the intervention of the local member of parliament ... (FCTZ, 2001)

Pressure on the land clearly intensified in most communal areas in the 1990s. Even state land was not immune from occupations, as the Chihwiti case illustrates. By the late 1990s, the social and political pressure for land reform could not be ignored for much longer. This gave impetus to the International Donors' Conference on Land, organised by the government in September 1998. The conference reached an agreement on the principles of effective land reform, and on the beginning of a two-year funded Inception Phase. The government prepared an Inception-Phase Framework Plan for 24 months

covering 1 million hectares. However, donors were not keen to finance the Inception Phase (UNDP, 2002). There was a lingering scepticism that the government could be trusted to implement a transparent land reform programme. Only the World Bank released some funding — some US\$5 million for a pilot project.

With little prospect of large-scale donor-backed financing for land reform, and with the UK government viewed as dragging its feet, the Zimbabwean government had few options for how to proceed (Adams, 2003). Relations between the Zimbabwean government and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were strained, and the two institutions suspended disbursement of funds to Zimbabwe in 1999. Meanwhile, the political opposition received a boost with the founding of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. To an increasingly beleaguered Mugabe government, the rejection of a new draft constitution in a referendum in February 2000 appeared to be the last straw. The prospects for the ZANU-PF government in the June 2000 election looked poor in the light of the referendum defeat. This is the wider context in which the first phase of *jambanja* should be assessed.

### **2.3 The opening phase of ‘land invasions’**

There is general consensus that the land invasions were organised soon after the February 2002 referendum result became known. It would appear that the immediate catalyst was this political setback to the government. Initially, the land invasions were unleashed by groups of war veterans, later accompanied by ZANU-PF youth and certain state agencies. (The war veterans had fought in the country’s liberation struggle in the 1960s and 1970s). The terms ‘land invasions’ or ‘land occupations’ originated during this period and began to be widely used, especially in the media. For a while, politicians used the term ‘land demonstrations’ but somehow it did not catch on. The role of war veterans in the invasions was pivotal. One state-controlled newspaper recalled, with some colourful embroidery, how it all started:

three days after the ‘no vote’ in the February 2000 referendum, seven veterans bumped into each other in Mucheke suburb in Masvingo. Like many land-hungry Zimbabweans, the war veterans had hoped that a new constitution would finally satisfy their unquenchable thirst for land ... As they discussed the results, one thing became apparent, that the ‘no’ vote had dealt a severe blow to the economic empowerment of blacks through a constitutionally provided equitable land redistribution programme. It was also clear that about 4,000 white farmers who clung jealously to Zimbabwe’s prime farming land had bankrolled the no vote campaign with assistance from their kith and kin locally and abroad ... For the first time, white commercial farmers supped, dined and drank with their labourers in open air parties held to celebrate the victory of the ‘no vote’ ... In the quiet of the night of February 16, 2000, the seven war veterans moved to occupy Yothum farm in Masvingo East

commercial farming area. The occupation effectively gave birth to the fast-track resettlement programme — the Third Chimurenga — which ushered a vibrant agrarian revolution for Zimbabwe ... (the *Herald*, 8 August 2002)

From the state media perspective, this was indeed a defining moment in the opening phase of land invasions in February 2000. There was perhaps an element of spontaneity during the first few weeks of the *jambanja*. This would change as months went by and it became increasingly obvious that they were orchestrated by the ruling party. Some analysts have stated that the *jambanja* began to be orchestrated from as early as two weeks after the referendum. For instance, one account observed that:

in a carefully coordinated campaign starting on 26 February 2000, gangs armed with axes and pangas invaded white-owned farms across the country. Government and army trucks were used to transport them to the farms and to keep them supplied with rations once there. They were war veterans, but some of the participants were too young to have participated in the war 20 years earlier. Their immediate task was to peg out plots of land. But the wider purpose of their deployment was crush support for the opposition in rural areas in the run-up to the 2000 election. (Meredith, 2002)

While this account seems to understate any initial spontaneity in the invasions, the official orchestration seems to have followed the initial invasions. The political objective of the invasions loomed large as the election campaign for the June parliamentary elections began in earnest in March 2000. By and large, the invasions served a double purpose (Chan, 2003). The first was to seize the land and thus 'punish' the white farmers for their political stance, and the second was to close off the commercial farming areas to campaigning by opposition parties. The overall objective of the invasions during this phase was to prevent a repetition of the referendum defeat. Hence the emphasis on wartime methods of political mobilisation such as all-night meetings known as *pungwes*, and considerable use of coercion and violence against both farm workers and farmers. The first killings of farm workers and farmers believed to be MDC members occurred during this first phase. Among the farmers killed were Martin Olds in the Nyamandlovu area near Bulawayo and David Stevens in the Macheke area. A number of farm workers died in politically-motivated violence in the provinces of Mashonaland East, Central and West during this period. By election time in June 2000, about 30 people (mostly opposition supporters) had been killed.

By the first week of March 2000, about 400 farms had been occupied under *jambanja*. Some of the 'invaders' disrupted production, while others were more aggressive, threatening violence, slaughtering cattle, demanding transport, and breaking into farmhouses (Meredith, 2002). By June 2000, nearly 1,500 farms had been 'invaded' with the three Mashonaland provinces witnessing a relatively higher level of coercion and violence in the process. It was no coincidence that these were the most intensely farmed provinces, and that there was some initial resistance by farmers and farm workers. In

general, the war veterans under their mercurial leader Chenjerai Hunzvi (who himself had not directly participated in the liberation war) maintained a high profile throughout this phase. But the land invasions were clearly not limited to the veterans and party youth. Local communities such as those in Svosve, which had attempted land occupation in 1998, took advantage of the new opening and momentum, and also participated. To that extent, *jambanja* was carried out in a mixture of spontaneous grassroots initiatives and top-down orchestrated coercion and violence. But the overall image that the land invasions gave was one of a degeneration into lawlessness, intimidation and violence. Hence the numerous calls from the judiciary, commercial farmers, human rights groups and the international community to restore the 'rule of law'. Not surprisingly, land reform itself was a central issue in the 2000 election. The promise of land was meant to be a vote-catcher with the rural electorate, but their response varied. For instance, subsequent voting patterns indicate that peasant and farm worker voters were sceptical towards the promise in such provinces as Matabeleland North and South, Manicaland and Midlands.

During this opening phase of *jambanja*, the disruption of farm production was less extensive than in later phases. But 804 farms were singled out for acquisition by government. The displacement of farm workers at this stage was also limited, with fewer than 30,000 affected (Kibble and Vanlerberghe, 2000). However, tension grew between the CFU and the government over the designation of the farms. A rift also opened between the government and the judiciary over the land invasions and the manner in which the property rights of commercial farmers were handled. Matters came to a head over these issues during the next phase, from July 2000 to the Abuja Agreement.

## **2.4 The launch of the fast-track programme**

Following its return to power with a narrow majority in directly-elected seats in June 2000, the government launched the fast-track programme as a strategy to consolidate the gains made through the land invasions. Another agenda was to implement and complete the programme with an eye on the 2002 presidential election. This was made explicit by President Mugabe:

the revolution is yet to be concluded. The next elected parliament should ensure that it concludes the last phase of our revolution . None of us revolutionaries who won the war of independence will want their careers to end without the repossession of our land. The revolution had been fought on the basis that the land will come with political power ... (Mugabe as quoted in Meredith, 2002)

The period between July 2000 and the end of 2001 would witness a concerted implementation of what was termed 'an agrarian revolution' or 'the Third Chimurenga'.

One vehicle of implementation for this phase was termed 'Operation Tsuru'. It began in 2000 and had three main facets. First was 'command and control',

which was undertaken by a coordinated group from the police, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the war veterans through the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), and for a brief period, the Ministry of Information (Chitiyo, 2002; Rutherford, 2001; Moyo, 2001). This group met for regular briefings to discuss the direction of *jambanja*. Second, 'operational zones' were established to identify loyal and 'opposition' zones and communities, with the ultimate aim of converting rural areas into politically 'liberated' pro-ZANU-PF zones. The loyal zones were rewarded, and the opposition zones punished. Third, the 'ground troops' were the land-hungry peasants (armed with farming implements such as picks and axes) led by war veterans with the state acting as armourer (*ibid*).

Operation Tsuru deployed both stick and carrot; land reform was the carrot for peasants and other assorted beneficiaries. Whenever the police said that land invasions were a political issue, there was some suspicion that they were actually unable to enforce law and order. It was indeed a highly politicised issue, but it also opened up conflict between the executive and the judiciary. Throughout 2000 and 2001, that tension festered against the background of more land invasions.

During this phase the land issue was fought out through litigation by farmers in the courts as well as 'low-intensity' local struggles on the commercial farms themselves. Portions of farms were occupied and production often disrupted, while in some instances there was an uneasy co-existence between the new settlers and the commercial farm owner. However, not all provinces and districts experienced *jambanja* in similar ways. The occupation of farms was relatively peaceful in Midlands, Manicaland and Matabeleland South. In Midlands, relatively fewer farms were 'invaded', and there was even talk of a 'Midlands Model' of negotiated settlement, characterised by the direct involvement of high-ranking officials from central and provincial government. The model was said to be a comparatively successful conflict resolution process at provincial level.

However, many farmers brought cases before the courts to challenge government designation of their farms. Both the High and Supreme Courts in 2000 and early 2001 handed down a number of judgements which the government perceived as favourable to the farmers. The CFU had challenged the legality of the entire resettlement programme, arguing that the laws under which the government was acting were unconstitutional. It also contended that the programme was being carried out unlawfully, and that because of the failure of the police to comply with the courts' orders to remove 'invaders', it was beset by lawlessness (Meredith, 2002). For its part, the Supreme Court declared that the fast-track programme was illegal, and that commercial farmers had not been given enough time to appeal against confiscation orders. The court then ordered the police to remove all war veterans, squatters and any others unlawfully occupying farms (*ibid*). In retrospect, the judgements of the courts now appear to have been largely academic. None of the other key state institutions was keen to enforce their orders. Nor did they agree with courts' assessment of the land question.

This was the broad context in which the rift between the executive and the judiciary widened. The President and the Attorney-General made strong verbal attacks on the judiciary. The Chief Justice, Justice Gubbay, was forced to take early retirement in the first half of 2001. A number of other judges retired or left the country as judicial independence came under sustained attack. But there were differences among the judiciary itself over the land issue. One of the leading judges argued:

it is no longer possible to give judgements on certain issues that are acceptable to both sides of the divide. In some instances, judgements of the judiciary (on land issues) that are highly praised by one side are gravely criticized by the other side of the divide ... (Judge Chidyausiku as quoted in the *Herald*, 9 January 2001)

Thus opinion was clearly polarised over how to address land invasions, and this reflected the division of opinion in the wider society. President Mugabe exploited this polarisation to make new appointments to the judiciary in a bid to ensure judgements more sympathetic to the government position.

There were other significant shifts on the land question during this phase. One of them was a conciliatory move by the CFU that was not reciprocated. Following its offer of 200 farms to the government in June 2000, the CFU increased the number in March 2001 to 561 farms covering 1 million hectares. The latter offer was known as the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI). The key features of ZJRI included the 1 million hectares of uncontested land, settlement of mainly small-scale commercial farmers, one hectare of free tillage for each of the families, a Z\$60 million grant for agricultural inputs and the establishment of a Z\$1.375 billion revolving fund. However, the political temperature in 2001 had risen to such a degree that the government no longer appeared to have any interest in compromise deals with commercial farmers. Instead, new laws sought to speed up land acquisition. The main new pieces of legislation introduced the Section 5 notice passed in June 2001, and later the Section 8 notice. (Section 5 contained a preliminary government notice of intended compulsory acquisition of a particular farm, while under Section 8 the title to land passes to the acquiring authority). This resulted in the acquisition of 6,481 farms covering 9.2 million hectares by November 2001. In addition, Statutory Instrument No. 338 passed in November 2001 forbade the ownership of rural land exceeding the following maximum sizes under models A1 and A2:

250 hectares in natural region 1  
400 hectares in natural region 2  
500 hectares in natural region 3  
1,500 hectares in natural region 4  
2,500 hectares in natural region 5.

The regulation further required owners whose farms exceeded these maximum sizes to subdivide them by February 2002, failing which the minister would do so at the owner's cost. The sale of farmland above the relevant maximum size was prohibited (cited in UNDP, 2002).

