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Statements Zimbabwe Watch

Notes and press releases on Zimbabwe

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December 2005

Seizure of passports - see Dutch press release on this page
Zimbabwe Watch veroordeelt inname paspoort van Mugabe critici.
De Zimbabwaanse geheime dienst heeft op donderdag 8 december het paspoort van Trevor Ncube en op vrijdag 9 december het paspoort van Paul Themba Nyathi ingenomen.

November 2005

Chilling Zimbabwe Footage shocks international parliamentarians

Parliamentarians from the African, Caribbean and Pacific nations and the European Union on Saturday saw chilling footage of the devastation caused in Zimbabwe by the brutal clearances of poor urban districts started in May this year.

A Joint Appeal to African Leaders to address the human rights situation in Zimbabwe

Through the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) African Heads of State and Government have made a commitment to human rights and accountability in Africa. We are calling on African leaders to honour these commitments and end their long silence on human rights violations in Zimbabwe.

June 2005

Humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe

Over the past five weeks the Government of Zimbabwe has been responsible for a human tragedy across the country. Under the cover name "Restory Order" - Murambatsvina, police, army and bulldozers have destroyed urban housing and businesses in high density suburbs, housing cooperatives and informal settlements. This has left tens of thousands of households without access to shelter, food and clean water.


November 2004

ACP-EU Political Dialogue - Zimbabwe the test Case
by Grace Kwinje, 17 Nov 2004
The EU and ACP partners in the Cotonou agreement are still faced with a challenge: the establishment of credible mechanisms and modalities for a genuine political dialogue. They have already had a bad start, Zimbabwe.

Letter to hw Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
On visa for Mr. Kumbirai Kangai, member of ZANU (PF) Politburo, in violation of the EU sanctions against Zimbabwe.
Letter by ZimbabweWatch.

October 2004

"If you are an Al-Qaeda you can not be expected to be given access to the public media. You cannot expect the MDC to be given the right to say ‘Mugabe must go’ in the public media,"
Zimbabwe 2005 Parliamentary Elections - International community has to act now
by Grace Kwinjeh, MDC European representative, Brussels.


June 2004
Open letter to Mbeki
An open letter in South African newspaper Mail and Guardian urges president Mbeki to change his strategy on Zimbabwe.


February 2004

  1. At about one year before the proposed general Parliamentary elections for Zimbabwe, there is a qualitative change in the situation caused by the use of Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Regulations, 2004 (essentially Emergency Powers) to amend the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. The effect of the amendment is to allow the police to arrest without warrant persons suspected of any alleged crime that affects the security of well-being of the State – and keep them in detention for up to 30 days, and specifically prevents recourse to the courts to review such detention or to grant bail.

    This new procedural provision removes in a formal way much of the actions of the police and the detention process from the supervision of the courts. While political interference of the courts has been significant and problematic, there has nonetheless remained a degree of professionalism in the application of the law (such as it is) by magistrates and judges. Now this (limited) protection of rights such as to due process appears to have been removed.
    As critics of the new measures have stated, the State no longer holds the burden to prove that an accused person is guilty because mere suspicion that an individual had committed an offence now amounted to a conviction.

  2. One year before the election dates, it is very apparent that the majority of requirements for a free and fair electoral campaign and transparent election process are absent.

     -  The independent media is under continual harassment and attack, and recently the Daily News was closed down by a decision of the Supreme Court, which approved as constitutional the contentious Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). Other independent media publications are fearing state intervention against them. It should be remembered that the electronic media, both radio and television, is entirely monopolised by the State, and is run under close control by the Minister of State for Information’s department.
     -  The space for public organising and protest is extremely limited, and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) is applied with vigour, but of course in a partisan manner. Recent examples of its application were the brutal breaking up of a public demonstration for constitutional government, and serious assaults perpetrated on leaders of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in early February; and the prevention of a Valentine’s Day march (14 February) with the distribution of roses, organised by Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), at which threats to shoot the marchers were made by police officers. Meanwhile the Government sponsored National Youth Service militias (known as Green Bombers) continue to operate with impunity.
     -  The Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) (responsible for the running of the elections) and the Registrar General’s office (responsible for the compiling and management of the electoral roll) remain firmly controlled by the political leadership of the Ministries of Justice and Home Affairs. Particularly worrying is the appointment of military officers in the ESC. The Registrar General’s office is the object of numerous long-drawn out court cases, in particular relating to that office’s refusal to release voter’s rolls to opposition parties before the dates of elections.