Two developments towards the end of 2001 marked the culmination of the fast-track programme. The first was the Abuja Agreement brokered by the Commonwealth in September 2001, and the other was a Supreme Court judgement in November 2001. The Abuja Agreement sought a peaceful end to the land invasions, and promised British assistance for land reform. For its part, the Zimbabwe government promised a return to the 'rule of law'. Unfortunately, the agreement was ignored right from the beginning. Perhaps it was unrealistic to expect it to stick given the heated presidential campaign that started in the last quarter of 2001 and climaxed in the March 2002 election. The restructured Supreme Court ruled in December 2002 that government acquisition of land was lawful and that the rule of law prevailed in commercial farming areas (*Herald*, 4 December 2001). The judgement gave the legitimacy of the law to *jambanja*, a legitimacy that had eluded the executive since the process started in early 2000.

What was the impact of these legal and political developments on farm workers during this second phase of the fast-track programme? First, the continued presence of the 'settlers', now protected by the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction Act), often created tensions on farms and disrupted production. There were conflicts between the new settlers and farm workers. The latter saw their jobs threatened by uncertainty and frequent disruption of work. It was not clear how many jobs were lost as a direct result of the land invasions. Certainly the figure had climbed from about 30,000 in 2000 to an estimated 70,000 in 2001.

Second, there was a relationship between the increased number of 'occupied' farms and the growing number of farm workers either laid off or displaced. The number of casual and seasonal workers who lost jobs was considerable because most listed farms scaled down their production. During this phase there was a flow of farm workers into informal settlements such as Maratos in the Concession area of Mashonaland Central, and Chihwiti and Gambuli in Mashonaland West, among others. Between the onset of the invasions in early 2000 and November 2001, the number of households in Maratos increased from 196 to 482, with farm workers constituting about 40 per cent of the entrants into the settlement (FCTZ, 2002a). At Chihwiti, about 66 per cent of the settlers were former farm workers (FCTZ, 2001). It would appear that the 'occupations' triggered a movement of some farm workers who had lost jobs and livelihoods, and those who had been coerced by the 'invaders' into moving off the farms.

Third, the situation remained fluid during much of 2001 as long as commercial farmers retained a physical presence on the farms. At best, the co-existence between the farmers and the settlers was uneasy. At worst, it broke out into open conflict, including violence. A number of farm workers and commercial farmers were killed, but also a few of the new settlers. Two of the more volatile areas for property destruction, intimidation and violence were the Makonde district in Mashonaland West and Hwedza in Mashonaland East.



**Table 2.2: Summary of area and families resettled under A1 model, 2001**

Province	No.of farms	Area (ha)	Total families settled
Mat North	383	1,147,452	13,270
Mat South	470	1,163,037	14,757
Mash Central	414	1,512,317	17,441
Mash East	434	446,963	21,572
Mash West	582	688 072	27 013
Manicaland	234	186,650	10,903
Midlands	283	565,197	17,512
Masvingo	274	1,093,194	37,872
Total	3074	7 269 936	160,340

**Source:** Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlement data as adapted in UNDP, 2002.

As a consequence of the fast-track programme, agricultural output declined substantially during 2001-2002. Even if a drought had not occurred, a decline would have been inevitable. Following a 21 per cent drop in output in 2001, it was predicted that output might drop by 40 per cent in the 2002-2003 season (Wright, 2002). For instance, tobacco production dropped from 236 million kg in 2000 to 165 million kg in 2002, and there are fears that it may slump to 75 million kg in 2003. When 65 per cent of 700 wheat farmers were served with eviction notices in January, this implied that wheat production in 2002 would be cut by up to half, to 115,000 tonnes (*Financial Gazette*, 31 January 2002). Maize and livestock production also declined sharply. One study concluded that agricultural exports had declined owing to disruptions associated with the fast-track programme (UNDP, 2002). The ripple effects have been felt widely in the economy with further contraction predicted for 2003.

In the last phase of the fast-track programme, the major development was the take-up of farms designated for A2 model settlement. This was a slower process but also more contentious. The speed of the implementation of this model, which originally aimed to settle 51,000 indigenous commercial farmers, depended on several factors. The first related to the availability of farm land; this explained the urgency attached to the evictions of commercial farmers still resident on their properties in mid-2002. Second, there was, paradoxically, a

slower up-take of the farmland. This was partly due to the large investment necessary to start production. Far fewer than the anticipated number of indigenous farmers had settled on the farms by the cut-off date of the end of August 2002. The Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Joseph Made, was obliged to issue a warning that prospective farmers must confirm their willingness to undertake agricultural activities by 23 August 2002 or risk having the offer of land withdrawn (*Herald*, 6 August 2002). At the time of writing (March 2003), it was still not clear how many farmers had been settled under the A2 model; however, one estimate was that about 30,000 or 60 per cent of the original target, had been settled on about 2 million hectares (Agri Sa, 2003; Adams, 2003). Access to credit finance remained a major constraint for most A2 model farmers. Attempts to create state-financed credit through an agri-bond issue in the last quarter were somewhat belated and under-subscribed.

However, throughout 2002 there was nevertheless a competitive scramble for commercial farms by members of the ruling elite. This was widely reported in the national and international press. To those who subscribed to the 'agrarian revolution', this was the last chance to share in the spoils, now that up to 300,000 people had been resettled, and yet surplus land remained. The timing of the scramble for land by the elite was almost impeccable. It followed an acceptance, however grudging, that thousands of families had been settled by the first quarter of 2002. However, because most of this land was in the prime agro-ecological areas and had good infrastructure, competition for it was intense (*Sunday Mail*, 9 March 2003; *Sunday Times*, 2 March 2003). Some prime farming areas which witnessed disputes of ownership included Mazowe, Goromonzi, Chinhoyi, Shamva, Marondera and Beatrice. It is no coincidence that these areas are situated in the three Mashonaland provinces. The scramble for A2 land was less intense in Manicaland and the Matabeleland provinces, and there have been few reports of such competition in Masvingo and Midlands.

There was apprehension that a new black land-owning elite was emerging. This was a sentiment raised at ZANU-PF's national congress held in Chinhoyi in December 2002. Ironically, it was the war veterans who were most vocal about land appropriations by the elite. Some governors were alleged to have acquired several farms each. 'Good' political connections were alleged to have been a factor behind land acquisition by a prominent television news correspondent and a sports promoter. In both cases, disputes over ownership had already erupted with war veterans living adjacent to the farms (*Daily News*, 14 December 2002). If most of the new landowners turn out to be largely 'telephone farmers', agricultural production would suffer. As 2002 drew to a close, and as no more than 600 to 800 white farmers remained on the land, hard questions were beginning to be asked about the method and pace of the fast-track programme. The Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement could not estimate how much grain had been planted for the season and admitted that this was 'a big problem for us as a government' (*Standard*, 1 December 19, 2002). In early 2003 there were tentative but somewhat feeble attempts to woo back white farmers through inconclusive discussions with the CFU.

## CHAPTER 3

### The Impact of Land Reform on Farm Workers' Livelihoods

#### 3.1 Introduction

What was the impact of land reform on farm workers' livelihoods by the end of 2002? What had happened to their access to jobs and regular incomes? What were the patterns of access to land, housing, water and basic social services such as health care? Drawing on field material gathered in October and November 2002 from eight provinces, this chapter addresses these issues. This material was gathered two months after the fast-track programme was said to be officially complete. The material was obtained on the threshold of the summer season, when most agricultural activity begins. The fortunes of farm workers were, predictably, tied to those of their employers, about 90 per cent of whom had left their farms properties because these had been compulsorily acquired under Sections 5 and 8 by the government (see Chapter 2). More than 50 per cent of farm workers had lost their jobs as a result. This chapter marshals the evidence on the ground to build a fuller picture on the state of commercial farms and farm workers at the end of *jambanja*.

#### 3.2 Production conditions and employment on farms

The main picture that emerges from field material is that by November 2002 most commercial farms had been transferred to new settlers and farmers under models A1 and A2 respectively. Between 80 and 90 per cent of the farms surveyed had experienced either a halt or a drastic decline in production (field interviews, October-November 2002). For instance, in Mashonaland West, of the 30 farms surveyed, 90 per cent had been acquired by government and 60 per cent of them had stopped production activities completely. The remainder had significantly reduced their operations. In parts of Manicaland, it was observed that only 10 per cent of farms were in full production; the remaining 90 per cent had scaled down production substantially. A similar pattern emerged in Mashonaland East. Out of 24 farms covered in that province, 10 per cent were operating fully, 20 per cent had scaled down operations and 70 per cent had halted production altogether. In the 30 farms studied in Matabeleland North and South, 80 per cent had been turned over to resettlement, and production on the remaining farms had fallen by 70 per cent. Similarly in Midlands, of the 15 farms surveyed, 12 had been affected by *jambanja*, leading to a halt or significant scaling back in production. However, larger estates and plantations, those specialising in sugar, tea and timber production in particular, were spared from acquisition. This was the case with tea estates in Manicaland, the three sugar plantations in the Chiredzi area of Masvingo province, and the citrus estates in the Mazowe area of Mashonaland Central. The smaller, white-owned, cane-producing farms in the Chiredzi area were, however, acquired.

This provincial pattern of a cessation or significant drop in production complements the national trend referred to in Chapter 2. Production on commercial farms in the 2002-03 season will reach much lower levels than it did in the 2000-01 and 2001-02 seasons. It is unlikely that the new settlers will make up for the lost production. While in the 2001-02 season most commercial farmers, although they scaled down production considerably, remained resident on their properties, during the 2002-03 season the majority left. This has far-reaching implications for employment levels on the farms.

The survey reveals a consistent pattern of significant job losses as farms scaled back or closed down operations. In the second quarter of 2002 — before the exodus of most commercial farmers under Section 8 — a survey of 235 farms established that more than 40 per cent of farm workers in Mashonaland East had lost their jobs, 46 per cent in Mashonaland Central and 33 per cent in Mashonaland West (FCTZ, 2002b). But job losses among seasonal workers were far higher. About 50 per cent of them had lost their jobs in the three Mashonaland provinces. Data from October-November 2002 suggests that job losses continued and increased. In line with the big decline in production on commercial farms, it was estimated that in Midlands Province, farm employment levels had dropped by 70 per cent. Similarly, 90 per cent of farm workers in Mashonaland West had lost their permanent status. Most become short-term contract workers (field interviews, October 2002). In the two Matabeleland provinces, data suggested that the farm workforce had been reduced by up to 65 per cent. An estimated 80 per cent of workers interviewed in Mashonaland East had no permanent employment. In Masvingo province there had also been large lay-offs but most workers had not received severance packages (*ibid*).

**Table 3.1 Pattern of farm workers' job losses, 2002**

Province	Estimated number of workers affected
Mashonaland West	18,300
Mashonaland East	11,260
Mashonaland Central	15,000
Manicaland	2,260
Total	46,820

**Source:** FCTZ, 2002c

The overall picture is thus one of massive job losses which would appear to reach more than the 50 per cent originally estimated. Further lay-offs ensued with the exodus of 90 per cent of commercial farmers in the last quarter of 2002. Although no precise estimates are possible of the number of farm workers who lost their jobs between 2000 and 2002, the commercial farmers themselves estimated them at over 200,000 (CFU, 2003). It would require a

much more extensive study than the present one to reach a more precise estimate.

The loss of permanent worker status on the farms is quite widespread. In its place, there is a pronounced trend towards contract work arrangements. This reflects the fluid situation on those commercial farms that are still operational. It also relates to the weaker capacity of new farmers under the A2 model to employ permanent labour. The new farmers have fewer financial resources and lower production capacity and so cannot absorb most of the former permanent workers. It would appear that the latter are often engaged as contract workers for shorter periods. The changes brought about by land reform, including the subdivision of farms, reduced the incentive to employ permanent labour on both the new farms, and the few remaining white-owned commercial farms. A nationwide government survey of farm workers in 2001 established that about 35 per cent of them were either contract or seasonal workers (Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, 2001). Some 20 per cent were contract workers, and 15 per cent seasonal. These proportions appear to have increased significantly since those findings were published in September 2001. Contract or seasonal labour is now one of the main sources of livelihoods for workers still on the farms. Land reform has thus brought about a shift in the organisation of work, mainly towards more flexible hiring and firing, and more insecure types of employment.

Significantly, despite the large lay-offs, a considerable proportion of farm workers remain on the farms. In the Mashonaland provinces surveyed in the second quarter of 2002, between 33 and 50 per cent of farm workers had stayed on despite losing their jobs (FCTZ, 2002b). It was observed:

in Mashonaland West, where most farms have been taken under model A2, farm workers were still on the farms. Some were on reduced working hours which translated into a cut in remuneration. On farms that had completely stopped operations, the majority of farm workers were staying on the farm in apparent hopelessness, as they were not clear as to where to go. (*ibid*)

There was a similar pattern in Mashonaland East. In Manicaland and the Matabeleland provinces, most farm workers also continued to stay on the farms. This involved some understanding between them and the former owner but also with the new owners who have an interest in the pool of labour that the workers provide. In some instances, the continued stay of farm workers has resulted in conflict with new settlers who sought to take over both the land and the housing on the farm.

### **3.3 Gender and employment patterns after reform**

Data from farm worker households show a steady decline in employment and access to housing and services on the farms. The overall decline amounts to 34 per cent among permanent male workers, and a much higher drop of 45 per cent among seasonal male workers (field interviews, October-November

2002) . This may be compared with a study carried out in the first quarter of 2002, which showed a decline in permanent workers of 25 per cent in Manicaland, 32 per cent in Mashonaland East, 40 per cent in Mashonaland West and 79 per cent in Mashonaland Central. There has been a pronounced trend towards bigger job losses among seasonal workers who, by virtue of their status, have less secure sources and opportunities of income. However, if the household data is broken down by gender, it becomes clear that job losses have been greater among both permanent and seasonal female workers. Some 51 per cent and 55 per cent of permanent and seasonal female workers respectively have lost their jobs. This may be compared with 30 per cent and 33 per cent respectively for permanent and seasonal male workers.

Land reform has therefore had a differential impact on male and female workers, with female workers much worse affected. Some female seasonal workers belong to households headed by male workers; others do not. It would appear that male workers have somehow held on to the few remaining jobs on the farms at the expense of female workers. The impact of job losses on women has been profound, especially because a large proportion of them are single or single parents, widowed or separated (see Chapter 1).

A similar picture emerges from household data on the numbers and proportion of workers living on farms. There has been a drop of nearly 40 per cent in the proportion of permanent workers living on the farms, and 31 per cent in the proportion of seasonal workers who do so. The smaller decline among seasonal workers is addressed in Chapter 5, which considers the changing forms of employment and social relations. When the household data are broken down by gender, they show that a much higher proportion of female workers, both permanent and seasonal, have left the farms. There has been a decline of 63 per cent and 42 per cent respectively in numbers of permanent and seasonal women workers living on farms. This reflects the higher job losses among them. The limited scope of this study did not allow investigation of where those farm workers have gone and how they currently survive. But this remains an important topic for further research.

### **3.4 Incomes, allowances and severance packages**

The loss of permanent and seasonal jobs arising from the decline in commercial farming meant that farm workers no longer received regular incomes. This is perhaps the largest single factor affecting their present capacity to sustain their livelihoods. Not that the incomes were very substantial in the first place. Farm workers have historically received some of the lowest wages in the economy (see Chapter 2). Together with domestic service workers and those in the sprawling informal sector, they form the lowest tier of income earners. Nevertheless, the incomes made all the difference between starvation and survival, between extreme poverty and access to the basic things of life. According to the authoritative Poverty Assessment Study Survey (PASS) of the mid-1990s, the incomes that farm workers received enabled them to escape becoming the 'poorest of the poor'

(PASS, 1997). In the 1990s, the farm workers made considerable strides in organising for higher wages (Kanyenze, 2001; Tandon, 2001). The role of the GAPWUZ labour union was central in this process, but so too was that of the National Employment Council (NEC) for Agriculture in negotiating collective bargaining agreements. A series of unprecedented nation-wide strikes in 1997 highlighted the grievances of farm workers over their wages and working conditions. Shaken by the newly found militancy among the workers, commercial farmers awarded them a 40 per cent wage increase (Sachikonye, 1998). Nevertheless, against the background of spiralling inflation, between 2000 and 2002 in particular, the real wages of farm workers have shrunk in real terms.

In our field findings, it appeared that most farm workers earned the minimum wage of Z\$4,300 a month and some earned much more. The wages were based on grades determined by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in the commercial agriculture sector. In Manicaland and Mashonaland East, the average wages tended to be much higher than the minimum. For instance, at one farm in Manicaland, seasonal workers received Z\$7,800, permanent workers Z\$8,500, and drivers and clerks Z\$15,000 a month (interviews, November 2002). At another farm, general labourers earned Z\$7,100 while drivers and foremen received \$9,500. In other provinces, such as Masvingo and Matabeleland North and South, wages for general farm hands ranged between Z\$3,000 and Z\$7,000 a month. This indicates that a considerable number of commercial farmers could pay much more than the stipulated minimum of Z\$4,300 (in 2002), while a few paid less than the minimum. The wide range of pay on different farms is reflected in the mean monthly pay of Z\$6,510 for the workers in our survey sample. Contract or seasonal workers tend to earn a lower wage while permanent workers earn at the higher end of the scale.

The level of these incomes will change, and most probably fall, as a result of the drastic scaling down of production by commercial farmers. The repercussions of the contraction and disappearance of farm workers' incomes will be widely felt throughout the economy. One estimate was that the annual wage bill paid to farm workers was about Z\$15 billion a year, and that the exodus of farmers would probably lead to a loss of Z\$13 billion in wages (*Financial Gazette*, 17 October 2002). Even if this is too pessimistic a projection, wage losses of between Z\$9 and 10 billion would have a significant impact on national income and individual earnings. About 27 per cent of the workers in the sample received allowances (interviews, October-November 2002), which mainly consisted of Z\$400 for paraffin. But most workers did not receive allowances.

In recognition of the inevitable displacement of farm workers under *jambanja*, a new statutory instrument was introduced in 2002 to ensure that they received severance packages. Statutory Instrument 6 of 2002 enjoined farmers whose properties had been compulsorily acquired to pay their workers:

- severance pay equivalent to the full wages of the employee for a period of three months before termination of employment

- wages in lieu of notice under the contract of employment or the Agricultural Industry Agreement
- an amount equivalent to twice the employee's current monthly pay for each completed year of continuous service with the employer
- Z\$5,000 for relocation of the employee
- the gratuity on termination of employment payable under Section 23 of the Agriculture Industry Agreement
- the cash equivalent of any vacation leave accumulated by the employee in the year in which the termination occurred.

An Agricultural Employees' Compensation Committee was set up to ensure all farm workers received their terminal benefits and entitlement. The committee consisted of one representative each from the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, GAPWUZ, and the NEC for Agriculture under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare.

The severance package was not small, considering the average monthly earnings of workers. It was based on the assumption that despite the drop in production, farmers had the means to pay out the packages to their workers. Farmers were required to pay whether or not they had received compensation from government for their properties. One critic sympathetic to the farmers argued that the government's acquisition of farms was equivalent to company take-over, where the new owners automatically inherit the liabilities of the business (*The Farmer*, 5 February 2002). According to this argument:

farming is a business like any other, and if government is taking over the farms, it automatically becomes legally responsible for the workers ... In terms of the new regulations, farmers would find themselves using virtually all the money they receive as compensation to pay off their workers when it was not their decision to stop farming in the first place .... (*ibid*)

Despite this criticism of Statutory Instrument 6, some farmers were able to pay the severance packages. The packages varied widely in size. Our field findings show them ranging between Z\$18,000 and Z\$50,000 on one farm in Mashonaland Central to Z\$100,000 at another in the same province. It was more difficult to obtain the level of severance packages in the different provinces. The rate of payments varies widely. At one farm in Mashonaland Central 60 per cent of workers, and at one in Masvingo 70 per cent, were not paid severance packages (interviews, October 2002). In the total sample, about 23 per cent of workers had received severance packages. This would be an improvement over the proportion (4 per cent, or 221 workers) of workers who had received them by mid-2001, according to a government survey (Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, 2001). This means that the majority of farm workers have not received severance packages. The main explanation could be that farmers intend to pay the workers when they receive compensation. Because the compensation process is very cumbersome, workers at the receiving end will wait for a long time before they receive their packages, if any.



**Table 3.2 Severance packages for farm workers**

	<b>Number</b>	<b>Per cent</b>
Farm workers who have received a severance package	233	22.8%
Farm workers who have not received a severance package	728	74.5%

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November 2002

The implication of receiving a severance package is that workers lose their permanent status thereafter if they continue working on the same farm. The long-term effect of Statutory Instrument 6 will be to deter the hiring of permanent labour. In most instances, the new farmers are employing few permanent workers. In sum, the agricultural work force has become much less stable and secure than before land reform.

### **3.5 Access to basic social services**

One of the major consequences of land reform is farm workers' diminishing access to certain resources and services. This is the result of change in ownership of a farm or new rules about housing made by the new settlers. While the quality of housing varied from farm to farm, workers were, at least, guaranteed accommodation as long as they worked on a particular farm (Sachikonye and Zishiri, 1999; Magaramombe, 2001). With the take-over of the farms, access to housing has become insecure. In some cases the new farmers or settlers have evicted farm workers from the compound houses (interviews, October 2002). Attempts by workers to keep their homes sometimes ignited disputes with the settlers, especially the war veterans. In one incident in January 2001, 30 farm workers were evicted by war veterans from their houses at a farm in Mashonaland Central (*Daily News*, 3 January 2002). It was reported that the veterans then allocated themselves the workers' houses and replaced the padlocks on the doors with their own. Although on some farms there has been peaceful co-existence between the workers and the new owners or settlers, where workers were evicted, the repercussions were immediate. Because most workers lived with their families, the total number affected by the evictions was considerable. It is estimated that up to 900,000 men, women and children may have been affected by the evictions by mid-2002 (*Standard*, 15 December 2002). During 2001 and 2002, the press carried reports of workers who had been evicted from farms in such areas as Hwedza, Mazowe, Chinhoyi and Esigodini. Some of the workers trekked to informal settlements, such as those in Macheke, Concession, Chihwiti and Gambuli (FCTZ, 2002b). The population in these settlements swelled during the remainder of 2002. There were reports of several more such settlements sprouting near Rusape in Manicaland, near Mhangura in Mashonaland West, Nyamandlovu in Matabeleland North, and a

more temporary settlement near Esigodini in Matabeleland South (interviews, October 2002).

Where workers still have access to housing on farms, the conditions vary. While most houses are built of brick and cement with asbestos roofing, some are made from timber logs — ‘poles’ — and earth material known as *dagga*. In our sample, the proportion of farms with such pole-and-*dagga* dwellings ranged between 15 per cent in Mashonaland East to 28 per cent in Masvingo and the Matabeleland provinces. Although housing was still far from ideal for most workers, it appears that gradual improvements had been made during the 1990s and up to the eve of the fast-track programme. However, it is not clear who is responsible for maintaining this housing stock on the farms, or how long unemployed farm owners will continue to have access to it.

Another important infrastructure on farms is the water supply. Most farms covered by this study had protected water supplies in the form of tap and borehole water. In Mashonaland East, Manicaland and Matabeleland provinces, most farms had protected water supplies. Only Masvingo appeared to have a problem: a third of the farms did not have protected water supplies (interviews, October 2002). In several instances, there were problems with maintenance of boreholes. The challenge to the new farmers and settlers will be to maintain the pumps, boreholes and other water infrastructure. Reports in December 2002 suggested that conditions on the farms were deteriorating. It was reported that some farms no longer had supplies of fresh water because most pipes had been vandalised, forcing residents to drink untreated water from dams and rivers (*Standard*, 15 December 2002). Some settlers were reported to be in arrears in their payment of electricity bills, and their power was cut off.

Two crucial facilities have also been directly affected by the fast-track programme: schooling and health-care. Although these were in short supply in commercial farming areas, access for farm workers and their families improved in the 1990s, as did access to early child education and care centres (ECECs). It was estimated that about 13 per cent of farm workers’ children were benefiting from ECEC facilities in 1999 (FCTZ, 2000). An increasing number of mothers had begun to take advantage of them. Organisations such as the Kunzwana Women’s Association were playing an important part in supporting these centres. The disruptions and evictions associated with the reform programme resulted in the closure of most ECECs (interviews, November, 2002). Similarly, those farms that ran schools encountered problems where the farm owner was served with an eviction order and left. When school maintenance ceases and the teaching staff are no longer paid, the school often closes. Thus one direct effect of *jambanja* has been to undermine the basic but fragile services which were beginning to serve an increasing number of farm workers’ children.