  3. Economically, the crisis of production and livelihood continues. The country has seen a systematic process of de-professionalisation and de-capitalisation. While it has been estimated that 99% of the population live with an income less than the poverty datum line, it is clear that factors such as the remittances from family members living outside Zimbabwe mitigate low incomes for at least a proportion of the population.
    It is estimated that between 15 and 25 % of Zimbabwe’s ‘normal’ population are living outside the country at present, mostly as economic refugees (i.e. between 2 and 3 million persons); and it should be noted that there are at least 500 000 internally displaced people, principally former farm-workers. A very significant proportion of professionals, such as doctors, engineers, educationalists and financial managers have sought employment abroad.

    National savings have been swallowed by government for recurrent expenditures, in particular on inflated security and military sectors. The invasion of farms and the attacks on property rights (with the use of questionable legal provisions and the operations of extra-legal activities such as the occupation of farms and the threats and harassment of businesses) has made Zimbabwe a very poor prospect for financial investment. The farming sector is in deep crisis with food production stunted, the national herd decimated, cash-earning crops extremely limited. Rampant corruption and illegal transactions have further undermined the capital base of the country.

  4. Politically, it appears that the ruling party Zanu-PF is extremely confident of its hold on power. The recent arrests of leading business personalities from the ruling party is an indication that the leadership around Mugabe has agreed that no discussion of succession in the party will take place until the end of Mugabe’s presidential term, in 2008; and thus actual or potential supporters of the only proponent of succession, the Speaker of Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa, are being harassed and targeted.
    This ‘purification’ of the party is being accompanied by an increasing militarisation; new appointments of Ministers, Governors and government institutional leadership (e.g. Agribank) have included senior military figures, and the new army commander Constantine Chiwenga has directly intervened in public policy issues, most recently during a doctor’s strike. Following the ZANU Conference in December 2003 it was said that ‘the High Command is back in charge’ i.e. the High command of the liberation forces of the 1970s.

    ZANU-PF is acting as though it feels that it has crushed the MDC and so can deal with internal problems. [It is said that Mugabe is prepared to negotiate with anyone, once he has crushed him]. The MDC has been attacked in many ways; the serious but farcical trial of Morgan Tsvangirai has removed him from international view; many MDC members of parliament have been harassed and assaulted, and some are outside the country, others have died; the closing of the Daily News has shut down one of the few means left for the MDC to communicate with the general public; the urban centres with MDC elected mayors have had centrally appointed governors appointed to oversee (and interfere with) them.

    It is clear that the MDC has not managed to organise itself strongly in the face of continuous assault: what is remarkable is that it survives at all. In a recent rural by-election, the MDC obtained more than 7000 votes against the purported vote for the ZANU-PF candidate of more than 20 000… The intense fear and actual intimidation of the people, together with a culturally deep-seated tradition of respect for established authority, however harsh its rule, makes it clear that the MDC is not able to mobilise mass support for public actions.

  5. National civil society remains weak and limited in its impact on the overall situation. The Trade Union movement, while able to hold its own in the labour sector negotiations process, has been unable to mobilise mass support for national policy goals, and its leadership has been arrested several times recently, as national protests have been planned. Civil society groups such as the Crisis Coalition and the National Constitutional Assembly continue to carry out small-scale lobbying and information processes, but even some of these are closed under the POSA regulations. Churches are involved in some mediation efforts, but it is very clear that the ruling party ZANU-PF is not seriously interested in dialogue, let alone negotiations.

  6. Internationally, the majority of African governments and leadership have ‘bought’ the ZANU-PF line on the situation in Zimbabwe. While the EU and the US must continue to pressure the ruling elite in Zimbabwe, it is critical that pressure should also and increasingly come from countries of the South; especially from Africa and in particular from South Africa.

  7. The debate on whether free and fair elections can be held or not is critical, for the coming months. It is increasingly apparent that some form of transitional administration, with international (UN, AU, SADC) support, will be needed to create the conditions for the Zimbabwean people to re-take control of their destinies without fear, threats and imposition. The key question thus is, how can such a transitional arrangement be brought about?

  8. In the absence of such a transitional arrangement, one may see the apparent provision of a level playing field, but one on which only the players from one side are permitted access, and where spectators are expressly forbidden, and where the referee is the coach of the side allowed on the field. There is the rule of law, distorted; the operations of media, very limited; the holding of elections, under many forms of duress; freedoms of belief and assembly – if your beliefs do not call into question the ruling elite; rights of property – with partisan definition.



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