Our survey established that access to schools is affected by a number of factors. First, many focus group discussions pointed out that that food shortage leading to hunger was affecting children’s school attendance (interviews, October-November, 2002). In Manicaland, at more than half of the

farms surveyed, some children were not attending school owing to hunger or inability to pay fees. For those who succeeded in attending, there was a shortage of books and sometimes of teachers. In Mashonaland West, one school was closed owing to *jambanja*, and some children, especially girls, dropped out in areas where schools were still open. Lack of fees and long distances were the main constraints (*ibid*). In one instance, the nearest secondary school was reported to be 60km away, and pupils lived in shacks to be close to the school. In sum, since 2000 the school system in commercial farming areas has come under considerable stress. That some infants and schoolchildren have dropped out of ECECs and schools respectively is a source of worry. It is difficult to estimate the proportion that has dropped out of school. On the farms surveyed in Manicaland, it ranged from 15 per cent to 55 per cent. This has fuelled worries that some of the children who have dropped out of school may drift into delinquency or prostitution (*Standard*, 23 June 2002).

**Table 3.3 Child health**

	Number	Per cent
Immunisation level	418	42
Health growth card	434	44
Child mortality level	266	27
Diarrhoea cases in the past two weeks	168	17

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November 2002

**Table 3.4 Children's access to ECECs**

Households with children attending ECEC	21
Households with no children attending ECEC	56
Not applicable	23

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November 2002

Even though access to health care in the sector was limited, there had been some progress through the farm health worker (FHW) scheme. Prior to land reform, about 58 per cent of farm workers had access to the services of an FHW, and 88 per cent of farms in Mashonaland West and 30 per cent in

Matabeleland North had such workers (FCTZ, 2000). The role of an FHW was multi-faceted: she was responsible for pre-school activities, dispensed drugs for minor ailments and educated communities on health and hygiene. With the take-over of most commercial farms, this rudimentary health system collapsed. FHWs were displaced; where this was not the case, resource constraints prevented them from carrying out their functions. In December 2002, a parliamentary portfolio committee on Lands and Agriculture and Rural Resettlement expressed apprehension about deteriorating conditions on the farms and newly-resettled lands (*Standard*, 15 December 2002). Clinics are few and far between. The nearest clinic can be up to 40km from the farm community. Another problem is shortage of drugs in the clinics (interview with a GAPWUZ official, October 2002). The growing problem of access to treated water is compounded by limited toilet facilities on the farms. Another parliamentary portfolio committee, on Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, stated that it was appalled by conditions on resettled farms (*Sunday Mirror*, 16 February 2003). Health-care infrastructure and services were certainly disturbed by the invasions, and it will take time and considerable resources to rehabilitate them. (See appendices for tables showing trends in access to toilet facilities, child immunisation, child mortality, and diarrhoea prevalence.)

In one informal settlement near Macheke, about 50 per cent of children under five showed signs of malnutrition, while one in three households in the sample had lost a child under five through sickness. For workers who have been displaced from farms, the major problem is access to alternative health services in informal settlements and in adjacent towns or peri-urban centres.

## CHAPTER 4

### Food Security, Vulnerable Groups, HIV-AIDS and Coping Strategies

#### 4.1 Introduction

Farm workers, like other poor groups, have often lacked food security. They spent the bulk of their incomes on food and in the late 1990s food prices began to rise steeply. In 2000-2002, food security was undermined, partly by disruption resulting from land invasions, and partly by a devastating drought in the 2001-02 season. The production of food, in particular the staple, maize, slumped. Zimbabwe's maize requirements amount to about 2.5 million tonnes a year, and in a good year such as 1996, output was estimated at 2.6 million tonnes (ZHDR, 1999). In 2000-2001, the maize harvest was about 1.8 million tonnes, leaving a substantial shortfall — in part because a strategic grain reserve of 500,000 tonnes had been run down. The farm disruptions of 2000-2001 certainly contributed to a decline in maize output. It is projected that this could decline further, from about 800,000 tonnes produced in the commercial farming sector in 2000 to about 100,000 tonnes in 2002-03. It will be difficult for the communal areas and the new resettlement and A2 holdings to make up the shortfall.

This chapter assesses food security among farm workers and the coping strategies that they are using to survive in a decidedly difficult environment in which HIV-AIDS has attained the status of an epidemic. The chapter then pays particular attention to the special circumstances and needs of the elderly, orphans, migrants and women. It also examines conditions faced by former farm workers in the burgeoning informal settlements founded in the wake of the fast-track programme.

#### 4.2 Access to land and food security

For most farm workers, the main resource with which to obtain food is cash income. The other resources basically supplement this one. Such is the case with small pieces of land allocated by a commercial farmer to workers to grow vegetables and maize.

In most cases, this land was a token amount, often less than one acre per worker. For instance, in two Mashonaland West districts, 40 per cent of farm workers were provided with plots of land ranging from half an acre to an acre to produce crops for their own consumption (Sachikonye and Zishiri, 1999). But this was an *ad hoc* arrangement between the farmer and the workforce. The farm workers in the survey sample sought to have the amount of land for their own use increased, arguing that their farming expertise would enable them to take advantage of an increased hectareage. In 2000, a survey noted that about 47 per cent of farm workers in its sample had access to pieces of

arable land, ranging in size from less than an acre to two acres (FCTZ, 2000). This was too little for self-sufficient food production, and it explains why cash was the dominant resource for food for 95 per cent of that survey sample (*ibid*).

In any case, farm worker households found it difficult to devote adequate time to their allotments because the planting season coincided with the peak period for labour demand on the farm. Our survey found that the practice of providing small allotments to farm workers still existed, although the circumstances were changing quickly as settlers and new farmers moved in. The majority of farm workers had entitlement to small pieces of land for vegetable and maize production. But this varied by province: in Matabeleland and Masvingo allotments were granted on 50 per cent of the farms studied and on 65 per cent in Manicaland (field interviews, October-November 2002). In Mashonaland East, only a quarter of the farms provided workers with land. On the whole, however, of the 484 respondents who answered the question of access to land, 249 had up to two acres each, 35 had two to four acres, 25 had four to six acres and 71 had more than 6 acres (*ibid*). These respondents, however, included a number of new settlers.

**Table 4.1 Access of farm workers to land on farm**

	<b>0-2 acres</b>	<b>2-4 acres</b>	<b>4-6 acres</b>	<b>over 6 acres</b>
Those with access to land	205	34	25	71
Those without access to land	123			

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November 2002

It was not sufficient to have access to land. Getting enough inputs — seed, fertiliser and so forth — was crucial. Most farm workers admitted difficulties in obtaining inputs largely because prices have shot up in recent years. When farms were still operational, the commercial farmer sometimes ordered inputs for the workforce, but this has mostly stopped owing to change in ownership. Some NGOs such as the FCTZ had started, on a modest scale, to provide inputs to farm workers in informal settlements (FCTZ, 2002c). Another effect of the eviction of white commercial farmers was that cheap maize became more scarce for farm workers. Those farmers who grew maize sold it at a subsidised price to their workforce. Others ordered maize in bulk from the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) for their workers. In both instances, maize was generally accessible and less expensive than it became in 2001-02 and afterwards.

Land reform and the bad drought of 2001-02 changed the situation drastically. The quasi-paternalistic arrangements for land access and subsidised maize supplies came to an end. Except for the few hundred farms where old commercial farmers continue to operate, farm workers had to find new sources of food. In this new situation food shortage began to spread in early 2002, and the government had no option but to import large amounts of maize to address a shortfall of more than 1.5 million tonnes.

### **4.3 Food scarcity and relief supplies**

Well before the survey on which this report is based was undertaken, there were already reports of widespread shortage of food among farm worker communities. For example:

in Mashonaland West province, the staple food situation on all farms surveyed was found to be quite critical. Although on some of the farms, the farmers had been assisting with subsidized supplies, they had since run out of resources. It was also observed that what made the situation even more critical was the abandonment of maize farming by most farmers. In Manicaland province, the unemployed workers are in dire need of food aid because they no longer have any alternative source of income with which to sustain themselves. A few farm workers managed to harvest some maize from pieces of land allocated by the farmers and are making do with that , but this will last until June at most... In Mashonaland Central ... the former workers are desperate for food aid .... (FCTZ, 2002b)

As the year progressed, the situation grew dire in other provinces too. In the Matabeleland provinces, 87 per cent of households sampled stated that they had experienced food shortage in the course of the year (interviews, October-November 2002). The proportions were 75 per cent in Mashonaland West, 84 per cent in Mashonaland East and 91 per cent in Manicaland. The numbers of those in need of food relief were similarly high in Midlands and Masvingo. By the end of 2002, food shortage was no longer confined to rural areas but had become common in urban areas as well. In the latter, queues for maize meal and bread became routine.

However, the depth of food shortages varied widely. In several provinces, such as Masvingo and Mashonaland East, a number of deaths caused by starvation were reported (field interviews, October-November 2002). In focus group discussions at Mukwene and Warrendale farms in Mashonaland East, and at McIntosh and Floridale farms in Masvingo, it was reported that several people had died of starvation.

The vulnerability of farm workers to starvation was a major issue in public discussion during most of 2002. Both domestic and international NGOs had warned of impending food shortages. Early expressions of concern came from the farm workers' union, GAPWUZ, and also from international organisations

such as the SADC's Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) and the World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP estimated that about half of the population (between 6 and 7 million people) would require food aid before the 2003 harvest was in. A report by the ZCDT stated that more than 150,000 farm worker households faced starvation unless they received supplies by mid-October 2002 (*Financial Gazette*, 12 September 2002).

Even much earlier in the year, it became imperative for a feeding programme to be launched for children of farm workers. FCTZ launched a supplementary feeding programme for children aged under five, and by November 2002, 49,000 had benefited from it in the three Mashonaland provinces and Manicaland (interviews, November 2002). The total number of child beneficiaries rose to 160,000 by March 2003. Adult farm workers were not ignored. FCTZ implemented a feeding programme for 10,000 adults in the same four provinces. Each beneficiary received 10kg of maize meal, 2kg of pulses and 375ml of cooking oil a month (*ibid*). The demand for food aid among the workers far outstripped supplies. There was, for instance, no comparable feeding programme for either children or adults in the remaining four provinces.

**Table 4.2 Households that cannot afford more than one meal a day**

Province	Per cent
Matabeleland North	18
Mashonaland West	21
Manicaland	31
Mashonaland East	39

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November, 2002

From our survey, it was clear that the amount of food farm workers ate had fallen significantly between 2000 and 2002. For example, 18 per cent of farm workers in Matabeleland South, 39 per cent in Mashonaland East, 21 per cent in Mashonaland West and 31 per cent Manicaland could afford only one meal a day in October 2002. The proportions in similar circumstances in Masvingo and Midlands were just as worrying. Focus group discussions often indicated that starvation and malnutrition were spreading in the farm worker community (interviews, October 2002). Where the farm workers could purchase food, they had to contend with irregular deliveries and fluctuating prices, of maize in particular. They bought it at a much higher price than the official price. The prices for a 20kg bucket of maize-meal ranged from Z\$900 to Z\$1,500 in parts of Mashonaland East to Z\$2,500 in parts of Masvingo. It was clear in the last quarter of 2002 that farm workers had problems of irregular supply and



inflationary food prices. The bulk of the food consisted of imports and so the flow of supplies in different provinces depended on the volume coming in.

#### **4.4 Vulnerable groups in the farm worker community**

Both the fast-track reform programme and the food shortage crisis exposed the increased vulnerability of certain social groups. Although these groups — migrants, women, elderly, children and youth — already experienced certain disadvantages, the events of 2000 to 2002 made them even more vulnerable. One of the principal factors behind their marginalisation is that they were not catered for under land reform. No special effort was made to address the needs of farm workers, as a whole, under land reform. The authorities took an ad hoc approach.

In addition, some policy makers had a tendency to xenophobia when it came to considering the interests of migrant workers or their descendants in commercial agriculture (Moyo *et al* 2000). One senior party official was quoted as saying: 'all your farm workers are Mozambicans, Malawians and Zambians and can be shipped home at a moment's notice' (*Zimbabwe Independent*, 5 December 1997). This mentality assumed that the majority of farm workers were 'foreigners' who had no rights in Zimbabwe other than those bestowed by their employers (Moyo, *et al* 2000). This line of thought had been exploited by politicians since the late 1980s to disqualify farm workers from securing land rights in resettlement areas and elsewhere.

Yet studies from the 1970s to the present have demonstrated that the proportion of migrant farm workers has been steadily declining, from an estimated 54 per cent in the 1960s to about 26 per cent at present. This points to a steady decline of about 50 per cent over the past 30-40 years. Most so-called migrant workers are actually second or third-generation descendants of the migrants imported during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Indeed, government-sponsored surveys corroborate the estimate that such workers now constitute little more than a quarter of the total farm workforce (Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, 1998, 2001). Other surveys conducted in the past five years confirm this diminishing proportion of 'migrant' farm workers (FCTZ, 2000). In the 2002 field study on which this report is based, the proportion of 'migrants' among farm workers was 29 per cent, almost within the 26-27 per cent range usually estimated (field interviews, October-November 2002). As table 4.3 shows, people of Mozambican descent comprised 12 per cent, of Malawian descent 11 per cent and of Zambian descent 5 per cent of the national farm labour force.

**Table 4.3 Farm workers: country of origin of forebears**

Country	Number	Per cent
Botswana	48	5
Malawi	113	11.8
Mozambique	119	12.5
South Africa	3	0.3
Zimbabwe	671	70.3

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November 2002

How vulnerable have 'migrant' farm workers been following land reform? First, they (like most other workers) were not allocated land when they lost their jobs. Less than 5 per cent of farm workers were granted land. In October 2001, only about 2 per cent had been resettled (UNDP, 2002). This was despite the findings of a government-sponsored survey which reported that:

53 per cent of sampled farm workers prefer to be allocated plots of land for resettlement. Others (21 per cent) would like to be re-employed in similar activities. Given the high rate of unemployment in the economy, it could be assumed that the best option for this group is resettlement. (Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, 2001)

Representations from the labour union, GAPWUZ, about land for farm workers came to little as government largely ignored their case. It is difficult to determine what has happened to workers of foreign origin. An indication of their intentions can perhaps be found in survey findings on farm workers' plans in the three Mashonaland provinces and Manicaland (FCTZ, 2002b). In Mashonaland Central, 56 per cent of displaced farm workers said they would stay on the farm, 16 per cent said they would leave for other farms, and 17 per cent planned to go to communal areas, while 4 per cent said they would seek land for resettlement (see Table 4.5). In Mashonaland East, 34 per cent intended to stay on at the farm, 17 per cent to leave for other farms and 46 per cent to leave for communal areas. In Manicaland, 53 per cent said they would stay on the farm, 30 per cent said they would leave for other farms and 11 per cent said they would go to communal areas.

It would have been useful to break down the responses so as to ascertain the preferences of workers of foreign origin. The proportion of those who intended to stay or seek work on other farms ranged from 51 per cent to 83 per cent. It would not be far-fetched to assume that 'migrant' workers would be strongly represented among those who intended to stay at the present or another farm.

On the whole, these findings from a 2002 survey are quite different from the 2001 government survey mentioned above. But perhaps the simple explanation is that during the earlier survey workers might have thought that the government was serious about allocating land to farm workers. Later they would have realised this was a mistake.

Farm workers of foreign descent are more vulnerable than other groups because few of them have communal homes in the country to fall back on. Their ties with ancestral homes in the neighbouring countries from which they or their grand-parents came have become very weak at best, and non-existent at worst. This means that about 80,000 workers, who together with their families would make up a community of nearly a half million, are in limbo in the wake of land reform. There were a number of reports in 2002 that the authorities moved some farm workers to border areas in the Mashonaland Central province; others have been settled in the Mahuwe area of Muzarabani in Lower Zambezi Valley (field interviews, November, 2002). There was no conscious planning to meet their immediate and long-term needs.

Another vulnerable group are the elderly retired workers who normally remained on farms till they passed away. There was no social safety net for this group, except perhaps a tiny pension, and access to housing and land on the formerly white-owned commercial farms. It is not clear where this group of vulnerable former workers will be absorbed. A survey in 1997-98 estimated that about 40 per cent of permanent male workers had a rural home (FCTZ and FEWSNET, 1997-98). It may then be assumed that up to 128,000 workers, or 640,000 people when their families are included, would trek back to communal areas. Responses to the 2002 survey indicates that in reality, the proportion is likely to be lower. A considerable movement to the communal areas would defeat the whole purpose of land reform. The main purpose was to de-congest the communal areas so as to ensure their regeneration (Zimbabwe government, 1990).

Women constitute yet another vulnerable social group among farm workers. They are the bulk of non-permanent workers; and they are rarely seen as workers in their own right (Amanor-Wilks, 1995). They account for less than 10 per cent of the permanent labour force in commercial farming. According to the Central Statistical Office (CSO), in 1999 the sector had 152,790 permanent male employees (90.3 per cent) and 16,460 permanent female employees (9.7 per cent) (CSO, 2000). Female employees were concentrated among casual workers: they constituted 55 per cent of casual labour (see Table 4.4). Female casual labour tends to be concentrated in the horticulture sector.

**Table 4.4 :Nature of employment in the agricultural sector**

Year	Permanent employees		Casual employees		Total employees	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
1998	155,519	15,972	71,025	81,773	226,594	97,745
1999	152,788	16,460	69,050	84,373	221,838	100,852

**Source:** CSO, 2000; Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, 2001

Women workers are often considered as part of a male-headed household and so their rights are often ignored. Also, women workers tend to be single. Nationally, women head one in three households. But their access to land for resettlement has been relatively limited, with one estimate being that they account for 16 per cent of the total number of people resettled by October 2001. In our 2002 survey, 19 per cent of the worker households were headed by women. Given the structural bias against women in access to permanent employment, land and other economic opportunities, this puts women in a disadvantaged, vulnerable position.

The uncertainty and insecurity generated by land reform have created a difficult environment for young people and children in farm worker households. With limited education and skills, they have few, if any, opportunities for employment or self-employment (interviews, October-November 2002). Such an environment is like to lead to drinking, drug abuse, prostitution, crime and stress. The Kunzwana Women's Association launched a programme aiming to prevent such an environment developing, but the effort was disturbed by the land invasions, as were activities initiated by Farm Development Committees (FADCOs). Another vulnerable group, the AIDS orphans, are considered in Section 4.6.

#### **4.5 Coping strategies**

So far this chapter has sought to explain and describe the extent of the crisis in food security and the declining fortunes of vulnerable social groups in farm worker communities. Clearly, problems of food scarcity are not confined to farm workers but have become widespread in the wider rural and even urban society. However, the implementation of land reform in conditions of economic crisis and drought has made these social groups even more vulnerable than they would normally be. It is important to explore how they are coping now that commercial farms have scaled back or halted production, and food shortages have become more acute.

Those coping mechanisms are part of a wider process of adjusting to a fluid, still evolving situation (see Chapter 3). The situation appeared to remain fluid on most farms until Section 8 notices were issued in mid-2002, leading to the exodus of the majority of white commercial farmers. Until then there had remained a prospect, however remote, that somehow co-existence with the settlers could stabilise. Some of the strategies pursued by farm workers in that context included piece-work, informal vending, gold panning, fishing and hunting (FCTZ, 2002b). Among the farm workers interviewed, about 47 per cent in Mashonaland West, 56 per cent in Mashonaland East, 70 per cent in Mashonaland Central and 43 per cent in Manicaland said that they engaged in piece-work. This was mainly at the peak of the agricultural season, especially at planting, weeding and harvesting. In Mashonaland Central, the trend was for former farm workers to hire out their labour to the new settlers who could not cope with their increased workload. However, piece-work jobs are neither secure nor as well paid as permanent jobs. No benefits, such as leave and medical support, go with this type of employment.

**Table 4.5 Percentage distribution of proposed destination for retrenched farm workers by province**

Province	Communal areas	Other farms	Stay on farm	Resettle-ment	Other
Mash West	17.3	16.3	56.1	4.1	6.1
Mash East	46.1	17.3	34.6	0.0	1.9
Mash Central	35.0	15.0	45.0	5.0	0.0
Manicaland	11.5	30.8	53.8	3.8	0.0
Total	26.9	18.1	48.6	3.2	3.2

**Source:** FCTZ, 2002 b

In our 2002 survey, the main ways of supplementing income in farm worker households were also piece-work and such activities as informal trade and building. A relatively larger number of farm worker households had supplementary income-generating activities in Mashonaland East and Central. Gold panning was mainly carried out in Mashonaland West. Remittances were another source of income, but mainly in Mashonaland West and less so in Mashonaland East and Central and the Matabeleland provinces.

**Table 4.6 Coping strategies of farm workers**

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Percentage of farm workers participating</b>
Sale of agricultural produce	46
Piece-work	38
Informal trade	18
Remittances	14
Gold panning	4

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November, 2002

A few households (between two and five in each province) reported that they had under-15s working to supplement their income. This was mainly through farm work, piece-work and informal vending. If there is no under-reporting by respondents, then child labour is not widespread.

In sum, there are few opportunities for supplementary income-generating activities for farm workers. However, focus group discussions in October 2002 identified more means for survival: selling second-hand clothes, moulding bricks, making mats and selling vegetables. Unfortunately, the survey could not establish the scale of these activities. Some coping strategies are quite basic. Several groups in Masvingo and Mashonaland Central stated that gathering wild fruit (such as *matamba* and *hacha*) was an important food supplementing activity.

One other way in which farmworkers have sought to cope with the changing situation has been to construct or join informal settlements. The number of such settlements, also known as 'squatter camps', is growing. In addition to Chihwiti and Gambuli, there are others at Concession, Macheke and Porta farm near Norton. These settlements are a last resort for the farm workers who gravitate towards them. About 51 per cent of occupants at Gambuli and Chihwiti settlements, 38 per cent at Concession and 63 per cent at Macheke had come from commercial farms.

What is the profile of these settlements and how do the occupants cope? Most of them were founded almost spontaneously in the late 1990s and after the start of the fast-track reform. They are home to landless and jobless people, including a significant number of former farm and mine workers. In 1998, a study in Mashonaland West observed that the 'squatters' were seasonal tobacco workers, gold panners, destitute people and others displaced from different parts of the province (Zishiri, 1998). The later phase of the creation of

informal settlements included the founding of the Concession settlement known as Maratos, about 50km southwest of Bindura in Mashonaland Central. One report observed:

influx of settlers into the settlement began in May 2000 amid occupation of commercial farms. The settlers are mostly made up of people who moved from rented accommodation in an undeveloped section of Dandamera township. They joined former employees on the farm that was previously leased as well as those who moved from commercial farming areas ... (FCTZ, 2002a)

The Chihwiti and Gambuli settlements were originally state farms that had been leased out. At these two settlements, farm workers were the most vulnerable group seeking sanctuary. They were the 'poorest group'; they sold their labour for food and about 30 per cent of their children had dropped out of school (FCTZ, 2002c). At the Macheke settlement, about 50 per cent of households consisted of migrant workers, and more than 70 per cent of occupants who had arrived in the previous 12 months had come from commercial farms (FCTZ, 2002d). At Porta farm near Norton, there was also a growing number of displaced farm worker households (field interviews, October 2002). They had settled there as 'squatters' and were engaged in informal trade and sometimes fishing (*Standard*, 25 June 2002). Clearly, although conditions were poor, the settlements provided a sanctuary for a growing number of former farm workers. There was, at least, one advantage in belonging to an informal settlement: they were within the reach of local donor organisations and the authorities were aware of their desperate conditions (see Chapter 5). There exists a prospect for some kind of collective solidarity for survival emerging in those settlements. However, it is not yet quite clear what their future will be.

#### **4.6 The impact of HIV-AIDS on farm worker communities**

The farm workers still on the farms and those who have been displaced have been caught up, like the wider society, in the HIV-AIDS epidemic. Food shortage and hunger have worsened the conditions of those living with HIV-AIDS. Deprived of regular incomes and reasonable access to housing and safe water, households lack the capacity to provide food and basic care to the sick. There is little comprehensive data on prevalence rates of HIV-AIDS in farm worker communities. However, isolated studies in the mid-1990s indicated that prevalence ranged from 23 to 36 per cent among ante-natal clients in Midlands province, and between 20 and 39 per cent on commercial farms nationwide (Mutangadura and Jackson, 2001). A reasonable estimate would be a 25 per cent infection rate among the sexually active population on farms, with infection levels much higher among casual and seasonal workers (*ibid*). The infection has affected productivity on the farms and in households, because of time away from work being sick, caring for the sick or attending funerals. The scenario is of a substantial loss of able-bodied adults. This:

in farming areas (among both new settlers and farm workers) over the next decade, with resultant setbacks in farm operations and productivity, has not been adequately woven into the overall planning for agrarian reform in Zimbabwe. A worst-case scenario is that much of the productive land being redistributed may well become underutilized in a few years as a consequence of loss of settlers and labourers to the AIDS epidemic. (UNDP, 2002)

In the informal settlements, the incidence of HIV-AIDS is reaching disturbing levels. It is difficult to establish whether the national AIDS awareness campaign is leading to behavioural change.

Our survey sought the level of AIDS awareness among the survey respondents. Almost everyone was aware of the existence of HIV-AIDS, and knew how it was spread. The majority of respondents had heard about the disease from radio, the village health worker, health personnel and friends. Curiously, 6 per cent of respondents believed that HIV-AIDS could be caused by mosquito bites while 1.4 per cent thought that one could catch it by sharing clothes with an infected person (interviews, October-November 2002). This would suggest that there is still some way to go in raising greater knowledge on how HIV-AIDS is spread.

**Table 4.7 AIDS awareness levels, 2002**

Source of information	Number of respondents
Radio	417
Village health worker	156
Health personnel	126
Friends	81
School	13
Total	793

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November 2002

The trends in AIDS-related deaths were reflected in the data gathered on the increasing number of orphans whose parents had succumbed to the epidemic. Four per cent of the households interviewed indicated they knew of orphans who had lost one or both parents (interviews, October-November 2002). The proportion of such respondents ranges from 5 per cent in Manicaland to 11 per cent in Matabeleland North, to 16 per cent in Mashonaland West to 25 per cent in Mashonaland East. The epidemic is certainly spreading faster than is commonly assumed. With a national orphan



population climbing to 1 million, the evidence on the ground shows that a substantial proportion of these are the children of farm workers. This means that child-headed households now exist among them (FTCZ, 2002c).

One estimate is that there are at least two AIDS orphans on each farm, and that there are about 14,000 such orphans on farms (interviews, November, 2002). This figure is likely to be an underestimate. While about 65 per cent of them attend school, the remainder have dropped out, or cannot afford to pay for their education. AIDS orphans are particularly vulnerable, because the epidemic has put the extended family system under severe stress. They are often last in the 'food queue'. Farm worker communities are less and less able to care for orphans as adult incomes dwindle or disappear, and their future on farms become less and less secure (*ibid*). Little assistance appeared to come from the National AIDS Council, which commands considerable resources built on the AIDS levy paid by income-earners in the past few years. Such provision of resources to farm worker communities and especially to the ill and orphans would make an important difference. Most focus group discussions observed that there were no community-based schemes to provide care either to orphans or to those ill from HIV-AIDS related diseases. There were, for instance, no special resources and arrangements to make food more easily accessible to these groups.

**Table 4.8 Orphanhood levels , 2002**

	No.	%
One female parent deceased	18	2.0
One male parent deceased	57	6.2
Both parents deceased	37	4.0
Total	112	12.2

**Source:** Field interviews, October-November, 2002

## CHAPTER 5

### After the 'promised land': towards the future

#### 5.1 Introduction

This concluding chapter assesses how the new 'farmers' and 'settlers' have used the opportunities opened up by land reform, and how they relate to the farm worker community. Information about the situation of these new landowners and their evolving relations with farm workers is limited. Although these aspects were not the major focus of this study, they should be considered in any provisional audit of the fast-track programme.

The chapter proceeds to outline the individual and collective responses of the farm workers themselves to the land reform and its consequences. Their response has not been passive (see Chapter 4). This chapter examines the extent to which their collective organisations, their trade unions, continue to play a role in shaping that response. It will then consider what options, if any, exist for farm workers who have lost jobs and other sources of livelihood. Hence the need to examine possible interventions by local and international NGOs and the state, interventions which are essential to prevent the situation from deteriorating rapidly, with far-reaching social implications.

#### 5.2 The 'new settlers' and 'new farmers'

It is a sign of changed times and circumstances that there is a new vocabulary to denote the small farmers, often from communal areas, who have been resettled on former white commercial farm-land. They are often termed 'settlers' by virtue of having taken over that land. The term for aspirant indigenous farmers is 'new farmers'. They have been allocated larger pieces of formerly white-owned commercial farmland. It is a strange slip or irony of history that today's indigenous small farmers are called 'settlers', once a derogatory reference to the white population. But then the land reform has spawned a variety of other terminology; from 'Third Chimurenga' to '*jambanja*', from 'agrarian revolution' to '*hondo yeminda*' (war for land) and 'fast-track reform', as we observed.

What are the current conditions of settlers? The government claimed that about 300,000 settler-households had moved on to new land. They came from communal areas, but also came from cities and towns. A few, less than 5 per cent, were farm workers. However, some analysts have expressed scepticism (in the absence of an independent audit) that the new settlers number about 300,000, as some did not take up the land allocated to them. The survey conducted for this report had a small sample of settlers, but nevertheless provided some interesting impressions.

A series of focus group discussions was held with settlers at four resettled farms in Masvingo, two in Mashonaland East and one in Matabeleland South. At the Masvingo farms, most of the settlers moved on to the land in 2000. The average number of settlers to a farm was about 45 (field interviews, October 2002). Each household was allocated about five hectares for cultivation. A committee elected by the settlers had a chairman, a vice-chairman, a secretary, a treasurer and two other members. There was also a technical advisor and sometimes representatives of youth and women were on the committee. Most of these committees were linked to ZANU-PF. The functions of these committees included, in the words of their members: 'to listen to the people's grievances'; 'to address the people's problems'; 'to lead the community'; and 'to register all the people when meetings with government officials are called or when there is food distribution' (interviews, October 2002). At the Mashonaland East farms, the committees included *kraal* heads and a secretary for security. An additional role for the committee was 'to monitor any movements in the area'. The average area of land for each settler was six hectares, plus eight hectares for grazing.

In the survey sample of 160 farms, 75 had been turned over to resettlement for small farms while 85 were subdivided into farms under the A2 model. Seventy of the A1 farms were owned by males, and only five by females. In other words, 93 per cent of the A1 model beneficiaries in our sample were male, and 6 per cent were female. This finding contrasts with the national pattern, which suggested that about 16 per cent of beneficiaries were female (UNDP, 2002). It would appear, nevertheless, that the new land ownership pattern under the A1 model may be reproducing the gender distribution of ownership in the existing communal areas. This reflects a strong patriarchal domination in land ownership.

However, the emerging pattern of land ownership under the A2 model appears slightly different from our sample. Female ownership of the land under this model stands at 12 per cent. Although this is still relatively low, it is better than that for A1 farms. The A2 farms are comparatively larger, and require more substantial resources to turn them into productive assets. If this trend in ownership of A2 model farms were replicated nationwide, then female ownership would be significant, even if it is far less common than male ownership.

In our survey findings, 50 per cent of beneficiaries of A2 model farms came from urban areas. They have had very little or no farming experience although they may be in a better position to access credit and other vital inputs. It remains to be seen, however, whether the A2 model farms will be transformed into productive units in the near and medium term. Given the strong urban roots of this set of beneficiaries, they are likely to be seen as 'telephone farmers'. They will need to work hard to shake off that image.

In general, the settlers shared a common problem of inadequate infrastructure and inputs to enable them to use their land fully. A common problem was lack of draught-power and labour. As noted at one resettled farm: 'the soil is too heavy, it also needs a tractor; they cannot pull it with cattle, and that is why

most of them will only plant four hectares (interviews, October 2002). At a farm in Masvingo, settlers had been able to use only half of the land area owing to insufficient inputs (including seed and fertiliser) and labour. Some of them relied on hired draught-power. Access to water was another major constraint: none of the settlers could afford irrigation facilities. These constraints confirm the strength of one thread of critique of the fast-track programme: the absence of rigorous planning and technical backup. In several discussion groups, it was stated that some settlers had since returned to their original homes owing to hardship.

These initial handicaps may be related to a profile of 11 'new farmers' covered in our study. Half of them had come from communal areas, a third from urban areas and the remainder from a commercial farm (interviews, October 2002). Most of them (six) had planted maize while two had planted wheat and one was growing tobacco. The limited effort to produce cash crops is worrying.

A more acute crisis in 2002 related to shortage of food among the 'new settlers'. Having harvested little, owing partly to the drought, they depended mainly on supplies from the GMB or purchases in the market. One observer said:

food is not available on a regular basis. They cut down on meals to one a day if it is a household of adults ... Cases of malnutrition are high amongst children ... They are surviving on wild fruits ... Some families have moved away because of starvation, and it is said that one family died of hunger ... (interviews, October 2002)

It is unfortunate that hasty resettlement in 2000 was followed by a bad drought in the 2001-02 season. This explains why food is an immediate issue to 'settlers'.

Other pressing needs include health care and schools. The social infrastructure on most settled farms leaves a great deal to be desired. Housing is often rudimentary, taking the form of pole and *dagga* huts, and sanitary facilities, including toilets, usually quite basic. At one settlers' area in Matopo, in Matabeleland, the nearest school and clinic were about 10km away, while at another in Masvingo, they were 15km distant. However, in some places in Mashonaland East settlers had schools and a clinic close by, and were planning to build 'new houses'. The 'inheritance' of social infrastructure and services varied from farm to farm and area to area, but services were inaccessible for majority of settlers. Massive resources will be required for social infrastructure as well as individual housing. Infrastructure and maintenance for a regular supply of safe water are crucial. One report observed that:

in the absence of bore-holes, desperate villagers are having to drink dirty water sourced from rivers and find themselves at the mercy of mosquitoes and wild animals which infest their land. The nearest clinics are sometimes 40km away. (*Standard*, 15 December 2002)

This prompted a decision at the end of 2002 to form a Parliamentary Committee to investigate the magnitude of settlers' problems and needs.

### **5.3 Settlers, new farmers and farm workers**

To what extent have social relations changed in the former commercial farming sector? The predominant relationship used to be that between 4,500 white landowners and 300,000 to 320,000 farm workers. Now it is between about 300,000 small-farmer households and about 30,000 black commercial farmers on the one hand, and the remaining farm workers and former workers on the other. There are no precise figures on how many farm workers remain, nor is it possible to trace where all the former workers are. But a new pattern of social relations is emerging. By and large, the 'settlers' and 'new farmers' have been the primary beneficiaries of land reform, while farm workers have mainly been 'losers'. Whereas the authorities interpret the success of reform in terms of the relocation of 300,000 'settlers', they say little about the fate of the 300,000 farm workers. The success of land reform should be judged on the basis of whether both sets of social groups benefited from it.

The relationship between settlers and farm workers was uneasy, if not hostile at the time of the land invasions in 2000 and 2001 (see Chapter 2). It was not difficult to see why. Farm workers appeared to stand between the settlers and their goal of wresting ownership from the white farmer. Hence the clashes that sometimes occurred between the two sides, and the settlers' interest in disrupting production so that the farm owner would leave or share the land with them through subdivision. In a sense, farm workers acted as a kind of buffer between the farmer and the settlers. At the same time, the workers were hostages of the situation: they may have wanted land also, but they could not agitate for it openly and be seen to be joining the settlers. Some farm workers did join the settlers, not in their own workplace but on neighbouring farms, as was the case in the Matabeleland provinces (interviews, October 2002). For the majority of farm workers, however, this was not the main option. They hoped to hang on to their jobs or to receive land for resettlement in their own right.

Several years later, they must co-exist in an unequal relationship with the new arrivals. While the settlers and new farmers have entitlement to land, most farm workers do not. They often have to provide labour to the new landowners. In the course of our survey in Mashonaland Central, it was observed that :

... the new farmer looks down upon the ex-farm workers. The ex-farm workers are not in any way getting paid better than before ....  
(interviews, October 2002)

At another farm in the same province, the compound that housed farm workers had been designated and they were evicted by the new landowners. On another, the new farmer torched the houses of farm workers to evict them *en masse*. On the farms where they were not evicted, the number of jobs was

often drastically reduced. This forced the workers 'to use their houses as dormitories while they go searching for employment from farm to farm' (interviews, October, 2002). This gives a picture of an itinerant, poor and unstable farm worker class — a vulnerable social group, almost destitute and constantly drifting, sometimes into informal settlements. Meanwhile, the settlers and new farmers blame the farm workers for bringing their present predicament upon themselves. For instance, interviewees reported that:

the new farmers have assumed a superior role which the white farmer used to enjoy over farm workers while the new settlers are of the opinion that the workers did not register to get land because they did not want to go against the white employer. (*ibid*)

The big difference in the new scenario is that for most workers job opportunities are far fewer and wages lower than before reform. Clearly, it will take several more years for the situation to stabilise. Other types of relationship besides that between the landowner and the worker may yet evolve. Besides providing wage-labour, farm workers may become new tenants or sharecroppers. Some new settlers may find it necessary to supplement their income from crops by selling their labour at more productive farms.

#### **5.4 The collective response and needs of farm workers**

The land reform programme has adversely affected the fortunes of farm workers in several ways. Because workers lost jobs, livelihoods and housing, the principal union in the commercial farming sector, GAPWUZ, has lost a substantial number of members. The workers who lost their jobs and left the farms could no longer maintain their membership, pay their dues and participate in union activities. One estimate is that the number of GAPWUZ members declined precipitously from more than 100,000 at the start of 2000 to about 50,000 towards the end of 2002 (interview with GAPWUZ official, October 2002). This steep decline is consistent with the evidence about farm workers who lost their jobs during the period. It has a direct impact on the union: the amount of money it receives in dues has contracted. For example, the union can no longer afford to finance officials' travel from farm to farm and district to district to meet with members (*ibid*). This was a particular problem in the Matabeleland provinces.

Nevertheless, despite the enormous constraints it faces, GAPWUZ continues to mobilise members, represent them in the NEC for agriculture, and provide a limited amount for the welfare needs of displaced workers. According to GAPWUZ:

to alleviate the misery and reported cases of malnutrition, we are giving out mealie meal, matemba and cooking oil ... We are also paying school fees for children, and we are assisting aged workers who were our members for a long time by giving them money to

travel to their homes ... (A GAPWUZ official as quoted in the *Standard*, 23 June 2002).

In addition, GAPWUZ continues to run a programme for children through its child labour section which it set up in 1999. It participates in the tripartite Compensation Committee which considers applications for severance packages for farm workers.

The land reform has presented the union with an additional set of problems. It now has to compete with a government-sponsored union called the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) led by a famous war veteran leader, Joseph Chinotimba. The ZFTU has been active in areas where land invasions occurred, and it was said to benefit from easy access to resources, such as transport to visit farms (interviews, October 2002). However, there were allegations that some ZFTU officials were involved in a series of extortion cases. They are accused of appropriating a considerable cut from the severance packages paid to some farm workers (*ibid*). There have been instances of GAPWUZ being invited to mediate in such cases by workers who fell victim to such extortion. There was also a case of an unregistered union which went about collecting dues and seeking a cut from severance packages. This was Horticulture-GAPWUZ, which operated mainly in the Mashonaland provinces. Some officials of this dubious union were subsequently arrested for extortion in 2002. However, it is important to note that it was not only rival unions that were involved in extortion. There were reports, confirmed by the CFU, of more than Z\$12 million being extorted by war veterans (*Daily News*, 5 March 2002). The *modus operandi* was to instruct farmers to lay off their workers immediately, and for workers to vacate their houses as soon as they were paid. The war veterans would insist on a cut of the pay.

Despite the inroads into its membership base, GAPWUZ remains the largest and most credible union in the agricultural sector. In our national sample, about 35 per cent of respondents confirmed that they were union members. Of those who named their union, some 75 per cent said that they belonged to GAPWUZ, while 25 per cent belonged to ZFTU. The provinces in which GAPWUZ is weaker are Masvingo and the Matabeleland provinces, but it is stronger in Manicaland and the Mashonaland provinces. The challenges facing this oldest labour union are new and manifold. It will need to reassess its mission and strategies in the post-reform situation.

## **5.5 The immediate needs of the workers and possible interventions**

The earlier chapters of this report have already provided considerable detail about the immediate needs of farm workers. It is useful, however, to re-state them in this concluding section, to draw attention to policy and humanitarian imperatives. Our survey specifically asked farm workers to spell out what they consider to be their most urgent needs. This section reports on recommendations that arose in focus group discussions.

It is useful to distinguish between the needs of farm workers who remain on the farms and those who have left, and the special situations of children, women and the elderly. Since the bulk of respondents were on farms, there may be an in-built bias in the majority recommendations. Four principal priority needs were identified:

- food,
- land,
- inputs and
- social infrastructure and services.

This list contains no surprises. Food shortage (see Chapter 4) has caused widespread hunger. Food is now a matter of life or death. Its irregular availability has caused much grief and suffering, as has the politicisation of its distribution. It is alleged that food distribution under government auspices has been partisan, but distribution by local and international NGOs has been relatively transparent. Farm workers would like food, especially maize, to be more accessible to them. The NGOs and government institutions providing food face a particular challenge here. They need to devise programmes (unless they have them already) to reach out to workers on farms. The food shortage on farms is compounded because 'farmers no longer supply them with subsidised maize meal, and in some instances, the GMB contributed to the problem because it impounded maize from warehouses meant for workers' (interviews, October 2002). At the same time, the food needs of the 'new settlers', new farmers and the workers they employ (mainly in piece-jobs) also deserve attention. The scope of food aid programmes for farm workers must be reviewed and expanded until the situation is clearer at the next harvest in April-May 2003.

The next widely-cited priority need was land. Farm workers who find themselves with neither jobs nor land believe that they can improve their material condition, including their food security, if they obtain land. GAPWUZ is demanding that workers who have lost their jobs owing to land reform should be provided with land for resettlement:

the land issue remains a big question because an insignificant number of farm workers have been resettled although the government had promised to include them in the land reform ... (GAPWUZ official as quoted in the *Daily News*, 29 April, 2002)

There appeared to be more clamour for land in the Matabeleland provinces than elsewhere. This is a pertinent issue to pursue in further research. More generally, the hunger for land among displaced farm workers is obvious. This challenges the government to fulfill its promise to provide land to the workers. There are reports that not all farmland acquired for the A2 model has been taken up, some of it in Matabeleland. If that is the case, this land should be opened up for well-planned resettlement by former farm workers. In a similar vein, there are claims that some members of the ruling elite have acquired more than one farm, or that the farms are much larger than the stipulated sizes. This raises the need for an independent audit of how land was



redistributed, and who received what. Those who received surplus land should forfeit it, and free it for systematic resettlement of farm workers.

The third priority is inputs. There was a universal desire for adequate inputs — in particular draught-power, seed and fertilisers — and infrastructure, such as irrigation. Insufficient attention to the supply of inputs was a glaring weakness in the land reform programme. Farm workers know that owning land is not enough without the necessary inputs. An input or asset universally mentioned by male farm workers in the Matabeleland provinces was cattle. They serve a double purpose of draught-power and accumulation. Recognising that inputs are indispensable, some NGOs have provided them to former farm workers (FCTZ, 2002c). This assistance programme should be expanded, and other organisations should provide resources to make that possible. The same applies to need to help the settlers, and here the government also has a special obligation to develop a coherent and substantial input assistance programme.

The fourth major priority listed by farm workers was social infrastructure and services. Schools, ECECs, health facilities and other services had been closed down during the reform process. Female respondents, in particular, pointed out the hardships that resulted. In the resettlement schemes established in the 1980s, there was a systematic effort to ensure that schools, clinics and extension services were available to the settlers. Such an approach was absent in the current programme. Nor was there a conscious effort to maintain the social infrastructure, schools and health facilities on the farms. This presents a challenge to both government and NGOs to resuscitate the services, which will require substantial resources. A number of NGOs have run social programmes ranging from ECECs, care for AIDS orphans and health care services. They should be encouraged to resume and expand their services on farms and in informal settlements where former farm workers have sought shelter. At the same time, it will be important to address the equally pressing needs of the new settlers, who are as starved of social services as the workers. The resources required will be substantial enough to warrant support from international development institutions and bilateral donors.

Other priority needs mentioned by respondents, especially women, were income generating projects, and better housing and sanitary facilities. A number of NGOs had already started to support such income generating projects on a modest scale, and that experience should be built upon. In sum, a holistic approach is needed to tackle the multi-faceted challenges that workers on- and off-farm are experiencing as a consequence of the way land reform was implemented.

## **5.6 Conclusion: Wider lessons from *jambanja***

This report has highlighted the context in which land reform was implemented, and its impact on one social group — farm workers — among a number of others. It has focused largely on the reform's outcome for farm workers and its

conclusions are generally critical and sombre. In sum, from the perspective of farm workers, the fast-track programme has been problematic. But from the perspective of the new settlers and new farmers, the experiences and outcomes may be quite different. It remains for studies to be carried out on these other groups to show whether land reform has had a positive outcome for them. Clearly, the debate on the method and outcomes will run for many years to come.

But what about more general lessons, if any, that can be gleaned from the reform programme? This is often raised in relation to the land questions in Namibia and South Africa, where land redistribution has been on the agenda but little has been done to address it. There appears to be little urgency in the Namibian and South African governments' responses to the demands for land from the poor and landless, and for tenure rights from farm workers. The scale of the land question, of course, varies from country to country. But one thing they have in common is the potential for a gradual build-up of pressure from the poor and the deprived for resources, especially land, in the absence of vigorous economic growth. In this situation ambitious populist politicians can fan the flames of agitation among the dispossessed poor. The land question would then be exploited in struggles for political office and power, rather than for social justice and historical redress. Land reform can also be approached through emotive campaigns in which race and xenophobia are used as ideological instruments. It can be orchestrated from the top in such a manner that the elite controls the reform process and reaps material gain.

On the other hand, land reform can be a genuine instrument for poverty reduction, in which the criteria for redistribution favour the poor, landless and serious tillers. In this case, there is a more pragmatic approach to reform, with greater emphasis on planning, consultation with key stakeholders, and mobilisation of resources for both capital and social expenditure on the reform process. Such an approach needs to be orderly and peaceful within the realm of the 'rule of just law' for it to earn credibility and support from local and international institutions.

But clearly, if the Zimbabwe experience is anything to go by, there is a need for consistent political commitment to land reform. Procrastination is a sign of lack of political will, and populists and demagogues can exploit it. However, land reform should not be used for electoral advantage. If it is, then it is likely to pander to short-term political expediency, rather than serving as a long-term pragmatic and systematic process of historical redress, social justice and poverty reduction.

Finally, there is a more general issue which Zimbabwe's fast-track reform programme failed to address in a consistent fashion. The programme did not define or address the 'land question' in terms of a broader 'agrarian question'. This is something that countries that launch land reforms should do. The agrarian question is much more than redistribution of land to 'small' farmers and 'large-scale' black farmers. It relates to the broad relationship between agricultural and industrial sectors (Goodman and Redclift, 1981). Key aspects of this question are:

- will agriculture generate sufficient surplus to make further industrial development possible?
- will the agricultural and rural sector contribute to the expansion of the national market by absorbing goods from the industrial sector?
- in other words, can the backward and forward linkages between the two sectors become complementary, strong and sustainable?

A second dimension to this broadly defined agrarian question concerns one of its consequences: social differentiation. Does agrarian reform result in class formation, ie of small and large proprietors and an agricultural working class, or does it undermine the growth of these classes? Will the transfer of land-ownership result in changes in land tenure and generate sufficient labour supplies? To cast the agrarian question in these terms of agriculture-industry relations and land tenure changes is to go beyond the 'land question' in Zimbabwe as it is currently — and narrowly — defined. The 10-point plan announced in March 2002 by the Zimbabwe government sought to address this gap, but it was more of an afterthought than an integral part of the fast-track programme.

What elements constitute the unfinished 'agrarian question' in southern Africa? They include agriculture-industry relations, land tenure patterns, decongestion of overcrowded communal areas, class formation, selection criteria for beneficiaries and transparency in the reform process. Clearly, the agrarian question should concern more than the number of people resettled. It should substantively address qualitative aspects of reform. Land reform ought to result in an expansion of the markets for inputs and services for the resettled households. These emergent markets should be able to absorb large quantities of products such as seed, fertiliser, agri-chemicals, credit finance, ploughing and harvesting equipment. The markets should draw on such services as extension services and research, as well as on transport, distribution and wage-labour. Unless land reform contributes to a wider process of industrialisation, economic growth and poverty reduction, it is unlikely to be sustainable.

## Appendix 1

### Country of origin of workers by province

Province	Zambia	Malawi	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	South Africa	Total
Mash West	19	39	48	71	-	177
Mash East	5	44	17	43	-	109
Mash Central	9	14	30	18	-	71
Manicaland	-	5	10	75	-	90
Masvingo	1	2	3	163	-	169
Midlands	2	2	1	101	1	107
Mat North	11	5	10	63	1	90
Mat South	19	39	48	71	-	177

## Appendix 2

### Length of stay by province

	Less than 1yr	1-2 yrs	2-5 yrs	5yrs +	Total
Mash West	16	16	35	108	177
Mash East	29	16	16	80	108
Mash Central	9	2	8	52	71
Manicaland	7	12	21	50	90
Masvingo	55	43	34	37	169
Midlands	11	37	20	39	107
Mat North	44	31	-	15	90
Mat South	29	16	16	80	142
Total	200	173	150	461	984

## Appendix 3

### Orphanhood (both parents deceased)

Mash West	9
Mash East	10
Mash Central	na
Manicaland	4
Masvingo	6
Midlands	2
Mat North	2
Mat South	4

na =not applicable

## Appendix 4

### ECEC: Reason for non-attendance

Province	School far away	Lack of funds	Lack of interest	Pregnancy
Mash West	2	12	3	1
Mash East	-	4	3	-
Mash Central	-	6	6	2
Manicaland	-	11	1	-
Masvingo	3	18	3	2
Midlands	6	9	2	1
Mat North	-	20	-	-
Mat South	1	23	2	1

## Appendix 5

### ECEC: Source of education assistance

	Government	Relatives	N/A	Total
Mash West	6	-	9	15
Mash East	2	1	1	4
Mash Central	-	-	8	8
Manicaland	1	-	-	1
Masvingo	3	5	7	15
Midlands	2	5	2	9
Mat North	-	29		29
Mat South	-	1	128	129

## Appendix 6

### Severance package: not received

Province	Not received	Yet to receive	Still employed	N/A	Total
Mash East	1	16	37	2	56
Mash West	-	12	69	93	17
Mash Central	-	-	58	7	65
Manicaland	-	2	46	-	48
Masvingo	1	4	123	30	158
Midlands	3	8	34	40	85
Mat South	na	na	136	5	141
Mat North	na	na	-	-	-

## Appendix 7

### Reasons for not receiving severance package

Province	Still employed
Mash East	37
Mash West	69
Mash Central	58
Manicaland	46
Masvingo	123
Midlands	34
Mat South	136
Mat North	na

## Appendix 8

### Monthly wage and allowances

Province	\$3,000	\$4,300	\$7,500	\$8,500	Allowances
Mash West	1	32	33	1	29
Mash East	-	10	3	2	11
Mash Central	-	6	11	3	5
Manicaland	-	-	6	4	8
Masvingo	-	1	14	21	25
Midlands	-	4	-	9	25
Mat North	na	na	na	-	16
Mat South	-	17	4	1	11

## Appendix 9

### Union membership by province

Province	Number	Per cent
Mash West	39	22.0
Mash East	27	24.8
Mash Central	18	25.4
Manicaland	23	25.6
Masvingo	33	19.5
Midlands	24	22.4
Mat North	42	46.2
Mat South	10	7.0

## Appendix 10

### Membership by union: GAPWUZ, ZFTU and others

Province	ZFTU	GAPWUZ	Others	Total
Mash West	-	32	7	39
Mash East	1	26	-	27
Mash Central	-	18	-	18
Manicaland	7	16	-	23
Masvingo	25	6	-	31
Midlands	2	15	-	17
Mat North	1	na	-	1
Mat South	3	7	-	10

## Appendix 11

### Major sources of household income

Province	Farm wages	Agric sales	Remittance	Informal trade	Gold panning	Grant
Mash West	147	-	-	2	4	11
Mash East	69	3	5	3	-	12
Mash Central	65	-	-	-	-	5
Manicaland	49	-	-	-	-	1
Masvingo	125	20	5	3	-	14
Midlands	43	22	5	9	3	-
Mat North	87	1	-	-	-	-
Mat South	140	1	-	-	-	1

## Appendix 12

### Other activities to supplement incomes

Province	Piece-work	Informal trade	Crafts	Brick making	Gold panning
Mash West	3	3	-	-	-
Mash East	19	5	3	2	-
Mash Central	7	5	-	-	-
Manicaland	3	1	-	-	-
Masvingo	10	11	5	-	-
Midlands	4	9	1	-	2
Mat North	1	-	-	-	-
Mat South	1	3	1	-	-

## Appendix 13

### Major items of expenditure — 2000

Province	Food	Clothing	School fees	Health	Total
Mash West	149	14	7	1	171
Mash East	99	5	2	1	107
Mash Central	60	2	9	-	71
Manicaland	48	2	-	-	50
Masvingo	146	12	7	-	165
Midlands	92	6	2	1	101
Mat North	1	90	-	-	91
Mat South	139	1	1	-	141



## Appendix 14

### Contribution of under-15s to household income

Province	Farm worker	Vending	Piece-work	Livestock selling
Mash West	3	2	-	-
Mash East	3	-	1	-
Mash Central	-	-	1	-
Manicaland	-	-	1	-
Masvingo	4	3	-	-
Midlands	1	2	1	-
Mat North	25	-	19	-
Mat South	-	2	-	2

## Appendix 15

### Access to arable land

Province	Yes	No
Mash West	65	111
Mash East	45	62
Mash Central	9	62
Manicaland	29	21
Masvingo	61	107
Midlands	72	32
Mat North	20	13
Mat South	37	104

## Appendix 16

### Access to arable land by households

Province	0-2 acres	2-4 acres	4-6 acres	Over 6 acres	Total
Mash West	58	5	1	1	65
Mash East	39	2	3	1	45
Mash Central	6	-	-	-	6
Manicaland	28	1	-	-	29
Masvingo	22	5	13	21	60
Midlands	11	13	8	40	70
Mat North	20	-	-	-	20
Mat South	21	8	8	-	37

## Appendix 17

### Food shortages and source of food

Province	Experienced food shortage		Sources of food			
	No.	%	Harvest	Purchase	Relatives	Handouts
Mash West	177	100.0	-	166	1	2
Mash East	104	95.5	8	84	9	3
Mash Central	71	100.0	6	63	-	-
Manicaland	50	55.6	3	46	-	1
Masvingo	168	99.4	4	153	6	1
Midlands	104	97.2	4	92	5	3
Mat North	60	65.9	3	56	-	-
Mat South	141	99.3	-	141	-	-

## Appendix 18

### Current meals per day

Province	3 meals	2 meals	1 meal
Mash West	135	27	2
Mash East	10	56	42
Mash Central	7	55	9
Manicaland	9	24	17
Masvingo	21	66	81
Midlands	19	36	51
Mat North	24	13	4
Mat South	51	66	25

## Appendix 19

### Future sources of food

Province	Work for food	Remittances	Purchases	Begging
Mash West	100	1	-	-
Mash East	47	5	50	1
Mash Central	10	-	37	2
Manicaland	24	1	25	-
Masvingo	36	4	91	-
Midlands	17	5	36	-
Mat North	88	2	1	-
Mat South	50	1	91	-

## Appendix 20

### Household asset ownership

Province	Livestock	Furniture	Bicycles/ scortcars/ ploughs	None
Mash West	99	72	41	2
Mash East	2	84	22	-
Mash Central	-	-	14	-
Manicaland	1	48	1	-
Masvingo	41	46	17	65
Midlands	55	24	25	-
Mat North	20	71	14	-
Mat South	11	64	8	-

## Appendix 21

### Price of a 20kg bucket of maize

Province	Minimum price	Maximum price
	Z\$	Z\$
Mash West	na	---
Mash East	200	2,500
Mash Central	200	2,500
Manicaland	280	1,500
Masvingo	500	2,800
Midlands	250	5,000
Mat North	na	-
Mat South	na	2,500

## Appendix 22

### Possession of toilet

Province	No of those having a toilet		Children only/men only use it	All family members use it
	No.	%		
Mash West	27	15.3	11	16
Mash East	71	65.1	3	68
Mash Central	68	95.8	-	68
Manicaland	11	12.2	1	10
Masvingo	46	27.2	3	41
Midlands	51	47.3	8	49
Mat North	43	47.3	24	19
Mat South	142	100.0	4	31

## Appendix 23

### Access to human excreta disposal facility

Province	Yes		Bush	Blair	Makeshift
	No.	%			
Mash West	na		-	-	-
Mash East	36	33.0	5	28	3
Mash Central	6	8.5	2	3	1
Manicaland	43	47.8	8	24	3
Masvingo	123	72.8	54	-	-
Midlands	55	51.4	53	-	-
Mat North	45	49.5	-	-	-
Mat South	142	100.0	43	34	4

## Appendix 24

### How last child delivered

Province	Respondents		Self	Nurse/ hospital	Relatives	Traditional midwife
	No.	%				
Mash West	109	61.6	7	-	21	1
Mash East	67	61.5	1	38	9	1
Mash Central	45	63.4	3	-	6	-
Manicaland	35	38.9	1	21	3	10
Masvingo	37	21.9	1	35	1	-
Midlands	50	46.7	3	34	8	5
Mat North	26	28.6	4	-	15	7
Mat South	45	31.7	-	40	3	1

## Appendix 25

### Patterns of exclusive breastfeeding

Province	Less than 6 months		6-12 months		More than 12 months	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Mash West	13	11.5	67	59.3	32	28.3
Mash East	55	82.1	9	13.4	2	1.8
Mash Central	43	95.6	2	4.4	-	-
Manicaland	32	91.4	2	5.7	1	2.9
Masvingo	30	78.9	6	15.8	1	2.6
Midlands	30	63.8	15	31.9	2	4.3
Mat South	35	79.5	7	15.9	3	4.5
Mat North	2	7.7	24	92.3	-	-

## Appendix 26

### Place of immunisation of children

Province	Nowhere	Mobile EPI Team	Clinic	Hospital
Mash West	-	36	77	-
Mash East	1	11	49	9
Mash Central	-	2	25	16
Manicaland	-	3	28	4
Masvingo	-	2	21	15
Midlands	-	2	42	6
Mat North	-	3	22	-
Mat South	1	-	27	17

## Appendix 27

### Health growth card prevalence

Province	Yes and verified		Yes but no card	
	No.	%	No.	%
Mash West	25	22.1	88	77.9
Mash East	65	97.0	2	3.0
Mash Central	41	91.1	2	4.4
Manicaland	33	100.0	-	-
Masvingo	10	26.3	28	73.7
Midlands	8	16.0	42	84.0
Mat North	1	2.3	4	9.3
Mat South	45	100.0	-	-

## Appendix 28

### Cases of diarrhoea in previous two weeks

Province	No of cases		Types of remedy	
	No.	%	Health Centre	SSS
Mash West	24	13.6	6	-
Mash East	13	11.9	1	8
Mast Central	18	25.4	9	9
Manicaland	8	10.0	1	8
Masvingo	1	3.0	2	3
Midlands	7	6.5	1	2
Mat North	46	50.5	-	5
Mat South	46	32.4	1	5

## Appendix 29

### Children who died aged under five years

Province	Below 1 year	With diarrhoea	With malaria	With other illness	Total
Mash West	9	23	10	-	23
Mash East	10	9	1	6	16
Mash Central	3	3	-	-	3
Manicaland	6	2	-	6	8
Masvingo	8	1	-	10	11
Midlands	-	1	1	8	10
Mat North	30	48	-	-	48
Mat South	10	2	-	15	17

## Appendix 30

### Sources of information about HIV-AIDS

Province	None	Radio	Health worker	Health personnel	School	Friends
Mash West	176	50	27	1	-	-
Mash East	108	42	14	29	4	18
Mash Central	71	26	5	21	2	17
Manicaland	50	23	10	13	-	4
Masvingo	117	66	3	33	2	4
Midlands	104	64	6	15	3	15
Mat North	62	5	30	-	1	1
Mat South	141	98	8	12	1	22

## Appendix 31

### How HIV-AIDS is transmitted

Province	Unprotected sex	Multiple partners	Sharing razor blades	MosquitoBites
Mash West	3	42	61	1
Mash East	49	46	11	-
Mash Central	42	26	1	-
Manicaland	18	27	4	1
Masvingo	87	26	2	-
Midlands	69	29	-	-
Mat North	39	1	-	46
Mat South	116	26	-	-



## Appendix 32

### NGOs operating in area of survey

Province	FCTZ	FOST	FACT	D/K	ORAP
Mash East	*	-	-	-	-
Mash West	*	-	-	-	-
Mash Central	*	-	-	-	-
Manicaland	*	*	-	*	-
Masvingo	-	-	*	-	-
Midlands	-	-	-	-	-
Mat South	-	-	-	-	*

## Appendix 33

### Forms of support for those affected by HIV-AIDS

Province	Home-based care	Orphan care	Funeral support
Mash West	42	125	-
Mash East	49	8	5
Mash Central	4	1	-
Manicaland	22	2	-
Masvingo	11	6	15
Midlands	13	7	26
Mat North	-	-	-
Mat South	51	4	7

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